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Abstract 
Contracting out government health services has been increasing in low and middle 
income countries (LMICs) and highly valued in improving health service delivery. 
In some cases, government health workers have been paid performance-based 
payments; such payments have been quoted to contribute to the achievement. 
However, impacts of the payments on the health workers’ total income including 
income from their private practice and the government salaries have been little 
studied, while their private practice have posed serious issues in the service 
delivery with the constraint from low government salaries. The impacts at the 
household level have been unstudied.  
 
This study investigated these impacts of the payments paid to the government 
health workers in a project for contracting out district health service delivery to 
international NGOs in rural Cambodia. In this study, key informant interviews 
elaborated payment mechanism and other factors in the incentive environment; 
household income and expenditure surveys of the health workers’ households 
ascertained their incomes and their households’ incomes and expenditures and 
compared these data between the two tyes of distrctircts (N=250); a mini-survey 
about payment mechanism at the subcontractor-level deepened understanding of 
important factors on the impacts; regression analyses of the incomes or 
expenditures confirmed the impacts of payments in relative to other possible 
influential factors on incomes and expenditures. 
 
The payments associated with the contracting settings including the 
performance-based payments were found to increase the heatlh workers’ incomes 
and their households’ incomes reasonably sufficiently, while non-recipients’ whose 
income mostly consisted of private practice income. The result of regression 
analyses supported the higher incomes. Therefore, this study tentatively 
argued,with further support from the interview result that transfers of the health 
workers’ labour supply from the private to government sector were brought about 
by the payments, i.e., labour supply increase in the government sector and 
reduction of dual practice.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction, Context and Background of 
This Study 
1.1 Context  
1.1.1 Performance-based incentives in contracting out health services 
in international health  
Among different types of incentives, financial incentives have increasingly been 
applied to health workers employed in the government health sectors in low and 
middle income countries (LMICs), with the intention of improving health service 
delivery or staff retention in rural areas (Hongoro and Normand 2006; Ensor and 
Thompson 2006). Effects of financial incentives in LMICs have been little studied, 
but those studies have showed both positive and negative effects (Makas 2009; Ir et 
al. 2008; Meach 2006; WHO 2000, MOH 2007; Thornton et al. 2009). Financial 
incentives need to have specific designs for obtaining the intended results. Careful 
consideration needs to be given to the interests of both the recipient and those 
providing the incentives, and to the conditions surrounding the incentives.  
 
The unique incentive environment in the health sector intensifies difficulties in 
obtaining the intended results. Furthermore, the environment in the LMIC-health 
sector frequently contains other unfavourable factors which influence the 
effectiveness of the financial incentives in achieving intended outcomes. Typically, 
these factors include multiple income sources of the workers (Dercon, S. 2002; 
Barretta, C. B. et al. 2001; Bryceson, D. F. 1999) and various low capacities of the 
health authority (McPake et al. 2002; Folland et al. 2004).  
 
Sources of income include those in both the government and the private sectors. In 
the government sector, some health workers receive supplementary salaries from 
international cooperation agencies and NGOs for their participation in, or 
contribution to, projects of these organisations. In the private sector the main 
source of income comes from dual practice (private practice by government health 
workers) (WHO 2006); other sources include non-health work such as agriculture 
and non-agriculture activities (Dercon, S. 2002; McPake et al. 1996; Ersado 2006). 
Income from private practice is highly likely to compete with other financial 
incentives in terms of labour supply of health workers in the government sector 
(Garacía-Prado & González 2007, Ferrinho et al., 2004; Jan et al. 2005). 
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The income from non-health work carried out by health workers’ household 
members is consideredto be included in the budget of health workers’ households, 
since a household is considered an economic unit of consumption and attempts to 
maximise utility (Samuelson 1956 cited in Lundberg and Pollak 1993). In the 
government sector, low management capacity exists not only in the specific 
management of incentives introduced into the health sector but also in the general 
management of the sector, such as budget and materials. These features and factors 
of the incentive environment have not been sufficiently reflected in studies of 
financial incentives. 
 
Contracting out government health services, which is one of financial incentives, 
has been increasing in LMICs (Mills 1997 in Bennett et al. 1997; Liu et al. 2004), 
under the assumption that contracting out achieves a higher degree of efficiency 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992) in public services than the same services provided by 
governments (Mills 1997 in Bennett et al. 1997). The health services are mostly 
contracted out to well-known international NGOs. The contracting out has also 
been advocated by major international financial development institutes, bilateral 
cooperation agencies, and researchers, particularly in those countries labelled as 
“fragile states” (Carlson et al. 2005). Such organisations have supported 
contracting out projects in LMICs. Fragile states are those which have weak state 
capacity of service delivery such as health. This is often due to the 
underdevelopment of physical infrastructure, human resources, finance, and 
governance (DFID 2005). The fragile states are exemplified by Afghanistan, Haiti, 
and Cambodia (DFID 2009a, 2009b) and often include “post-conflict” states 
(USAID 2006). The advocates of contracting out argued that such projects resulted 
in improvements in health service delivery (World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank: ADB 2002b; DFID 2004; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2004 Arur et al. 2010). Some of these contracting out projects applied 
performance-based payments to the NGO contractors (Arur et al. 2010) or 
government health workers who provided services in the project (Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003).  
 
Performance-based payments have generally been attached to various types of 
objectives e.g. quantity or quality of health service delivery or health outcomes 
(Eichler et al. 2009), whereas studies of the effect have been limited in health 
economics (Liu and Mills 2007). In particular, few studies debated the impact of 
the payments on the household economy of health workers. This, despite the fact 
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that a household is the unit of consumption and the household economy is highly 
likely to be composed of a variety of sources of income of health workers and their 
household members in LMICs. However, the payments have been much promoted 
based on a view point which focuses on performance outputs. 
1.1.2 Cambodian Contracting out Health Services 
The international promotion of the contracting out of government health services 
reached Cambodia, a fragile state, which faces problems in health service delivery. 
These contracting out projects were implemented with support from international 
cooperation organisations. Some of these organisations applied performance-based 
payments to the health workers. The problems, which were largely in common with 
other LMICs, included shortage and quality of legal provision in health service 
delivery, shortage of budget and human resources for health (HRH) and also higher 
out-of-pocket health expenditure. Persistent dual practice by the health workers 
decreased their attendance at government health facilities, encouraged harmful 
practice, and increased out-of-pocket expenditure (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; 
Vong et al. 2005). The problems also included lower capacity of the Ministry of 
Health (MOH) (MOH 2002; World Health Organization 2006). They seemed to 
present challenges to the contracting out projects and the performance-based 
payments in relation to their ability to achieve the intended objectives. 
 
A pilot project for a contracting out project (herein after called the ADB Pilot 
Project. ADB: Asian Development Bank) began in the late 1990s, supported by 
international cooperation organisations. The ADB Pilot Project expected that the 
contracting out would increase health service delivery in rural areas by increasing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery (ADB 2004, P. vii). One of the 
NGO Contractors introduced performance-based payments into the Operational 
District, a unit of health service delivery, where they were responsible for 
increasing the service coverage. The NGO applied the performance-based 
payments to government health workers who were working for the Operational 
District. 
 
The pilot project received a positive evaluation, based mainly on an argument that 
it obtained noticeable achievements: increasing the coverage; improving the quality 
of the service and improving the equity of the poor (ADB 2004). This high 
evaluation of the project was shared by some international cooperation 
organisations, including those which supported the project and some researchers 
(ADB 2002b, World Bank, Soeters and Grifitths 2003. Bloom et al.2006). 
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Consequently, this positive evaluation of the pilot project led to the implementation 
of a larger-scale contracting out project (DFID/World Bank Project).  
 
This new project required NGO Contractors to improve health service delivery at 
the Operational District level and to apply performance-based payments to 
government health workers who were working for Operational Districts. However, 
the contract left the designing of the payments to the discretion of NGO 
Contractors. The contract included a separate clause from the set indicators of the 
health service delivery. The clause stated that the health workers were required to 
abstain from private practice. However, this clause did not specify the degree of 
abstention required or the method of ensuring it.  
 
This project was assessed in depth by a MOH review (MOH 2007). On the level of 
performance-based payments, the review argued that the pay level was sufficient 
(MOH 2007). However, the level was investigated in less depth and without 
reflecting thoroughly on the incentive environment, which would include the 
impact of payments on the household economy of health workers. As a result, the 
impact of payments remained ambiguous as to whether it was large enough to 
induce the health workers to increase their efforts in the government service. Also, 
despite that he impact is likely to be influenced by factors in the incentive 
environment such as income from private practice, these factors were not 
sufficiently investigated.  
1.2 Objective of this study 
1.2.1 Objectives  
This study aims to explore the impact of performance-based payments on the 
government health workers’ incomes and their household income and expenditures 
in contracting out government health services in rural Cambodia.  
 
The main goal of this study is to present empirical results for the exploration of the 
impact of payments on the health workers and their household economy and to 
describe the compositions of the workers’ and their household incomes in relation 
to the payment in the complex Cambodian incentive environment.
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1. Illustrating the payment mechanism of performance-based payments and other payments 
associated with contracting out and describing the incentive environment surrounding the 
payments; 
 
2. Describing incomes of government health workers and their household income from 
different sources by status of Operational District. The status concerns whether the district 
was contracted out or managed by the ministry of health, and comparing the incomes 
between the two status groups; 
 
3. Describing household expenditures of the health workers by Operational District status 
and comparing the expenditures between the two status groups; 
 
4. Exploring the impact of performance-based payments and other incomes to the income of 
health workers and their household incomes by Operational District status. In the districts 
managed by the health ministry, exploring the impact of other incomes;  
 
5. Identifying factors influencing different types of incomes and expenditures of the health 
workers and their households;  
 
6. Evaluating policy implications of the study results in order to make policy 
recommendations. 
 
1.2.2 Research questions 
In order to meet the overall aim and the specific objectives of this study, the following 
research questions were formulated:  
 
Overall question 
What are the economic implications of the different types of health workers’ income (e.g. 
performance-based payments) to their total income and household income? 
 
Detailed questions  
1. What are the differences in incomes and expenditures of health workers’ households 
between the two types of districts: one contracted out and another managed by the ministry 
of health? 
 
2. What is the importance of performance-based payments to health workers’ incomes and 
their household income? 
1.3 Outline of this thesis 
Chapter 1, as seen here, presents the current experiences, as well as the context, of financial 
incentives and the contracting out of government health services, some of which accompany 
performance-based payments in LMICs. This chapter presents the objectives and research 
questions of this study and outlines this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 reviews existent theories and literature about the incentive environment, different 
incentives including performance-based payments and contracting out and those in the health 
sector. Theser factors in LMICs are focused on. Theroy of Change this study applied is 
explained.   
 
Chapter 3 outlines the history of Cambodia after the liberation from French colonial control 
and describes the development of the Cambodian health sector from the early 1990s, 
including the contracting out projects.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology and methods of this study. This chapter explains the 
qualitative and quantitative methods used in the study. The chapter then explains the study 
site and population. 
 
Chapter 5, 6, and 7 present results of this study. Chapter 5 illustrates payment mechanisms 
for performance-based payments and the implementations of the contracting out project 
relating to the payments. It also illustrates the incentive environment surrounding the 
performance-based payments. 
 
Chapter 6 shows the results of analyses of differences in health workers’ and their 
households’ income and expenditure. The incomes and expenditures of the two types of 
Operational Districts are compared.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the impact of the incentive to incomes and expenditures in the contracting 
settings in comparison with other factors such as attributes of health workers which are 
hypothesised to change the incomes, employing regression analyses.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the qualitative evidence for labour supply transfer between the 
government and private sectors, i.e., a reduction in dual practice. Theses disscussions 
responses to the research questions presented here in Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 9 Then, it discusses the contributions and limitations of the study and presents 
policy recommendations and suggestions for areas of further research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review  
Incentives have been increasingly applied to government health workers in LMICs. Included 
in such incentives introduced in the contracting out of government health services is the 
attempt either to raise health workers’ performances or to retain staff. In this chapter, first, 
the conceptual framework of this study is stated, followed by the introduction of the research 
questions of this study. Then, literature related to the framework is discussed from a 
viewpoint of what has been studied and known about the practical applications and effects of 
the incentives.  
2.1 Conceptual framework 
Incentives are factors “allowing individual(s) to behave in accordance with expected material 
rewards or favours that can be traded for such reward including leisure” (Lindbeck 1997 in 
McPake and Normand 2008. p.174). Incentives are significant devices by which 
organisations raise the performance of workers through motivating, retaining, attracting and 
satisfying them (International Council of Nurses et al. 2008). This is because individuals are 
perceived to behave in response to material rewards or “favours”, such that “incentives are 
present in every scene” (McPake and Normand 2008. P.174). They are frequently 
categorized into financial or non-financial incentives and analysed at organisational and 
individual levels. The incentive environment accommodates the principal-agent relationship 
described in the principal-agent theory: for example, the workers of a firm (the agents) make 
efforts on behalf of the interests of the firm owner (the principal). The principal is 
disadvantaged in obtaining information concerning the agents’ performance (information 
asymmetry); because of this, the agents may cheat and behave opportunistically (Preker et al. 
2000). Thus, the principal’s obtaining the desired outcome relies on monitoring the agent’s 
performance and applying incentives to induce the agent to make efforts and reduce 
unacceptable behaviour (Milgrom and Robert 1992). 
 
In the incentive environment in the public sector, financial incentives are highly valued by 
workers, despite a general assumption that financial incentives are less valued (Wright 2001). 
This implies that financial incentives have effects on public sector workers. However, 
characteristics of the public sector, and the health sector specifically, increase the complexity 
and difficulty for the principal to induce the agent’s efforts in its interest. These 
characteristics include multi-task setting, hierarchy of principal-agent relationships, 
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increased information asymmetry which disadvantages the principal (McPake and Normand 
2008) and intensity of team work required of health workers (International Council of Nurses 
et al. 2008).
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Figure 2.1 shows the incentive environment in the government health sector in Cambodia. 
The public sector incentives contain factors related to the health workers’ income which 
function as incentives. They are fixed salaries, employment conditions such as 
predetermined salary schedule by cadre, supplementary salaries from NGOs, management 
practices, and the working environment.  
 
This incentive environment is further shaped by rules and penalties regarding dual practice 
and opportunities in the private sector. The rules and penalties concerning dual practice 
restrain or encourage it. The opportunities include income from private practice and working 
in non-health related work. The income from private practice is likely to be affected by the 
economic status of the location where the practice is conducted (Ensor et al. 2009) and 
attributes of the health workers.  
 
The performance-based payments introduced under contracts in Cambodia, considered to be 
“motivational factors”, are expected to increase workers’ efforts to raise performance (Figure 
2.1). These increased efforts are expected to result in changes in income distributions 
between public and private sectors and a reduction of dual practice. This scenario would 
occur if health workers are income maximisers and where performance-based payments 
produce a higher marginal hourly return from public sector work, for example.  
 
According to literature on characteristics of these incentives and factors in LMICs (Hongoro 
and Normand 2006; Eichler et al. 2009), without the payments introduced under contracts in 
Cambodia, the incentive environment that existed was not expected to encourage work 
motivation or efforts to raise performance. Also, it was not expected that health workers 
would increase their work hours in the public sector or reduce dual practice and/or private 
sector non-health work. 
 
However, there are still relatively few studies of the impact of performance-based payments 
(Eichler et al. 2009) in LMICs, nor is the role they play in the household economies of health 
workers well understood.  
 
Therefore, this study had the two research questions (Chapter 1, 1.2.2). 
1. What are the differences in incomes and expenditures of health workers’ households 
between the two types of districts: one contracted out and another managed by the ministry 
of health? 
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2. What is the importance of performance-based payments to health workers’ incomes and 
their household income? 
 
2.2 Incentives 
2.2.1 Incentives and the principal-agent relationship 
Incentives are applied not only to the micro-management of individuals but also to managing 
and regulating business and markets, such as a price-cap imposed on public services such as 
telecommunications, which contribute to the public interest (Normand and McPake 2007).  
 
Designing appropriate incentives has been considered to be one of the core methods for 
changing the performance of employees in labour economics (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; 
Holmstrom, and Milgrom 1991). However, as mentioned above, the principal–agent 
relationship inevitably contains difficulties in applying incentives and in obtaining the 
intended results from incentives. Information asymmetry also hides some important 
information about the agent from the principal in the principal’s designing of attractive 
incentives ('incentive compatibility constraints') (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). 
 
Other features which cause difficulties include the following: the principal and the agent are 
both utility maximisers, the two parties’ utilities are not necessarily the same; responsibility 
for the decision and implementation of the actions for the benefit of the principal are often 
delegated to the agent; and the agent and the principal select the alternatives based on their 
utility functions (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Facing these features, the principal needs to  
sufficiently monitor the agent’s performance in order to obtain the intended results from the 
incentive (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). High intensity of incentives cause variances in 
monitoring, consequently it requires raising the precision (‘monitoring intensity principal’). 
This leads to raising the monitoring cost. If the variance in the precision is large, the intensity 
of incentives should be limited, because raising the precision requires high cost.  
 
When the agent needs to conduct multiple tasks, his or her efforts concentrate mainly on the 
work monitored or on their individual work, but less on unmonitored tasks or tasks that are 
difficult to monitor, including teamwork (Lazear 1998; Milgrom and Roberts1992). As a 
result, the quality of output is often disregarded (Milgrom and Robert 1992). In order to 
avoid the negative effects, the marginal return of payment in each of the tasks should be the 
same (‘equal compensation principal’) (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), if the same 
performance on each task is desirable. 
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2.2.2 Work motivation 
Despite the argument that incentives are important in changing the performance of the agent, 
the principal–agent theory does not elaborate on what motivates the agent, which is the 
object of incentives. However, in psychology, the motivation has been extensively studied 
and some of the studies seem to accommodate issues for identifying effective incentives in 
the health sector in LMICs. Particularly, they recognise that gaps exist between the outcome 
and the intention of incentives and present interpretations of the gap. They also recognise 
issues in the incentive environment such as issues of their working environment and 
non-financial incentives.  
 
In psychology ‘worker motivation’ and ‘affect motivation’ are relevant to an individual’s 
psychological attitude towards work (Kanfer 1999). Worker motivation is more directly 
connected to performance than affect motivation which is generated by individual affect 
(feeling) (Locke 1976). Worker motivation largely depends on his or her cognitive 
expectation based on their estimated ability to achieve the organisational goals, the necessary 
efforts or resources to achieve the goal, and the return they can obtain (Franco et al. 2002). 
Higher worker motivation does not necessarily lead to higher performance by the employee 
or higher performance by the organisation the employee is working for. Also, achievement of 
objectives by the employee does not necessarily achieve the objectives of the organisation 
(Hunter and Schmidt 2000; Franco et al. 2002). Another psychological category relating to 
motivation is job satisfaction, which is sometimes used haphazardly in a ‘lay’ manner and 
has been defined as “a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of 
one’s job or job experience” (Locke 1976). 
 
Herzberg's widely established theory classifies factors influencing motivation into 
motivating factors and dissatisfying factors ('hygiene factors'). The motivating factors 
originate from the work itself; the dissatisfying factors from the work environment include 
policies of organisations, salaries, working conditions, status, human relationships, job 
security and fringe benefits (Herzberg 1968). However, improvement in the dissatisfying 
factors is considered neither to satisfy nor motivate workers (‘hygiene factors’). Herzberg 
thus argues that motivating factors should be enhanced in order to raise worker motivation, 
by making the job itself more attractive to the employee (Cook et al. 1981).  
 
There is another typology of motivation which does not specify the area where the 
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motivation raises or decreases but includes motivation pertaining to work. The typology 
divides motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation “refers to 
doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable”, and extrinsic motivation, 
“refers to doing something because it leads to a separate outcome” (Ryan and Deci. 
2000:55). 
 
2.3 Incentive environment in the government health sector in 
LMICs 
The prevailing incentive environment reflects the differential effects of incentives in both the 
public and private sectors. While the incentive environment in the health sector appears to 
have unique features which are different from that in the private sector, it shares common 
features with the public sectors (Allard et al. 2011; Chalkley and Malcomson 1998; Jack 
2005; Biglaizer and Ma 2007; Delfgaauw 2007). However, the common features appear to 
be disadvantages in obtaining the intended incentive outcome. Furthermore, the health sector 
in LMICs seems to bear a double disadvantage. This is because in the sector, frequently dual 
practice, i.e., an income opportunity in the private sector, prevails and absorbs the labour 
supply of health workers, whereas weak government capacity appears less able to realise the 
intended incentive outcome against the dual practice. 
2.3.1 Characteristics and issues  
Incentives have been used routinely in the health sector (Chernichovsky and Bayulken 1995; 
Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaibon 2003; Eggleston 2005; Liu and Mills 2005; Dumont et al. 
2008; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Ir. et al. 2008). The health sector holds unique 
characteristics, some of which are shared with characteristics of the public sector (Dixit 
2002; Besley and Ghatak 2003). Public sector employees also value financial incentives 
(Wright 2001). The valuing of financial incentives seems to be reasonable in the health 
sector of post-conflict fragile states or LMICs where efforts for daily survival are still 
imperative. 
 
Government health workers’ motivation was found to be similar to public sector employees’ 
motivation (Wright 2001; Dixit 2002). Public sector employees’ motivation is considered to 
contain factors which pertain to what the sector produces or embodies (Graham and Renwick 
1972; Lawler 1971; Gabris and Simo 1995; Crewson 1997). These factors include unique 
types of utility, professionalism, and mission. The utility includes motivation to commit to 
the interest of the public (Perry 1996) and the fulfilment of employees’ needs through their 
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work, which is connected to their serving the public and providing public goods (Graham 
and Renwick 1972, Lawler 1971). Professionalism is defined as the competence or skill 
expected of a professional (Oxford Dictionaries. on-line accessed on 20th November 2012). 
Professionalism is combined with career concerns which seek to obtain skills and 
experiences from the work and which functions as a promotional incentive in the public 
sector where strong incentives are lacking (Dixit 2002). Mission is defined as “a culture that 
is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike” (Wilson 1989, P. 
95), unifies the organisation and defines its activities (Besley and Ghatak 2003). Besley and 
Ghatak (2003) argue that the mission of organisations in the public sector is much more 
important than in the private sector and works as a non-financial incentive. Studies about 
motivation of government health workers, but not about the effects of incentives, indicate a 
similarity to that of public sector employees (Wright 2001; Dixit 2002). However, Kohelar 
and Rainey (2008) argue that there is no difference in incentives, motivation and job 
satisfaction of workers between the public and private sectors (Kohelar and Rainey 2008)  
 
The difficulties of monitoring health workers’ performance is augmented by specific features 
of the health sector which are common to the public sector in general. These features include 
work which has multiple dimensions and a hierarchy of multiple principal-agent 
relationships in the sector. The multiple dimensions most likely accompany multiple tasks 
(Besley and Ghatak 2003), where a trade-off of some of the tasks is almost impossible (Dixit 
2002). The issue of multiple principals originates from the fact that goods and services 
produced by the public sector inevitably involve the “non-excludability” of public goods, 
multiple stakeholders (Dixit 2002) and externality (Besley and Ghatak 2003).  
 
Combining the two sets of multiplicity causes the free-rider problems over incentives. If a 
principal pays an incentive for a specific task among multiple tasks which complement each 
other, other principals do not need to pay incentives. The paid incentive is regarded as 
remuneration for all tasks. The incentive paid thus becomes a low-power incentive compared 
to its original purpose. If a task substitutes another task and each principal pays an incentive, 
each incentive becomes low powered in terms of motivating the agent (Besley and Ghatak 
2003). 
 
The incentive environment in the government health sector has additional complexities due 
to the sector’s unique features and other settings. Information asymmetry disturbs the 
monitoring of performance, particularly concerning quality (McPake and Normand 2008). 
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Information asymmetry is intensified by the hierarchy of principal-agent relationships. It 
exists between patients and doctors (Scott and Vick 1998), doctors and managers of health 
facilities and health facilities and local health offices (Liu and Mills in Preker et al.2007). 
Health outcomes are influenced by many factors, and cannot be attributed to the performance 
of health workers alone. Patients do not have sufficient information to assess health service 
(McPake et al. 2002; Folland and Stano 2004). 
 
The information asymmetry problem about monitoring deteriorates when monitoring for 
health workers’ dual practice is necessary, as often it is the case in LMICs where dual 
practice is common. Further discussion about dual practice follows below.   
 
In the prevailing multiple task setting, designing effective incentives is critical to achieving 
the desired outcome by increasing and directing efforts from workers towards a specific task 
(Hongoro and Normand 2006). However, the information asymmetry again poses difficulties 
in designing these incentives (Eggleston 2005; Dumont et al. 2008, 2007). Information 
asymmetry hides workers’ preferences about incentives including the marginal returns, 
particularly in an environment where resentment exists among the workers about differences 
in their payments (Kingma 2003). 
2.3.2 Incentives to health workers in LMICs 
A range of financial and non-financial incentives have been applied to health workers in 
LMICs, some of which have been well known (Table 2.1). Some of them may function as 
motivating but others as ‘hygiene’ factors (Herzberg 1968). Financial and non-financial 
incentives are often combined. Combinations of the two types, however, do not necessarily 
obtain the intended objectives (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaibon 2003). In the course of time 
both types are implemented whether or not there is an intentional connection between the 
two. “(T)rade-off” of effects between the two types of incentives needs further study in 
which the income levels of health workers are reflected (Ensor and Thompson 2006. P. 158). 
In addition to the organisational and the individual levels, team level incentives have been 
applied (Kingma 2003). Applications of incentives and their effect are greatly influenced by 
the overall incentive environment, although some studies of incentives, particularly  
financial incentives, appear to include less in depth investigations of this wider environment.  
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Table 2.1 : Types of incentives in the health sector 
 
Adopted from Hongoro and Nomarnd 2006.  
 
(1) Financial incentives 
It would be reasonable to conclude that the effect of financial incentives in LMICs are still 
ambiguous because of the limited number of studies which have been carried out and their 
mixed results. Also, empirical studies have rarely elaborated the impact of financial 
incentives in relation to health workers’ other incomes, despite the likelihood of their earning 
income in the private sector: private practice income and/or their households’ earning income 
from non-health related work.  
 
The governments of LMICs seem to be unable to ensure the requirements for the design and 
operation of effective incentives. Studies of the effect of incentives have concentrated on 
specific issues, such as retention of health workers in rural areas. Also, themes or topics of 
study have been different from those in high income countries (Willis-Shattuk et al. 2008) 
Financial incentives Non-financial incentives 
 salaries   
 reimbursement payments (subsidies, 
fee-for-service, price-cap, capitation, 
payments, payments paid for 
provisions of specific services  
- contracting,  
-  bonuses,  
-  performance-based payments 
-  travel and hardship allowances 
- subsidized meals and other services for 
the individuals or their families (indirect 
financial incentives) (McPake et al. 2002; 
Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000) 
-   promotion 
-  increases in work authority 
- training (domestic/abroad) and 
education,  
-  prize and award 
- working environment(resource 
availability, environment in working 
facilities, management) 
- workload  
- conditions for working (working hours, 
holidays) 
- recognition and appreciation from 
superiors or the community where they 
work 
*Below are seen more often in LMICs 
than high income countries: 
-  pension,  
-  free health care, 
-  insurance,  
-  allowances (housing, education of 
children, severity of living rural or remote 
area) 
-  per diem,   
-  career development  
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and mainly focus on the effects of incentives on the motivation of health staff (Stilwell et al. 
2004; Dielemann et al. 2004; Agyepong et al. 2004; Manongi, R. et al. 2006). The incentives 
are more effective if they reflect cultural and social features of the incentive environment 
(Hongoro and Normand 2006).  
 
Financial incentives for health workers are found in both high income countries and LMICs 
(Chernichovsky and Bayulken 1995; Eggleston 2005; Liu and Mills 2005; Dumont et al. 
2008; Soeters and Griffiths 2003).  
 
The incentives targeted at doctors have been the focus of most studies in health economics 
(Pauly and Gaynor 1990; Blomqvist 1991; Gaynor and Gertler 1995; Gruber and Owing 
1996; Newhouse 1996; Barro and Beaulieu 2003).  
 
Pursuing efficiency by setting appropriate incentives for doctors is widely regarded as an 
indispensable measure (Allard et al. 2011). Doctors, however, are often a minority in health 
cadres in LMICs (WHO 2006). Where incentives are targeted at other cadres in LMICs have 
been studied (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Ir. et al. 2008), they have shown mixed results 
(Makas 2009; Ir et al. 2008; Meach 2006; WHO and MOH 2007; Thornton et al. 2009). 
Some studies have limitations due to the methodological difficulties in conducting 
randomized controlled trials, the lack of comparability of interventions, and the small size of 
the study populations (Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000). 
 
Financial incentives have different objectives. The objectives are broadly categorised into 
controlling: quantity, quality, and cost of services. Some incentives are highly likely to bring 
a trade-off between quantitative or qualitative improvements. For example, if financial 
incentives are focused on increases in quantity of health services, the quantity of services is 
likely to increase but the quality is likely to decrease. However, sophisticated incentives 
which are sometimes a combination of financial incentives and regulations or rules for health 
service prices can mitigate the trade-off (Newhouse 1996; Ellis & McGuire 1986; Chalkely 
and Malcomson 1998). Appling such sophisticated combinations of incentives seems to be 
impossible in LMICs where the government and other institutional settings are undeveloped.  
 
A short summary of the effects of various types of incentives is as follows:  
Capitation may increase the number of referral cases (Allard et al.2011) and the number of 
registered patients but minimise the number of contacts with each patient and the service 
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intensity (Bennett 1997 in Bennett et al. 1997) of the health service (WHO 2006), and can be 
difficult for the principal to monitor.  
 
An incentive which contains cost is prospective payment, i.e., fixed-payment, but it may 
sacrifice quality (Chalkely and Malcomson 1998). An incentive attached to a reduction of 
specific types of services, e.g., in managed-care organisations in the U. S., could reduce the 
cost (Grumbach et al. 1998; Hillmark). Salaries are paid at a predetermined rate for a specific 
time and not connected to performance (Liu and Mills 2007). However, salaries and global 
or prospective budget reduces the number of patients and that of the services provided 
(Bennett 1997 in Bennett et al. 1997).  
 
It seemed to be reasonable that financial incentives aiming at increasing service quantity 
have been applied in LMICs and fragile states where the shortage of service delivery has 
been an urgent issue (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Eichler et al. 2009; Allard et al.2011). 
Studies of the experiences of implementing these incentives have been few in number and in 
depth, though. However, applying financial incentives linked to the quantity of services 
seems to require greater caution in LMICs, because the incentives may overwhelm the 
quality. Also, this type of financial incentive often encourages health workers to provide 
unnecessary care which is “care medically not needed” such as “unnecessary outpatient 
visits, inpatient admission”, “treatment” and “drugs” (Liu and Mills 1999, P. 409) and 
expensive services. This type of incentive included reimbursement such as fee-for-services, 
without limiting the cost.  
 
Performance-based payments can either be connected to quantity or quality of health service 
delivery or health outcome (Eichler et al. 2009). However, studies of their effect have been 
limited in health economics (Liu and Mills 2007) and those in LMICs have been also 
similarly limited. The design of these payments possibly influences their effectiveness 
(Lagarde et al. 2010); for example, performance-based payments in a Rwandan case study 
improved both the quantity and the quality of services. In contrast, negative outcomes in 
other cases included false reporting of the quantity or ‘cream-skimming’ of patients who 
would quickly and/or easily recover, or avoiding severely ill patients (Lagarde et al. 2010: 
32). 
(2) Issues in raising effectiveness of financial incentives  
Achieving high effectiveness of financial incentives requires the consideration of several 
factors. An optimal intensity of incentives induces the agent to make the maximum effort in 
 19 
 
the interests of the principal, within the constraints originating from the setting (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). The optimal intensity is obtained by solving a maximisation problem 
(formula) with the following variables: 1) the effort of the agent which the principal wants to 
induce, 2) fixed payment to the agent, 3) the intensity of incentive, and 4) result of the 
risk-aversion of the agent regarding fluctuations of payments (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). 
In a maximization problem, each of these variables varies according to other variables in 
order to maximize the formula. A prerequisite for this maximisation problem is that the 
principal is able to change the fixed payment - more precisely, its proportion of the payment 
to the total payment (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The risk-aversion strategy of the agent 
may be to select low payment with low risk. Therefore, the principal needs to bear the cost of 
imposing the risk on the agents and to reflect the risk in the financial incentive (Milgrom and 
Robert 1992). The risk is thereby a significant factor in the principal's decision to apply the 
payment mechanism.  
 
In addition, the optimal intensity relies on the following four factors:1) “the incremental 
profits created by additional effort”; 2) “the precision with which the desired activities are 
assessed”; 3) “the agent’s risk tolerance”; 4) “the agent’s responsiveness to incentive” 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992 p. 221). High precision in assessment, i.e, a high intensity of 
monitoring, is required by a high intensity of incentive, whereas incentives with a high 
intensity cause variances in monitoring (‘monitoring intensity principal’). Raising the 
precision requires high cost. The third factor, the “risk tolerance” reflects the risk-aversion 
explained above. The fourth factor addresses constraints to agents’ responsiveness. The 
responsiveness may be constrained by factors not originating from the agent but from other 
settings (e.g. negative working environment such as resource constraints in performing the 
task or no room for discretion in making efforts to achieve the incentive objective) (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992).  
 
Identifying and ensuring the four necessary factors seems to present difficulty in LMICs due 
to peculiar features of the health sector and of LMICs. Interpreting “the incremental profit” 
in the first factor could be difficult; the profit may be a health outcome or increase in health 
delivery (Folland and Stano 2004). From the second to the fourth factor, difficulties would 
occur in: monitoring quality, identifying what and who contribute to the health outcome or to 
the team work, obtaining sufficient information about the labour market, incomes of health 
workers and the working environment and arrangements affecting the responsiveness.  
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(3) Non-financial incentives 
Non-financial incentives have been applied in the variety of forms and presented different 
effects and meaningful implications. However, studies about these non-financial incentives 
are limited in number and tended to be rather contextual, having the methodological 
difficulty of measuring changes in motivation (Bennett et al. 2001). Some non-financial 
incentives could be associated with the public sector’s nature of serving the public and 
producing public goods (Graham and Renwick 1972, Lawler 1971; Shattuk et al. 2008). 
These incentives included support or appreciation or respect from their community, work 
load, relationships between their supervisors and staff, and appreciation shown by their 
mangers and colleagues (Al-Ma'aitah et al. 1999; Sararaks and Jamaluddin 2000; Ndiwane 
1999; Dielman et al. 2003). Some non-financial incentives may be implemented only in 
LMICs or specific areas in high income countries where utility from these incentives is 
sufficiently attractive to health workers in the social and economic conditions, for example, 
housing allowance for health workers deployed to rural areas.  
 
Non-financial incentives were found to be effective in the retention of health workers in a 
systematic review of studies into their motivation (Willis-Shattuk et al. 2008). Job security 
was appreciated by health workers (Ssengooba et al. 2006) and appeared to be a factor in 
retaining workers, which accorded relatively high job security in the public sector (Charmes 
2002). 
 
However, some of the non-financial incentives in Table 2.1 in LMICs are likely to be 
negatively correlated to motivating health workers. They often have been in negative or 
disadvantaged situations or status to raising their motivation. Rather, their situations are 
likely to reduce their motivation. For example, a poor working environment and shortage of 
drugs and materials disturb their performance. Weak management reduces the efficiency of 
performance. Allowances are constrained or lacking because of a shortage of financial 
resources (Shattuk et al. 2008; WHO 2006; Van Lerberghe et al. 2002; Gruen et al. 2002). 
(4) Institutional arrangement and organisations  
Mathauer and Carrin (2010) accommodated incentives and a number of other factors 
concerning the purchasing and delivering health services in relation to rules for the health 
financing, having founded on pragmatic experiences of incentives and the organisations 
involved. They presented a theory about the incentives resulting in effective purchasing and 
health services delivering. The theory included the context of the organisations where 
incentives were expected to function and the broader context of the organisations from which 
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they originated. Therefore, the theory is understood to concern factors influencing the 
incentive environment. The theory seemed to and be applicable to cases in LMCs, where the 
logical consequences they described seemed to occur frequently. 
 
The theory explicated how arbitrariness functions for incentives and influences an 
organisation concerning whether it brings in the outcome expected by the incentives. They 
maintained that incentives and rules do not necessarily influence organisational practice 
because “the specific interests of organizations and individuals” influence the organisation 
practice. The interests of organisations and individuals are determined by “actual or potential 
benefits or disadvantages as perceived by organizations and individuals” in “the 
organizational and wider context” (Mathauer and Carrin 2010. P.10). 
 
2.4 Contracting out in health sectors in LMICs  
2.4.1 Theory of contracting out and applications 
The contracting out of government services has been implemented with financial incentives, 
mostly to the contractors. In the U.K., in the mid-1990s, the approach of New Public 
Management (NPM) advocated increasing the efficiency of government through the market 
mechanism (Le Grand 2003); efficiency here “means that society is getting the maximum 
benefits from its scarce resources” (Mankiw 2002 p.5). Contracting out government service 
delivery is promoted by theories the NPM supports. The theories advocate the advantages of 
the private sector over the public sector (Mills 1997 in Mills and Bennett 1997). The market 
mechanism was extended to the health sector in LMICs soon after, through international 
cooperation (Palmer 2000; Mills 1997). Contracting out government services has been 
advocated by major international cooperation agencies, for example, the World Bank and the 
U.K. Department for International Development (DFID). Contracting in the health sector is 
defined as “a normal market exchange of services which is formalized in advance by the 
issuing of a contract binding the buyer and seller to the conditions of the exchange” (McPake 
and Hongoro 1995 P.14).  
 
The mechanism of payment to the contractors varied and included a global budget based on 
capitation, fee-for-services, and performance-based payment (Liu et al. 2007). Payments to 
health workers within the contracting out have included performance-based payments 
(Soeters and Griffiths 2003; MOH 2007). However, studies of contracting out have centred 
less on the effects of these financial incentives and more on the outcomes for service 
delivery.  
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While the number of such studies have been limited, the effect of contracting out (Eichler et 
al. 2009; Liu et al. 2007) seemed to be ambiguous. Instead, studies found empirically and 
theoretically that contracting out faced issues pertaining to capacity of the government as the 
principal and those relating to the market (McPake and Hongoro 1995; Mills 1997)(Table 
2.2).  
 
Contracting out has been particularly promoted in countries where government service 
delivery capacity was judged to be rather low. Development agencies and organisations  
have supported contracting out projects within the context of broader support to 
state-building and increasing the effectiveness of development (DFID 2005a; Carlson et al. 
2005; OECD 2008). This was particularly the case in those countries labelled fragile states. 
The World Bank defines ‘fragile states’ based on government capacity for achieving poverty 
reduction, sustainable development and effective use of international assistance (World Bank 
2008). The World Bank definition does not generally include middle-income countries. The 
definition offered by DFID includes aspects of “state authority for safety and security”; 
“effective political power”, “economic management” and “administrative capacity to deliver 
services” (DFID 2005a, p.8). DFID includes countries affected by conflict, e.g., Afghanistan, 
Nepal, the Democratic Republic of Congo and others, as fragile states (DFID 2009a). 
Cambodia is considered a fragile state, as it has demonstrated a “lack of regard for the rule of 
law” represented by “corruption” and has a state of “continued poverty and growing 
inequality” (Thornton et al.2009 P. v). The fragile states also include “collapsed states” and 
“(g)radually improving” states (DFID 2009a No page). 
 
The issue of government capacity (McPake and Hongoro 1995) (Table 2.2) could be  
viewed as an important question when advocating contracting out in LMICs (Riddle 2005), 
because obtaining higher results from contracting may require a higher – or at least sufficient 
– level of management capacity from governments in LMICs than they possess. Also the 
augmented information asymmetry in the health sector exacerbates the difficulty of the issue. 
Most of the issues identified (Table 2.2) appear to be beyond sole capacity or control of most 
health authorities and governments in LMICs. Facing these issues, the health authority or 
government needs to manage different areas as the principal, e.g., designing incentives, 
monitoring the performance, and setting performance indicators (Eichler et al. 2009).  
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Table 2.2 Rationale for promoting and issues of contracting in the health sector in 
LMICs 
 
Note: Technical efficiency
1
 is defined as producing maximum possible output with “a given quantity 
of inputs, or a given output is achieved with minimum inputs”, indicating that the production “is 
operating on the production possibility frontier” (Mills 1995. P.3). It is a contributing factor to 
economic efficiency (Bitran 1992). Allocative efficiency
2
 is defined as the production of the 
maximum social value of health services at minimum cost (Liu et al. 2004).  
 
Contracting out has been implemented, for example, in Afghanistan (Strong et al. 2005), 
Cambodia (Soeters and Griffiths 2003), Haiti and Uganda (Eichler et al. 2009). The services 
 
Rationale for 
contracting (Broomberg 1994) 
 
 
Issues of contracting 
- Enhancement of provider competition, 
which leads to the improved technical 
efficiency1 of the providers and allocative 
efficiency2 within the health system 
 
- Increases in efficiency by increasing 
transparency in aspects of service delivery 
(price, quantities, and quality), and 
promoting managerial decentralization 
 
- Realization of benefits from contracting 
which, overall, surpasses the cost of 
contracting for establishing and 
maintaining the mechanism 
Relating to the government  
- Government capacity to manage contracting 
(McPake and Hongoro 1995)  
 
- Less developed institutional setting (Hammer 
and Jack 2002) 
 
- Cost incurred for the entire process of 
contracting out, while governments of LMICs 
are budget-constrained (Mills 1997). 
 
Relating to the market 
- Potential shortage of providers, which does 
not foster provider competition (McPake and 
Hongoro 1995); 
 
- Potential unavailability of necessary capital 
for providers to compete for contracts 
(Broomberg 1994). The governments of LMICs 
are often budget- and capacity-constrained and 
difficult in arranging capital (Waldman et al. 
2006); 
 
- Providers’ opting out from ‘price-competition’ 
for ‘non-price competition’ focusing on service 
quality may disturb perfect market 
competition and increase the contracting 
budget or squeeze budgets for non-targeted 
services (Broomberg 1994).  
 
- The possibility that the government may have 
to bear any additional costs, most likely 
transaction costs which may exceed the actual 
benefit (Palmer 2000).  
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contracted out were both clinical and non-clinical and a specific group of services or a 
package of services provided at levels of health facilities or offices (Mills 1997, Liu et al. 
2007). The cases cited above were contracted out mostly to the non-profit sector, mainly 
NGOs. A common definition of NGOs has not been established, due to their diversity in, e.g., 
size, place of origin, structure, work sectors, religious affiliations (Lewis and Wallace 2000; 
Lewis 2001). Some studies argue that NGOs were more effective and efficient in service 
delivery than governments or bilateral and multilateral donor agencies in LMICs (Gilson et 
al. 1997; Lewis 2001; Loevinsohn and Harding 2005).  
2.4.2 Performance-based payments in contracting out  
Performance-based payments have been applied to health workers in contracting out (Soeters 
and Griffiths 2003; MOH 2007), however the majority of past applications was to the 
contractors. The principal-agent relation in contracting out is explained by standard agency 
theory; therefore, the central issue in increasing effectiveness of contracting out is the design 
of effective incentives which induce the agent to promote the principal’s interest. The agent 
can opportunistically maximize his or her utilities and avoid efforts to maximize the 
principal's utility by taking advantage of the limited information held by the principal 
(‘information asymmetry’). However, designing effective incentives face constraints caused 
again by information asymmetry (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Monitoring of the agent’s 
behaviour by the principal is among the strategies for preventing the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviour (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; MacDonald 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; 
Preker et al. 2000). 
 
Studies of payments to the contractors found that issues of applying the payment which 
obtains desirable outcomes seem to be similar issues to those associated with applying other 
types of incentives in LMICs. The issues were mainly issues of management capacity of the 
health authority or the NGO contractors (Liu and Mills 2007) as well as the ability of the 
government to continue to pay them (Wibulpolprasert and Hempisut 2004). Here again, 
factors other than the payment itself, seemed to be the main focus of the studies. 
 
Performance-based payments to the contractors were mostly connected to: quantity (output) 
of services; cost (per capita in the catchment area); access of the poor to health services; 
collection and analyses of health management information statistics; motivation of project 
health staff, especially output of services have been frequently connected (Eichler et al. 
2007; Schwartz and Bhushan 2005; Arur et al. 2010; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Strong et al. 
2005; Riddle 2005; SRC 2006; MOH 2007b).  
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The quantitative (output) changes in services were counted almost in the number of provided 
cases of services. The contracting out project in Afghanistan, for example, counted the 
number of female patients who received services (Arur et al. 2010). Connecting this figure to 
the number of hours worked in the government sector was rarely seen in available literature. 
This suggests that either an accurate monitoring of hours worked was challenging for various 
studies (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001; Alcázar and Andrade 2001) or that an increasing of 
service outputs was prioritised. Monitoring is likely to involve a focus on workers’ 
absenteeism, about which relevant actors have diverse interests in the hierarchy of 
agent-principal relationship. The interests are likely to disturb monitoring, augmenting the 
information asymmetry (Alcázar and Andrade 2001). 
 
Studies of the effect of performance-based payments to the contractor in contracting out have 
been less in depth in health economics (Liu and Mills 2007). The economic impact of the 
payments on the health workers’ income has rarely been investigated. Whether the payments 
are sufficient to change behaviours of the workers has not been comprehensively studied. An 
evaluation of a Cambodian contracting case within the government structure investigated the 
impact (Keller et al. 2008); however, it did not investigate the impact in the major cadres of 
health workers in rural areas.  
 
Performance-based payments were evaluated in relation to achievements of indicators 
attached to them, mainly by comparing the indicators in the contracting projects with those 
made by the government service or non-contractor NGOs (Loevinsohn and Harding 2004; 
Eichler et al. 2001), i.e., the quasi-experimental cross sectional study design. Other 
evaluations compared the indicators before and after project implementation (Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003; Strong et al. 2005; Arur et al. 2010). However, changes in the labour supply 
of health workers were seldom evaluated with sufficient data or description or reflecting the 
settings. 
2.5 Dual practice  
2.5.1 Consequences, factors which bring about dual practice  
Motivation influenced by incentives does not necessarily result in a rise in performance; 
instead, it sometimes leads to negative behaviour such as cheating or dual job-holding.  
Low salaries in the government sector and high salaries in the private sector, as seen in some 
LMICs (Akashi et al. 2002), could motivate health workers to conduct dual practice. Dual 
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practice can be regarded as a significant factor in the incentive environment in LMICs. It 
absorbs health workers’ labour supply. Dual practice has been prevalent in LMICs (WHO 
2006), affecting quantity, quality and labour supply of health services (Garacía-Praco & 
González 2007; Ferrinho et al. 2004; Jan et al. 2005), despite the fact that many health 
workers often earn a higher income than other types of government officials or the general 
public (Witter et al. 2007; Koot and Martineau 2005; Das Gupta et al. 2008 cited in McCoy 
et al. 2008). Dual practice has been studied with a focus on its negative consequences. 
However, studies appear to be limited in number and scope, when compared with those in 
high income countries.  
 
An individual, as a utility maximiser, often conducts dual practice (Newman 2012), if the 
combination of leisure and income from the first job is not the most preferable combination 
(Berman and Cuizon 2004). The individual adjusts the allocation of hours amongst the first 
and second jobs (working hours) and leisure within limited working hours a day, after 
extracting leisure time from the 24 hour day. The wage of each job is higher than the 
employee’s reservation wage (Berman and Cuizon 2004), which refers to the lowest wage 
the employee will accept (Mankiw 2011). Leisure time means any time other than that which 
the individual spends working to earn income; but does not necessarily mean free time. The 
hourly wage for the first and second jobs are often different.  
 
Even if the individual earns a lower hourly wage from the second job than the first job, the 
individual will still take the second job, and the total labour supply of the individual 
increases, while the individual is working as much as possible in the first job (Perlman 1966; 
Marby 1973; Shisko & Rostker 1976). The secondary job is still placed as “contingent” or 
“complementary” to the first job because its income contains “unacceptable uncertainty” to 
risk-aversion for some individuals (Shisko and Rostker 1976. P.299). 
 
When the increases in the marginal utility of their first job are lower than that from the 
secondary job, leisure and other activities, workers substitute the secondary job, leisure and 
other activities for the first job (Moses 1962 cited in Berman and Cuizon 2004; Perlman 
1966; Shishko and Rostker 1976). This explicates the dual practice in LMICs caused by low 
and fixed government salaries.  
 
Relations between wage rates and hours allocated in the first and the second jobs are as 
follows: 
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Hours worked in the secondary job are positively correlated with wage rates of the secondary 
job. 
Hours worked in the secondary job are negatively correlated with the earnings from the first 
job which resulted either by increases in the wage rate or in hours worked.  
Increase in family size is positively related to the hours worked on the secondary job 
(Shishko and Rostker 1976).  
  
Dual practice is also explicated by a modified utility-maximiser model. However, this model 
seems to be less persuasive than the utility-maximiser model in LMCIs where government 
salaries are often below their necessary living cost (Ensor and Witter 2001; Jumpa, 2007; Jan 
et al., 2005; WHO 2000). A modified utility model emphases doctors’ altruism, which is 
satisfied more in their private practice than in government services, e.g., improvement of 
patients’ health problems. Another model stresses opportunities for skills development in the 
private sector (Jumpa et al. 2007; Humphrey & Russel.2004). Differences in management 
between the two sectors resulted in dual practice (Allard et al. 2011; Chalkley and 
Malcomson 1998; Jack 2005; Biglaizer and Ma, 2007; Delfgaauw 2007).  
 
Bad management in the government services, in both materialistic and non-materialistic 
respects, hinders service delivery and frustrates the health workers (Jamal et al. 1998; Van 
Lerberghe et al. 2002; WHO 2006; Berman and Cuison 2004). This explanation might also 
be applicable to health workers in LMICs (Socha and Beck 2011). In the private services 
doctors may have more autonomy in their choices of medical treatments or of time spent on 
a case than in the government service (Jumpa et al. 2007; Humphrey & Russel 2004). Other 
health cadres might experience the same. 
 
In high income countries, dual practice frequently causes self-referral of patients to a private 
practice (Eggleston and Bir 2003) where patients with severe illness might be avoided due to 
the unacceptable cost of treatment (Martinussen & Hagen 2009; McGuire & Hughes 2003; 
Ellis 1998; Newhouse 1996), and ‘cream-skimming’ of the patients who could pay higher 
fees for private services (González 2005). In LMICs, practices harmful to patients and 
resource diversification from the government to the private sector are both major problems 
(WHO 2000 and 2006; Narasimhan et al. 2004, Akashi et al. 2004; Gruen et al. 2002; Jan et 
al. 2005; Ferrinho et al. 2004, Ensor and Thompson 2006, Garacía-Praco & González 2007). 
 
A positive argument for dual practice maintains that social welfare is increased by dual 
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practice for some patients who are referred to the private services (Biglaiser and Ma 2007). 
These might be patients who are able to afford the service, or the services may be paid by the 
public sector; however they are unlikely to be the majority in LMICs.  
2.5.2 Dual practice as corruption  
Doctors’ conducting private practice at a public facility during their office hours and 
absenteeism are both viewed as illegal activities by the theory of corruption (Di Tella and 
Savedoff2001). Though the theory does not specify the reasons for absenteeism, they are 
highly likely to include dual practice outside of the facility. These activities or cheating or 
shirking or collusions are attributed partly to the multiple principal-agent relationships and 
the information asymmetry in the health sector (Di Tella and Savedoff. 2001; Milogrom and 
Roberts 1992).  
 
If dual practice is prohibited, the decision to conduct or not conduct it depends the 
probability of being detected and punished, and the consequent income through by job. If the 
probability is low, dual practice is not restrained (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). These factors 
constitute the incentive environment in the health sector. The importance of the probability 
implies that prohibition or restriction of dual practice is a significant challenge to LMICs, 
due both to their low capacity of monitoring and to their weak regulatory setting. In some 
LMICs, a corrupt health authority may be an issue (Ensor 2004). Furthermore, in practice, 
corruption is influenced by numerous factors beyond the boundary of the health sector 
(Ensor and Thompson 2006). 
 
The probability of being detected and punished changes the relative value of the government 
wage and the grand total of 1) the total income from the government and corrupt activity 
multiplied by the probability of detection and punishment and 2) the difference in income 
resulting from the punishment (Ensor and Thompson 2006). This is expressed by 
 
 
–  
 
Where  
P is the probability of corruption of being found by the authority and punished. 
CB is income from on corrupt activities resulted from multiplying the number of activities by 
the income-level from each corrupt activity.  
Wg is government wage 
Wp is alternative income earned from alternative job in the private sector or government 
sector to the present job if the unofficial activity lose   
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ƒ is the value of punishments on the activities put on when they are caught . 
 
Increasing the government wage has only a limited effect on restraining the health worker 
from corrupt activities (Di Tella and Savedoff. 2001). In contrast, Rijckeghem and Weber 
(1997) maintain that the corruption is mitigated in LMICs, if the government workers 
receive remuneration above their fare-wage. The fare-wage is “what the employee’s efforts 
deserve”(s) (Akerlof and Yellen 1990. p.256) and is determined by factors such as, for 
example, their market clearing wage (the equilibrium wage in market), civil servant status, 
and money required for subsistence (Rijckeghem and Weber 1997). This hypothesis may be 
associated with the modified utility model of health workers (Ensor and Thompson 2006).  
2.5.3 Labour supply of health workers between the two sectors  
The effects of dual practice on the labour supply of government health workers have not 
been sufficiently addressed by empirical studies (Socha and Beck 2011). Also, there have 
been few empirical studies in LMICs which addressed dual practice, even indirectly. One 
study investigated health workers’ working hours in the private sector and intention to 
change labour supply in Cambodia under assumptions that their government payments were 
increased (MOH 2005). Brekke and Sǿgard (2007) taking the setting of the UK National 
Health Service as theoretical conditions, maintain that dual practice reduces quantity of 
services in the mixed provision of public and private services; however, their study was not 
empirical. 
 
Empirical studies note that benefits obtainable by health workers from being in the 
government sector in LMICs increase profit in their private practice and contribute to 
retaining them in the government sector (González 2004; Ensor and Thompson 2006). The 
reputation as good doctors in the government service, or even the fact that they are working 
in the government service attracts patients and as a result increases income in their private 
practice.  
 
Also, the ability to shirk government work and conduct dual practice, i.e., coordinating their 
labour supply easily according to their preference, is counted as a factor in retaining health 
workers in the government sector (González 2004). This would seem to reflect the weak 
institutional arrangement. Though evidence for this has been limited (Berman Cuizon 2004; 
Ensor and Thompson 2006).  
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2.5.4 Financial incentives to reduce or stop dual practice 
Reducing dual practice by financial incentives has been attempted in LMICs; however, their 
effect has been insufficiently studied (Prakongsai 2005). An Indonesian case which applied 
modified performance-based payments (rather similar to promotion) proved unsuccessful, 
mainly because the payments were lower than income from private practice (Chernichovsky 
and Bayulken 1995). Instead, an allowance is potentially effective in a specific condition. 
This condition is where health workers work a total of eight hours a day and the hourly wage 
in private practice differs in profitability according to hours worked after the opening hour 
(diminishing marginal wage). The allowance is understood as sufficient, if it equals the 
highest hourly wage in their private practice. It should not equal the amount of the highest 
hourly wage multiplied by eight (hours) (McPake and Normand. 2008). 
 
2.6 Exploring the impact of performance-based payments in LMICs 
The optimal effective financial incentive reflects other payments to the worker (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). This implies that designing performance-based payments for government 
health workers in LMICs requires them to reflect other payments, i.e, income. In other words, 
exploration of the impact of financial incentives requires the inclusion of other incomes paid 
to the health workers as seen, for example, in Ensor et al. (2009); where they obtained 
payments both in the public (government salaries and others) and private sectors (dual 
practice or work in non-health sectors) (WHO 2006; Asiimwe et al. 1997; Das Gupta 2003, 
Ensor et al. 2009). These incomes constitute the incentive environment and are likely to 
influence the impact of performance-based payments. However, some of these incomes 
remains excluded from studies which argue for the positive impact of payments. 
2.6.1 Incomes health workers in the government and private sectors  
Health workers obtain income from different sources; one of the sources is apparently the 
government sector. This is the core income to be investigated in studying the impact of 
performance-based payment, since it includes the payments and is indicative of the 
importance of this income to their total income and to their households’ total income. It also 
indicates the extent to which they spend their labour supply in the government sector. For, 
example, the incomes in this category earned by Indonesian rural midwives reached only 
about one third of their total income because the midwives earned income from both private 
practice and non-health work (Ensor et al. 2009). 
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The income in the government sector in LMICs includes not only government salaries but 
also supplemental salaries from NGOs or other development aid organisations or per-diems 
in LMICs (Ensor et al. 2009. Jacobs et al. 2010). This category of payments seems to be one 
of the core sources of income and may compete with income from dual practice or economic 
activities such as agriculture. Health workers’ receiving this category of payments implies 
the multi-task setting and the setting may affect the labour supply of health workers in the 
incentive environment of the multiple-task setting with the multiple principal-agent 
relationship. Supplementary salaries from the Global Fund, for example, were blamed for 
drawing the labour supply of health workers (Biesma et al. 2009) away from activities less 
connected, or not-connected, to the Global Fund salaries, and towards activities to which the 
Global Fund salaries were connected (Biesma et al. 2009). Per-diems are so attractive to the 
workers as an additional source of income that they are frequently absent from government 
facilities in order to attend training days or workshops (Smith 2003).  
 
Government health workers who receive performance-based payments are also highly likely 
to still receive government fixed salaries. Therefore, it would be reasonable to include 
government salaries in the exploration of incentive impact.  
 
Private practice income of government health workers may compete against 
performance-based payments for the labour supply of health workers and disturb the 
effectiveness of the payments. Previous studies and reports have concentrated on the private 
practice income of doctors who could be regarded as minorities in rural areas in most LMICs. 
They included insufficient analyses for exploring the impact of performance-based payments. 
Some have limited or minimal descriptions of the methods of data collection (Ferrinho et al. 
2004). 
 
The amount and proportion of doctors’ income from private practice was studied almost 
exclusively in relation to their total income (Ferrinho et al. 2004; Macq et al. 2001). Macq et 
al. (2001) found that doctors’ private practice gave them between 0.6 and 10 times the hourly 
income of their government work (calculated in the purchasing power parity) across the 37 
countries (N=138) (Macq et al. 2001). It is difficult to interpret these variances because 
information about the doctors’ other incomes and the economic status of their households 
received little attention in their study. Another study by Ferrinho et al. (1998), mentioned 
above, found that the private practice income of doctors in urban areas in African countries 
reached 65% (the median) of their total income (N=65).  
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The study by Ensor et al. (2009) mentioned above investigated Indonesian midwives’ income 
from private practice and from non-health work. The private practice income reached 
two-thirds of their total income (Ensor et al. 2009). This study comprehensively investigated 
determinants and interactions of incomes from the private and from the public sector 
(government salaries, per-diem and income from non-health work). Factors explored for the 
determinants of private practice incomes were, for example, poverty-related data at the 
sub-district level and the population for the economic status and size of the area where the 
midwives were working or, years of their working for the quality of services, and the 
distance from the nearest hospital for health service market conditions. Applications of these 
variables were based on a hypothesis that the private practice income was likely to primarily 
rely on the amount and the price of service delivered, and these two types of factors were 
translated into these proxies. It found that the private practice income was most closely 
related to the quality (translated into midwives’ years of experiences) and less closely to the 
distance from the nearest district hospital (Ensor et al. 2009). 
 
The Cambodian MOH investigated the significance of income from private practice earned 
by health workers to their government salaries (MOH2005) and asked how much income 
their health workers wished to receive (‘willingness to accept’) from the government in 
consideration of their time allocation in dual practice. The findings of this study are further 
elaborated in Chapter 6. Health workers who were the subject for this study largely (84%) 
consisted of those who belonged to the highest two government employment grades 
(MOH2005). The two grades were less seen in health workers in rural area, i.e., doctors, 
dentists, pharmacists and assistant doctors (MOH 2005). The income from private practice 
was, at maximum, around 15 times higher than the government salaries of specialist doctors. 
Health workers with higher qualifications and skills would require nearly 15 times their 
current government salary, if they totally gave up dual practice (MOH 2005). However, they 
would require nearly 6 times their government salary, if they were still to conduct dual 
practice but work for 8 hours per day in the government sector (MOH 2005).  
2.6.2 Health workers’ household income 
It is reasonable to consider that health workers’ household income influences the impact of 
performance-based payment, given the quoted low government salaries (Akashi et. al. 2004; 
Ensor and Witter 2001) and a peculiar feature of LMICs as described below. Nevertheless, 
health workers’ household income was included by only a limited number of studies 
(McPake et al. 1996; Das Gupta 2003; Ensor et al. 2009). 
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Household members put their own income into the budget of the household as an economic 
unit which seeks to maximize profit with limited budget (the unitary model, explicated 
below) (Samuelson 1956 cited in Lundberg and Pollak 1993). The household as a unit of 
consumption is expressed by the following. 
 
n 
∑ pix i≤ m, 
i=t 
 
where i is kinds of goods (i=1…n), pi is price of i, x i is consumption of i, and m represents 
income. 
 
A household is defined as the state of dwelling together, by covering living costs from one 
source, including food costs, and pooling funds (Deaton 1997).  
 
There are two models for household economy. The unitary model is one of two contending 
models of household economy. Another is the collective model. The unitary model seems to 
be more suitable for exploring the impact of performance-based payments in LMICs. This is 
because the model considers the household as a unitary profit-maximiser-economic unit (a 
consumption unit) which pools all incomes of household members and which behaves to 
maximize a single utility function (Samuelson 1956 cited in Lundberg and Pollak 1993). 
This feature fits the households in LMICs, which frequently has more than one breadwinners 
and different income sources but combines these incomes together in the household budget. 
Another feature of the unitary model is that an altruistic member of a household makes 
resource allocation of the household in a way that maximises the single utility function with 
budget constraint. The altruist concerns oneself about the welfare of other household 
members, even including those who are completely selfish (Becker 1974 and 1981 cited in 
Lumberg and Pollak 1993). This feature is somewhat different from the conventional theory 
of rational consumer behaviour which maximizes his/her own utility. 
 
The collective model assumes that households are collective entities of individuals and that 
the allocation (the decision) of the individuals is at Pareto Efficiency (Donni 2004). The 
distribution is attributed to, for example, status, age, gender (Donni 2004; Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995), the power of negotiation among the household members (Basu 2006) or the 
rank of wives in polygamy (Mammen 2004). Therefore, this model has less relevance to 
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measuring the impact of financial incentive to the household economy as a unit not the 
distribution inside the household.  
 
This household’s obtaining different incomes as a  consumption seems to strengthen in 
LMICs, particularly in low income countries. Their economies depend largely on primary 
industry (agriculture or fishery or forestry). Health workers and their household in rural areas 
diversify income sources within and outside the primary industry in order to avoid shocks 
and risks which severely affect the household economy (Dercon, S. 2002; Barretta, C. B. et 
al. 2001; Bryceson , D. F. 1999). Incomes from these diverse sources may intricately 
influence each other and may induce other income to increase or decrease. Government 
health workers and their households in LMICs conduct other jobs in other sectors, e.g., 
agriculture (Asiimwe et al. 1997). This environment reasonably indicates that investigating 
the impact of health worker incentives on their household income is important, given the 
diversities of income sources of households in LMICs and the household as an economic 
unit. Within the total household income in LMICs, the degree to which a health workers’ 
income has important implications depends on its significance to the total household income. 
 
Nevertheless, the implications of the non-health income of health workers, as well as the 
incentive impact, on the household income have received only limited study. Studies in 
Uganda (McPake et al. 1996), Nigeria (Das Gupta 2003), Indonesia (Ensor et al. 2009), and 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Indonesia (Ensor no date) did include such income. The Burkina Faso 
case indicated a high importance of midwives’ income to their overall household income. 
The Indonesian midwives were breadwinners (Ensor no date). Therefore, their income and 
changes in their income were highly important to the households. This also implies that the 
proportion of financial incentive to health workers’ total household income is a crucial factor 
when studying the impact of incentives.  
2.6.3 Household Expenditure 
It is reasonably important to investigate the impact of payment in relation to health workers’ 
and their households’ income, considering the household as an economic unit. However, 
there have been widely recognised difficulties in obtaining accurate information about 
income, since incomes may be under-reported (Deaton 1997). Obtaining the household 
expenditure data contributes to exploring and increasing the accuracy of household income, 
because the expenditure is the function of the household income. More accurate assessments 
of incomes would contribute to exploring the impact of performance-based payment. Also, 
some types of household expenditure, or the structure of total household expenditure, 
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indicate the economic status, e.g. a higher proportion of food or non-food expenditure to 
total household expenditure (The Engel’s Law. Mankew 2009). However, applying the 
advantage of being able to determine household expenditure has been excluded from most 
explorations of the impact of performance based payments.  
 
Empirically collected household expenditure data establishes and compares the economic 
status among households and between groups of households (not specifically health 
workers’). Nationwide household surveys collected a large number of samples at the national 
level in LMICs. One conventional survey framework is the Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) program by the World Bank which has conducted 70 household surveys in 
more than 40 countries (World Bank 2010).  
2.7 Knowledge gap about impact of performance-based payments 
in contracting out in LMICs 
Performance-based payments to government health workers were applied in contracting out 
government health services in the public sector in LMICs because they were thought to be 
effective in increasing service delivery. However, as seen above, there have been knowledge 
gaps about the impact of performance-based payments on government health workers and 
their households. The impact of payments, i.e., the importance of the payments to the income 
has been little studied; whether the payment significantly increases the health workers’ 
income, what proportion the payments represented of their total income and, as a result, what 
proportional income changes were realized in their total income and their household income.  
 
The impact has not been studied, despite the impact of payments being a core concern in 
changing the health workers’ labour supply in the government sector, consequently for the 
increase in service delivery. Namely, it was highly likely that performance-based payments 
paid to the health workers in the Cambodian contracting out project sufficiently increased 
their total individual income and total household incomes. Consequently, it was highly likely 
that proportional changes of incomes in the government and the private sectors occurred to 
their total household income. Therefore, as an outcome of these changes, increases in labour 
supply in the government sector and transfer between the two sectors were likely to be 
realised. 
 
The incentive environment is largely influenced by the characteristics of the public sector, 
private practice income, and dual practice regulation; however, these factors have received 
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little attention in the studies which argued for the payments. The payment mechanism at the 
NGO contractor level has nearly lacked study, therefore, information about it should help to 
better understand its impact and the factors influencing the incentive environment. 
2.7.1 Incentive environment  
In order to promote health workers’ efforts to increase government health service delivery, 
applying performance-based payments is highly likely to be necessary. While both theory 
and experiences indicated that financial incentives were preferred and applied to the health 
workers in the government sector, the special characters of the public sector incentive 
environment: multi-task and multiple principal-agent relationships have possibility of 
influencing the effect of the incentive. The effect may be influenced also by the payment 
mechanism. In the case of DIFD/World Bank Contracting project, the effect may be 
influenced by the implementation methods of the contracting project by NGO, in addition to 
the factors above. Investigations of these factors are expected to contribute to better 
understanding of the effect of incentives. However, such investigations have not been studied 
in depth. 
 
Institutional issues, some of which seem to be embedded in the health sector, are highly 
likely to create difficulties in the incentives’ achieving the intended results in LMICs and the 
fragile states. The issues seem to be connected with the weak government capacity in terms 
of service delivery and managing the contacting out (McPake and Normand 2008), and a 
similar weak capacity in restraining government employees’ corruptive activities including in 
private practice (Ensor and Thompson 2006).  
 
Weak dual practice regulations seemed to encourage dual practice. Also, NGOs might have 
enhanced countermeasures to the dual practice in order for the NGOs to achieve the 
objectives of the contracting project. Consequently, changes in the health workers’ dual 
practice might have occurred.  
 
2.7.2 Health workers’ different income, their households’ income and 
expenditures 
The health workers working for a contracting out project in LMICs are highly likely to 
obtain income from different sources. These incomes are highly likely to include their 
government salaries, supplementary salaries and per-diems, other than income from private 
practice. However, the government salaries are often below the level which affords a decent 
life (Ensor and Witter 2001; Jumpa 2007; Jan et al. 2005; WHO 2000), encouraging private 
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practice or resignation from government work in LMICs (Chernichovsky and Bayulken 
1995; Akashi et al. 2004; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Witter et al. 2007; Zambia Ministry of 
Health, Zambia 2007 quoted in McCoy et al. 2008). These payments and/or the total income 
may have impacted the effectiveness of performance-based payments.  
 
The income from private practice is likely to be significant to total income of the health 
worker. It may compete against performance-based payments in the contracting out setting 
with regard to health workers’ decisions in allocating their labour supply between 
government and private sectors. However, the income from private practice and its 
implication have largely been absent from previous studies (Dieleman et al. 2003; Chen et al. 
2004; Stringhini et al. 2009; Jacobs et al. 2010; ADB 2001, Soeters and Griffithes 2003; 
SRC 2006; MOH 2007; Jacobs et al. 2010). 
 
Also, as discussed above, income from non-health work in the private sector, including 
income obtained by other members of health workers’ households, have received little 
consideration in previous studies. 
 
Investigating some types of household expenditure or the proportional structure of 
expenditure item in the total household expenditure is expected to indicate the economic 
status of the health workers’ households. The economic status is most likely influenced by 
the financial incentives and private practice income.  
 
Data on their household expenditures increases the accuracy of the assessment of the income 
of health workers and their households. However, investigataions of household expenditures 
have been little applied to exploring the impact on performance-based payments in LMICs. 
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Chapter 3 Cambodia - the context of contracting out and past 
contracting projects 
 
This chapter provides an outline of Cambodia’s history, following its liberation from French 
colonial control, focusing mainly on the political and socio-economic developments which 
were highly influential to health development. It then describes the development and current 
state of the health system which has had to face various issues. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the cases of contracting out of government health services to NGOs in 
Cambodia in which performance-based payments were paid. The payments were evaluated 
highly as they contributed to increasing health service delivery. 
3.1 Post colonial history of Cambodia  
3.1.1 Genocide, conflicts and political instability 
The history of Cambodia, after almost a century of colonial rule by France, has been 
coloured by conflicts from both outside and within the country. During these years, the name 
of the country and political system were changed - often by those whose motives were 
self-interest and power, while the life of the people, particularly the poor, changed very little. 
The country remained under-developed. These tragic incidents have degraded the health 
status of the population and disturbed the development of the health sector.  
 
The war in Vietnam negatively affected Cambodia physically, politically, ideologically, and 
socially. During the war, the American invasion and air-attacks in Cambodia resulted in 
destruction, injuries and deaths (Shawcross 1987). 
 
Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime ruled and devastated Cambodia 
(renaming it Democratic Kampuchea). The genocide carried out by the Khmer Rouge has 
been estimated to have killed 1.7 million people, either directly or indirectly through 
resulting famine, disease or displacement (Hinton 2004). The regime destroyed specific 
groups of the population: by generation, gender, social class – e.g. young males (Walgue 
2006) or the intellectual class which included medical staff and teachers. A large number of 
refugees from the genocide and displacement sheltered in camps along the Thai-Cambodian 
border or in Thailand (Blunt and Turner 2005). The regime destroyed almost all the 
infrastructure of the country: physical, social, and production, i.e., the foundations of the 
development of the country, social norms, culture, and traditions (Gottesman 2002). The 
regime has had a lasting negative effect on many aspects of the country, including a legacy 
of trauma and psychiatric diseases among the population.   
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The Khmer Rouge regime was displaced in 1979 by the Vietnamese. The People’s Republic 
of Cambodia was established in 1979, supported by the Vietnamese. However, the Khmer 
Rouge, which had been backed by China, the United States, and other anti-communist 
neighbouring countries such as Thailand, maintained its military power and even continued 
to control some areas, conducting repeated attacks and insurgencies against the government. 
The Khmer Rouge-led conflicts against different Cambodian regimes lasted for over a 
decade, even into the 1990s, and cost the lives of many Cambodians and disturbed the 
development of the country.  
 
During the era of the People’s Republic of Cambodia, Cambodia belonged to the Soviet Bloc, 
having the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam as its allies. Due to this situation, the government of 
Cambodia could not get official United Nations recognition as a state; instead, the Khmer 
Rouge held official government status. Also, during this period, aid from the so-called 
Western Block and even from the United Nations was limited. Thus, aid was provided only 
by the Soviet Bloc, Vietnam, and UNICEF. 
 
In the late 1980s, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet bloc led Cambodia to abandon communism. In 1989 
Cambodia was again renamed, this time as the State of Cambodia, under the leadership of 
Hun Sen, who became Prime Minister. However, political and military turmoil continued, 
with further involvement of the royal family of Cambodia, which aimed to restore the 
monarchy by collaborating with different interest groups, including the Khmer Rouge, as 
well as some foreign powers. 
 
The Paris Peace Accord in 1991, resulted in the establishment of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993. The first national election was 
held in 1992, with the royalist party, FUNCINPEC victorious.; However, the governing party, 
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen, the current prime minister, persisted in 
power. As a result, CPP and FUNCINPEC formed a distorted two-party government and the 
country was re-established as a constitutional monarchy (the Kingdom of Cambodia). The 
coalition government was, in fact, not a coalition government as is commonly understood. 
For example, there were two prime ministers; the first prime minister’s seat was allocated to 
the leader of the FUNCINPEC and the second seat to the CPP’s leader, Hun Sen. This 
situation deepened the already existing political divide in the country (Hendrickson 1998). 
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The coalition sustained only a brief superficial peace. In 1997 CPP-led violence raged in the 
capital and prominent figures of the FUNCINPEC were expelled or killed. These incidents 
contributed largely to the victory of the CPP in the subsequent national election in 1998, and 
made Hun Sen the prime minister. Since this election, the CPP has continuously expanded its 
political power (Hughes 2009). 
 
The establishment of a new government in 1993 led to a rapid increase of donor support. 
International cooperation was eighteen times larger than it had been in 1989, four years 
earlier (Lanjouw et al. 1999). These flows resulted not only in visible changes in the country, 
but also in high inflation. However, substantial results from this international cooperation 
were not achieved until the late 1990s (Andersen 2004; Sedara and Öjendal 2009). It was 
recognized that government decentralisation and administrative reform were necessary in the 
rebuilding and development of Cambodia, together with increasing good governance (World 
Bank 1992; UNDP 1995; ADB 1999; Blunt and Turner 2005), as seen in other LMICs 
(Grindle and Thomas 1989). 
3.1.2 The Economy, poverty, and corruption 
The years spent under the Khmer Rouge regime and the international embargo of the 
government of the People’s Republic of Cambodia collapsed the Cambodian economy. 
However, the inflow of a large volume of aid money after 1993, combined with the 
economic growth of neighbouring countries, led to an average growth rate of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in Cambodia of 8.52 % from 1994 to 2004 (World Bank 2007 P ii, 
calculated from Figure 1). Despite this, the country has not developed industries which have 
competitive advantages over other countries. Only the garment industry, in which 
Cambodia's cheap labour has been the only advantage, has been developed by foreign 
investment without significant additional investment in terms of both capital and human 
resources (UNDP 2011).  
 
However, development of primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, and 
husbandry, on which the poor depend, has lagged behind, and has hindered their 
emancipation from poverty. In the poor rural areas in Cambodia, 70% of the labour force was 
engaged in primary industry; however, their average annual growth rate was 3.4% from 1994 
to 2004 (World Bank 2007). The growth rate was lower than those of neighbouring countries 
which were at a similar stage of economic development, in the same period (World Bank 
2007). 
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The GNP per capita was US$270.00 adjusted by the purchasing power parity (PPP), in 1995 
(World Bank 1997) (GNP values hereafter were adjusted by the PPP). The country was 
ranked 21st from the bottom among 133 countries (World Bank 1997), being much lower 
than the Philippines’ US$1,050.00 and Thailand’s US$2,740.00 and positioned between the 
Vietnam’s US$240.00 and the Laos People’s Democratic Republic’s US$350.00 (World 
Bank 1997). In the early and mid-1990s almost half of the population was destitute; their 
economic status was below the consumption poverty line (World Bank. 2006). From 1994 to 
2004, despite the fact that poverty was reduced by almost a quarter, disparity in wealth 
increased, particularly in rural areas; the Gini coefficient, which indicates income disparities, 
rose from 0.35 to 0.40 nationally (World Bank 2007). 
 
Alongside rapid economic growth, corruption has been widespread in the Cambodian public 
system, from the highest to the lowest levels, and in society generally. It even exists between 
students and teachers in relation to getting sufficient grades or qualifications (UNICEF 2005; 
Akashi et al. 2004). The widespread corruption has been viewed by donors, NGOs, investors, 
and the Cambodian people themselves as an obstacle retarding many aspects of development 
- including poverty reduction (World Bank 2006). Due to the significance of this negative 
influence, promoting good governance, through anti-corruption procedures and other 
measures, has been presented as the first national strategic development plan (World Bank 
2006, 2007).  
3.1.3 Other social aspects 
While Cambodians struggled for survival in these years, education seems to have held a 
lower priority for them, as shown in the primary school enrolment rate for 1993 which was 
48% for males, and 46% for females. The primary school enrolment rate means “an estimate 
of the ratio of children of all ages enrolled in primary school against the country’s population 
of primary school-age children” (World Bank 1997, P. 225). However, in the post-conflict 
years, access to education in Cambodia improved. The net enrolment rate in primary schools 
increased from 53% in 1997 to 76% in 2004 (Badloe et al. 2007). This net-enrolment ratio in 
primary schools means “the number of children enrolled in primary school who are of 
official primary school age, expressed as a percentage of the total number of children of 
official primary school age” (UNCEF 2007 p.121). The adult illiteracy rate was 20% for 
males and 47% for females in 1995 (World Bank 1997). 
 
Educational expenditure is expenditure on a basic social service; therefore, it has been 
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regarded as one of the important indicators showing the current economic status of 
households, and the factor which influences the future economic opportunity of the 
household, through the child who receives the education (World Bank 2007). Educational 
expenditure in the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) 2004 demonstrated 
“extremely striking wealth-based differences” in per-child household education expenditure. 
Expenditure amongst the richest quintile was found to be 25 times greater than in the poorest 
quintile (World Bank 2007, p.127). Inferred from this (possibly theoretically) was that 
"perpetuation of wealth” has been "very pronounced" (World Bank 2007. p.124), as having 
higher education and higher income earning opportunities have been linked (World Bank 
2007).  
 
The education level of household members often correlates to the socio-economic status of 
the household (Bollen 2001; McPake et al.1996). In Cambodia, access to education above 
primary school level shows a level of income disparity: while the net enrolment rates in 
secondary schools for the period 2000 to 2004 were 17% for males and 11% for females 
(UNCEF 2007), the enrolment rate among households of the richest economic quintile in 
2001 was 10 times higher than that among the lowest quintile (Badloe et al. 2007. p.3 Figure 
1).  
 
Embedded gender discrimination and socially defined gender roles made the situation of 
women worse than that of men in many aspects of Cambodian life; for example education 
(United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women: CEDAW 2004), as shown above. Cambodia was ranked lower in the United 
Nation’s Gender-related Development Index (GDI) (105th out of 144 countries) and in the 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (the lowest in Asia). The GDI represents the 
situation of women as it relates to levels of health, knowledge and income relative to men. 
The GEM represents the situation of women as it relates to decision making powers in 
national level politics and economic activities, and their opportunities of having "power 
over" economic resources (UNDP 2007: 360; Cambodia Royal Government 2004). 
 
The Cambodian gender perspectives divide jobs between “appropriate” or “not appropriate” 
for women, and prevent them from getting highly-paid occupations (UNIFEM 2004). 
Therefore, an assumption is that in the health sector, normative gender roles seem to confine 
Cambodian women to traditional women’s occupations such as that of nurse and midwife, 
instead of medical doctor. 
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Even during the recent rapid economic growth, defined gender roles disadvantaged women 
relative to men in terms of increasing their income (UNIFEM, World Bank, ADB, UNDP, 
and DFID 2004; World Bank 2007). A small proportion of women benefited in terms of their 
employment almost solely in the garment industry, where, exceptionally, females comprise 
90% of the work force (USAID 2006).  
3.2 Development of the health sector  
The underdevelopment of the health sector, including a general shortage of HRH has been a 
serious problem to the health of Cambodians. Although various development measures were 
taken; it seemed that more effective measures were being sought. The underdevelopment 
was immediately attributable to the genocide carried out by the Khmer Rouge regime and the 
following stagnant sector development. The genocide and forced labour inflicted by the 
Khmer Rouge is quoted as having reduced the number of doctors from 1000 to less than 50 
(MOH 2002). However, this shortage has been re-balanced to some extent by their 
accelerated production since, particularly during the communist era. In 2000, the number of 
HRH per 1,000 people was 0.61 for nurses, 0.23 for midwives, and 0.16 for doctors (World 
Health Organization 2006). The shortage, i.e., excess demand, tended to undermine the 
morale of health professionals, which was claimed to have had a long-term negative impact 
on health services (Akashi et al. 2004). Health service delivery was largely restricted to the 
capital and a few relatively large towns (Hills and Tan Eang. 2007).  
 
During the years of the communist regime in the 1980s, the health sector received limited 
support from the Western bloc countries; only NGOs and UNICEF had projects/programmes 
there (MOH 2002). Even after the Paris Peace Accord in 1991, because the political power of 
the former communist regime was influential in governing and developing the state, some 
‘western’ bilateral donors refrained from supporting the new government. Instead, they 
supported NGOs, consequently, the NGOs responded to a large demand for health services 
including those from refugees and returnees. Due to this, the NGOs later participated in the 
official process of the health sector-wide management (SWIM). 
 
Meantime, since the enhancement of coordination among donors including NGOs was 
regarded as important for the development of the health sector, in 1992 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) began to support the government in establishing and enhancing the 
national coordination mechanism. This was followed by the establishment of the 
provincial-level mechanism and processes towards a sector-wide approach which aimed at 
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effective and efficient resource use for prioritized issue areas. The SWIM was started for the 
inclusive purpose of coordinating prioritised areas and the support of NGOs through 
“formulating policy and managing all agencies and organisations, both public and private, 
with a common strategy and mutually agreed management arrangement” (MOH 2002, p. 62).  
 
After the establishment of the new government, the flow of aid to the health sector from UN 
organisations, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs significantly increased; Public health 
expenditure depended on such international cooperation for as much as 88.6% of its funding 
(Lanjouw, S. et al. 1999). 
 
During the same years, dual practice was claimed to have increased largely due to the 
shortage of health service delivery by government services (Akashi et al.2004). The dual 
practice has been quoted as being widespread and is attributed as having contributed to high 
out-of-pocket expenditures (van Damme et al. 2004), low quality of the government health 
services because of health workers’ absenteesm and limiting service (Soeters and Griffiths 
2003; MOH 2002; Hardeman et al. 2004; Jacobs and Price 2004; Akashi et al.2004; Chhea et 
al. 2010), as well as harmful medical practices (Vong et al. 2005; SRC 2006; Vong et al. 
2005; Personal observation). Dual practice seems to be an open secret since it has been 
ubiquitous and privately admitted to by health workers. It was sometimes even conducted 
during official working hours (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Chhea et al. 2010), despite the fact 
that government regulation prohibits this during working hours. Enforcement of the rule has 
been weak, although punishments included dismissals or transfer of the offender from the 
current health facility where they are working to a different one (SRC 2006). A study 
conducted by MOH (MOH 2005), which is described below and elaborated in Chapter 6, 
asked health workers about the number of hours worked and the number of patients health 
workers saw in their dual practice sessions in one week. The majority of the health workers 
who participated belonged to cadres with the highest qualification and who were working in 
the capital or in relatively big towns (MOH 2005). 
 
Very little information about private health services as a whole in rural areas is available. 
This seems to be attributable to the low level of institutional development in the health sector. 
Even in the late 1990s, the rule of the central government had not reached into all local 
areas; remnants of Khmer Rouge actually ruled some areas. A coup d’état in 1997 made the 
capital into a battle field. During this time, the MOH was striving primarily to improve the 
government health service, and create the coordination mechanism for a large number of 
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cooperation agencies and NGOs. Only in the early 2000s, did the MOH begin to regulate the 
private health service sector. 
3.3 The current situation of the health sector 
The current situation of the health sector development still shows problematic features, 
particularly in relation to service delivery. With such problems, special measures like 
financial incentives to health workers may be easily conceived and argued for as necessary, 
but with little reference to assessing the likely impact on the health workers’ and their 
households’ income. This was despite there have been indications that they have a variety of 
income sources.  
 
In the early 2000s, the health status of the Cambodian population was the lowest of all South 
Asian countries (MOH 2002). In 2001, the life expectancy at birth was 56 years and the 
infant mortality rate was 97/1000 live births (UNICEF 2003). A high poverty rate 
exacerbated this low health status (Khun and Manderson 2008; Huy et al. 2009; Hong and 
Mishra 2006). 
 
Access to government health services was low due to the general shortage of health facilities, 
physical difficulties of access, and a shortage of HRH (MOH 2002). These problems were 
more acute in rural areas than in urban areas. A shortage of midwives was particularly 
critical (Sherratt et al. 2006). The HRH shortage has at times been eased by the employment 
of so-called casual staff who had medical qualifications but who had not obtained civil 
servant positions. Even unqualified personnel, who were neither government officials nor 
qualified medical staff, were hired at the discretion of the managers of the health facilities 
which were experiencing shortages (Abe 2008). This practice has exposed patients to 
potentially harmful medical procedures. 
 
Government spending on the health sector has been low; and insufficient to improve the 
health status of the population. In contrast, out-of-pocket health expenditure was more than 
10 times higher than government expenditure, i.e., $25.90 versus $2.50, in the Cambodian 
Demographic and Health Survey 2000 (ADB 2002a). This high out-of-pocket expenditure 
has been partly due to fees for private practice or to unofficial payments often requested at 
government health facilities (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). The high out-of-pocket 
expenditure causes catastrophic situations for poor households. In order to meet these high 
out-of-pocket expenditures, poor households often need to sell their property, thus becoming 
landless, or they need to borrow from money-lenders at a high interest rate, sacrificing other 
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economic activities to meet interest payments (Van Damme et al. 2004).  
 
Under chronic budget shortage, the MOH has continued to be heavily dependent on funds 
from donors (MOH 2002), though concreate figures has been unrevealed. In addition, budget 
disbursements from the MOH to Provincial Health Departments (PHDs) and from PHDs to 
Operational Districts, has frequently been delayed, as is typically seen in  “fragile states” 
(DFID 2005; World Bank 2010). Delayed disbursements have been problems for service 
delivery in Cambodia despite the fact that direct disbursement of budgets from the national 
treasury to prioritized national programs in Operational Districts has been set up.  
3.3.1 Health policy 
After the massive inflow of support, the MOH began to developed national health policies 
and plans (Grundy et al. 2009).  
(1) Operational Districts: structure and services  
The first prepared plan was designed to increase service delivery, strengthening district level 
basic health services for specific target groups: people in rural areas; mothers and children; 
vulnerable people such as orphans and the disabled, and strengthening the health care system 
through efficient resource management (MOH No date). The Health Service Coverage Plan, 
created in 1996, constructed a network of health districts named Operational Districts. An 
Operational District consists of an Operational District Office, a Referral (District) Hospital, 
and several Health Centres (around 10 to 20), and covers 100,000 to 200,000 of the 
population. This network aimed to:  
1) expand health service coverage,  
2) achieve appropriate use of resources,  
3) establish a referral system and  
4) increase efficiency of the management of Operational Districts.  
 
The MOH redefined the functions of Referral Hospitals and Health Centres by introducing 
packages of health services to be provided by them. They are the Minimum Package of 
Activities (MPA) for Health Centres, and the Comprehensive Package of Activities (CPA)
 
for 
Referral Hospitals (Table 3.1) which has three levels (CPA 1 to 3, from the lowest to the 
highest) designated according to the level of surgical facilities (MOH No date). There were 
44 CPA2 and CPA3 hospitals (Annear, P. L. et al. 2008). For this plan, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation agencies have provided supports for a variety of objectives (MOH 
2002).  
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However, implementation of the policy had been disrupted by the inadequate capacity of the 
MOH (MOH 2002) as well as by problems caused by conditions inside and outside the 
health sector. For example, the number of health staff at rural health facilities has been much 
lower than the required number by policies (MOH 2002), frequently only half the number 
defined as required by the MPA policy (Personal observation). In an Operational District, 
most health workers who had higher medical qualifications were required to assume 
managerial roles at health facilities and offices; doctors or assistant doctors were required to 
act as the district managers or deputies. The construction of Health Centres in rural areas has 
frequently been delayed; consequently, as late as 2008, some Health Centres were operating 
without buildings, providing services at the home of a Health Centre staff member (personal 
observation). 
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Table 3.1 Outline of Minimum Package of Activities (MPA) and 
Comprehensive Package of Activities (CPA) 
 
Minimum Package of Activities (MPA) Comprehensive Package of Activities (CPA) 
Primary curative 
consultation 
(malaria, 
sexually 
transmitted 
diseases, 
diarrhoea) 
Consultation for 
infants aged 0 to 4  
(vaccination, 
management of 
malnutrition, 
prevention of 
vitamin A 
deficiency) 
Referred cases Medical and surgical 
emergencies:(amputation, 
strangulated hernia, 
appendicitis, transfusion, 
cardiovascular 
resuscitation) 
Chronic Disease 
(TB, leprosy) 
 
Care for pregnant 
women 
(antenatal and 
postnatal care, 
tetanus toxoid 
vaccination, 
prevention of 
anaemia, delivery 
and referral of 
complicated cases) 
Complicated 
deliveries  
(extra-uterine 
pregnancy, 
obstructed 
labour, 
haemorrhage, 
retained 
placenta, 
Caesarean 
sections) 
Simple surgery cases 
(hernia, cataract) 
Birth spacing Referral Complicated TB 
cases 
Hospitalization 
Outreach 
Activities 
Health promotion 
relating to all these 
activities 
Laboratory 
diagnosis 
Radiological and 
ultrasound diagnosis 
  Rehabilitation 24 hour ward duty by 
skilled staff 
   Health promotion relating 
to all these activities 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Guideline for Developing Operational District [no publication 
date]. 
 
 
(2) Human Resources for Health 
In spite of these policies, plans and other guidelines (MOH 2006a, b, 2007a), staff 
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development and deployment have been facing problems. Ordinary rural Health Centres had 
no doctors, assistant doctors, (MOH No date) or secondary midwives. The accelerated 
production of HRH to some extent filled this gap, but the repeatedly changing duration or 
content of the training of HRH have caused problems in the quality of health services (MOH 
2006b).  
 
At the time of the fieldwork of this study (2007), MOH had a grading system of technical 
cadres and non-technical staff of MOH for managing basic payments and promotions (Table 
3.2)  
 
Table 3.2: MOH personnel grading system  
 
Educational background* does not mean the education (training) to become HRH.  
Source: MOH 2005 
 
In the early 2000s, responding to chronic shortage of HRH (doctors, assistant doctors and  
secondary midwives) in rural areas, and issues related to low salaries for HRH, the MOH and 
cooperation agencies adopted merit-based performance payments (MOH 2006a). Two types 
of regimes were introduced, with higher payments than ordinary government salaries, for a 
group of staff in high managerial positions in the MOH or the PHD (MOH 2006a). However, 
the regimes were short-lived not because of outcomes of the payments but of results from 
criticism of the extra payment by other ministries and issues involving the relationship 
between the government and cooperation agencies (Personal observation). 
Grade Educational 
background* 
Technical cadres and other categories 
Grade 
A 
 
4 year education 
after high school 
education  
Doctors, dentists, pharmacists, non-medical staff 
with graduate education] 
 
Grade 
B 
 
2 year education 
after high school 
education  
Assistant level staff of Doctors, Dentists, 
Pharmacists and Physiotherapists. Secondary 
Laboratory Technician.  Secondary Midwives and 
Secondary Nurses who are in managerial positions 
at health facilities 
Grade 
C 
  
High school 
education 
Primary and Secondary Midwives, Primary and 
Secondary Midwives, Primary Laboratory 
Technicians 
Grade 
D 
  
The required 
education level was 
not specified.  
Drivers, Other manual labourers 
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(3) User-fees 
User-fees were introduced in 1997 in order to serve several purposes. They were intended to 
decrease: 
1) unofficial payments such as under-the-table-payments (Barber et al. 2004; Hardeman et al. 
2004; Van Damme W et al. 2004), including formalisation of them (Ensor 2004) and  
2) out-of-pocket expenditure (Barber et al. 2004; Hardeman et al. 2004; Van Damme et al. 
2004)  
as well as to increase:  
3) the quality of health services, 
4) the operational budgets of Health Centres and Referral Hospitals, 
5) the income of health workers, hence increasing staff motivation (Jacobs and Price 2004; 
Soeters and Griffiths 2003).  
 
The level of user-fees was set, through community participation in each Operational District, 
to reflect the socio-economic situation of the community. 
 
Government rules defined the allocation of user-fees collected at the health facility level: 1% 
should be sent to the national treasury and another 1% to PHD, 50% for the operational 
budget, and 48% for supplementing the salaries of health workers employed by the health 
facility. However, no rules had been set for the allocation of funds within the 48% designated 
to supplement salaries (Noirhomme et al. 2007). In 2006, the allocation to operational cost 
was increased to 69% (MOH 2007b). 
(4) Equity Fund 
Poor people in the community were exempted from the user-fees; an 'equity fund' 
supplemented the loss of user-fee incomes from those exempted. The ‘equity fund’ was set 
up primarily in hospitals in Operational Districts through funds made available by 
cooperation agencies or NGOs. Twenty-six equity funds existed in government hospitals in 
2006 (Noirthomme et al. 2007) and almost half of the Operational Districts accessed this 
fund (Annear et al. 2008). Studies of a limited number of these equity funds showed positive 
results in increasing the access of the poor to health services (Hardeman et al. 2004; Van 
Damme et al. 2004; Noirthomme et al. 2007; Jacobs et al. 2006; Annear et al. 2008; Ir et al. 
2010). 
 
Community-based health insurance was also begun by NGOs, in order to reduce the burden 
of health expenditure among the less-poor population (Jacobs and Price 2006; Annear et al. 
2008; Ir et al. 2010). Community-based health insurance has expanded slowly and, in 2003, 
the government included it in its health policy framework (Annear et al. 2008). 
 52 
 
(5) Decentralization  
The decentralization of national government and administrative reform have been promoted 
since the mid-1990s, and have advanced the MOH’s delegation of planning, financing and 
other administration to PHDs and Operational District Offices. However, this delegation has 
been slow: hindered by the insufficient capacity of PHDs and Operational District Offices to 
undertake the delegated responsibilities (Men et al. 2005).  
(6) First national strategic plan 
In 2002, the MOH developed the first national strategic plan for the heath sector for the 
period 2003 to 2007. This strategy had 6 thematic areas: Non-communicable-disease, Health 
service delivery, Behavioural change, Quality improvement, Human resource development, 
Health financing, and Institutional development. Creation of this strategic plan was expected 
to strengthen the MOH’s leading role in sector wide management (MOH 2002). 
(7) Private sector health services  
Private clinics were rare, even in Phnom Penh, until the mid-1990s, but almost never seen in 
rural area. Since the mid-1990s, provisions of private services have increased, probably as a 
result of dual practice by government health workers (Rose et al. 2002; CENET and 
University Research Co. Ltd. 2004; Options/DFID 2001). 
 
The government has been regulating the private sector health services for only a decade, 
mainly in Phnom Penh. After 2009, regulations increased significantly (Fujita 2012). In 2011, 
4,962 private clinics (including polyclinics) were licensed (Fujita 2012). Regulations state 
that the owner of a clinic cannot be an MOH staff member; and dual practice is prohibited. 
However, there are no dual practice regulations relating to the health staff of clinics (Fujita 
2012).  
 
While there are no studies available about private health services during those years, a few 
studies were carried out by consultants, NGOs and MOH on the services available to the 
urban poor. These indicated that there were problems in the quality and prices of the services 
and found that most service providers were government health workers (Rose et al. 2002; 
CENET and University Research Co. Ltd. 2004). The prices were unacceptably high, 
compared with the annual household expenditures of patients (Options/DFID 2001).  
3.3.2 Payments to government health workers  
In Cambodia, as illustrated below, payments to government health workers usually consist of 
a variety of payment types including government salaries, supplementary salaries and 
per-diems from cooperation agencies and NGOs, as well as income from private practice. 
The existence of a variety of payments suggests that incentive measures to health workers 
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need to take these payments into account.  
(1) Government regular payments 
Government salaries for health workers have been extremely low when compared with living 
cost (Akashi et al. 2004; Soeters and Griffiths 2003), quoted as $10 to $30 per month in the 
early 2000s, encouraging dual practice (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). The major component of 
the government salary is based on cadre (Table 3.2); other components are: seniority, length 
of service, and a family allowance (paid only to males). While the salaries are due monthly, 
payment is often delayed. Low salaries have caused the prevalence of dual practice (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency: JICA 2002; Soeters and Griffith 2003). In 2005, the 
Prime Minister of Cambodia, bypassing the legislative process, increased salaries to 
government officials including health workers by 15%. Since then, the salaries of health 
workers have been raised by around 10% every year; however, due to the low original salary 
level, the increases have not made a substantial difference (Fujita 2009).  
 
Government salaries have discouraged people from pursuing careers in the government 
health sector, since the salaries are regarded as imbalanced when compared with the 
educational investment required (Personal observation). This argument seems to be 
particularly apt for midwives (Sherratt et al. 2006). Government salary levels have caused a 
'brain drain' of staff from the MOH to NGOs and an absorption of graduates from 
government health training institutes into NGOs’ health facilities. Low salaries also 
contribute to persistent shortages of some types of HRH in rural area (Personal Observation). 
 
Unofficial payments to the health workers prevailed (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Van 
Damme et al. 2004; Barber et al. 2004; Hardeman et al. 2004; Akashi et al. 2004), partly due 
to the nature of the public sector (Dixit 2002; Besley and Ghatak 2003) and also due to the 
under-developed institutional settings of the government health sector. However, after the 
adoption of the user-fee system, requests for unofficial payments appeared to reduce (Akashi 
et al. 2004). The amount individual health workers receive has been largely unstudied. Fairly 
frequently, limited numbers of health workers received honoraria for conducting training or 
for teaching (Personal observation). 
 
As outlined above, two regimes of meritocratic performance-based payments were applied to 
the specific group of staff.  
(2) Income from private practice  
Information about government health workers’ income from dual practice has been largely 
unavailable, except for the MOH study which investigated their income from and work hours 
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for private practice (MOH 2005) and was referred to above (more detailes in Chapter 6). 
However, it has been obvious that the incomes have been higher than their government 
salaries, indicating that dual practice has negatively affected government service delivery 
(Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Akashi et al. 2004). This implies that the effect of financial 
incentives in the government sector is highly likely to have been influenced by private 
practice income. 
(3) Supplementary salaries and per-diems  
Supplementary salaries and per-diem payments from mainly NGOs or national programmes 
were important sources of income for health workers. Although these payments varied, 
depending on the role of the health worker, the workload and the organisation which made 
the payment, generally their contribution to annual income was significant, relative to 
government salaries. The amounts were in the tens of US dollars per month (Personal 
observation). These amounts were still significant, when compared with the quoted 
government regular salaries above. There were no government rules relating to health 
workers’ receiving these payments (KI14, April 23, 2005), and health workers were often 
eager to receive them. 
 
Supplementary salaries from the Global Fund have been claimed to reach to hundreds of US 
dollars if the recipient health worker was at a senior level in MOH (Personal observation). 
Per-diems paid by NGOs, UN Organisations and the national program ranged from US$2.00 
to US$31.5. Most organisations surveyed provided more than US$20.00 for an overnight 
stay in Phnom Penh for those travelling from a province (MEDICAM 2006). This money 
was often saved by the recipient by various means. 
 
In Cambodia, supplementary salaries and per-diems were understood to be influenced 
indirectly by the patronage system (Tan 2008), and their allocation affected the management 
of service delivery (Personal observation). The patronage system seemed to distort the 
allocation of opportunities among health worker for receiving salaries and per-diems and to 
reduce meritocratic aspects of payments. The chief of the Operational District would gain 
respect, and could exercise leadership smoothly, if they were able to secure outside projects 
and programmes, because of the resulting payment of supplementary salaries and per-diems 
to health workers in their Operational District (KI11, August 14 2006).  
 
If high supplementary salaries are paid, in parallel with performance-based payments, in a 
contracting setting, they may compete with the performance-based payments for efforts, i.e., 
influence on allocation of heatlh workers’labour supply from the multiple-task setting was 
enhanced by the project attached to these payments. Per-diems received for attendance were 
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a strong pull for the health workers, often regarded as a cause of the frequent absence of 
health workers from health facilities due to their attendance at training courses (Smith 2003). 
Thus, these payments often proved detrimental to the carrying out their government work 
(Personal observation). Therefore, supplementary salaries and per-diem payments were 
likely to influence the effect of government financial incentive.  
(4) Share from User-fee income  
The objectives and allocation methods of the user-fees were explained above, together with 
the lack of information on the amount of money health workers received.  
(5) Other incomes 
Unofficial payments to the health workers were prevalent (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Van 
Damme et al. 2004; Barber et al. 2004; Hardeman et al. 2004) but decreased after the 
adoption of the user-fee system (Akashi et al. 2004). However, little is known about the 
payment individual health workers received. Honoraria for conducting training or teaching 
were received fairly frequently by a small number of health workers (Personal observation).  
3.3.3 NGO activities in the health sector 
The activities and presence of NGOs in the health sector have been significant, as described 
above. Their involvement, particularly in health service delivery, has increased - around 100 
NGOs implemented projects between late 2006 and early 2007 (MOH 2007a). The NGO 
umbrella organisation, MEDICAM was established in 1989 (Vaux et al. 2005). It participated 
in the SWIM with UN organisations and bilateral donors as described above. 
 
NGO perspectives on health sector development in Cambodia have varied. Some NGOs have 
collaborated with the MOH, in such cases as the equity fund or the contracting out of 
government health services (Annear 2008; Ir et al. 2010; Soeters and Grifitths 2003; Jacobs 
et al. 2010), showing the strong influence and presence of NGOs. However, other NGOs 
have not followed national policies or have even taken contrary approaches to national 
policies. 
 
As described above, NGOs absorb government health workers and graduates from health 
training institutes. However, the NGO jobs were often said to be more demanding of staff 
than the government work required (KI02 May 27 2007; KI15, 27 March 2007, KI17 July 18 
2007). Job security at NGOs was also uncertain, since relatively big NGOs could suddenly 
dismiss a large proportion of their local staff, in response to changes in the focus of their 
funding-source (often bilateral cooperation agencies), e.g. from health education in 
HIV/AIDS prevention to access to ARI (Personal observation). 
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3.4 Cambodian contracting of health services 
3.4.1 ADB pilot project 
(1) Features 
The ADB Pilot Project has been seen as a successful example of contracting out as well as 
performance-based payment; however, what factors made the payments effective have not 
been thoroughly studied. In particular, the implications of payments to health workers’ and 
their household income need to be studied in more depth. This pilot project started in 1998 
with a hypothesis that "the government might deliver health service more effectively and 
efficiently through administering contracts to non-governmental entities" (ADB 2004, P. vii). 
The Pilot Project ended in 2003. In the Pilot Project, five Operational Districts were 
contracted to four NGOs: HealthNet International, the Association of Medical Doctors of 
Asia, Save the Children France, and Save the Children Australia. One of the contractors 
voluntarily applied performance-based payments to the government health workers who 
were working in the district contracted out. 
 
Two types of contracting were implemented in this pilot project: 'Contract-out' and 
'Contract-In'. They differed in payments and other human resource management of HRH, 
drug and supply procurement and budget disbursement procedures (Table 3.3). 
‘Contract-Out’ was implemented in two Operational Districts and ‘Contract-In’ in three 
Operational Districts. ’Contract-Out’ was delegated a larger authority over human resources 
to NGOs than ‘Contract-In’.  
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 Management of HRH Procurement and budget 
disbursement 
‘Contract- 
Out’ 
- allowed the NGO contractors 
to employ health workers who 
had been working in the 
Operational District. The 
health workers employed took 
leave of absence from the 
MOH and made individual 
employment contracts with the 
NGO contractor. The 
contractors could form their 
own staff-mix and dismiss the 
health workers. 
- allowed the NGO contractor 
to decide payments to health 
workers.  
- allowed the NGO contractors to 
purchase drugs and supplies as 
they liked, following the 
procurement guidelines of ADB. 
 
- allowed the NGO contractors to 
receive an operational budget 
directly provided by the project, 
not through the MOH. 
‘Contract- 
In’ 
- did not allow the NGO 
contractors authority to 
employ and dismiss health 
workers (the NGO contractors 
requested proper deployment 
of health personnel in terms of 
both the number and the 
cadre, from MOH. However, 
their requests were not 
fulfilled). 
 
- required the NGO 
contractors to maintain the 
previous staff-mix and to work 
with health workers 
previously employed. 
. 
- The health workers were still 
paid government monthly 
salaries. 
- required the NGO contractors to 
obtain drugs and supplies through 
the normal MOH route. But this 
caused delays, and thus problems 
for health service delivery and 
other activities of ‘Contract-In’. 
 
- The operation budget 
disbursements were made through 
the normal MOH framework
 
with 
ordinary operation budget for an 
Operational District, and delays of 
disbursement occurred. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Differences between 'Contract-Out' and 'Contract-In' Operational Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB 2004; Soeters and Griffiths 2003. 
 
(2) Payments to health workers  
This section presents information on the main forms of payment to the health workers in the 
pilot project, but includes less on the amount of the payments, due to a limited availability of 
 58 
 
information. Presenting the amounts lies beyond the scope of this study. 
 
In ‘Contract-out’ Operational Districts, health workers were employed by the NGO 
contractor and were paid NGO-based salaries. As a result, the payments were much higher 
than payments in ‘Contract-In’, even though in ‘Contract-In” Operational Districts extra 
payments were paid to the health workers by the NGO contractors (KI14 April 23 2005; 
KI13 Aug 26 2006). Among the extra payments a particularly notable one was 
performance-based payment, which is described below. 
(3) User-fee income 
A higher proportion of user-fee income than the national rule was allocated to health 
facilities in the ADB Pilot Project; after 1% was remitted to the Provincial Health Office and 
another 1% to the national treasury from the total, the remaining 98% could be used for 
payments to health workers (MOH 2007b). 
(4) Prohibition of dual practice  
The level of restriction on private practice varied among the NGO contractors; one of them 
totally prohibited it but others only applied partial restrictions (KI01, June 19; KI02, July9, 
2007; KI03, July 10, 2007). 
(5) Performance-based payments in the Pilot Project  
An NGO contractor (HealthNet International: HNI), which implemented ‘Contract-in’ within 
the Pereang Operational District, Prey Veng Province, introduced performance-based 
payments through the setting up of sub-contractual relations in 2001, two years after 
beginning of the project (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). It is argued that these payments 
contributed to the increase in health service coverage as well as to the efficiency of health 
service deliveries (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). These outcomes matched the objectives of 
project.  
 
The payments were connected to the volume of output. Dual practice among health workers 
was totally prohibited, with punitive measures in place for enforcement. “The total income of 
health workers from government health work (comprising performance-based payments, 
supplementary payments from HNI, shares from user-fee income and government regular 
payments) was quoted as totalling 500 to 800% more than their basic government salary 
(Soeters and Griffths 2003). However, the percentage of each component is unclear, thus the 
economic importance of performance-based payments is also unclear. 
(6) Evaluation of the pilot project by ADB 
An evaluation of the ADB Pilot Project made by ADB, a funding source to the project, 
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investigated the experience of eight Operational Districts: two ‘Contract-Out’; three 
‘Contract-in’; and three control Operational Districts. The ADB evaluation argued that 
contracting was effective and successful in various respects: increasing output of health 
services, ‘cost effectiveness’, raising the quality of services as well as improving equity 
(ADB 2001, 2002a, b, 2004; Keller and Schwartz 2001). Other studies supported some of 
these views (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Annear et al. 2006). However, elaborations of 
performance-based payments, supplementary salaries, and user-fee allocation and payment 
arrangements or mechanisms seem to be lacking in the ADB evaluation and in other studies 
and reports which supported the positive evaluation. 
Service coverage 
On average, output indicators of health service delivery increased by more than 3 times in 
‘Contract-out’ and by 1.8 times in ‘Contract-in’ Operational Districts during the project 
duration (calculated from ADB 2002a. p.36). However, they decreased in the controls 
(Appendix 1). The quality of services was also better in ‘Contract-out’ and ‘Contract-in’ 
Operational Districts than the control Operational Districts (Appendix 1 ) (ADB 2002b). 
Cost effectiveness  
The cost effectiveness of service delivery was found to be better in ‘Contract-out’ and 
‘Contract-in’ Operational Districts than in the controls. However, the definition of cost 
effectiveness used in the evaluation was ADB's own definition. It was defined as “the 
average percentage of change(s)” in all eleven indicators, such as the number of cases of 
antenatal care, “divided by the average total cost per capita over the 2.5-year pilot period” 
(ADB 2002b P.36), and thus it differed from the cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) in health 
economics. 
Equity 
The evaluation argued that the pilot project gave benefits to people belonging to lower 
socio-economic groups through decreasing their out-of-pocket health care expenditures 
(ADB 2002b). However, the project results could be seen as too mixed to be able to support 
such a definitive conclusion. In fact, out-of-pocket expenditure increased in two ‘Contract-in’ 
Operational Districts, while it decreased in two ‘Contract-out’ and in one ‘Contract-in’ 
Operational District (ADB 2002b). 
3.5 DFID/World Bank Contracting Project  
Because of the positive evaluations of the pilot project (ADB 2001, 2002a, b, 2004; Keller 
and Schwartz 2001; Soeters and Griffiths 2003) and MOH’s acknowledging this, a new 
contracting out project (hereafter referred to as the 'DFID/World Bank Contracting Project' 
because they were the main funders) was begun. In this project, performance-based 
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payments were required to be applied because of the experience of a district in the pilot 
project. The results of this new project were also praised by the supporting donors and the 
MOH (MOH 2007b).  
(1) Features 
The DFID/World Bank Contracting Project was one of the components of a larger Health 
Sector Support Project (HSSP), supported by World Bank, DFID and other cooperation 
agencies. It was implemented from May 2004 to December 2008 and covered 11 Operational 
Districts, including 5 of the Operational Districts where the pilot project had originally been 
implemented (MOH 2007b). Table 3.4 shows the 11 Operational Districts with their 
provinces and the NGO contractors.  
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Table 3.4: Operational Districts contracted out in DFID/World Bank Contracting 
Project  
 
Operational 
District 
Province NGO contractor Note 
Peareang  Prey Veng Healthnet 
International 
The province having a border with 
Vietnam  
Preah Sdach Prey Veng Healthnet 
International 
The same as above 
Kirivong Takeo Swiss Red Cross The same as above 
Angroker Takeo Swiss Red Cross The same as above 
Memot Kampong Cham Save the Children 
Australia 
The same as above 
Ponhakrek Kampong Cham Save the Children 
Australia 
The same as above 
Sre Amble Koh Kong Care The province being along the Gulf of 
Thailand  
Smach 
Meanchey 
Koh Kong Care The same as above 
Banlung Ratanakiri Healthnet 
International 
The province having borders with 
Laos and Vietnam; plateau area 
Senmonorum Mondulikiri Healthnet 
International 
The province having a border with 
Vietnam, below Ratanakiri, the 
western part of Cambodia 
Tbeng 
meanchey 
Preag Vihear  Health Unlimited  The province having a border with 
Thailand and being border conflict 
area. Plateau area. 
 
 
 
Note: Note in the table was added by this study. 
Source: World Bank 2008. 
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These 11 Operational Districts were selected, because of their perceived difficulty in 
increasing health service delivery. This was due to a combination of factors, including: their 
remote, rural and impoverished location; having ethnic minorities; or being affected by 
border conflicts with another country (MOH 2001, 2007b; World Bank 2006, 2007). The 
NGO Contractors were five relatively well-known international NGOs. A Cambodian NGO, 
the Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia (RHAC), was a sub-contractor of an 
international NGO for the implementation of the project in Preah Sdach Operational Districts 
(Table 3.4). 
 
This project did not have the two types: ‘Contract-in’ and ‘Contract-out’, having only one 
type. There was less left to the NGO contractors’ discretion in this project, compared with 
‘Contract-out’. They were required to procure drugs and supplies and to implement budgets 
within the framework of the MOH system, though they received specific project budgets. 
The budget for the project implementation for each Operational District was based on a 
per-capita budget by district. However, the framework caused problems in implementation 
because of chronic shortages and delays in physical and financial resources (MOH 2007b). 
 
The MOH established a monitoring team for the implementation of the project. This MOH 
monitoring team visited these Districts quarterly. The monitoring included qualitative aspects, 
such as patient satisfaction with health services. Guided by the results of the monitoring 
process, the MOH disbursed the budget funds to the Operational District on a quarterly basis; 
however, disbursements were sometimes delayed. In addition, each NGO contractors created 
their own monitoring mechanism to access their subcontractors’ performance (KI12, August 
8 2006).  
(2) Payment arrangements and sub-contracting  
Payment arrangements for health workers were considerably changed from the pilot project; 
the NGO contractors decided the details but without the NGO’s obligation to report on the 
payments. Consequently, at the time of writing this thesis, limited information about 
payments was available, with the amount available varying among the NGO contractors. 
Features relating to the payment arrangement are outlined below (further details are 
described in Chapter 5): 
 
1) Government regular payments continued as before; 
2) Performance-based payments were incorporated into sub-contractual relations between the 
NGO contractor and the Operational District Office or the individual health facilities (Health 
 70 
 
Centres and Referral Hospitals); 
3) Existing government health staff, working for the Operational Districts, were seconded to 
the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project NGO contractors;  
4) Abstention from private practice by the health workers was required (no levels or 
quantified indicators were specified);  
5) Parts of user-fee income was required to be sent by sub-contractors to the Operational 
District Office (MOH 2001). 
 
The user-fee income of health facilities was also allocated to the health workers after a 
proportion was sent to different organisations: 1% of the user-fee income went to the 
national treasury; 1% to the PHD; a certain percentage (which varied in each of the 
Operational Districts contracted out) went to the Operational District Office. The remaining 
user-fee income was allocated to the individual health workers (MOH 2001). 
(3) MOH Review of DFID/World Bank Contracting Project  
The MOH conducted a review of the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project (MOH Review) 
in order to extract recommendations for the MOH's own plans to implement a wider 
application of internal contracting (MOH 2007b). In the course of the pilot and this project, 
the MOH conceived of the idea that the advantage of the contracting out, i.e., increasing 
health service delivery, could be achieved in their preferred form, ‘internal’ contract. The 
internal contract was to set the PHD as the principal, with the Operational District Offices 
and health facilities acting as the PHDs agents. The internal contracting was partly consistent 
with the Cambodian government’s goal of decentralisation. 
 
The timing of the review was more than one year prior to the end of the project. It included 
an evaluation of the achievements of each contracted-out district and of the project as a 
whole. The review presented a limited amount of detailed data; however, from the review, 
those factors exclusively relevant to our study are outlined here. 
 
The performance-based payments were given a high evaluation, as they were judged to have 
brought in positive changes: improvements in the coverage and quality of health services, 
increases in health workers’ incomes by appropriate amounts; improvements in their 
motivation, increases in attendance during working hours; and improvements in attitude. 
However, it is unclear what economic criteria were used to judge the level of payments as 
appropriate. Health workers’ incomes from different sources were mostly excluded from the 
judgement about the effect of payments.  
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The review recommended prohibitions of dual practice (MOH 2007b). This recommendation 
seemed significant when its implications of changing the incentive environment were 
considered. However, the recommendation included few details of the proposal; it contained 
few descriptions of levels of reduction of dual practice, punishment, mechanism and 
institutional arrangement concerning prohibition and punishment. 
 
This review did not compare the achievement with those of the control Operational Districts. 
The main results of the review, in the areas in common with the ADB Evaluation (ADB 
2002a), are shown in Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5: Result of MOH Contracting Review on service coverage, quality of care and 
equity 
Service coverage Quality of care Equity Per capita 
expenditure 
4 of 6 indicators for the 
year 2006 were achieved.  
Achieved indicators:  
antenatal care, deliveries 
at government health 
facilities, full 
immunizations, provision 
of vitamin A.  
 
Unachieved indicators: 
delivery assisted by 
trained attendants, birth 
spacing 
Improved aspects:  
health service 
delivery, 
accountability of 
health services to 
patients, attendance 
of government health 
workers. 
Data to show 
changes in 
equity was not 
specified in 
the review. 
US$3.83 to US$14.98  
(average: US$7.30) 
 
 
Note: Details of the indicators: both the targeted and achieved were not described in the reports. 
Target indicators for each contracted Operational District differed and stipulated in the 
contract agreement.  
Source: MOH 2007b p.29, 53. 
 
 
The review assessed the quality of care provided, though the contract agreement between 
each of the NGO contractors and the MOH does not have specific indicators relating to the 
quality (MOH 2007b). Details of descriptions and figures supporting the review assessment 
lacked elaboration.  
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The review maintained that data relating to access to health services by the poor was lacking 
in the project documentation, but it still expressed concerns about decreases in access to 
health services due to user fees and the inadequacy of the equity fund (MOH 2007b). 
 
The review views the level of the annual per capita health expenditure of the project (Table 
3.6) positively, compared with the national average of US$4.11 in 2005, which was regarded 
as too low (MOH 2007b) to provide adequate health service. 
1) Performance-based payments 
The review maintained that the health workers had been receiving “proper” incentives and 
“higher” income, that their attendance at health facilities had been adequate, and that health 
workers were present “most of the time” due to “proper” incentives. However, elaboration of 
the interpretation of “proper”, “higher”, or amounts of income and “most of the time” (MOH 
2007b P.50) appeared to be insufficient for the conclusions advanced. Consequently, the 
important things left unexplored by the review were the impact of payments in terms of the 
economic implications, the changes in their working hours which could be inferred by the 
economic impact (or may be directly investigated), and the incentive environment affecting 
the payments.  
2) Dual Practice  
The review contained limited descriptions of dual practice and its reduction, but mentioned 
that dual practice might have caused staff absences “during weekends” (MOH 2007b P.60). 
This highlighting of weekends seems to be almost irrelevant, time-wise, when compared to 
the frequency of absenteeism in weekday afternoons caused by dual practice (Personal 
Observation). No concrete descriptions of income from, or changed labour supply due to, 
dual practice were elaborated. The recommendation to prohibit dual practice with 
punishments did not give any specific details of the level of prohibition or punishments 
proposed. 
(4) Capacity assessment 
Separate to the MOH Review described above, the MOH also conducted a capacity 
assessment of all 11 contracted out Operational Districts (Table 3.4), other non-contracted 
out Operational Districts and PHDs. It employed the absolute evaluation method, and it was 
conducted in 2008, shortly before the end of the project (MOH 2008). Only one of the two 
assessment reports expected to be published (MOH 2008) was available during the period of 
the writing of this study. The background purpose of this assessment is closer to that of the 
MOH Review; obtaining recommendations from it to guide the MOH’s planned internal 
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contract relations (MOH
 
2008). It did not investigate details concerning performance-based 
payments. Consequently, this assessment was less relevant to the focus of the current study, 
the impact of performance-based payments to health workers. Some assessed areas were not 
stipulated as the objectives of the contracting out and even out of the authority of NGO 
contractors, e.g., allocations (deployment) of human resources.  
 
The contracted out Operational Districts received a mediocre evaluation: the average score in 
the seven areas related to managerial competence was around half of the possible score in the 
evaluation on the absolute scale (MOH 2008). This contrasts with the positive evaluation of 
the project in previous reports and studies; however, the areas assessed here were different 
from the focus of previous studies. No comparisons were made between the situations before 
and after the implementation of the contracting project. Table 3.6 show the results of the 
assessment. 
 
Table 3.6: Results of MOH Capacity Assessment of the Operational District contracted 
out 
Areas assessed (7 areas) Areas scored over 50% Areas scored below 50% 
- Planning  
-  Monitoring and 
supervision  
- Human resources 
allocation and management  
- Technical support  
- Essential drug 
management  
- Financial management  
-Coordination 
- Drug management (64%) 
- Human resources allocation 
and management (61%) 
- Financial management 
(59%) 
- Planning (37%)  
- Monitoring and supervision 
(44%) 
- Technical support (49%) 
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
The government health system of Cambodia has been facing issues that are typically seen in 
“fragile states” and other LMICs. The contracting out projects, including the pilot project, 
has been viewed as successful in increasing and improving health service delivery. Also, the 
performance-based payments paid in the projects have been regarded as a sufficient incentive 
for health works to raise their performances. However, evaluations of the impact of 
payments were limited. There was limited assessment of the payments’ economic impact on 
the health workers’ and their household income. The incentive environment and its influence 
on the impact of the payments were barely touched on in these studies.   
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Chapter 4 Methodology and Methods 
4.1Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological framework of this study followed by the methods 
applied, which took the form of mixed methods research. Rationales for this study’s using 
the mixed methods research are explicated. In the section on methods, details of qualitative 
and quantitative methods employed are described. After this, description of the study site and 
a discussion about the validity of quantitative investigation of this study follow. Finally, 
ethical consideration made for this study is described. 
4.2 Methodological framework 
4.2.1 Epistemology 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with how we understand, acquire, and 
explicate what we know (Crotty 1998). According to Crotty (1998), epistemology refers to 
“the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the 
methodology” of a study. The epistemological approach of a researcher therefore guides the 
development of the research design and methodological choice (Carter and Little 2007). The 
epistemological position that this study largely embraces is post-positivism and, to a lesser 
extent, pragmatism. While positivism has often been regarded as a foundation of empirical 
methodology, post-positivism, argues Clark (1998), “has replaced positivism as that which 
underpins most researchers’ empirical method” (p. 1243). Unlike positivism, with its focus 
on “discovering infallible and universal laws” (Clark, 1998, p. 1244), post-positivism 
acknowledges the influence on accepted reality of theoretical and cultural frameworks and 
conjectures (Phillips and Burbules 2000) and “that the outcome of investigation is an 
estimation of the truth rather than the truth itself” (Houghton et.al. 2012; p. 30). These views, 
and others described below, are appropriate to the subject under investigation of this study 
because the income and expenditures of government health workers studied were influenced 
by ‘unobservable factors’ such as culture and social trends. Second, performance-based 
payments investigated in this study are usually constructed deductively on the theory of 
contracting, and this study develops its arguments about the payments in the Cambodian case 
based on this theory. However, the design as well as the impact of the payments inevitably 
have been influenced by the social and cultural context in Cambodia. 
(1) Post-positivism 
In order to explain post-positivism, it is necessary to refer first to positivism and the 
challenges to its main premises. Positivism argues first, that an ultimate understanding of the 
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world is possible through knowledge; second, that theories must be grounded in empirical 
observation which can be tested, thus inferred theories are rejected; third, observation of the 
empirical world provides the only foundation of knowledge, thus theories of 
“non-observable things” are rejected as speculation in the metaphysical sphere (Phillips and 
Burbules 2000: p.9, 11). Finally, the argument of ‘logical positivism’ centres on “the 
theory/observation distinction” which maintains that “observation was independent of 
theories that they could serve as evidential warrants to appraise the adequacy of theories” 
(Phillips and Burbules 2000, p.9, 11). Many researchers considered that if empirical methods 
were not founded on the positivist view, the justification of the findings may not be 
convincing (Clark 1998). Yet, as Clark (1998) argues “positivism employs an overly 
reductionist view of the person in its quest for universal mechanistic rules which are 
culturally independent” (p. 1245). 
 
Positivism has been challenged repeatedly by different proponents of the science of 
philosophy. One of the main groups of challengers were Karl Popper and his followers, who 
argued the fallibility of knowledge and that theories are falsified or corrected or adjusted or 
discarded by other theories that have superior points. Thus, this group regards scientific 
theories as historically situated conjectures. However, they still maintain that science aims at 
finding the truth of existence and that theories are valued according to their degree of success 
in achieving the truth (Chalmers 1999). 
 
Another significant critique of Positivism was made by Thomas Kuhn, who denied that the 
development of science is produced through the sequential accumulation of new knowledge 
one piece at a time. He maintains that it occurs through periodic paradigm shifts which 
transform scientific inquiries in the area; that all paradigms include anomalies, and that these 
anomalies, not falsifications, disturb the development of science (Chalmers 1999). At the 
extreme end of the challenges, the view of Feyerabend situates science in the same rank as 
the mythologies or theories employed by enigmatic sects or religious groups (Chalmers 
1999). 
 
However, many of those who questioned positivism, but continued to find some of its 
features useful, forged post-positivism and argued that: 
a. observations are inevitably theory-laden, thus rejecting the argument of separation of 
theories from observations (Phillips and Burbules 2000);  
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b. knowledge is inevitably grounded on conjecture (speculation or inference) which has 
assertions capable of being adjusted or even discarded (Phillips and Burbules 2000);  
c. accepted reality is framed by theories and cultures (Phillips and Burbules 2000) and is 
“imperfectly apprehendable” (Houghton et.al. 2012, p. 35);  
d. the fallibility of induction is inevitable (Phillips and Burbules 2000);  
e. the researcher (the observer) is not thoroughly isolated from the inquiry (the observed) 
(Clark 1998);  
f. The aim of science and the value of theories consist of the degree to which they are helpful 
in approaching“‘warranted assertability’ as opposed to the ‘truth’” (Houghton et al. 2012, p. 
35). 
 
As Clark (1998) argues, studies founded on post-positivism do not reject qualitative data or 
findings obtained through qualitative methods, individual experiences or the meaning of the 
experiences. The successful combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies is 
also noted by Houghton et.al (2012) in their examination of health researchers who chose 
post-positivism for its emphasis on “the importance of multiple measures and observation” 
(p. 35).  
(2) Pragmatism 
The philosophy of pragmatism entails (though this is not an exhaustive list): rejection of 
traditional dualism; recognition of two parallel worlds, “the natural and physical world” and 
“the social and psychological world” which included human institution, subjective thoughts, 
language and culture. It has specific views of knowledge, truth, and theories. It views 
knowledge as a composition by constructed knowledge and knowledge articulating “the 
reality of world”. It views knowledge, the current truth and meaning as tentative and 
changeable. It regards theories as instrumental according to their “predictability and 
applicability” (Johnson and Onwuebguzie 2004, P. 18).  
 
Pragmatism emphasises that evaluations of a theory or concept need to examine how that 
theory or concept functions, and its consequences (Houghton et al. 2012). It is noted that 
both post-positivism and pragmatism originate in the ‘realist’ tradition which views reality as 
framed by experience, and as complex and multidimensional (Houghton et al. 2012). 
 
Pragmatism enables researchers to emphasise an area of interest by taking any 
epistemological and methodological approach which are appropriate to the context but 
without struggling with rhetorical construction (Houghton et al. 2012). Because of these 
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features, pragmatism is often employed in mixed-methods research (Houghton et al. 2012 ). 
(Mixed-method research is explained in the next section.) Pragmatism requires the research 
methods and data to articulate the research question, and to provide important results for the 
participants (Houghton et al. 2012). These requirements are considered to be fulfilled by 
mixing methods and approaches, and generating tentative results which lead to final 
synthesized results (Johnson et.al 2007). 
4.2.2 Mixed methods research  
Mixed methods research is defined by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 17) as “the class 
of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study.” Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2009, p. 5) maintain that mixed methods research “should incorporate many 
diverse viewpoints” and that “the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in 
combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach 
alone.” As noted above, pragmatism has generally been associated with mixed methods, 
since it offers an ‘umbrella’ paradigm allowing the convergence or combination of 
quantitative and qualititative methods. Pragmatism, as already noted, places less emphasis on 
epistemological purity, and more on ‘what works’ with an emphasis on the research 
questions that call for “real-life contextual understandings, multi-level perspectives and 
cultural influences” (Creswell et al. 2011, p. 4). Similarly, post-positivists are also open to 
both quantitative and qualitative data and even advocate the “importance of multiple 
measures and observation” (Houghton et al. 2012, p. 35), particularly in policy research. This 
is of particular relevance to a mixed methods research design as outlined below. 
 
Mixed methods began to be increasingly applied at the end of 1990s; Creswell and 
colleagues (2004), for example, noted that in 1999 a National Institutes of Health (NIH) task 
force issued guidelines that called for the application of mixed methods in health research. In 
other words, the NIH were calling for qualitative research to become more routinely used in 
health sciences to “improve the quality and scientific power of data” through its combination 
with the “clinical trials, surveys of attitudes and beliefs, and the epidemiological measures” 
used in quantitative research “to better understand health problems” (Creswell et al. 2011, p. 
2). Ozawa and Pongpirul (2013) concur with this view and suggest that mixed methods is 
also important when undertaking health systems research “because it allows researchers to 
view problems from multiple perspectives, contextualize information, develop a more 
complete understanding of a problem, triangulate results, quantify hard-to-measure 
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constructs, provide illustrations of context for trends, examine processes/experiences along 
with outcomes and capture a macro picture of a system” (Ozawa and Pongpirul 2013, p. 2). 
 
Mixed methods research has the advantage of accommodating more than one methodological 
approach with the aim that research is practical and effective in answering the research 
questions (Johnson and Onwuebguzie 2004). This was particularly apt for the current 
research study since it required a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods to fully investigate the effect of performance-based payments on health worker 
behaviour in a complex incentive environment.    
 
Bryman (2006 in Bryman 2012) analysed the reasons given by researchers for choosing 
mixed methods research, noting that the ‘enhancement’ or augmentation of findings from 
either qualitative or quantitative data was the most frequently stated reason. Table 4.1 lists 
the ways that these studies combined qualitative and quantitative research according to 
Bryman’s study (2012, pp. 633-34).    
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Table 4.1 Ways of combining quantitative and qualitative research (Bryman 2012:pp. 
633-34) 
Rationale Purpose 
1.Triangulation or 
greater validity 
Refers to the traditional view that quantitative and 
qualitative research might be combined to triangulate 
findings in order that they may be mutually corroborated.  
2.Offset Refers to the suggestion that the research methods 
associated with both quantitative and qualitative research 
have their own strengths and weaknesses so that combining 
them allows the researcher to offset their weaknesses to 
draw on the strengths of both 
3.Completeness Refers to the notion that the researcher can bring together a 
more comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in which 
he or she in interested if both quantitative and qualitative 
research are employed 
4.Process Quantitative research provides an account of structures in 
social life but qualitative research provides a sense of process 
5.Different research 
questions 
This is the argument that quantitative and qualitative 
research can each answer different research questions… 
6.Explanation One of the two research methods is used to help explain 
findings generated by the other 
7.Unexpected results Refers to the suggestion that quantitative and qualitative 
research can be fruitfully combined when on generates 
surprising results that can be understood by employing the 
other 
8.Instrument 
development 
Refers to contexts in which qualitative research is employed 
to develop questionnaire and scale items, for example, so that 
better wording or more comprehensive closed answers can be 
generated 
9.Sampling Refers to situations in which one approach is used to 
facilitate the sampling of respondents or cases 
10.Credibility Refers to suggestions that employing both approaches 
enhances the integrity of findings 
11.Context Refers to cases in which the combination is rationalized in 
terms of qualitative research providing contextual 
understanding coupled with either generalizable, externally 
valid findings or broad relationships among variables 
uncovered through a survey 
12.Illustration Refers to the use of qualitative data to illustrate quantitative 
findings, often referred to as putting ‘meat on the bones’ of 
‘dry’ quantitative findings 
13.Utility or improving 
the usefulness of 
findings 
Refers to a suggestion, which is more likely to be prominent 
among articles with an applied focus, that combining the two 
approaches will be more useful to practitioners and others 
14.Confirm and 
discover 
This entails using qualitative data to generate hypotheses 
and using quantitative research to test them within a single 
project 
15.Diversity of views This includes two slightly different rationales – namely, 
combining researchers’ and participants’ perspectives 
through quantitative and qualitative research respectively 
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and uncovering relationships between variables through 
quantitative research while also revealing meanings among 
research participants through qualitative research.  
16.Enhancement or 
building upon 
quantitative/qualitative 
findings 
This entails a reference to making more of or augmenting 
either quantitative or qualitative findings by gathering data 
using a qualitative or quantitative research approach 
 
 
Timing and sequencing of either one of qualitative and quantitative methods is important and 
relates to the priority given to one or the other method (Creswell et.al 2011). Bryman (2006) 
presented nine types of approaches for the timing and sequencing, incorporating the weight 
of each qualitative and a quantitative method. Bryman's typology is straightforward: he first 
divides types of mixed methods into three categories by weight: priority on quantitative 
methods, on qualitative methods, and equal priority. Under each of these three categories, 
three types of the sequence were set. However, finding the best connection between the 
priority and the sequences seems to be critical and requires careful consideration.  
 
Using Bryman's typology, my study design belongs to the type which places an emphasis on 
quantitative methods with the sequence starting from a qualitative method followed by 
quantitative methods. 
 
Creswell et.al (2011b) also identified four major sequencing designs which seem to be 
comprehensive. The designs consist of: convergent, in which the two designs are conducted 
in parallel; sequential, in which one builds on the results of the preceding method; embedded, 
in which the two methods are conducted again in parallel but with the one data collection 
method ‘nested’ in the priority method to add insights; and multiphase which involve 
multiple projects sharing common overall objectives are “conducted over time with links in 
place so that one phase builds on another” (Creswell et.al 2011b, p. 8). My study design is 
the sequential in which the quantitative research was build on the result of the preceding 
qualitative method.  
 
As seen above, there are advantages in employing mixed methods research and approaches. 
However, it is critically important to synthesise and appropriately integrate the results from 
the quantitative and qualitative methods. Some mixed method research presents the results 
from the two methods separately, with insufficient synthesis and integration. Reflecting this 
integration in writing up the results is important and requires it to be “more than the sum up 
of its parts” (Bryman 2006. p.699). 
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4.3 Methods of this study 
4.3.1 Mixed methods research  
In order to investigate the two research questions, both quantitative and qualitative methods 
were applied. Applying mixed methods was expected to increase the research capacity of this 
study since the characteristics of the subject issues and the research environment suited this 
approach, described below. Also, the rationale accorded with what Bryman maintains for 
mixed methods as noted in Bryman’s list presented in Table 4.1. Of the 16 reasons listed, 
eight were relevant for the application of mixed methods to this study: triangulation, 
completeness, process, explanation, credibility, context, utility, and enhancement, as follows. 
 
1 Triangulation and enhance validity 
Given the shortage of literature and previous study, results from both methods provide 
another venue for triangulation and enhance validity. 
 
2 Completeness  
The mixed method approach was expected to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of the impact of payments associated with the contracting settings. The qualitative methods 
were likely to result in an understanding of context, process, mechanism of the payments and 
other relevant aspects to the payment while the quantitative methods addressed the relative 
effects of variables concerning the payments.  
 
3 Process 
The qualitative methods of this study were expected to deepen understanding about the 
implications of institutional processes and rules. 
 
4 Explanation 
Results from the qualitative methods were expected to extend the explanation of results from 
the quantitative methods which the non-experimental settings were likely to constrain. 
 
5 Credibility 
Enhanced credibility of the findings was expected to result from integration of findings by 
employing mixed methods. This was important in the given study environment where 
findings might contain discursive features due to the shortage of literature and information 
particularly in Cambodia. 
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6 Contextual understanding  
The mixed method approach was highly likely to contribute to contextual understanding, 
since the mixed methods employed within this study performed a similar function to those 
described by Bryman, with “qualitative research providing contextual understanding coupled 
with” a “broad relationship among variables uncovered through a survey.” (Bryman 2012 
p.634). 
 
7 Utility  
The combination of the two methods was expected to increase the usefulness of findings 
from this study, since the quantitative methods were likely to suggest the appropriate level of 
payments associated with the contracting settings and the qualitative suggesting the 
appropriate operation of the mechanism and institutional settings.  
 
8 Enhancement 
The result from the quantitative methods about the allocation system operating at health 
facility level was expected to enhance the findings relating to the entire institutional 
arrangement of the payments, which were expected to be derived from the qualitative 
methods. 
 
Before deciding the methodology and methods, empirically researching subject issues 
involving incomes (Deaton 1997) and matters concerning money considered to be difficult 
and demanding. Difficulty in obtaining such information was intensified by the information 
asymmetry (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). More importantly, the subject issues appeared to be 
complicated and multifaceted. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the theory of change concerning 
the subject involves different spheres such as individual, organisational, operational as well 
as institutional spheres. The research environment had generated little literature and 
publicised information on the subject, exacerbated by situations in Cambodia as a 
post-conflict fragile LMIC where the physical, social and institutional infrastructure was not 
conducive to the conduct of a robust study.  
 
In this study, qualitative methods complemented quantitative methods, with quantitative 
being the dominant method. In keeping with Creswell et.al (2011a), a sequential design was 
instituted, in which qualitative data collection was followed by two quantitative surveys. In 
this design, the qualitative method preceded quantitative methods, contributing to the 
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following quantitative method. This design is also effective to this study because it 
accommodates a straight forward implementation by a single researcher and emerging needs 
from the qualitative phase with a quantitative phase (Creswell 2011a). The sequence of each 
research method in the process of this study is shown in Figure 4.1 below.  
 
The outline of the three investigations and their relations including contributions to each 
other and the entire research processes are as follows. 
1) Qualitative (key informant interviews) :  
Investigation of the mechanisms of the payments associated with the contracting settings and 
the incentive environment. The investigation had the following detailed objectives and 
contributed to the following tasks and processes. 
- Obtaining information about the incentive environment and the payment mechanisms 
associated with the contracting settings, 
- Obtaining information for important variables to be collected and formulating questions for 
the household survey and primarily enhancing construction of the household survey, 
- Obtaining information that serves theoretical selection of variables in regression analyses, 
- Obtaining information that serves selection of the control group districts, 
- Helping the interpretation of results of quantitative investigation. 
 
2) Quantitative (household income and expenditure survey and regression analyses) 
Investigation of health workers’ and their households’ incomes and expenditures and of the 
impact of payments associated with the contracting settings. These investigations were 
expected to be contributed to by the qualitative investigation as described above. 
 
This study used a quasi-experimental cross-sectional survey design to respond to the 
research questions. The design consisted of the household income and expenditures survey 
followed by descriptive statistical analyses of the result and regression analyses for the 
impact of payments using the data for income (Ensor et al. 2009, Durmont et al. 2008) and 
expenditure (National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania and Oxford Policy Management Ltd, 
UK. 2001) from the household survey. Variables for these investigations included those 
identified in the results of the key informant interview.  
3) Quantitative  
A mini-survey investigated allocation methods of payments associated with contracting, such 
as performance-based payments, at the Health Centre level (the subcontractor level). This 
investigation was expected to provide information about the payment mechanism and the 
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incentive environment and to help in the interpretation of the results of the quantitative 
investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative ‘mini-survey’ 
Questionnaire about allocation 
methods of payments made to 
workers and analysis  
 
Qualitative 
Key informant 
Interviews and 
analysis  
 
  
  
 
Synthesis of findings and interpretation from results of qualitative and 
quantitative investigations  
 
Quantitative  
Household income and expenditure 
questionnaire survey and analysis 
(descriptive statistical analyses, 
regression analyses) 
 
Response to research 
questions 
  
 
    
 
Figure 4.1: Sequence of research methods 
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Questionnaire surveys have been widely applied in studies of economics, including health 
economics, to ascertain incomes and expenditures of different units of study: individuals, 
households, organisations and countries, and some of these questionnaires are regarded as an 
established method (McCoy et al. 2008; Ferrinho et al. 1998; Macq et al. 2001; Ensor et al. 
2008; Deaton 1997; Grosh and Glewwe 1998; World Bank 2010; Luxemburg Income Study 
2010).  
 
The second research question asks, “what is the importance of performance-based payments 
to the income of health workers and their household income?” This question explores the 
impact of performance-based payments and other incomes to the income of health workers 
and their overall household incomes. 
 
Quantitative studies which investigated the impact of a specific income to other incomes and 
to the total income of an individual (or the individual’s household) have been accumulated. 
Quantitative methods identify the features of the impact with proper treatment of the issue of 
variations and multiplied variations (Deaton 1997; Grosh and Glewwe 1998).  
 
However, in health economics, it is noted that so-called latent variables inevitably influence 
the data empirically collected (Jones 2000). This study partly drew on the qualitative method 
(the interviews) to explore the latent variable. 
 
Alongside these epistemological and theoretical issues, it is noted that applying quantitative 
methods in this study required hiring a person with sufficient skills, knowledge and 
qualifications in language and qualitative methods, in order to supplement the investigator’s 
limited command of the Khmer language.  
4.3.2 Qualitative methods 
There were two reasons for conducting qualitative research at the beginning of the study. 
First, to better understand the incentive environment, interviews were conducted with key 
informants most of whom had management responsibilities. Such interviews were designed 
to gain insights into the incentive environment pertaining to the contracting setting through 
the experience and descriptions by the interviewees (Kvale 1983; Silverman 2004). Second, 
as outlined earlier, the qualitative study contributed to the formulation of questions for the 
two questionnaire surveys and the analyses and interpretation of results of empirical studies.  
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(1) Key informant interview  
The overall purpose of the key informant interviews was to gain a better understanding of the 
mechanisms of the payments associated with the contracting settings, contributing to the 
tasks and processes in the study as outlined above. 
 
The key informant interviews were considered necessary given the shortage of data 
including publicized data. The method accommodates flexibility for both the interviewer and 
the key informants; interviews with the same informants were possible over a longer period; 
questions were in the form of open-ended or structured, and could be changed or restructured 
as desired; the snowballing techniques allows an increase in the number of key informants 
(Tremblay 2005 in Burgess ed. 2005). Key informants “are able to provide more information 
and a deeper insight into what is going on around them” (Marshall 1996, p. 92). 
 
Selection criteria for key informants are concerned with five characteristics: “role in 
community”, “knowledge”, “willingness”, “communicability” and “impartiality” (Tremblay 
2005
 in Burgess ed. 2005). The “role in community” concerns their “formal roles” which 
expose them to the information the research seeks and it is the primary criteria to be fulfilled 
by the informant. The informants should have knowledge in the form “intelligible to the 
interviewer” (Marshall 1996, p. 92). 
 
Referring to these criteria and the objectives of the interviews, 18 key informants were 
purposively selected based on the purpose of the interviews and attributes of the informants 
which enabled them to provide sufficient information that this survey wished to obtain.  
 
Core interviewees were managers of the NGO Contractors who knew and operate the 
payment mechanism in the incentive environment at the field level. Other interviewees were 
expected to add information about the mechanism and environment and increase the 
accuracy of information. Those who were not officially involved in the contracting project 
were expected also to provide information which may contrast with information provided by 
those inside the project. The purposes, attributes of respondents, and timing of interviews are 
described below.   
 
1. Managers of the NGO Contractors responsible for implementation the contracting project 
of DFID/World Bank Contracting Project 
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Purpose: To obtain information about the incentive environment and the mechanisms of the 
payments associated with the contracting settings. The information included the payment 
mechanism institutional arrangements concerning dual practice and factors which influenced 
the incentive environment. Questions about management and operations of the 
implementation of contracting project were also asked.  
 
They were expected to provide detailed information because of their positions as managers 
of the contractors who were responsible for implementation. They were working for 
prominent international and national NGOs and had experience in managing health projects. 
The information and perception were expected to be derived from their understanding of the 
incentive environment.  
 
1) KI01: Fred Griffiths, Manager of Healthnet International (HIN) Peareang Project, 
Manager 
April 23, 2005, March 17, 2006, June 19, August 22, September 5, 7, 2007. 
2) KI02: Or Sivarin, RHAC Preah Sdach Manager 
Feb 27, March 10, 2 May July 24, 2006, May 2, 27, July 9, August 22, 2007.  
3) KI03: Bart Jacobs, SRC Takeo Province, Kirivong Project, Manager 
July 30 2006, May 19, July 10 Aug 27 2007. 
4) KI04: Rob Overtoom, SRC Takeo Province, Manager. 
April 22 2005, March 17, 2006, May 19 June 4 2007 
 
Interviews with the above included e-mail correspondence between 2005 to 2007, and some 
in 2008. 
 
2. Staff of NGO Contractors who were working at the project sites 
Purpose: To obtain additional information on the payment mechanism and management and 
operations of the implementation of contracting project. 
 
They were expected to provide detailed information based on their operations and 
observations which occurred during their daily interactions with the health workers.  
 
5) KI05:Anonymous, staff, HIN Peareang Project, March 17, June 19, 2007. 
6), 7), 8) KI06, 07, 08 : Anonymous, staff, SRC Kirivong Project, July 30 2006, May 19 
2007. 
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3. Government health workers of Operational Districts contracted out  
Purpose: To obtain information on the mechanism and operation and practices concerning 
the payments in the specific Operational Districts. 
 
The information from these informants was expected to provide greater details, particularly 
those at the health facilities. Also, these informants might have seen the incentives, the 
payment mechanism and the incentive environment differently from the NGO managers. 
Therefore, informants were expected to add importantly different perspectives regarding the 
payment mechanism at the facility level. 
 
9) KI09: Anonymous, Health Worker, Peareang District, September 1 2007. 
10) KI10: Anonymous, Health Worker at the managerial level, Kirivong District, July 12 
2007. 
 
4. Government health workers in managerial positions working outside of CODs and MODs 
Purpose: To obtain additional information and perceptions relating to the incomes of general 
government health workers outside of the contracting project. 
 
Because of their positions, these informants were expected to elaborate different types of 
incomes such as private practice income and household income from non-health related 
economic activities.  
 
11) KI11: Anonymous, Health Worker at the managerial level. August 14, 2006. 
 
5. MOH staff based in Phnom Penh responsible for the implementation of the project 
5.1 Purpose: To obtain information concerning the entire contracting project and about the 
operations of CODs, which could then be compared with the information provided by the 
NGO Contractors.  
 
Becase of their responsibility, information with a high degree of accuracy and details was 
expected to be provided by them. 
 
12), 13) KI12, 13, Anonymous, two staff in charge of ADB Pilot Project and DFID/World 
Bank Project, August 8, 2006. 
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5.2 Purpose: To obtain information on the payments associated with the contracting settings, 
information on the general situation of dual practice of health workers and other aspects of 
the incentive environment. 
 
14) KI14: Anonymous, one staff member that was in charge of various projects supported by 
bilateral and multilateral development organisations, April 23, 2005, May 16 2006  
 
6. NGO managers (involved in other development projects)  
6.1 NGO manager in rural development  
Purpose: To obtain the information which enhance construction of the household survey. The 
information includes that about livelihoods and life in rural Cambodia relating to household 
expenditure and income in the health workers’ households which enhance the 
socio-economic and geographical information of the study site. Obtaining the information 
about income generations and behaviours relating to monetary transactions among ordinary 
and wealthy Cambodians and health workers.  
 
15) KI15: Suon Seng, Project Manager of field work of this study, R & D Manager, Director, 
the Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture: CEDAC. 
March 15 , 23, 27, 2007, May , 2 to 26 , 2007, June 1 to 6, several times in July 2007, June 
14, 2011 
 
6. 2 NGO managers in the health sector (in other health sector projects) 
Purpose: To obtain information concerning different types and sources of income and their 
significance to government health workers. To obtain information about dual practice among 
government health workers. The information was expected to enhance the construction of the 
household survey. Interviewees were Cambodian staff with more than a decade of experience 
of NGOs which were the outside of the contracting project. They were knowledgeable about 
the sector and the contracting project. Their Cambodian perspectives were valuable to 
deepening understanding the context of the contracting project. 
 
16), 17), 18) KI16, KI17, KI18 Anonymous, three managers, Cambodian office, international 
NGO in the health sector, March 28 2007, April 25, 2006, July 21 2007, April 22, May 24 
2007 
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The interviews were semi-structured using interview guides in some cases (Appendix 2) but 
in other cases they were asked questions informally with an open structure, particularly when 
the investigator visited the project site. The interviews were conducted by the investigator in 
English at (the project sites and Phnom Penh) during 2005 and 2007. Interviews were 
transcribed by the investigator; none of the informants accepted tape-recording of their 
interviews. The content was induced and compared with content provided by different 
informants. After this, some of the induced content was used for selecting questionnaire 
variables or formulating hypothesis. During this process, the snowball method 
accommodated interviews with persons from within MOH and NGOs who provided different 
or deepened explanations and views. Triangulation was made by referring to literature.  
4.3.3 Quantitative methods 
As noted above, the quantitative methodology was dominant in the mixed methods approach 
taken in this study. Two separate surveys were undertaken, with the household 
income/expenditure survey the dominant of the two. However, during the household survey, 
it became apparent that different methods pertained for allocating payments from the 
payments associated with the contracting setting by different sub-contractors (Health 
Centres). A ‘mini-survey’ was designed to further investigate these differences and to include 
outcome from the investigation in the final analysis about the impact of performance-based 
payments.  
 
The income/expenditure household survey took a quasi-experimental cross-sectional design 
and the mini-survey a cross-sectional design. The majority of the description that follows, 
however, is devoted to the household income/expenditure survey. 
 
Quasi-experiments are “studies that have certain characteristics of experimental designs” 
(Bryman 2006, p. 56). Quasi-experimental design has advantages in terms of conducting 
evaluation research studies of interventions in a society or organisation concerning the 
effects of interventions. The design adequately responds to a common condition of such 
interventions in that it is impossible to randomly assigning the participants to either the 
treatment or the control group. However, a doubt about the internal validity arises since 
quasi-experimental studies lack random assignment and since the treatment and control 
groups “may not have been equivalent” (Bryman 200, p. 56). Thus, the design “does not 
fulfill all the internal validity requirements” (Bryman 2006, p. 56), a concern noted by 
several researchers (Mash and Mash, 2012; Toulany et.al 2013; Harris et.al. 2004; Craig et.al 
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2008). Craig et al. (2008) suggest that a quasi-experimental design suits a situation “where 
the intervention is irreversible, necessarily applies to the whole population, or because large 
scale implementation is already under way” (p. 981); the latter situation was found in the 
setting of this study. Also of relevance to this study, Harris et.al (2004, p. 1587) identify “an 
inability to randomize locations” as a reason for considering a quasi-experimental design. 
 
Despite the challenges presented to internal validity, which is not considered optimal (Craig 
et.al 2008), such studies are considered to “yield useful results” while noting their limitations 
and “wherever possible, evidence should be combined from different sources that do not 
share the same weaknesses” (Craig et.al.2008, p. 337). Bryman (2006) agrees, suggesting 
that causal inference may be increased by additional information which helps to prioritise or 
discount interpretations and causal links brought about by the absence of experimental 
design; he further argues that the results are strongly supported because they are not artificial 
and hold high ecological validity. Ecological validity concerns “social scientific findings 
were applicable to peoples’ everyday and social settings” (Bryman 2006, p. 48). The validity 
is less sufficient in those researches which are valid in the technical aspect of methods, 
procedures and operations, but have little relevance to what is actually happening in people’s 
everyday lives (Bryman 2006). The subject of this study is a policy intervention, i.e., the 
impact of payments associated with the contracting settings in the rural Cambodia. With the 
subject of this study, employing a quasi-experimental study design was suitable and expected 
to strengthen the validity of findings. This is because the ecological validity of the findings 
should have high applicability and relevance to the sphere with which the impact is 
concerned. The impact was exposed to various incidents of daily life, which influence the 
sphere relating to the incentive environment, some of which may be unseen. The health 
workers were also exposed to these happenings (Bryman 2006). The control group in this 
study was expected to highlight and help to clarify the impact of payments. It is noted that in 
this study, designing a study which compares ex-ante and ex-post of the DFID/World Bank 
project was impossible because the project began before this study.  
(1) Household income and expenditure surveys: household as a unit 
Empirical investigation of this study was designed to ascertain the incomes of government 
health workers, sources of income, plus their household incomes generated through other 
activities and expenditures. This study applied the concept of household as the unit of 
consumption consisted of household members which miximises the utility under the budget 
constrain while providinding labour or capital in the market (Samuelson 1956 quoted in 
Lundberg and Pollak 1993, Pass, C. L., Collins Dictionary of Economics 2005)(Chapter 2, 
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2.6.2). The expression is as follows. 
n 
∑ pix i≤ m, 
i=t 
 
where i is kinds of goods (i=1…n), pi is price of i, x i is consumption of i, and m represents 
income. 
 
The study drew extensively on a household expenditure survey in order to ascertain the 
incomes of government health workers and their household. This was because household 
expenditure is a function of household income and the household expenditure survey is more 
able to capture an accurate picture of the household economy (Deaton 1997). To the 
household survey, the concept of permanent income, not of transitory income, was applied 
due to its general applicability to household income and expenditure surveys (Deaton 1997) 
and its inclusion of attributes of the income earner (Freidman in Bollen et al. 2001; Bollen et 
al. 2001).  
 
Economic theory maintains that since all income of a household is consumed during a 
specific time period, the total income equals the total consumption within the household. 
Over more than one time period, savings could be made by a household; however, over a 
longer time, if seen in present value terms, the average level of consumption and that of 
income are equal (Deaton 1997). The advantages of measuring expenditure (consumption) 
over measuring income have been argued for less in relation to economic theories but more 
in relation to practical factors: measuring expenditure raises fewer problems than measuring 
income (Deaton 1997). Household expenditure surveys elicit more accurate features of 
household economic status than a household income survey in the one-year reference term, 
since the frequency of receiving income varies among individuals as well as households, e.g., 
farming households may receive income less frequently than seasonally (Deaton and Grosh 
1998 in Groch and Glewwe 1998). However, apart from this practical knowledge, economic 
theory maintains the smoothing of household income and expenditure in a specific time 
period (Deaton 1997).  
 
The working definition of a household employed by this study is as follows: a household is 
defined as the state of dwelling together, by covering living costs including food costs from 
funds pooled together by different sources or household members (Deaton 1997). 
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A household questionnaire survey is a widely used method to ascertain income and 
expenditure (Deaton 1997). In addition, expenditures themselves are relatively well accepted 
as an indicator of economic status in development studies (Ravallion 1996). The percentage 
of questions about expenditure is much larger than that of questions about income. The 
design of the questionnaire of this study included the coping measures for highly inevitable 
issues in the survey and reflected the Cambodian context. 
 
Household questionnaire surveys of incomes or expenditures have been frequently 
conducted by national governments and the accumulated knowledge of the economic 
situation of households have been used for policy formulation and implementation by 
governments. In the field of development, World Bank had conducted 110 household surveys 
in LMICs by 1998 (World Bank 1999 cited in Devereux et al. 2004). Other scholars have 
also applied these methods, including in the health sector (Fabricant 1992; McPake 1996). 
Most of the previous surveys mainly employed quantitative methods, in the framework of 
microeconomics (Deaton 1997; Deaton and Grosh 1998; Ravallion 1996; Groch and Muñoz 
1996). 
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This study largely drew on the established (conventional) theories, methods and lessons 
learned from the experience of World Bank's Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) 
(Chapter 2) which was thought to increase the robustness of this study and provide 
reasonable data for my research questions.  
 
The LSMS asks a “great” many detailed questions on (Deaton 1997, p. 27) consumption in 
order to arrive at figures of expenditure by grouping questions into sections and aggregating 
the answers (Deaton and Grosh 1998). The questions include those about income, assets, use 
of social service, possessions of durable goods, and access to basic infrastructure (Deaton 
1977).  
 
The LSMS ask for: different categories relating to the price of goods (the purchasing price, 
the resale price); market information pertaining to prices such as the real interest rates; the 
consumer price index or current market prices, depending on the approach of each survey 
(The World Bank Poverty and Human Resources Division 2001). 
 
Relatively common sections of the questions of different LSMS, though still comprehensive, 
are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Examples of the sections in the LSMS questionnaire surveys 
 
Source: Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics. no date; Grosh and Muňoz 1996; Deaton 1997; The World 
Bank; Poverty and Human Resources Division 2001. 
 
 
1. Attributes of members of the household  
2. Education  3. Health  4. Migration 
5. Employment  6. Housing (materials and utility)   
7. Agricultural (forestry and fishery) and livestock  
8. Food-expenditure and home production  
9. Non-food daily (fuel, electric light bulbs etc.) and annual expenditure (clothes, shoes, etc.) 
10 Durable goods   11. Income and remittance (receiving) 
12. Borrowing, lending, and savings on the day of the survey  
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LSMS, enhances the accuracy of responses by including respondents who have detailed and 
accurate knowledge of consumption of specific types of goods and services (Caslely and 
Lury 1987; Deaton 1997; The World Bank; Poverty and Human Resources Division 2001). 
The data was collected by the survey visit and/or sometimes by the household having kept 
written records of consumption (Deaton 1997). The main characteristics of LSMS are shown 
in Table 4.3.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Main characteristics of LSMS survey 
 
 
Source: Caslely and Lury 1987; Deaton 1997; Deaton and Grosh 1998 cited in Grosh and 
Glewwe 1998; The World Bank; Poverty and Human Resources Division 2001. 
 
 
 
Number of 
questions 
Recall period Reference time Respondent 
The number differs 
among the LSMS 
surveys.  
Reasonable 
frequency of paying 
the expenditure, e.g., 
a week, a month, and 
a year. 
Conventional 
time-period subject for 
either household 
income and 
expenditure: one year.  
 
Respondents include those 
who know the household 
consumption the best  
 
Visiting respondent Aggregation of 
expenditures 
   
Some surveys have 
two visits.  
a. Multiplying 
monthly food 
expenditures by 
twelve;  
b. Adding 
expenditures on 
other items such 
non-food goods 
(e.g., clothes, fuels) 
and education, after 
annualisation if 
necessary 
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(2) Household income survey 
Components of this study’s household income surveys drew on the national surveys  
produced by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). LIS is a data archive of cross-national 
income surveys, which began in 1983 and contains data collected at various time periods 
relating to more than 30 countries, both developed countries and LMICs (Luxemburg 
Income Study [online] 2010). It is reasonable to draw on selected surveys placed in LIS for 
determining the components since the survey data in LIS has been used and referred to in 
studies in health sector (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004; Lynch et al. 2001) and includes 
national surveys conducted by governments such as Canada and the United States which are 
presumed to have applied appropriate frameworks in order to collect accurate data. Items 
included in components vary by country (Statistic Canada. 2000, U. S. Census Bureau 2000 
and Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 in Luxemburg Income Study [online] 2010) and are 
not necessarily aggregated. Examplens of main components are shown in Table 4.4. 
  
Table 4.4: Income components of surveys in the LIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistic Canada. 2000, U. S. Census Bureau.2000, Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2001 
Source: The LIS web archives. http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm (Luxemburg Income 
study [online] 2010). 
 
It is difficult to come to a firm conclusion regarding the accuracy of an income survey, since 
there are few studies that discuss their accuracy (including household income surveys). 
Kangas (2000) argued that LIS does hold accurate information on income, but the designs 
and means of implementation of the surveys he was referring to were not detailed in his 
paper, which could be a reasonable source for judging their accuracy. In contrast, having 
Aggregated income components Not-aggregated income components 
- Wages and salaries (both employed and 
self-employed) 
- Net-income or net-loss from self-employment 
- Government cash transfer  (pension, allowance, 
benefit) 
- Private cash transfer  
(annuities, alimony, child support )  
- Interest (on savings and or bonds) and dividends 
- Income in-kind 
- Inheritance  
-Capital gains and losses  
 
 
 98 
 
praised the usefulness of LIS, Behrendt (2000) also indicated that under-reporting of income 
and the problem of low response rates exist in LIS.  
 
There have been issues concerning the accuracy of household income surveys. In response, 
this study undertook coping measures; however, overall, this study intended to mitigate these 
issues by establishing the data about household expenditure through a household expenditure 
survey. 
 
Sensitivity about income, which could be regarded as higher than sensitivity about 
consumption, leads to issues of reluctance or refusal on the part of respondents to provide 
information (Deaton 1997). Bollen et al. (2001) suggested that disaggregating income by 
enquiring about its source could help with eliciting the information of household’s 
consumption. This study adopted this strategy based on the available knowledge of 
Cambodia health sector, rural life and livelihoods, the anthropology of Cambodia and 
information from the key informants (Chambers 1997; Mosse 1994). 
 
Under-reporting income compared with expenditure may occur partly due to inflation rising 
over the recall period. The recall period of income is often the year before the survey, and 
that of expenditure the week or the month before. This often causes reported income to be 
low relative to consumption due to inflation (Paxon 1992). In Cambodia, after the data 
collection of this survey, high inflation began in September 2007 (Ginting and Bird 2009). 
 
Obtaining accurate data on income from rural farming households often encounters 
difficulties in LMICs due to these households’ frequent confusions about the production, sale 
of that product, benefits from the sales, and home-consumption (Casley et al. 1987; Deaton 
1997). However, since the subjects of this study related primarily to the households of 
government health workers, not farming households, such confusion had been expected to be 
limited. Also, the scale of the contribution of farming activities to total household income 
was estimated to be limited.  
  
In households in some countries, such as Thailand and Taiwan, accumulated assets (savings) 
disproportionate to their household income, such assets as seeds, cattle, money and gold 
inter-temporally (Deaton 1997); while surveys of both household income and expenditure 
rest on the theory that total income equals total consumption over a certain term. The 
relevance of such a high level of saving is regarded as being of less importance to this study, 
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because in rural Cambodia, there is often a tendency for surplus money to be spent quickly 
(Ebihara 1968).  
 
Survey-based estimated household income may generate multiple levels of understatement 
and become lower than the real income (Deaton 1997). These disparities are expressed by 
using a sign of inequality as follows. 
 
a) Survey-based income  survey-based expenditure (4.1) 
b) Survey-based expenditure  the real income (4.2) 
 
From a) and b), 
c) Survey-based income  the real income (Deaton 1997). (4.3) 
 
The survey-based income is often lower than the survey-based household expenditure of the 
same or an equivalent group (4.1) (Deaton 1997). This could be attributed to any of the 
reasons mentioned above. Survey-based expenditure itself tends to be understated, compared 
with actual income (4.2), again for various reasons as mentioned above. Because of these 
two potential situations, it might be concluded that the gap between the real and the 
survey-based income is large (4.3) (Deaton 1997). However, if survey-based income is 
largely understated, total expenditure could be used as a proxy for income (Casley and Lury 
1987). This study explored the possibility of under-reporting by comparing the total 
household expenditure with the total household income. 
 
Reflecting these factors and in order to increase the accuracy of reported income, this study 
created accounting frameworks corresponding to flows of money or material (e.g. food 
bartered) of the economic activities (Deaton 1997). The knowledge of Cambodian rural 
livelihood and life were applied to the creation of the frameworks.  
 
Another measure employed to increase accuracy was to apply experiences and approaches of 
nation-wide household surveys and the Cambodian context. The experiences and approach 
of the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES), a series of national household surveys, 
were shared with the investigator by core staff of the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of 
Cambodia. These surveys have been conducted since 1993 (but not annually) by the NIS. 
The CSES in 2004 aimed to determine the living standard and poverty level of the 
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Cambodian population, and collected data from 15,000 sample households. The survey 
covered 7 focus areas of information which had 16 sections in total (Appendix 3).  
 
Another series of established national household surveys was the Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS). The DHS in 2005 was administered by the National Institute of Public Health 
(NIPH) of Cambodia and the experiences and approach of conducting DHS was also shared 
with the investigator. The DHS is a well-known USAID programme which collects the 
demographic and health data in LMICs. It has been conducted in over 75 LMICs, with a total 
of 200 surveys completed (http://www.measuredhs.com/ accessed August 18, 2010).  
 
Table 4.5 shows the main categories in the questionnaire and the factors or states which the 
questions referred to in each category. It is noted that they are not sections and do not appear 
in the same order as they do in the form of sections in the questionnaire survey.  
 
 
Table 4.5 The main categories and factors of questionnaire 
 
Basic 
Information  
Expenditure Income Others 
- 
Geographical 
and 
administrative 
information,  
- Household 
members,  
- Their 
attributes 
- Education 
- Foods 
- Non-food goods  
- Utilities  
- Agricultural (forestry 
and fishery) and 
livestock  
- Health 
- Non-farm 
self-employment 
- Gifts and donations 
(money) given outside 
the household 
- Health workers  
- Other employed 
household members 
- Household enterprises 
(the primary industry, 
manufacturing, or others) 
- Income and remittance 
received (transfers such 
as pensions, other 
welfare money, saving, 
remittance) 
- Borrowing, lending, 
and savings 
- Possession of durable 
goods 
- Material goods of the 
house 
 
 
 
For these main categories and factors, questions were cautiously formulated and sections and 
sub-sections were set up. The questionnaire sheets (English) are included at Appendix Part II 
The Khmer version is available upon request to the investigator. 
 
 
 101 
 
(3) Health workers’ and their household Income 
1) Important variables to be collected and hypothesis about them  
Based on this study’s knowledge of the potential diversity of income sources of the 
government health workers was hypothesised. Therefore, questions about their income 
sources were divided into three main categories, reflecting the core interest of this study: 
income from health work excluding private practice (the income obtained in the government 
sector), income from dual practice and income from sources other than health work such as 
agriculture or the employment income of the health workers’ other household members. 
They were assumed to be intricately connected to each other in the incentive environment 
where the performance-based payments were paid (but only in CODs). The majority of these 
incomes was regressed in the regression analyses as explained below. 
  
There were subcategories in the three main categories. Subcategories of the income from 
health work excluding private practice were described including their definition in Chapter 3. 
 
1) Incomes obtained from their employment as government health workers  
Government regular payments  
Performance based payments (paid only in the District contracted out) 
Supplementary salaries from NGOs and/or donors  
Per-diems 
Honorarium for giving training or lectures  
Share from user-fee income;  
2) Private practice income 
3) Incomes from sources other than health work 
Employment work by household members of the health workers 
Household enterprise 
4) Total household income(the total of 1), 2) and 3)) 
 
Of these categories, questions relating to the amount, frequency, frequency of payments, and 
annualized payment were asked. The surveyors calculated the total annual income by 
aggregating the annualized payments. In order to make them less conspicuous, questions 
relating to private practice income were not posed in a separate section but as one of  
questions about income of health workers, because private practice was not totally allowed.  
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Questions relating to income from employment earned by household members included 
questions about income from their secondary jobs because of the tendency of Cambodians to 
maximize income earning opportunities (Ebihara 1968; Ministry of Planning, Cambodia and 
UNDP, 2007).  
 
In relation to income from sources other than health work, questions were asked about the 
three most important household enterprises, their total income and expenditure and net 
income or net-loss (expenditure) in terms of their contribution to the household budget. 
However, a hypothesis for the household enterprise was that they did not bring about 
net-income or net-loss with significant level to the household economy, because the main 
income of the household was likely to be income from health work obtained by the health 
workers.  
 
Hypothesis about the four main variables are as follows: 
a. Incomes from health work excluding private practice (income in the government 
sector) 
This category of income was hypothesised to reflect income increases directly from the 
payments associated with the contracting settings. The share from user-fee income was 
highly likely to increase in correspondence with the projected increases in service delivery in 
the contracting settings. This category of income was hypothesised to be higher in the 
Operational Districts contracted out: CODs than in the Operational District under MOH 
management: MODs. The proportion of this category of income to the total household 
income in CODs was projected to be higher than in MODs, thanks to the payments 
associated with the contracting settings. The increases and proportional changes were 
expected to show a labour supply increase in the government sector and labour supply 
transfer from the private to the government sector.  
 
Descriptive statistics of this category of income were likely to show a level of economic 
benefit from DFID/World Bank Contracting Project, when it was compared with the same 
category of income in MODs.  
 
b. Private practice 
Their private practice income was likely to decrease in CODs, if the payments paid in the 
contracting were a meaningful amount to the health worker and their household. Difference 
in the proportion was likely to indicate the importance of this income to health workers in 
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CODs and MODs. Comparisons of its proportion to the total household income in CODs and 
MODs were hypothesised to show a transfer of labour supply from the private to the 
government sector. 
 
c. Income from sources other than health work 
It was important to obtain information on this category of income since this study considers 
that the impact of the incentive in the contracting setting needed to be evaluated in relation to 
its implications for the total household income. This was based on the hypothesis that the 
health workers had sources of income other than health work and that incomes of health 
workers and of their households were intricately connected to each other. Therefore, it was 
assumeded that income from sources other than health work might differ between CODs and 
MODs because of the payments associated with the contracting settings paid in CODs. 
 
d. Total household income  
The total household income was hypothesised to be higher in CODs than in MODs, since the 
payments associated with the contracting settings might contribute largely to making thetotal 
income higher in CODs than MODs. The higher income might have been brought by a 
hypothesised situation that the level of payments associated with the contracting settings 
were designed to have sufficient impact on income in order to change health workers’ 
behaviour. The higher income in CODs might have resulted in despite that private practice 
income or income from sources other than health work might have contribute more 
significantly to the total household income in MODs than in CODs. 
2) Other incomes 
Other incomes asked about were selected, drawing on previous nation-wide surveys 
(Statistic Canada 2000; U. S. Census Bureau 2000; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 in 
Luxemburg Income Study), information from the key informant and literature. Details about 
savings were not requested because of the low development of banking systems in Cambodia 
and the tendency among Cambodians described above. Questions about the possession of 
gold and jewellery by the households as a means of saving (Ebihara 1968) were not asked in 
consideration for Cambodian security issues; people were afraid of thieves if they revealed 
ownership of such possessions. However, the relatively widespread social custom of a saving 
group, the ‘Tontine’, was inquired about. Regular monthly payments to funeral clubs were 
also inquired about (KI15 May 2 2007).  
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(4) Household expenditure survey  
The main purpose of the measurement of household expenditure was to derive evidence 
supporting increases in the income of health workers and their households in CODs and 
proportional changes in the incomes. 
1) Important variables to be collected and hypothesis about them  
a. Food expenditure  
The proportion of food expenditure to the total household expenditure differentiates the 
economic status of households. The economic status is compared by application of the 
Engle’s Law (Mankiw 2011) which maintains that the proportion of food expenditure to the 
total household income decreases according to increases in the income. The proportion in 
CODs were hypothesised to be lower than in MODs, because of the higher economic status 
of households in CODs raised by the payments associated with the contracting settings. 
 
b. Educational expenditure 
Educational expenditure was considered as one of the main expenditures for signifying the 
economic status of the surveyed household (Bollen 2001; McPake et al. 1996; World Bank 
2007; Badloe et al. 2007). The current access level to educational services is regarded as one 
of the most important non-monetary indicators showing the current economic status of 
households (Bollen 2001; McPake et al. 1996; World Bank 2007; Badloe et al. 2007). In 
Cambodia, rates of school enrolment of children were strongly associated with the 
socio-economic status of the household (World Bank 2006; Badloe et al. 2007). Therefore, 
the educational expenditure of the household in CODs was hypothesised to be higher than in 
MODs because the household could afford higher expenditure due to their raised income 
resulting from the payments associated with the contracting settings. 
 
c. Access to basic infrastructure, housing materials, possession of durable goods 
Variables regarding access to basic infrastructure, housing materials and the ownership of 
assets contribute not only to estimating total income, but also to exploring differences in 
household economic status (Baulch and McCulloch 1998; World Bank 1999; Turton 2000; 
Hanson et al 2009; Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The variables in the questionnaire drew 
predominately on the CSES 2004. However, adjustments were made, reflecting findings 
from the key informant interviews and personal observation such as inclusion of decorative 
wood furniture made of highly valued tropical woods (personal observation) such as 
Dalbergia bariensis (Ma and Broadhead 2002). 
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2) Other expenditure 
Questions about other expenditure items drew mainly on the LSMS survey.  
3) Issue s of measuring household expenditure and coping measures 
Measuring household expenditure still raises practical and conceptual problems (Deaton 
1997), thus, this study employed coping measures to minimise them.  
The measures concerned recall period, accuracy of reporting, level of disaggregation and 
errors of imputation. 
 
Recall errors of expenditures are inevitable. If the recall period is longer, respondents tend to 
forget their consumption; this means recalled expenditures tend to be reported as less than 
actual ones. In contrast, short-term recall periods bring in higher expenditures than long-term 
recall periods but overestimations of variance of the expenditures. Additionally, errors of 
reporting expenditures that were actually incurred in the previous term may be reported in 
the present term (‘boundary problem’) (Deaton 1997). 
 
A monthly recall period has often been considered too long for ordinary households in 
LMICs where receipts and bank statements are rarely used (Deaton 1997). This study 
reflected the frequency of consumption of items in order to ensure appropriate recall periods 
(Devereux et al. 2004) and tended to apply shorter-term recall periods in order to avoid the 
‘boundary problem’ (Deaton 1997). The recall periods of food expenditure were the previous 
week of the survey and a typical week. The typical weekly expenditure reduced possible 
anomalies in the previous week’s expenditure. 
 
Household expenditures also tend to change according to season, particularly in LMICs 
(Deaton 1997). Some farming households may consume all the rice of their home production 
and may need to buy rice immediately before harvest. Households may also spend money 
disproportionately against their total expenditure for an annual festival such as New Year 
(The World Bank Poverty and Human Resources Division. 2001). However, as noted in 
Table 4.3, the reference time of household expenditure surveys is normally set for one year, 
in which seasonal variations are absorbed (Deaton 1997). This study therefore used a 
one-year reference time.  
 
Respondents of household expenditure surveys are frequently reluctant or refuse to report 
their expenditure accurately (Deaton 1997). Disaggregating questions of expenditure, using 
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various sources of information for triangulation reduces this problem (Casley and Lury 
1987). Answers to disaggregated questions are calculated or imputed and could be 
transformed into expenditure items by type or area such as educational expenditures (Deaton 
1997). This study accommodated any potential reluctance by disaggregating questions. 
 
However, disaggregation would make the questionnaire survey longer in both the number of 
questions and the time required to complete. The World Bank’s LSMS sets an interview time 
of “two to three hours” as a “practical” length for obtaining the data (Deaton 1997). This 
study set the guideline maximum time of 2 hours for asking the survey questions.  
 
Imputations are made by using collected data or non-collected existing data based on 
theories, in order to increase the accuracy of figures for expenditure. However, errors of 
imputation unavoidably occur (Deaton 1997). To reduce these errors, this survey checked 
errors in imputations during the data collection and before data input.  
 
Capturing accurate food expenditure was achieved by asking questions about expenditures 
on food items reflecting the national and rural context (Chambers 1997; Mosse 1994) 
including estimated-prices of foods produced by the respondent households’ own efforts and 
consumed. Food items (N=66) were selected by drawing on the CSES 2004 (National 
Institute of Statistics 2005) and an investigation of the poverty line in Cambodia (Ministry of 
Planning, 2006). The 66 items were considered as sufficient to understand food expenditure.  
4) Sections of questionnaire sheets.  
Employing the coping measures and reflecting the importance of variables, the following 
sections and sub-sections were set up with specific purposes and strategically structured 
(Table 4.6.1 and 4.6.2). The questionnaire was asked in Khmer language. Questionnaire 
sheets in English were attached in Appendix Part II. Most questions were intended to 
determine, or estimate, expenditure on goods and services in the 12 months previous to the 
time of the survey (Deaton 1997).  
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Table 4.6.1 Sections, sub-sections, purposes, and the main items of the questions 
 
 
Sections and 
sub-sections (number of 
questions)  
Purpose and Question items (example) 
Face sheet (20) To list basic information of the government health worker, 
administrative information of the household,  surveyors, etc. 
0. Household 
information   
To obtain basic information about household members  
0A: Household member 
roster (12) 
Name, age, sex, relation to head of household, occupation 
0B: Occupation (7)  Employed or unemployed, nature and place of employment 
0C: Migrations (3) Previous place of residence, length of residence, reason for migration. 
1. Education   To ascertain the level of education, educational expenditures 
1A: Information (6) Completed education, current enrolment (details, grade), and location of 
schools 
1B: Expenditure (9) Tuition, books, transportation, expenditures on examination preparation, 
support for schooling of children away from home  
2. Health To obtain expenditure for health services 
2A: Chronic disease and 
last illness or injury (9) 
Nature of illness or injury, expenditure on consultation, drugs, transportation 
and lodging 
2B: Last maternal care  
(8) 
Expenditure on consultation, drugs, transportation and lodging. (including 
delivery) (for the last 12 months) 
3. Employment 
(income)  
To know the income of government health workers and of other 
household members who were employed 
3A: Income from main 
job including in-kind 
income (6) 
Sources, regular payment, performance based payment supplemental salaries, 
bonuses, , frequency, amount, annual payment 
3B: Income from the 
secondary job  
including in-kind 
income (6)  
Same as above. 
4. Housing To obtain information about dwelling (materials, facilities, construction 
price, etc.), expenditures on utilities 
4A: Type (5)  Ownership: own, sharing, renting  
4B: Characteristics and 
expenditure (7) 
Size and materials of house 
4C: Utilities and 
facilities (9) 
Sources or types and charges of utilities (water, electricity, etc.) 
4D: Construction and 
price of housing (7) 
Year of construction, additional construction or maintenance works, costs for 
maintenance, price of housing plot 
  
 108 
 
 
 
Table 4.6.2 Sections, sub-sections, purposes, and the main items of the questions 
 
5. Agricultural  To outline the activities of the household, net income or net expenditure  
5A: Agriculture (10) 
 
Land, kinds of production, home consumption, sales, expenditure on inputs 
(fertilizer, paid labour, etc.)  
5B: Forestry and/or 
fishery (5) 
The same as above. 
5C: Livestock (10) Kinds and amount of production, sales, purchasing, and home consumption, 
and expenditure on inputs (feed, veterinary services, etc). 
5D: Machinery and 
implements (2) 
Ownership, purchasing, sales and resale prices and leasing. 
6. Non-farm 
self-employment (6)  
To outline the activities of the household, net income or net 
expenditure. The three most important types of enterprise, gross income, 
expenditure on inputs, net income. 
7. Food-expenditure  
(18)** 
(66 items, 7) 
To ascertain food expenditures by kind and by mode (purchasing, 
consumption of home production).Rice and other staple foods, 
vegetables, fruits, meat, fish, seasonings, oil, alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco products. 
8. Non-food and 
durable goods 
To know non-food daily and annual expenditures and possession of 
durable goods. 
8A: ‘Non-food daily’ 
expenditure  
(13 items, 3) 
13 categories of items: wood for cooking; gas or kerosene for cooking; soap 
or shampoo or toothpastes or other toiletries ; insecticide or spray or moths 
quite coils; haircut or hairdressing; dish-wash or laundry detergent; gasoline 
for motorbike and car for individuals (not business) use; transportation 
service for individuals (motorbike, chicro, buses and trucks); newspapers or 
stationary for home use; pocket money for children for special occasion 
such as ceremonies excluding that spent on foods bought at school; 
entertainment; wage to home servants; others to be specified. 
8B: ‘Non-food Annual’ 
expenditure (10 items, 3) 
10 categories of items: clothes or underwear or fabric; footwear; hat or 
umbrella; towels or Cromer; bags; plates or cups or pans; light bulbs or 
batteries; materials for minor repair or maintenance of housing; wedding or 
funeral; others to be specified (e.g. toys). 
8C: Durable goods: 
Ownership (20) 
Radio, TV, mobile phone, electric fan, motorbike, bicycle, purchase price, 
resale price. 
8D: Gifts and others Money and in-kind to other households, financial donations. 
9. Income and received 
remittance (6) 
To ascertain inflow of cash or goods to the household, not connected to 
employment or any household enterprise  
Pensions and social transfers, rent of building or equipment, sale of assets, 
interest on savings, remittance 
10. Borrowing, lending, 
and saving (5) 
To ascertain flows of cash or goods as loans or lending between the 
household and the outside, or those of savings  
Amount, participation and payments in savings groups or funeral clubs. 
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Some parts of the questionnaire alternate sections on income with those on expenditures, 
while others have sections specifically related to either income or expenditure, in order to 
prompt the respondent to recall the income or expenditure more accurately. 
 
Most of the questions, except those asking for details of specific monetary amounts, had 
multiple reply options. This was to avoid the replies of “I do not know” or “(unspecified) 
others,” which may, in fact, be due to the reluctance of the respondent to find out or 
accurately provide the real figure. Some questions were specifically formulated and asked in 
a particular order to encourage the respondent to recall.  
5)Strategy for collecting cases: number of cases chosen for a complete survey  
This study intended to obtain a sufficient number of cases in order to ensure the regression 
analyses (the regression method and objectives are explained below) with the robustness and 
the appropriate effect size (Cohen 1992), employing the quasi-experimental cross-sectional 
design. Therefore, this study chose to conduct a survey with complete enumeration (Milligan 
and Njie 2004) which requires the collection of data on all cases in the survey population. In 
the health sector in LMICs, household surveys have been frequently conducted without 
employing an inclusive sampling frame. They benefitted by such an approach’s advantage of 
the time and expenditure necessary for setting up the sampling framework and implementing 
the survey according to the framework (Milligan and Njie 2004). Therefore, these benefits 
were expected to be obtained by this study. In addition, there were expected benefits from a 
complete enumeration to this study as follows. 
 
The complete enumeration was suitable for the Cambodian health sector settings, rural 
settings, and other unpredictable incidents in securing the number of cases predefined or 
calculated as the sample number. Even obtaining accurate but basic demographic data about 
health workers in the Operational Districts contracted out proved very difficult, suggesting 
that obtaining such data of non-contracting out Operational Districts was futhre difficult. The 
information was necessary to developing a sampling strategy. The unpredictable incidents 
included problematic weather or disturbed transportation; and/or non-cooperation by the 
respondents during the data collection. These things were anticipated to reduce the number 
of cases collected. However, cautious treatments were necessary for expanding application of 
the result of statistical analyses to other health workers outside of the study subject.  
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While employing the complete enumeration method, this study had a case selection approach 
for respondents of the questionnaire which strengthened the validity of the quantitative 
investigation of this study. The case selection approach set selection criteria for respondent 
health workers. They were framed by the district coordinates as contracted out or 
non-contracted out and elaborated by theoretically set-up eligibility for individual health 
workers as below.  
 
Criteria for the respondents (health workers): they must have an official government post and 
have worked for at least two years at the time of the survey. They must not be temporary 
staff. They must have had experience in receiving government salaries continually, including 
performance-based payments (only in Districts contracted-out). Some members of the health 
workers household were also respondents but only those who were likely to be the most 
knowledgeable about a given subject area of questions. They were named by the health 
workers and asked about the specific area. For example, food expenditures were mostly 
asked of the female member of the household, most often the wife of the health worker, who 
actually purchases the household food supply.  
 
Employing the complete enumeration appropriately reflected issues of the so-called “ghost” 
health workers. The “ghost” health workers’ names were on the list of current employees but 
they were not actually working for various reasons, e.g., receiving government salaries by 
appearing at the work place only on pay days (KI15, March 15, 2007). This study cautiously 
avoided counting the so-called “ghost” health workers as eligible respondents before the 
survey implementation.  
 
Due the resource constraints of this study, 300 cases were regarded as the maximum number 
of cases to be collected. However, the number of eligible (and therefore collected) cases was 
predicted to be 200 to 250 from calculations and this number was expected to give the 
statistical validity (Salkind 2004) required for analysis for the second research question. The 
calculations were made based on an assumption that each Health Centre was reported as 
having 4 to 5 eligible health workers; and 80% of the existing Health Centres in CODs and 
MODs were physically accessible, i.e., 4 to 5 health workers multiplied by 51.2 Heath 
Centres ( the total number of Health Csentres: 64 (MOH 2002) X 80%). 
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The statistical requirements from regression analyses gave the number of cases identified as 
follows. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) maintain a ‘rule of thumb’ for: a) testing multiple 
correlation,  and b) testing individual coefficients as follows: 
 
a) ; 
b) ,  
 
where m = the number of independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p. 117). This 
study intended to use the attributes of health workers as independent variables. The number 
of possible attributes to be used was estimated at less than 10. Thus, substituting 10 in m in 
the formula a) and b),  
 
a) obtains , and  
b) obtains . 
 
When the distribution of the dependent variable is skewed, a rule of thumb for the sample 
size is: 
 
,  
 
Where   (for small effect, medium effect, and large 
effect) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p. 117), substituting these three numbers and 10 as the 
number of independent variables, the formula obtains, 809, 62, and 32 (rounded into real 
numbers) respectively. Due to the resource constraints of this study, collecting the 809 cases 
specified by this calculation, which would give a suitable test with small effect, was 
impossible. Instead, achieving the second best figure (62), the requirement for testing with 
medium effect, was aimed for.  
6) Organisation of fieldwork  
Local knowledge is important as the base of researches in practice and studies in 
development in a rural context (Chambers 1997; Mosse. 1994). Promoting the participation 
of the respondents contributes to the acquisition of more accurate data and to the efficient 
conduct of the survey in LMICs (Casley and Lury 1987). In order to increase the 
understanding, cooperation and participation from local health organisations and health 
workers, this study was introduced by the University of Health Science in Cambodia. The 
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university was the only national medical university and has an influence on local health 
administration, to the Office of CODs and MODs, and to the Provincial Health Department 
(PHDs) of Prey Veng and Takeo Provinces. This protocol was considered suitable for the 
hierarchical and centralized authority in the government health system. In person, the 
investigator provided detailed explanations of the field work and the study to Managers of 
CODs and MODs, the two PHDs; and Managers of Health Centres.  
 
The investigator also increased in linguistic competence before the period which contributed 
to the elaboration of the questionnaire and the data collection. The investigator studied the 
Khmer language for a period of 4 months in Cambodia, focusing on the words, expressions, 
and concepts relating to this study. 
 
Furthermore, to assure the competence of the survey data collection, this study 
commissioned a local NGO, CEDAC (the Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in 
Agriculture) to undertake the data collection of the household survey. CEDAC, which was 
established in 1997, is one of the most experienced NGOs in Cambodia regarding social and 
rural development and socio-economic surveys and has worked with UN and bilateral 
cooperation organisations. CEDAC has been supporting a large number of farmers in their 
forming cooperatives. A senior Cambodian staff of CEDAC had a good knowledge and 
experience of rural Cambodian livelihoods and household economics. Their knowledge and 
experiences strengthened the quality of the questionnaire survey and made it more culturally 
appropriate to the context. The investigator had a close working experience with CEDAC, 
from 2001, in a project of the Japanese government; hence, there was a first-hand knowledge 
of the capacity of CEDAC staff. 
 
Two Cambodian staff members of CEDAC worked with this project: one as Project Manager 
(the Project Manager of the commissioned project to CEDAC); another as Field Supervisor.  
 
The support CEDAC provided was: 
- Support for developing the questionnaire and conducting the pilot test; 
- Recruitment and training (in co-operation with the investigator) of surveyors and the Field 
Editor;  
- Scheduling, supervising, on-site training and reporting on data collection; 
- Creation of database, and editing and entering of data. 
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The Survey Team which collected data consisted of: a Field Supervisor; Field Editor; Six 
Surveyors (three pairs: one male and one female for each pair). Considering the gender 
influence in Cambodia (UNIFEM 2004), the female surveyors asked questions to female 
respondents when they were providing information about expenditure on items, e.g, food or 
clothes, of which purchasing is generally regarded as a female responsibility (USAID 2006).  
7). Processes and flow – household survey 
Table 4.7 shows the processes of the fieldwork. Although the processes are numbered here, 
some of them advanced or proceeded in parallel as opposed to sequentially. The main tasks 
in each process and flow of processes are shown in Appendix 4.  
 
Table 4.7 Processes and main tasks of household survey 
 
Processes 
1. Development of questionnaire 
2. Translation of the questionnaire 
3. Pilot test 
4. Revision of questionnaires 
5. Recruitment of surveyors 
6. Training of surveyors 
7. Finalising questionnaire 
8. Creating database for data entry  
9. Introduction of data collection Provincial and District Health Offices 
10. Identifying eligible respondents 
11. Data collection 
12. Editing data collected  
13. Entering data 
 
a. Development and translation of questionnaire  
Since the data collection uses both the Khmer (for the asking of questions and filling the 
questionnaire sheet) and English languages, in order to achieve reasonable quality in 
translation between the two languages, this survey applied back-translations to the 
questionnaire (Lee and Yom 2007). Also, since researchers for a study employing 
questionnaire survey have a substantial understanding of the content and structure of the 
questionnaire, they are to contribute to correct translation (Roberts et al. 2007). The Field 
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Supervisor of the data collection (CEDAC staff), who also had knowledge and experiences 
of rural livelihood researches, were involved in the wording of the translation of the original 
English version into Khmer. This enhanced the quality of questionnaire. The Khmer 
translation was brought to a professional translator for re-translating back into English 
(back-translation). The investigator compared the two versions, clarified the Khmer language 
questions with the Field Supervisor and translator and corrected some words and 
expressions. 
b. Pilot test 
The pilot test was conducted at a Health Centre in a District in a rural setting in Kandal 
Province, outside the study site. The subjects for this test well reflected the subjects of the 
current study including: health workers of both genders, those with involvement in dual 
practice and their household members. The investigator, Project Manager and the Field 
Supervisor observed the pilot test and reviewed the collected data to determine whether 
anything had to be stressed within the training of the surveyors. The questionnaire was 
revised according to the findings from the pilot test. 
c. Recruitment and training of surveyors 
Steps taken in recruiting the surveyors and training of them ensured the quality of data 
collection. Announcement of the recruitment was posted at the locations (Appendix 5) where 
qualified university students and researchers would see it; including the national institutes 
where nation-wide household surveys are administered. Shortlisting (from 128 applicants), a 
written test, and formal interviews were then conducted. The surveyors were trained in a 
training course (Appendix 5) and field practice (a Health Centre in Kandal Province).  
d. Identifying eligible respondents  
The number of eligible health workers for the survey was identified by the investigator by 
using information collected directly from the Chief of each of the Districts. However, 
immediately before and after the start of data collection, some of the eligible health workers 
were identified as unavailable by the District Office, so that a decrease in the number of 
subject cases occurred. Further explanation will be provided in Section 6.2. 
e. Data collection  
The data collection was undertaken in the 5 Districts from the 18
th
 of June to the 15
th
 of July 
2007. The 6 surveyors, in three pairs (one male, and one female in each) conducted the 
interviews either at Health Centres or the houses of the health workers. Debriefing and 
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feedback sessions were held almost daily. Supervisory visits by the investigator and field 
training by the Project Manager enhanced the data collection process.  
f. Data checking, editing and data entry 
Errors in writing, miscalculations, imputations, and other errors in the collected 
questionnaire sheets were checked, confirmed and corrected by the Field Editor and the Field 
Supervisor before the data entry. Data was double entered in an ACCESS (Microsoft 
ACCESS 2003) data-base. After entering, the investigator compared the two sets of data and 
corrected the anomalies. Then, the data was transferred to SPSS. These repeated checks 
increased the accuracy of the date entry.  
8) Data analysis  
a. Aggregation of household survey data 
Income items were divided into aggregated and non-aggregated ones and then aggregated, 
drawing on the approaches of the Luxemburg Income Study (Luxemburg Income study 
[online] 2010), with reference to LSMS (Grosh and Muňoz 1996). After this, they were 
categorized into sub-categories and were aggregated within the sub-categories, according to 
hypothesis. 
 
Regarding the methods of aggregation of expenditures, the consensus of economic theorists 
is limited; furthermore, different surveys have devised different methods (Grosh and Muňoz 
1996). This study drew on the LSMS approach, which is a "relatively non-controversial 
approach" (Grosh and Muňoz 1996, p. 270). This is accomplished by modifying it to the 
Cambodian context.  
 
Saving and investment (e.g., investment in stocks, bonds, property, and household 
enterprises) were excluded (World Bank Poverty and Human Resource Division 2001) from 
the aggregation. Categories for aggregation of expenditure items are therefore: 
1) food; 2) ‘non-food daily’ 3) ‘non-food annual’ expenditures; 4) education; 5) health 
services; 6) utilities 7) rent; 8) economic activities other than health work (net expenditure 
incurred by household enterprises).  
 
Access to basic infrastructure, housing materials, and the possession of durable goods were 
analysed as follows. The proportion of the households which possessed the durable goods 
was calculated against the total number of households in both CODs and MODs and in each 
district. The proportions were compared:  
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1) with results of CSES and 2) between CODs and MODs. 
 
The comparison with the national level data distinguishes difference between clearly through 
comparing them with data by household economic quintile or geographical grouping, as is 
common to the area of development studies and practice (World Bank 2005).  
 
b. Descriptive statistical analyses and statistical tests of differences between CODs and 
MODs
1
 
Based on the hypotheses of this study and about variables described above, descriptive 
statistical analyses were intended primarily to compare incomes and expenditures between 
CODs and MODs and proportional changes in incomes associated with the contracting 
settings in CODs. The analyses had other purposes as well, to provide variables for the 
regression analyses and to show the relative importance of variables and the data structure 
which the regression analyses. The mean, median, and standard deviation were calculated on 
the income and expenditure and their subcategories of incomes and expenditures by 
tabulating or cross- tabulating them.  
 
The following variables for incomes were compared between CODs and MODs,  
 
1) Category: incomes from health work excluding private practice  
Government regular payments   
Performance based payments (paid only in CODs) 
Supplementary salaries from NGOs and/or donors  
Per-diems   
Honorarium for giving training or lectures  
Share from user-fee income;    
Total household income 
 
2) Category: Private practice income 
Private practice income 
 
3) Category: Incomes from sources other than health work 
                                                     
1
 Software used were SPSS 12, 15, 16, 17. 
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Incomes from sources other than health work such as agriculture 
 
In addition, the following categories of incomes were compared. 
- Income from the health work excluding private practice as the total of the category 
- Income from health work including private practice (the total of 1) and 2) above) 
 
The Income from health work including private practice was highly likely to reflect the 
magnitude of the importance to the health worker of income from health work. 
The household expenditures were compared by expenditure category the aggregation 
employed. 
 
Tabulating or cross- tabulating were made by: 
1) Status of the district: whether it was a COD or a MOD,  
2) District (the five districts: Pereang; Preah Sdach, Kirivong Kamchy Mea, Mesang,) 
3) Cadre 
4) Gender 
5) Cadre by district  
 
In order to protect confidentiality and anonymity of assistant doctors and doctors whose total 
number was less than 10, only selected income and expenditure data for assistant doctors and 
doctors were disclosed.  
 
If the same type of variables employed in this study descriptive statistical analyses were 
available in nation-wide data, such as CSEC 2004, or studies based on the CSES 2004 data, 
or other studies relevant to this study, these variables were also compared.  
 
Mann-Whitney U test  
Data of six subcategory-incomes, that of seven subcategory-expenditures and the total 
household income and expenditure (not in the log-transformed form) were tested by the 
Mann-Whitney U statistical test, in order to investigate whether the data differences between 
CODs and MODs was significant (p-value <0.05, two-tailed). The subcategories were: 
Incomes: 
1) government regular payments, 2) supplementary salaries and per-diems, 
3) share from user-fee income, 4) income from private practice,  
5) incomes from sources other than health work, 
6) Total household income. 
Expenditures on: 
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1) food, 2) ‘non-food daily’, 3) ‘non-food annual’, 
4) education, 5) education received by children away from household, 
6) health services, 7) total household expenditure. 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test examines difference between two non-parametric data. The test 
was suitable to the income and expenditure data of this study. 
(5) Regression analyses for exploring the imapact of payments 
This study employed linear regression analyses to explore the association between 
contracting setting and health workers’ income and household expenditure. The regressions 
analyses were performed in two sets of cases of health workers. One set consisted of two 
groups: health workers who belonged to CODs and MODs (N = 250). Another set consisted 
three cadre groups in the same health workers: primary nurses (N = 117), secondary nurses 
(N = 64) and midwives (N =.61). The second set was expected to clarify and confirm the 
impact of payment presented in the analyses of the first set. This is because controlling for 
cadre, a potentially influential factor relating to changes in health worker income, in the 
second set was likely to further elaborate the impact of payments with other potentially 
influential factors.. The possibility of matching the cases based on health workers 
demographic attributes failed due small numbers of matched cases (Appendix 8).   
 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique for estimating the equation, which has the best 
suited sets of observations of dependent and independent variables, in order to obtain the 
best estimate of the relationship between these variables (Pass et al. 2005). Regression 
analyses “attempt(s) to understand or explain the nature of phenomena for purposes of 
testing or development theories” (Licht 1995 p. 21). Studies compare, by employing 
regression analyses, the effects of independent variables to the dependent variable (Durmont 
et at. 2008; Mullahy 2009; Channo and Padmadas 2008; Ensor et al. 2009).  
 
Because these functions of regression analyses, this study employed regression analyses in 
order to explore the impact of performance based payments based on the hypothesis about 
the impact on health workers’ income. 
 
Regression analyses also benefit studies which “attempt to predict events or behaviour for 
practical decision-making purposes in applied settings” (Licht 1995 p. 21). However, this 
function has little relevance to this study whose purpose is not to identify the best model for 
prediction.  
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Multivariate linear regressions associate a continuous dependent variable with more than one 
variable (independent variables) on an assumption of a linear relation between the two 
groups of variables (Channo and Padmadas 2008). Assumption of liner regressions consisted 
of four aspects: linearity, normality, independence, and homoscedasticity as below. However, 
the independence concerns time-series data and since this study did not have times-series 
analyses, three other aspects are explained.  
 
Linearity refers to the linearity between independent and dependent variables. Normality for 
regression analyses refers to distribution of the error (residuals). The residuals (the error) in 
the population must be normally distributed (Field 2005). Normality in statistical analyses 
also frequently refers to normal distribution of variables (distribution of sampling) (Field 
2005). 
 
Data of household incomes and expenditure like the data of this study are generally 
characterised by being highly-skewed and having a long right-tail and relatively large portion 
of nil-value-cases to the total cases (Amemiya 1985; Deaton 1997, Fagiolo et al. 2007; 
Mullahy 2009). The household income and expenditure data of this study has this highly 
skewed structure.  
 
Also, influence of the outliers is inevitable in household income and expenditures (Amemiya 
1985; Fagiolo et al. 2007; Mullahy 2009). Total household expenditure often did not increase 
linearly and the increase rate changes before and after children became adults (Office for 
National Statistics 2005). These features are highly likely to affect the linearity and the 
normality.  
 
In order to response these issues (the normality issue here is the one concerning distribution 
of sampling), this study transformed incomes and expenditure to natural logarithm and 
included a variable for age squared for adjusting the linearity.  
 
After this treatment, this study tested the linearity by plotting the expected normal value of 
the dependent variables (the incomes and expenditure) (Y-axis) and the observed value 
(X-axis) and checked the normality of log-natural transformed variables (Field 2009). 
 
Coefficients of dummy variables obtained from the regression analyses were computed, in 
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order to give “the exact percentage difference in the predicted dependent” variable, in 
comparison with the reference variable. This computation “(e)xponentiates ” the coefficient 
and “subtracting one” (Wooldbridge 2009. P.232) :  
 
exp (coefficient) -1. 
 
This study investigated the heteroscedasticity of models by 1) checking visually plot of the 
regression standardised residuals versus the regression standardized value and 2) employing 
the modified White test. SPSS does not have the White test in its default setting which tests 
the hetroscedasticity
2
. As a result, this study conducted the modified version of the White test 
(Economic History, History Department, Oxford University accessed April 8, 2013) by 
applying the syntaxes of the modified version (Appendix 7). 
 
For the plots, if bimodality was presented, further tests were conducted to confirm whether 
COD, the variable, was the main factor which caused the bimodality The test methods and 
examples
3
 of data produced by the tests were described and presented in Appendix 8.  
1) Dependent variables 
Following variables were selected as dependent variables based on the hypothesis described 
in the subsection for the household income survey above. Expression of variables are 
presented in Chapter 7. Some of them were the subject of descriptive statistical analyses and 
others were derived from the result of the descriptive statistical analyses or the key 
information interviews.  
 
The dependent variables consisted of different types of income reasonably reflected the 
hypothesis of the health workers’ having different income sources. Investigating the impact 
of incentives to these different incomes was expected to elaborate implications of the impact, 
consequently, contrast the effect of payments associated with the contracting settings.  
 
1) Income from health work excluding private practice 
The income from health work included the payments associated with the contracting settings 
(but only in CODs). 
2) Income from health work including private practice 
                                                     
2
 SPSS users frequently employ the scattered plot for examining the hetroscedasticity. 
3
 Test data not included in Appendix 8 are provided by the investigator upon request.  
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This category of income includes and reflects private practice income. Since private practice 
income was assumed not to be earned by all health workers, the private practice income was 
excluded from the dependent variables. Therefore, the income from health work including 
private practice is important to exploring the payments associated with the contracting 
settings. 
 
3) Total household income  
This income category was comprised of income from health work and non-health work. 
These two incomes were assumed to be intricately connected with each other in the incentive 
environment. 
 
Regression results of the total household income were hypothesised to reflect the impact of 
the payments associated with the contracting settings and implication of the income from 
non-health work in relation to other factors which were hypothesised to influence the total 
household income. The total household income was highly likely to be influenced by 
exogenous factors outside of the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project, such as the 
economic status.  
 
4) Total household expenditure  
Regression results of the total household expenditure of this income were hypothesised to 
reflect the impact of payments associated with the contracting settings to the household 
economic status. This is because household expenditures seemed to reflect the economic 
status more accurately than household incomes (Deaton 1998). 
2) Independent variables 
Independent variables were theoretically selected based on hypothesis concerning the 
incentive environment of DIFD/World Bank Project and hypothesis derived from descriptive 
statistical analyses and the key informant interviews. Definitions and expressions are 
described in Table 4.8 placed at the end of this section. Additional details of hypothesis for 
independent variables are explained in the result chapter.  
 
1) Status of the district as districts contracted out. Another status was districts managed by 
MOH. The contracted out status was hypothesized to reflect differences brought about by the 
payments associated with the contacting setting between CODs and MODs. This is the 
variable of core interest to this study. 
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2) Economic status of the five districts 
CODs and MODs were selected as they were considered to have similarities which would 
accommodate the comparison of the impact of the contracting payments in the 
quasi-experimental settings. However, it is important to test an assumption that the economic 
status of the district was likely to influence on the income from dual practice and the total 
household expenditure through prices of goods and services.  
 
3) Degree of the prohibition of dual practice by NGO Contractors  
The degree of the prohibition of dual practice by NGO Contractors was hypothesised to 
influence private practice income and indirectly other incomes and the total household 
expenditure through the magnitude of private practice income against other incomes. The 
DFID/World Bank Project contracting agreement intended health workers’ abstaining from 
dual practice (Chapter 3). The degree was measured as follows, in order to tranform them 
into an independent variable. Three degrees were identified among CODs and MODs. 
However, further details of the prohibitions by the NGO Contractors which were derived the 
key informant interviews were presented in a result chapter (Chapter 5). 
 
The prohibition rules of the MOH that were applied during the field work period (2007) were 
used as the baseline and provided the basis of comparison with the prohibitions applied by 
the three NGO Contractors. The MOH rules prohibited dual practice during working hours 
and duty hours but appeared to have limited effect in restraining health workers from 
conducting dual practice (Soeters and Griffiths 2003; Akashi et al. 2002). The MOH rules 
were applied by non-contracting Operational Districts including MODs.  
 
Using the MOH rules as the baseline, differences in strengths of prohibitions by the three 
NGO Contractors were investigated. Information and experiences about the prohibitions by 
the NGO contractors were obtained by the key informant interviews and were compared with 
the MOH rules. The comparisons were made about the hours of prohibitions and other 
aspects such as the intensity or additions of rules, punishments and prohibitions of 
health-related private business, for example, operating pharmacies by the health workers or 
their households.  
 
Among CODs, RHAC applied the MOH’s rule in Prea Sdach Operational Districts, as a 
result, the degree of RHAC’s prohibition was perceived to be the same as the MOH baseline. 
The SRC in Kirivong Operational Districts, while applying the same working hour 
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prohibition as the MOH, imposed their own internal rules which included punihments such 
as reductions of payments. Because of this feature, SRC’s prohibition was considered stricter 
than the MOH’s rules. HNI’s prohibition in Peareang Operational Districts, however, 
appeared to be even stricter than RHAC and SRC. HNI prohibited dual practice completely 
as well as family members’ medical practice or conducting pharmacy business. HNI also 
imposed internal rules which included punishments. Some of the punishments appeared to be 
heavier than SRC’s; the punishments included the immediate transfer of the health worker 
who conducted private practice to another health facility (Jacobs and Price 2006; Jacobs et al. 
2010; SRC 2006; KI01 and KI02 in 2006, KI10, 2007). As a result, HNI’s prohibition was 
considered the strictest among the three NGO Contractors. Consequently, three different 
degrees were identified: low level equivalent to the MOH rule applied by RHAC and two 
MODs, middle level applied by SRC, and the strictest level applied by HNI. These three 
levels were expressed by binary dummy variables (Table 4.8).The rules are explained in 
Chapter 5.  
 
4) Variables for the five subject districts were intended to represent inclusive differences 
among them. The differences might have influenced the incomes and expenditure through 
the incomes of health workers which, in turn, were influenced by the economic status. 
 
5) Attributes of individual health workers  
The payments which were basically the scheme of fee-for-services and previous studies and 
the contracting document did not appear to indicate these attributes of individual health 
workers as determinants on the payments (ADB 2002b; MOH 2001;KI02, Feburary 27 2006; 
K01, March 17 2006; KI04, April 22 2005). Controlling for them in regressions in this study 
was expected to elaborate the effect of the payments and other variables which appeared 
relevant to the changes in incomes in CODs.  
 
Cadre 
The cadre with higher qualifications was likely to bring in higher government salaries and 
income from private practice (MOH 2005). Cadre was likely to influence the health workers’ 
payments associated with the contracting settings. This hypothesis was derived from the 
result of the key informant interview of this study. It was found that cadre was considered in 
the payment guideline of NGOs and the allocation methods at Health Centers. 
 
Gender  
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Gender seemed to be a determining factor for entry “(UNIFEM 2004)” into some cadres 
such as doctors and midwives. Therefore, gender may influence health workers’ and their 
households’ income and expenditure through the cadre. 
 
Age and age squared 
Age was likely to correlate to the income of health workers, often being translated into the 
seniority in the government regular payments and with the number of years of experience 
influencing the demand for private services provided by the health worker and consequently 
his or her private practice income (Ensor et al 2009). The age data was squared and both this 
age squared and age variables were entered in regressions of total household expenditure, 
reflecting that household expenditure generally did not increase in linearly (Office for 
National Statistics 2005). However, the health workers questioned by the survey were on 
active service, therefore, their age increases were likely to correspond to increases in the 
government and private service income. Data of age squared was employed in order to adjust 
the linearity since incomes might not hold the linearity as described above. 
 
Household size  
The number of household members was previously found to be correlated to the expenditure 
(Office for National Statistics 2005). Household size would affect the relationship between 
the income and expenditure, given the same income, household size could increase the 
expenditure. However, household size cannot offer a full explanation of either the 
expenditure nor income. Therefore, household size was not to be used as a crude proxy for 
the expenditure in this study. Incomes of household members, both from their employment 
and household enterrises, were requested in this survey as explained above, in order to 
ascertain the total household income.  
 
Marital status 
The marital status i.e. being married could be associated the possibility of the availability of 
a spouse’s additional income to the household. However, marital status cannot offer a full 
explanation of either the income nor the expenditure of household. Therefore, marital status 
was not to be used as a crude proxy for the income and expenditure in this study. Incomes of 
household members, both from their employment and household enterrises, were requested 
in this survey, in order to ascertain the total household income.  
.
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Table 4.8 Expressions and definitions of independent variables 
 
 
 
  
Expression Definition 
OD Status Status of districts: whether contracted out or not
COD MOD=0, the reference variable
COD=1
Cadre Cadres, 
Primary NS Primary nurses, the reference variable =-00000
Secondary NS Secondary nurses= 00001
Primary MW Primary midwives = 00010
Secondary MW Secondary midwives = 00100
Assis. Doctor Assistant doctors = 01000
Doctor
Gender 
Male Female= 0, ther reference variable 
Male= 1 
Household size 
HHSize Household size of health workers
Age
Age Age of health worker
Age Squared Age of health worker squared 
Economic status 
EconoStatus Economic status of districts based on poverty distribution map.
 Kirivong = 00, the reference variable, Lower eonomic status than Kirivong=01 
(all other districts Peareang, Preah Sdachm, Kamchay Mea, Mesang) 
Level of strength of prohibition of dual practice (details are in Chapter 5)
Prohibition dual
practicce Strict
The strictest level in Peareang district (complete prohibition set by internal ruals
with punishiments )  =000, the reference variable
Prohibition dual
practice Mid
The middle level in Peareang district (prohibition only within working hours set by
internal rurle with punishment ) =010
Prohibition Dual
Practice Low
The weakest level (the same as the MOH rule)  in Preah Sdach, Kamchay Mea
and Mesang districts =001
Nominal differences in the five districts
Kamchay Mea Kamchay Mea (MOD) = 10000, Reference variable 
Mesang Mesang (MOD) = 01000
Prea Sdach Preah Sdach (COD) = 00010
Kirivong Kirivong (COD) = 00001
Peareang Peareang (COD) = 00100
Prohibiton of dual
practice
Five Operational
Districts
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3) Empirical Models 
Prior to the estimation, high collinearity between the variables was found. Due to this, some 
of these variables were excluded automatically by the SPSS default setting (tolerance of 
0.0001) when all variables were entered together for regressing the incomes and expenditure. 
Combinations of variables which were not accepted by SPSS were: 
 
1) The variable for the status of districts (COD) and those for the five districts, 
2) The variables for the five districts and the variable for the economic status,  
3) The variables for the five districts and those for the levels of strength of prohibitions, 
Therefore, it was not possible to put together any of these three combinations in regressions.  
 
In the next step, considering the above issues, two groups of variables were formed (Table 
4.9). Neither of the two groups include any of the three combinations mentioned above.  
 
The first group, Group A, intended to elaborate influence (coefficient) for CODs, the variable. 
This group avoided combination 1) above. Therefore, this group excluded the variables for 
the individual five Operational Districts but included all other variables. This group 
consisted of the variables for CODs, the economic status of ODs, the degree of prohibition of 
dual practice and attributes of health workers and their households (six attributes) (Table 4.8). 
However, these were still not able to give a calculation result due to the high correlation 
between two variables: economic status and the degree of prohibitions of dual practice, if all 
of them were put in together. As a result, in order to avoid grouping these two variables 
together, two separate models were formed from the variables in Group A. Model 1 included 
the economic status of Operational Districts and other Group A variables but excluded the 
degree of prohibitions of dual practice. Model 2 included the degree of prohibitions of dual 
practice and other Group A variables but excluded the economic status of Operational 
Districts.  
 
Group B intended to elaborate influence (coefficient) for the five individual Operational 
Districts, the variables. Group B thus included variables other than CODs, economic status 
and prohibition rules. This group avoided the combinations of 2) and 3) above and consisted 
of the variables of the five individual Operational Districts and the attributes of health 
workers and their households (the six attributes)(Table 4.8). 
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These groups and model variables were entered by a SPSS method which enters all variables 
designated, i.e., forced–entering. 
 
 
Table 4.9: Groups and models of independent variables (basic type) 
 
Group A Model 1 Group A Model 2 Group B Model 3
Cadre,  Male, Married,
HHsize, Age, Age Squared,
Cadre,  Male, Married,
HHsize, Age, Age Squared,
Cadre,  Male, Married,
HHsize, Age, Age Squared,
CODs, EcoStatus CODs
Measang, Peareang, Preah
Sdach, Kirivong
Prohibition dual practice
Mid,  Prohibition dual
practice Low  
 
Note: Variables above included the variables which were expressed in the form of dummy 
variables (Table 4.8).
 
Models for incomes are as follows,  
Group A Model 1 
Ln (YI ) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW + b4 Secondary MW  
+ b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctors + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared + b9 Male + b10 Married  
+ b11 COD + b12 Economic Status + e 
 
 
Group A Model 2  
 
Ln (YI ) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW + b4 Secondary MW  
+ b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctor + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared + b9 Male + b10 Married  
+ b11 COD + b12 Prohibition dual practice Mid + b13 Prohibition dual practice Low + e 
 
 
Group B Model 3  
Ln (YI) = Ln (YI ) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW  
+ b4 Secondary MW + b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctor + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared  
+ b9 Male + b10 Married + b11 Measang + b12 Peareng + b13 Preah Sdach + b14 Kirivong + e 
 
where YI means the categories of incomes explicated above, a is a constant, b1.. bt  are 
coefficient for 1
st
 to t
th
 independent variables and e is error term.  
 
Models for the total household expenditure was expressed as follows 
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Group A Model 1 
Ln (Total HH Expenditure) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW  
+ b4 Secondary MW + b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctor + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared  
+ b9 Male + b10 Married + b11 COD + b12 Economic Status + e 
 
 
Group A Model 2  
 
Ln (Total HH Expenditure) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW  
+ b4Secondary MW + b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctor + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared  
+ b9 Male + b10 Married + b11 COD  
+ b12 Prohibition dual practice Mid + b13 Prohibition dual practice Low + e 
 
 
Group B Model 3  
Ln (Total HH Expenditure) = a + b1 HHsize + b2 Secondary NS + b3 Primary MW  
+ b4 Secondary MW + b5 Assis. Doctors + b6 Doctor + b7 Age + b8 Age Squared  
+ b9 Male + b10 Married + b11 Measang + b12 Peareng + b13 Preah Sdach + b14 Kirivong + e 
 
 
Where a is a constant, b1.. bt  are coefficient for 1
st
 to t
th
 independent variables and e is error 
term. 
 
Prior to estimations, though the independent variables were selected based on theoretical 
hypothesis, univariate regressions of each dependent variables using each independent 
variable were peformed in oder to confirm the selection of independent variables were 
acceptable to the model regressions. By the univariate regression, R-square for the 
independent variables and other statistics including p-value for the model were tested. As 
noted in Table 4.8, the independent variables consisted of scale variables and sets of dummy 
variables for categorical or ordinal variables. Each set of dummy variables were used as 
regressors in the test regressions except the referene variables.  
 
The cut-off point for the independent variable was p-value below 0.2 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, Tanzania and Oxford Policy Management Ltd, UK. 2001) for the model. Variables 
which resulted in the model p-value above 0.2 were excluded. 
 
After the regressions were performed, the following points were checked concerning the 
diagnostic of the estimations. It is noted that types of diagnostics applied vary in studies due 
to the different levels of statistical analytical requirements in each study and also due to 
different checking points that statistical software, e. g., SPSS, can or cannot produce (Filed 
2005; UCLA 2009). Selection of the tests needs to rely on “the benefit” derived from them in  
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presenting the model’s important problem which can be mitigated or solved, not on the 
availability alone. “(N)ot all features” tested “are equally important to perspectives of 
research consumers” (Mullahy 2009. P.8).  
 
This study employed conventional tests (Howell 2007; Filed 2005), though not in an 
exhaustive way, based on the non-time series data and objective of regressions of this study 
which was not the best prediction model identifications through selections of variables. This 
study decided cut-off points based on commonly recommended value (Howell 2007; Filed 
2005; University Leeds 2009).  
 
Cook’s Distance  
The household income and expenditure data of this study inevitably contained outliers 
(Amemiya 1985; Fagiolo et al. 2007; Mullahy 2009) and the transformation to natural 
logarithm mitigated this issue. Cook’s D (Distance) measures the ‘influence’ of outliers on 
resultant features of equations and a combination of 1) “distance” which identifies outlier of 
dependent variables and 2) “leverage” which identifies outliers of independent variables 
(Howell 2007). In other words, Cook’s D is “a function of the sum of the squared changes in 
bj” that would occur if the ith observation were removed from the data and the analysis rerun” 
(Howell 2007, P. 517). A case which has a Cook’s D of more than 0.5 is an outlier and 
inappropriate for inclusion in the regression analysis (Howell, 2007). 
 
One way of excluding outliers identified by the Cook’s test is trimming them. Given the 
limited total number of cases of this study (N=250) and needs for regressions on separated 
cases from the total, smaller number of cases in the separated regressions, trimming was 
carefully considered. In consideration of the nature of the data, the transformation, and 
negative influence of reductions of the number of cases by trimming, the outliers in some 
models were trimmed but those in other models were left in the models. 
 
Tolerance 
Tolerance of independent variables indicates collinearity among them by showing 
contribution to the variance of independent variable in percentage which is not made from 
the other independent variables. An excessively low value of tolerance is regarded as 
indicating collinearity. In order to check the tolerance, variance inflation factor: the VIF in 
SPSS was used by the study. The VIF in SPSS analyses is 1 / tolerance. Cut-off points of a 
VIF vary in studies (Field 2005), for example, a VIF of higher than 10 is regarded as 
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indicating collinearity (UCLA 2009). This study employed a conservative value of VIF of 5 
(Ensor et al. 2009). 
(6) Mini-survey regarding allocation of the payments at subcontractor level  
A survey was conducted in order to better understand the payment mechanism of 
performance-based payments through investigating the allocation mechanism of payments to 
individual health workers at the subcontractor (Health Centres) level. The allocation was 
made from the payments paid to the subcontractors by the NGO Contractors. The researcher 
became aware of the allocation during the process of conducting the household survey. 
Information obtained from the investigation was expected to contribute supplementary 
information to the process of articulating the incentive environment, with the key informant 
interview functioning as the main tool of this investigation. The sub-contractor level 
allocation mechanism including the methods was likely to influence the impact of 
performance-based payments. Allocation mechanism of sharing user-fee income were also 
investigated, since the sharing of user-fee income was closely associated with the contracting 
settings. 
 
This investigation intended to find factors involved in the allocation and the weight given to 
each of these factors in deciding the allocation, as its main interest. It also investigated rules, 
monitoring and punishments related to dual practice, since these were likely to shape the 
incentive environment. Reasons for applying the factors and allocation methods were also 
investigated. 
 
A questionnaire survey was selected as the best method for this investigation, as this method 
best reflected the objective of the investigation (to obtain information in a fixed concrete 
scope), accommodated language issues (the subcontractors’ language being Khmer), and 
because of the supplemental nature of the investigation. A questionnaire survey is a relatively 
simple method of comparing interviews and accommodates data which are likely to be 
analysed by more standardised methods (Phellas et al. 2004 in Seale 2004). Due to its 
anonymity, it also accommodates addressing sensitive issues (WHO 2001) such as income 
allocation. The questionnaire (Appendix 9) had options for replying, in order to increase the 
ease for administering it. An investigator asked the questions in face-to-face interviews 
through an interpreter who posed the questions in the Khmer language. Interviews were 
conducted in a confidential environment. 
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The survey was conducted with 9 subcontractor managers at three subcontractor Health 
Centres from each COD. They were strategically selected according to their level of 
performance in relation to performance targets in subcontracting: low, middle and high (one 
for each from one CODs) and identified by the manager of the NGO Contractor who knew 
the level of performance of the Health Centres. The survey was conducted at he Health 
Centres and at the Operational District Office in the event that some subcontractors’ facilities 
were difficult to access due to bad road conditions. 
 
Increasing the number of cases surveyed was difficult due to the physical access problems. 
Access was becoming increasingly difficult due to the rainy season which occurred during 
the time of the survey. It was also made difficult due to the limited time and financial 
resources available to this survey. The limited number of respondents also meant that a 
cautious approach was required when trying to extend the results of this survey to all 
sub-contractors. 
4.4 Study site 
(1) Operational Districts contracted out  
Exploring the impact of performance-based payments in rural settings is significant, because 
it is in the rural areas of Cambodia that most of the population lives, often in deprived 
situations, and where the problems of heath sector development are serious (MOH 1997, 
2002; Jacobs and Price 2006). Because of this, this study first selected provinces: Prey Veng 
and Takeo Provinces (bottom of the map, Figure 4.2), from the 7 provinces where health 
districts were contracted out (Table 3.4 in Chapter 3. Figure 4.2 showed the non-selected 5 
provinces with arrows). From these two provinces, three districts contracted out which had 
similar socio-economic status and health status (Table 4.10) were selected, two from Prey 
Veng and one from Takeo Province  
 
These two provinces were rural areas but had higher accessibility from the capital than the 
other five provinces. The accessibility concerned the distance of 250 Kilometres from the 
capital, road networks, transportation both from the outside and within the province, 
resources necessary for transportation, and security issues. Prey Veng Province, which is 
located on the other side of the Mekong River to Phnom Penh, is known as a relatively poor 
rural area where most of the people conduct a subsistence level of rice cultivation. Cars 
sometimes have to drive on open country in this province. Rivers in, and surrounding, the 
province had limited numbers of bridges.  
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Takeo Province was located in the plain area. The province is an oblong extending from the 
north (close to Phnom Penh) to the south. The northern part of the province was more 
developed than the southern part and was experiencing population growth due to its location 
close to the capital. Two national roads extending from the capital city contributed the 
province’s development. The southern part suffers chronic floods and was understood to 
share poverty levels similar to Prey Veng Province. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Locations of Prey Veng and Takeo Provinces in Cambodia and the other five 
provinces where Opearational Districts were contracting out (indicated by arrows) 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Cambodia. 2009. The General 
Population Census of Cambodia, 2008: National Report on Final Census Results. p.vii. 
 
 
In Prey Veng Province, Peareang District was contracted out to HealthNet International 
(HNI). The HNI had a contracting relationship with the same district in the ADB Pilot 
Project. Preah Sdach District was also contracted out to HNI, but it was then sub-contracted 
to RHAC: the Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia (RHAC). Performance 
indicators for RHAC were similar to those which HNI was required to achieve in 
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DFID/World Bank Contracting Project. These two districts were chosen as the subject for the 
study.  
 
In Takeo Province, Kirivong District, which was contracted out to Swiss Red Cross (SRC) 
was chosen as a subject for this study. Kirivong Operational Districts had been contracted 
out to Save the Children France in the ADB Pilot Project. There was another district 
contracted out in Takeo Province. That was Ang Roker District; however, this district had 
fewer rural features due to its having the (administrative) district town which was the centre 
for commerce and transportation. 
 
Table 4.10: Main health indicators of two provinces 
 
 
Population  
Infant 
Mortality Rate 
per 1,000 live 
births 
Under-5 Mortality 
Rate Per 1,000 live 
births 
Vaccinated Children age 
12-23 months all kinds* 
(%) 
Prey Veng 947,357 121 143 68.5 
Takeo 843,931 96 102 76.8 
Cambodia 
Rural 
N/A 92 111 66.2
 
 
Deliveries assisted by medical 
staff** (%) 
Health Expenditure per capita 
Total US$ (Transportation + Health Care) 
Prey Veng 28.0 16.93 (1.21 + 15.85) 
Takeo 62.1 10.24 (1.95 + 9.70) 
Cambodia 
Rural 
39.4 13.71 (1.17 + 12.76) 
 
Note: All kinds*: BCG, measles, and three injections of DPT and of polio vaccines (which excludes 
polio vaccination at birth) (Source 1 p.154). Medical staff**: a doctor, a nurse or a midwife. 
Source: Except the population data, all other data were from Source 1. Source 1: National Institute of 
Public Health, National Institute of Statistics and ORC Macro. 2006. p.37, 120, 125, 144, 154. The 
percentage of deliveries assisted by medical staff**was calculated from Source 1 p.144. The 
population data was from Source 2: National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Cambodia. 
2009: National Report on Final Census Results. p 7 
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Health status and service delivery in the two provinces were disadvantaged, compared with 
other rural areas of the country (Table 4.10). Thereby, it was assumed the health status and 
service delivery were similarly disadvantaged in the three Operational Districts and the 
DFID/World Bank Project’s reason (rural poverty-stricken districts with problems of health 
service delivery) for selecting the Districts to be contracted out reinforced this assumption. 
Takeo’s better indicators (Table 4.10) were largely attributable to the relatively developed 
northern part of the Province, but Kirivong Operational District is located in the south. 
 
The following outlines features of the three Operational Districts. 
Peareng Operational District  
Peareng Operational District is situated approximately 60 Km south east of Phnom Penh. 
From Phnom Penh, people needed to use a ferry to cross the Mekong River to go there, since 
no bridge was constructed on the road to the district. This often required extra time for the 
journey, depending on the number of passengers and cars at ports waiting for a ferry. The 
less developed road networks in the district cause severe access difficulties during the rainy 
season; traveling from one part of the district to another may require a detour through a 
neighbouring Operational District.  
Preah Sdach Operational District 
Preach Sdach Operational District is situated approximately 100 kilometres to the south-east 
of Phnom Penh; the south has a border with Vietnam. The total journey to the Operational 
District from Phnom Penh required more than 2.5 hours, not including the waiting time for 
ferries crossing over the Mekong River. The waiting-time issue for ferries operation 
chronically occurred here also. After the river, the limited road network again disrupts access, 
both to and within the district; this problem intensifies during the rainy season.  
Kirivong Operational District  
Kirivong Operational District is located at the south end of Takeo Province and borders 
Vietnam. Access from Phnom Penh to the Operational District was improved in early 2007, 
when a part of National Road No. 2 was paved, since the Operational District is located 
relatively close to this road. However, within the Operational District, small rivers, lakes and 
undeveloped roads pose problems to transportation. Floods in rainy season exacerbate the 
problems. But in some areas, underdevelopment of roads and bridges requires the use of 
boats throughout the year.  
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(2) Operational Districts operated within the MOH system  
In order to reasonably explore the impact of the payments associated with the contracting 
settings, this study identified a control group of Operational Districts. Having a control group 
was also expected to help clarify and elaborate the impact of payments based on this studies 
quasi-experimental cross-sectional study design. Definition of the control groups was centred 
on their Operational Districts’ status as those not contracted out and operated within the 
MOH system (MODs) in the same province where two CODs are located having the same 
MOH health delivery structure and other similarities as described below. As noted above, 
statistical data for the economic status for Operational Districts was unavailable since they 
were not administrative districts.  
 
The strategy for selection of MODs was to select Operational Districts which maximised the 
similarities between the two groups: CODs and MODs. However, there was limited usable 
data available for the selection for the quasi-experimental research design; difficulties in 
randomizing the locations for intervention and control (Harris et.al 2004) were experienced 
in this study. Particular attention was given to exclude Operational Districts which had 
apparent differences associated with endogenous factors, such as economic status, causing or 
having the potential to cause differences in income (Ensor et al. 2009) and expenditure from 
CODs. Another strategy was to collect information on candidate Operational Districts as the 
control group from the key informants. The third strategy was to check the result of 
descriptive statistics analyses of variables in collected data concerning similarity, to see 
whether the similarity was ensured, given the lack of such statistics prior to data collection. 
The similarity concerned were the government regular payments????? which were 
hypothesized to be the same in all five Operational Districts, and the structure of cadres. The 
data was presented at the beginning of Chapter 6. The fourth strategy was to collect primary 
data directly from different sources, given the low- or non- availability of secondary data, 
and process the collected data into usable data for the decision. 
 
Data about the economic status of any Operational Districts in Cambodia was not available; 
therefore, prior to the data collection, the economic status of CODs and MODs were decided 
by drawing on approaches to deciding status in the area of development study and practices 
(Chambers 1997; World Bank 2006). The approaches construct the economic status through 
proxies. The managers in CODs and some other Key informants were asked for their 
opinions about whether selection of MODs was reasonable.  
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1) Criteria for selecting the control group of MODs  
The two MODs were to be located in the same province as the two CODs, which was 
considered to ensure some similarity. In the selection of these two MODs, the following 
aspects were required and checked, drawing on development studies (Chambers 1983, 1997). 
- The socio-economic development levels similar to CODs’. 
Existence of industry other than the primary industry, scale of main markets, paved road 
net-work and traversable road during rainy season, accessibility from big towns outside the 
Operational District, accessibility of within the Operational District (KI01 March 17 2006; 
KI03 July 30 2006; World Bank 2006). 
- Similarity of geographical access to national roads to the CODs’ access.   
- The Operational Districts, which have not been “heavily” supported by NGOs or donors. If 
the support is "heavy", it might be the case that a large proportion of health workers in the 
Operational Districts are paid supplementary salaries and/or per-diems by the NGOs and/or 
donors. If such payments were made, this study’s comparison between these Operational 
Districts and CODs could be disturbed.  
  
“Heavily” concerns the scale of resources supported by the NGOs and/or donors such as:  
project budget; geographical coverage; involvement of the health workers; the high intensity 
of managerial guidance or direction from the NGOs and/or donors to the running of the 
Operational District, in terms of closeness, routines, and influence. 
 
"Heavily" supported Operational Districts were excluded based on the following 
understanding.  
The level of support was checked in the database of MEDICAM, the NGO umbrella 
organisation in the Cambodian health sector. However, the information in the database was 
insufficient to judge the level.
.
In Cambodia, information about NGOs seemed rarely to be 
available other than in the MEDICAM database. Subsequently, the investigator obtained 
additional information directly from the NGOs.  
2) Selected control Operational Districts (MODs) 
In Prey Veng Province where two CODs (Peareang and Preah Sdach Operational Districts) 
are situated, two Operational Districts - Kamchey Mea and Meseng Operational Districts - 
were selected as the control Operational Districts.  
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As a result, two CODs and two MODs in Prey Veng province were the subjects for this study 
(Figure 4.4
4
). The similar features of the three CODs and two MODs, and the factors used in 
selecting them, are outlined in Table 4.11.  
 
The two MODs were from five Operational Districts in the province which were not 
contracted out (details of the screening are given in Appendix 10). Kamchay Mea 
Operational District is situated at the western end of the province. Undeveloped roads in and 
out to the Operational District were severely affected by rain, posing access problems. 
Similarly to the three CODs, this Operational District did not have a noticeable industry, 
other than a near subsistence-level of rice cultivation; the area was deprived. It had been a 
control Operational District in ADB Pilot Project evaluation (ADB 2004). This suggested 
that our selection of this Operational District was reasonable since the evaluation potentially 
found its characteristics worth being used as the control (ADB 2004). 
 
Mesang Operational District is situated in the south of Kamchay Mea Operational District. It 
had similar access problems to those in Kamchay Mea. It was assessed as particularly poor 
even within Prey Veng Province and as a difficult place for Cambodian NGOs to conduct 
projects due to security issues (KI16 March 28 2007).  
ii. Takeo Province 
In Takeo Province, there are three Operational Districts which were not contracted out and 
two Operational Districts which were contracted out (Kirivong and Ang Roker Districts). 
Screening excluded all the three Operational Districts , because their development level and 
access to the national roads were better than Kirivong, suggesting they were likely to have a 
higher economic status. As a result, no control Operational Districts were selected (Appendix 
10).  
 
 
                                                     
4
 A map showing health Operational District was not available. 
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Figrure 4.3: Location of five Districts* 
Note:District*: administrative districts. Maps for (health) Operational Dstrcits were 
unavailable.  
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Table 4.11 Outline of features of Districts subjects for this study  
 
 CODs MODs 
Districts Kirivong  Peareang Preah Sdach Kamchey 
Mear  
Mesang 
Province Takeo Prey Veng Prey Veng Prey Veng Prey Veng 
Populatio
n  
196,380 115,217 201,870 126,045 123,289 
HC* 15 9 20 10 11 
Main 
industry  
agriculture agriculture agriculture agriculture agriculture 
Road 
network 
develop
ment 
level 
(paveme
nt, ranks 
of road, 
access,et
c.) 
A little better 
around 
Operational 
District office 
due to its 
closeness  to a 
paved national 
roads. 
Obstructed by 
lakes and floods 
which require 
uses of boats in 
the areas 
through the 
year.   
Low. Severe 
affects by 
raining season 
which access 
from 
Operational 
District office 
to health 
centres 
impossible. 
Need to detour 
through 
another 
Operational 
District to visit 
a group of 
Health Center. 
Low. Need 
to go 
through 
fields. 
Severe 
affects by 
raining 
season 
which access 
from 
Operational 
District 
office to 
health 
centres 
impossible. 
Low. severe 
affect by 
raining 
season 
which access 
from 
Operational 
District 
office to 
health 
centres 
impossible.   
Low. severe 
affect by 
raining season 
which access 
from 
Operational 
District office 
to health 
centres 
impossible. 
Markets  Not having a big 
market. Not an 
very mportant 
traffic point. 
Not having big 
markets. Not 
an important 
traffic point.  
Not having a 
big market 
and 
Not an 
important 
traffic point.  
Not having a 
big market. 
Not an 
important 
traffic point.   
Not having a 
big market. 
Not an 
important 
traffic point. 
Support 
for health 
develop
ment 
NA NA NA ‘not 
heavily’(Ap
pendix 10)  
‘not heavily’ 
’(Appendix 
10) 
Other 
feature 
NGO 
contractor: 
Swiss Red 
Cross 
NGO 
contractor: 
HealthNet 
International 
Quoted as 
very poor 
area (KI01 
Apr. 23, 
2005) 
NGO 
contractor: 
RHAC** 
 Quoted as 
very poor area 
(KI17 April 
25 2007) 
 
RHAC** Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia 
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Source: Peareang: Noirrhomme et al. 2007; Preah Sdach: Preah Sdach District, 2006; Kirivong; 
National Institute Statistic 1999, cited in Jacobs et al. 2010; Mesang: Mesang District, 2007; Kamchey 
Mea:  Kamchey Mea District, 2007; KI01 Apr. 23, 2005; KI17 April 25 2007. 
NGO  
4.5 Validity of the quantitative investigation in this study  
As described above, due to the quasi-experimental design of this study, the internal validity 
of this study concerning the quantitative study part is incomplete. However, aspects of 
validity are still fulfilled, while scientific tests or experimental research projects examine 
different aspects of the validity or projects depending on their disciplines or methodologies. 
The validity concerning the accuracy of the expenditure and income household surveys was 
increased by the strategies described above. Statistical conclusion validity refers to whether 
or not statistical inference of covariance between variables is justified (Onwuegbuzie and 
Johnson, 2006). This study secured the statistical conclusion validity by: a sufficient sample 
size for statistical methods; checking the accuracy of fit of regression models, 
heteroskedasticity and the VIF (Howell 2007; Filed 2005; Dumont et al. 2008; UCLA 2009; 
Ensor et al. 2009), where different studies employ different tests, even sometimes depending 
available test methods by the statistical software applied. 
 
Internal validity addresses whether or not an observed covariation should be considered a 
causal relationship which is influenced by the quality of study design (Bryman 2004; Salkind 
2004). The internal validity was ensured by the arrangement which removes discerned 
‘threats’ to the validity (Onwugebuzie and Jonson 2006) of this study. These threats were 
concerning “history,” “maturation,” “selection,” “testing,” “instrument,” “regression” (not in 
the statistics) and “mortality.” “History” concerns an external event that occurs 
simultaneously which may affect the experiment (the research setting). “Maturation” 
concerns the changes caused by physical and psychological forces. “Selection” concerns the 
selection bias of participants in the experiment. “Testing” concerns the influence of a pre-test 
on the later performance of the subject of a study. “Instrument” concerns the accuracy of the 
measuring instrument of the test. “Regression” concerns the propensity of extreme scores 
which will regress to the mean. “Mortality” concerns the dropping out of participants before 
completion of the experiment (Salkind 2004). These threats would have hardly affected this 
study, because (1) quantitative methods of this study were conducted in the relatively short 
term but the elaborated questionnaire reflected at the maximum level of the changes in 
incomes or expenditures of the health workers that might have concomitantly occurred; (2) 
physical and biological forces that affected the health workers and their environment were 
 141 
 
not reported; (3) the complete enumeration survey rendered the household survey free from 
the selection threat; the sample selections of the survey for sub-contractor-level payment 
allocation drew on knowledge of the NGO Contractor managers and this approach reduced 
the selection bias  (4) the pre-test was not conducted in the same areas where the actual 
survey was conducted; (5) physical measurement instruments were not used; (6) selections 
of the health workers surveyed were not based on their extreme scores in an ordinal variable 
concerning their features. 
 
External validity examines whether or not an observed causal relationship should be 
generalized across different measures, persons, settings, and times (Calder et al. 1982 cited 
in Linch 1983). External validity faces the following three threats: “multiple treatment 
inference,” “reactive arrangements,” and “pre-test sensitization.” “Multiple treatment 
inference” concerns an unintended treatment the participants receive which may hinder the 
generalization of the results of the experiment. “Reactive arrangement” concerns changes in 
behaviours of the participants due to their awareness of the experiment. “Pre-test 
sensitization” concerns the influence of a pre-test on the treatment of the experiment 
(Salkind, 2004). None of the three threats had any relevance to this study. The pre-test of this 
study was conducted outside the study site. The reactive arrangements threat was eliminated 
by (1) the elaborate questions of questionnaires; (2) informing participants of the purpose of 
this study as a scientific study; and (3) protecting the confidentiality and the anonymity of 
the participants. 
 
Validity concerning qualitative studies is “interpreted as the extent to which an instance 
accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (Hammersley 1990: 57). In 
addition, concerning qualitative studies, reliability of the findings is important. The 
reliability “concerning qualitative studies refers to the degree of consistency with which 
instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer 
on different occasions” (Hammersley 1992, p. 67). This study’s strategic selection of the key 
informants ensured these aspects of validity as explicated above. 
4.6 Ethical Consideration  
This study obtained official permission for its fieldwork from the ethics committee of the 
Cambodian Ministry of Health  (Appendix 13). In addition, the Ethics Committee of Queen 
Margaret University reaffirmed the earlier approval of the Ethics Committee of the London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), given prior to the transfer of the 
investigator from LSHTM to Queen Margaret University.  
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Data collection did not include biomedical and in-vivo experiments. Also, no children 
participated in the research study, which would have required parental consent, nor did any 
vulnerable persons, who might have been affected by their participation. 
 
Informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity of respondents in the data collection were 
assured in the course of this study. However, the names of key informants are retained only 
on a list in consideration to cultural sensitivity. Informed consent from the respondents and 
key informants assured, prior to their decisions to participate. The purpose, the content, tand 
the option of non-participation, were all explained to them both verbally and in writing, in 
the Khmer or English language. Measures in place to ensure confidentiality and anonymity 
were explained. Upon their consent, they signed consent forms.  
 
The surveyors, the people who implemented the data entry, and the interpreter, were all 
trained to respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents. The data was 
securely stored, with only the investigator able to access it. Data from the cadres, in which 
the number of respondents was limited, has remained undisclosed. 
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Chapter 5 Implementation of the DFID/World Bank Project in 
Peareang, Preah Sdach, and Kirivong Districts 
 
This chapter presents findings responding to Research Question 1. The research question is:  
what are the differences in incomes and expenditures of health workers’ households between 
the two types of districts: one contracted out and another managed by the ministry of health? 
This chapter illustrates the payment mechanism of performance-based payments and other 
payments associated with the contracting out, implementation methods of DFID/World Bank 
Contracting Project and the incentive environment surrounding the payments. These findings 
concern the three contracted out districts: CODs (Peareang and Preah Sdach Districts in Prey 
Veng Province and Kirivong District in Takeo Province). The findings were derived from the 
key informant interviews, except the one relating to the payment mechanism at the health 
facility level.  
 
It was hypothesized that the payment mechanism, operation of the mechanism, other aspects 
of implementation and arrangements of the contracting projects have been influencing the 
incentive environment. The characteristics of the government health sectors and health 
workers’ private practice income were also likely to have influence.  
 
It is important to note that these payment mechanisms and implementation methods were 
uniquely set by each of the NGO contractors. Some sections of this chapter provide uneven 
descriptions of the three districts, resulting from the imbalance of information available. The 
imbalance seems to pertain to the fact that there was no requirement for the contractors to 
document the implementation in the project. 
5.1 Basic information of three districts 
(1) Issues of physical settings 
Difficulties in transport due to the underdevelopment of roads and bridges are described in 
Chapter 4. These difficulties were a burden on the population in terms of accessing health 
services within the three districts (e.g. as represented by photos in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 below), 
affecting health service delivery and the working environment at the health facilities through: 
- Disturbing patients’ service access  
- Encouraging some patients to visit health facilities outside the area where they lived in 
order to access health services more easily  
 144 
 
 
- Bad communications and delivery of materials between the (health) Operational District 
Offices and the Provincial Health Department or MOH, or between the Offices and health 
facilities within the district. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Photograph of a road after rain in Peareang District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Photograph of a ferry in Peareang District 
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(2) Economic status 
The three Operational Districts were selected on the basis of their socio-economic similarity 
(Chapter 4. 4), given the limited availability of economic information (Health Operational 
Districts were not subjects for government economic study) and the basic notion about 
features of these Operational Districts by the DFID/World Bank Project which selected them 
as its project site (Chapter 3.6.1). In DFID/World Bank Contracting Project, the selection 
was based on their feature as poor, rural and remote Operational Districts with low health 
status (MOH 2007b). However, in exploring the impact of the contracting 
performance-based payments on the income of health workers and their households, it is 
important to test whether the impact of payments exceeded that of the impact of the 
economic status of the Districts. This is because the impact of the two factors may compete 
in terms of increases in incomes of heath workers as the economic status may influence 
income from dual practice (Ensor et al. 2009). 
 
Given the lack of economic data for health Operational District, this study estimated the 
economic status from available data of distribution of poverty rates at the level of communes, 
through estimating the economic status of administrative districts. A commune is an 
administrative unit under a district in the Cambodian administrative structure. The poverty 
rate is a measure of poverty widely used and shows the rate of people living below the 
poverty line (MOP and WFP 2003). Detailed information of communes having their own 
poverty rate was unavailable.  
 
Peareang and Preah Sdach Districts (Figure 5.3) appeared to have a similar economic status; 
patterns of the poverty rate distribution appeared to be similar except for the fact that 
Peareang District has the highest range of the rate, greater than 75% in one area. Kirivong 
District (Figure 5.4) appears to have a lower poverty rate than the two districts and Kamchay 
Mea and Mesang Distrigts (Figure 5.3). This estimation of the slightly higher economic 
status of Krivong District was supported by a long-term observation of the three districts by 
one MOH staff member responsible for monitoring the two consecutive contracting projects 
(KI 13 August 8, 2006). 
 
In Figure 5.3, Peareang and Preah Sdach Districts appeared to have a similar economic status 
to that of of Kamchay Mea and Mesang Districts. As a result, these four Districts appeared to 
have a slightly lower economic status than Kirivong Districts (Figure 5.3, 5.4).  
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Figure 5.3 Poverty rates distributions at 
commune level in Peareang, Prea Sdach, 
Kamchay Mea and Mesang Districts in 
Prey Veng Province 
Source: MOP and WFP, 2003, P.53. 
Borders of the Districtss were added 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Poverty rates distributions 
at commune level in Kirivong District 
in Takeo Province 
Source: MOP and WFP, 2003  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.53. Borders of the district were added 
 
Peareang  
Prea Sdach 
Kamchay 
Mea 
Mesang  
 
Kirivong  
Greater than 75%  
 50 -75%  
25 – 50% 
Less than 25% 
Outside CSES 97 
sampling frame 
Greater than 75%  
 50 -75%  
25 – 50% 
Less than 25% 
Outside CSES 97 
sampling frame 
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(3) Health facilitiess,the equity fund, NGO staff  
It was confirmed that all three Operational Districts had the same health system structure as a 
rural health district. The setting of Equity Fund differed; however, the difference seemed to 
have little affect on the research setting of this study (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Basic features of contracting arrangements of the three Operational Districts 
Source: KI02, Feburary 27 2006; K01, March 17 2006, June 19 2007; KI04, April 22, 2005. 
 
HNI had one international (manager) and 14 national staff and RHAC had only national staff 
(one manger and 6 staff). The information for SRC was unavailable. A shortage of health 
workers was commented as an issue in Preach Sdach and Kirivong Operational Districts; the 
number of midwives and secondary-level health workers were low in the former and the 
number of different cadres in the later (KI02, Feburary 27, 2006; K01, March 17 2006; KI03, 
July 30 2006).  
(4) Subcontracting 
The NGO Contractors subcontracted operations of health facilities to health workers of the 
facilities. The arrangement of subcontracting was almost the same among the CODs (Table 
5.2). Subcontractors (often the facility head) seemed to have a high level of management 
responsibility for their health facilities. Only SRC established a subcontracting relationship 
with the Operational District Office at the time of the fieldwork of this study, but HNI and 
RHAC perceive that the capacity of the Office was inadequate. Instead, they established 
District 
(contractor) 
Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
Number of 
Health Centres 
and Referral 
Hospitals  
- 15 Health Centres 
(including a former 
District Hospital) 
- 1 Referral Hospital 
- 9 Health Centres 
 
- 1 Referral Hospital 
- 20 Health Centres 
 
- 1 Referral Hospital 
Equity Fund  - had existed, was 
used-up in 2006 
- held at the referral 
hospital 
- held at pagodas in the 
community for services of 
the HCs and the Referral 
Hospital. 
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contract relations with individual staff members of the Office (KI02, Feburary 27 2006; K01, 
March 17 2006; KI03, July 30 2006). 
 
Subcontractors, in order to achieve the subcontract targets, were required to operate the 
facility by managing resources such as health workers, finance, and materials, by making 
action plans and budget plans, and by monitoring health worker performance.  
 
 
Table 5.2 Outline of subcontracting structure and monitoring in three Operational 
Districts 
 
 
 
Note: OD* Operational District 
Source: (KI02, Feburary 27 2006; K01, March 17 2006; June 19; 2007; KI03, July 30 2006)
District 
(contractor) 
Peareang (HNI) Preah Sdach (RHAC) Kirivong (SRC) 
Subcontracting 
structures 
- HNI and the 
Health Centres 
 
- HNI and the 
Referral Hospital 
(no subcontract 
with OD* Office) 
 
- RHAC and the Health 
Centres 
 
- RHAC and the 
Referral Hospital 
(no subcontract with 
OD Office) 
 
- SRC and selected Health 
Centres 
 
- SRC and the Referral 
Hospital 
 
- SRC and the district 
Office 
 
-The OD Office and 
selected Health Centres 
 
 
Monitoring 
(number of the 
team) 
- 3 joint 
monitoring teams  
- HNI monitoring 
team on 
administrative 
aspect  
- A team of OD Office 
staff  
- RHAC monitoring 
team 
 
- A joint monitoring team to 
which staff of OD Office 
joined 
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One term of all subcontracting lasted three months. After each term, reviews of performance 
achievements and of contraventions of the contract were held. If targets were achieved with 
no contraventions, the contract was automatically renewed.  
 
The employment arrangement of health workers were the same in CODs, having a two-tiered 
contractual structure; first, with the subcontractor (the health facility they were working for), 
and second, with the contractor NGOs. The health workers were seconded to the contractor 
NGOs, and in which these NGOs had the option of not-making a contractual relation with 
specific health workers.  
 
The sub-contracting arrangement appeared to intensify some of the meritocratic features of 
the contracting project: for example, HNI which took a “hands-off” approach (KI01 March 
17 2006) allowed the sub-contractors to hire health workers from outside, including those 
who were not government workers, and to opt to not hire government workers who, though 
they belonged to the health facility, were judged to be less capable of contributing to 
achieving performance targets. Those government workers were able to maintain their 
employment relationship with the MOH. In all CODs, the subcontractors could choose the 
best person for achieving the targets as the manager, as a result some managers were not the 
Health Centre Chief (KI01 March 17 2006; KI02 July 24 2006; KI04 March 17 2006). HNI 
replaced some of subcontractor managers with other health workers because they were not 
regarded as competent (KI01 March 17 2006). These arrangements appeared to be more 
meritocratic than in the government sector.  
 
Some NGO contractors formed joint monitoring teams, consisting of their own staff and 
health workers, and often including the staff of the Operational District Office. Some NGO 
project managers monitored and decided the final results themselves (KI02 July 24 2006; 
KI13 August 8 2006). These seemed to have an intensified form of monitoring which aimed 
to improve the health workers’ performance as well as preventing or decreasing dual practice 
(Di Tella and Savadoff 2001). Alongside these forms of monitoring, MOH also conducted 
quarterly monitoring on the contractor NGOs’ performance. 
(5) Special rules for dual practice 
The NGO Contractors imposed punishments on misdeeds, including dual practice, by 
subcontractors and individual health workers. Therefore, it was expected that the dual 
practice was reduced. However, the effect has been little reviewed. HNI and SRC imposed 
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financial punishments which included reducing and stopping payments to the health workers. 
The HNI penalties were imposed over the incidents including money fraud of a 
subcontractor, over-charging patients, false reporting and prescribing drugs irrationally 
(KI01, June 19 2007). SRC punished breaches of their internal rules and the punishments 
included cancelling of contracts (KI04, May 19 2007). The MOH rules had formal warning 
procedures in which the third warnings against misconducts theoretically leads to dismissals; 
however, dismissals were rarely carried out because of resistance from the provincial health 
office level (KI01, August 22 2007; KI04, May 19 2007). 
 
These penalties and punishments seemed to be changes in the institutional settings 
(Mathauer and Carrin 2010). They may be viewed by health workers as changes in job 
security. The subcontractor level, conducting misdeed seemed seledom affect payment 
allocations to individual health workers, the minisurvry found (more details in 5.2.6). 
 
5.2 Performance-based payments  
The mechanism of the performance-based payment in CODs were almost similar to each 
other (Table 5.3)  
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Table 5.3 Income composition of health workers by the contractor NGOs definition 
 
Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
1) Government regular 
payments 
 
2) Performance-based 
payments 
 
3) Share from User-fee 
income 
 
5) Others* 
 
1) Government regular 
payments 
 
2) Performance-based 
payments 
 
3) Share from User-fee 
income 
 
4) Seasonal (quarterly) 
payment (not connected to 
performance) 
 
5) Others* 
1) Government regular 
payments 
 
2) Performance-based payments  
 
3) Share from User-fee income 
 
5) Reimbursements from the 
equity fund  
 
5) Capitation payments for 
occurrences of new purchases 
of social health insurance  
 
6) Bonuses** (occasionally) 
  
 
Note: 5) Others*: supplementary salaries and per-diem paid by external organisations. 6) Bonuses**: 
were paid every 6 months to the best performing five subcontractors among all the health facilities and 
the Operational District Office (KI03, Kirivong District. May 19 2007). 
Source: KI01 March 19 2007; KI02 May 2 2007; KI04 May 19 2006.  
 
The main income components were similar among the three districts, except that incentive 
payments (capitation payments) in Kirivong Operational District paid for increasing the 
purchase of social insurance by patients (Table 5.3 Point 3). In the three districts, shares of 
user-fee income were paid according to a national allocation policy and other arrangements 
which are explained below. Point 4) in Preah Sdach and 6) in Kirivong Operational Districts 
were not main components (Table 5.3) (KI01 March 17 2006; KI02 July 24 2006; KI04 
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March 17 2006). 
(1) Payment mechanism 
The performance-based payments in the three Operational Districts took a similar form to the 
fee-for-services in which payment are retrospectively made based on the number of services 
provided. They set an amount of payment for one case of a type of health service to which 
subcontracting performance indicators were attached: e.g. 1000 riels for one case of 
antenatal care. The three Contractor NGOs set their own fee schedules. However, the 
subcontractors were not necessary paid according to the number of cases provided, since the 
NGO Contractors reflected other aspects of performance in their payment decision.  
 
Generally performance-based payments expose employees to risks of fluctuations of the 
payments; however, HNI and SRC restrained the fluctuations since they included in the 
payments to the subcontractors (health factilities) the proportion which reflected the past 
total payments. The proportion ensured that the health workers received payments which 
reached at least a certain level of the previous payment.  
 
Separatly from the subontrator level arrangement, the NGO contractors had a kind of 
guidelines for monthly total payments, in order to finally ensure a sufficient level of payment 
to the individual worker for their living and to avoid unfair differences in payments among 
them (KI01, April 23, 2005; KI02, July 24, 2007). Details of this were presented in 5.2.(3).  
 
HNI, with their hands-off approach, largely delegated decisions about payments and 
allocations at the individual-health-worker level to the subcontractors (KI01, April 23 2007), 
though specifics about the degree of delegation seemed difficult to define. 
(2) Indicators  
These indicators for performance-based payments were all quantitative, except in Kirivong 
district (Table 5.4), and nearly the same as the items stipulated in the primary contract 
agreement between MOH and the NGO Contractors apart from a few exclusions (e.g. breast 
feeding) and additions (e.g., staff appraisal, monitoring of Health Centres by Operational 
District Office). Because of this emphasis on the volume of output of service delivery, an 
increase in service delivery seemed reasonable to expect (Eichler et al. 2007). However, the 
qualitative aspects also were actually monitored and reflected in the payments in Peareang 
and Preach Sdach Operational District.  
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Targets of the indicators were decided based on the size of the population in the catchment 
area of the subcontractor. In Kirivong Operational District conditions surrounding Health 
Centres were also reflected in the indicators; for example, lenient indicators were applied to 
some remote Health Centres (KI10, July 12 2007). SRC changed the indicators for all 
subcontractors in the course of the project implementation in order to more accurately reflect 
the subcontractors’ capacity and to further improve health service delivery. For example, an 
indicator for deliveries attended by health workers which was previously without 
specification of the location of the delivery now became with the specification (Health 
Centres).  
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Table 5.4 Examples of performance indicators for subcontractor-Health Centres in 
three Operational Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (   ) Contractor 
Source : MOH 2007b; RHAC Preach Sdach Project 2007a.b.; SRC Kirivong Project 2007.  
Note: Target of these indicators differed at each Health Centre. Some indicators were altered in the 
course of implementation.
 
(3) Guidelines for allocation of the payments among health workers 
As stated above, NGO Contractors set guidelines for payments to the health workers in order 
to ensure fair payments. This study assumed that the information asymmetry (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992) between the NGO contractors and the health workers influenced effects of the 
application of guidelines. It assumed also that multiple-layers of principle-agent relations 
(Besley and Ghatak 2003) and distortions by organisation (Mathauer and Carrin 2010) might 
have had an influence. In order to protect confidentiality and privacy, the guideline payments 
to the cadres, to which a limited number of health workers belonged or were assigned to, 
were not shown in a specific district. 
Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
- Outpatients  
- Deliveries at health 
facilities  
- Deliveries at home  
- Users of birth spacing 
(oral and injectable 
contraceptives)  
- Children who were 
provided with Vitamin A  
- Short admission 
- Minor surgery 
- Safe dilation and curettage 
- Full immunization 
- Antenatal care 
- Vitamin A provision 
- Outpatients  
- Deliveries at health 
facilities attended by trained 
staff 
- Deliveries at home by 
trained HC staff  
- Users of birth spacing 
- Oral and injectable 
contraceptives 
- Children who were 
provided with Vitamin A  
 
(Indicators were changed both 
regarding values and content in 
the course of implementation)  
- Outpatients 
- Deliveries at HC 
- Antenatal care ( more than 2 
times during the pregnancy) 
- Birth spacing 
- full immunisation of children  
Whether the following was done 
or not 
- Staff appraisal  
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HNI in Peareang District 
HNI had guidelines on maximum total monthly payments: for example, US$200.00 for 
nurses. The guideline was set based on health worker’s 1) cadre, 2) responsibilities in the 
MOH health system such as Health Centre Chief, Chief for EPI and 3) positions in the 
subcontracting, such as manager.  
 
Payments to subcontractors were first calculated based on the quantity of services provided 
and the fees, then adjusted by results of monitoring of other aspects. From the adjusted 
amount, financial penalties were extracted if mismanagement such as false reporting of the 
achievement was found. Then, the payments were made to the subcontractors. At the 
subcontractor level, the payments were allocated among health workers alongside the 
user-fee income. However, before the allocation, 2% the user-fee income was deducted from 
the total for remittance to the national treasury and PHD, with a part of this (the ratio/amount 
was decided by the subcontractor) being kept at the facility as a budget item relating to 
operational costs.  
 
In order to ensure the payment level to individual health worker, HNI obtained information 
and receipts of the received income of the individuals (KI05, March 17 2007). 
 
RHAC in Preah Sdach District 
RHAC reflected in the performance-based payments, not only the output of health services 
but also three other factors. Of the performance-based payments, 55% reflected a) the 
outputs and b) the monitoring result, 15% reflected c) the punctuality, and 30% d) other 
performance. RHAC also set guidelines for maximum payments which reflected the same 
two factors as HNI did: 1) cadre and 2) responsibility within the MOH health system (KI02, 
May 2, July 9 2007) (Table 5.5).  
 
Table 5.5: Reference payments in contracting out in Preah Sdach (monthly, US$) 
 
Primary Nurse Secondary Nurse Primary Midwife Secondary Midwife 
80.0 100.0 80.0  100.0  
 
.
Source: KI02, July 9 2007. 
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RHAC had guiding formulas for the allocation of user-fee income within a health facility for 
the same purpose as with the performance-based payments (KI02 July 9 2007).  
SRC in Kirivong District 
SRC took a more interventionist approach to payments to individual health workers, than 
HNI and RHAC, particularly in comparison with HNI. SRC ultimately decided the payments 
to individual health workers. It calculated allocations to the individuals from the total 
payment to a subcontractor based on three factors relating to the individuals 1) cadre, 2) the 
responsibility within the MOH health system, and 3) type of facility (Health Centre, the 
District Office or the Referral Hospital), in reference to SRC’s allocation schedule to 
individuals. The monthly average of the total payment among the health workers was 
reported to be around US$100.00, not including government salaries and the occasional 
bonuses (Table 5.3) which were different from the performance-based payments, but 
including the incentive to increase participation in community social insurance (SRC 2006). 
(4) User-fee income allocation 
The three contractor NGOs differed in their policy about the allocation of user-fee income 
for payments to the health worker. This consisted of differences in: 
1) level of adherence to the national policy of user-fee allocation (or, instead, the level of 
adherence to the special allocation rate for the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project: the 
98% available for payments to health workers), and 2) portion to be sent to the Operational 
District Office after the remittance to the national treasury and the remittance to the 
Provincial Health Department. HNI theoretically made 98% of user-fee income available for 
payments to health workers; RHAC mostly followed the national allocation policy; SRC 
took mixed approaches (Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6: User-fee income allocation approach in the three districts 
Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
98% of the total was 
allocated to the 
budget for incentive 
of the facility staff  
- Adhered to the national 
allocation policy 
 
- Upon adherence, 55% of 
the total was allocated in the 
budget for the incentive of 
the facility staff  
 
- A remittance of 5% of the 
total to the OD* Office 
needed to be made  
- Applied different rates based on 
the health facility type 
- Changed the rates during the 
project   
 
At health centres: 
- 93% ( later 55% ) of the total 
allocated in the budget for the 
incentive of health facility staff  
 
- A remittance of 5% of the total 
to the OD Office needed to be 
made  
 
At the hospital:  
- 90% (later 52%) of the total was 
allocated in the budget for the 
incentive of health facility staff  
 
- A remittance of 8% of the total 
to the OD Office needed to be 
made  
 
Note: (   ): name of NGO Contractor, OD* Operational District. 
Source: KI01 March 17 2006; KI02 May 2, 2007; KI04 May 19 2007, SRC 2006 
 
(5) Supplementary salaries  
Without control from the contracting setting, i.e., in ordinary settings, degree of the 
importance to the government health workers of supplementary salaries appeared to be 
enhanced. The salaries were mostly paid by NGOs and bi- and/or multilateral international 
cooperation agencies and were often higher than government salaries. Health workers 
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reacted sensitively to differences in supplementary salaries and per-diems (Personal 
observation; KI16, July 21, 2007) that they received within the LMIC health sector. 
Supplementary salaries appeared to be a factor, brought in by the multi-layered and 
multi-task principal-agent relationship, that was framing the incentive environment. 
The differences in supplementary salaries sometimes resulted in resentments among the 
health workers towards those who obtained the salaries or higher salaries (KI16, July 21 
2007), as they also sought the higher salaries.  
 
Allocating supplementary salaries and per-diems seemed to function as a venue for 
exercising the patronage system in Cambodia (Tan 2008) that exists between the manager of 
Operational District and the health workers. The Operational District Chiefs’ allocation of 
opportunities to receive supplementary salaries and per-diems among health workers, i.e., 
opportunities for participation in projects and training courses, seemed to be entangled with 
and distorted by the patronage between the two parties. Patronage indirectly affects health 
workers’ total income. Such Chiefs were respected health workers in the Operational District 
as those who could invite projects to the Operational District for which the health workers 
could receive supplementary salaries and per-diems (KI11, August 14, 2006). 
 
This allocations seemed to be connected with the institutional arrangements (Mathawer and 
Carrin 2010) surrounding the public sector incentive environment (Besley and Ghatak 2003). 
Also, such payments and allocations could have the effect of distorting and reducing the 
effectiveness of financial incentives paid by the government. They seemed to fragment the 
health workers’ labour supply among tasks and sectors or to increase the supply of labour to 
the work which resulted in higher payments.  
 
SRC controlled supplementary salaries and per-diems from outside the contracting project. 
SRC pooled these payments and allocated them to the health workers based on the payment 
schedule to individual health workers (KI04, April 22 2005), but they could not control 
supplementary salaries paid by a vertical program in the global scale (Jacobs et al. 2010).  
 
SRC set a ceiling on the share of user-fee income (US$45.00 monthly) to individual health 
workers in the later part of the implementation, because SRC intended to keep the health 
workers’ total income moderate, avoiding the creation of large problematic disparities 
between their income during and after the project (because of income decrease after the 
completion of the project) (SRC 2006; KI10, July 12 2007). However, it was said that this 
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ceiling affected only workers at District Hospital, not Health Centres, because the income 
was low at Health Centres (KI10, July 12 2007). 
(6) Payment methods to individual health workers at the subcontractor level  
The payment guidelines set by NGO Contractors seemed to be blurred in the allocation of 
payments to individual health workers at the subcontractor level, since the subcontractors 
held the authority to allocate payments and had their own methods of allocation, and actually 
paid the health workers. The methods might have influenced the impact of 
performance-based payments or the incentive environment. Compliance with the guidelines 
might have been low due to resentment towards meritocratic payments among the health 
workers and to a particular Cambodian way of monetary transactions (KI15, March 27 2007; 
KI05, June 19, 2007, SRC 2006). Their allocation methods seemed to be less meritocratic 
and, as a result, the degree to which payments reflected individual performance was 
ambiguous. Overall, it seemed that an accurate account of the amount that an individual 
health worker received was known nearly only to themselves.  
 
Although the methods adopted the same factors as the guidelines contained as below; 
however, at extreme, they were equal allocations. Securing explicitly a certain level of 
“equality” by a collective unionized approach indicated their strong preference for less 
meritocratic payments. This approach was also interpreted as a reflection of resentments felt 
about others’ receiving higher payments, which resulted in implicit and explicit rebellious 
attitudes towards superiors and damaged teamwork (KI17 August 20, 2006). At some Health 
Centres, equal allocation was made only after the manager was paid extra amounts ranging 
from $2.5 to $5.0. 
 
Having the tendency towards equal allocation, the methods still showed limited variations in 
the combination of factors considered in deciding allocations (Figure 5. 5 and 5.6), with the 
following added minute variations to the methods. 
 
- Some subcontractors (Health Centres) mixed performance-based payments and income 
from user-fees and allocated, but others did not. 
- The allocation guideline was only applied to sharing income from user-fee. 
- Some of the allocation percentage had two decimal points (e.g., 9.05%, 7.75%). 
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[Non-meritocratic]         [Meritocratic] 
 
 
 
 
Highly           Highly 
- Cadre      - Achievement of indicators 
(and level difference: primary or secondary)  assigned to specific health staff  
- Length of working  
- Responsibility at Health Center  
- Type of health facility    - Performance expected to the carder 
(only SRC guideline included)   (e.g., How was staff good as a  
        midwife) 
- Equal allocation 
   - Position in the subcontracting structure  
(mainly only the manager or others) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 5.5: Non-meritocrtic or meritocratice intensity of factors used for allocations of 
the performance-based payments (and user-fee income at some facilities 
 
 
Proportions of each factor among all factors used for determining allocations were quantified. 
The quantified proportions were transformed into a radar chart and showed an inclination of 
the factors towards a less-meritocratic nature (Figure 5.6) 
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Figure 5.6: Factors used for allocation of performance-based payments and user-fee income at 
Health Centres (total score: 800)  
Note: Responsibility in HCs1: positions in the Health Centre under MOH management system  
Position in sub-contracting2: positions assigned in the sub-contracting, e.g., the manager of 
subcontracting. Each respondent was given 100 points and the 100 were divided by factors defined by 
the respondent according to their level of importance. The maximum point of a factor was 800 points.  
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5.3 Dual practice  
It seems that reducing or eliminating dual practice was less emphasized than increasing 
health services delivery as the objectives of contracting out and of performance-based 
payment in the DFID/World Bank Project. In the project, the health workers were simply 
required to refrain from dual practice. This was confirmed in the explanation made above 
(Chapter 3) about the clause in the contract document concerning dual practice. 
 
Dual practice seems to be an open secret since it has been ubiquities in Cambodia. Health 
workers spoke informally about their dual practice (Personal observation, KI15 March 15 
2007, KI 14 May 16 2006) and sometimes even that of their family members, who had no 
medical qualification (Personal observation, the monthly meeting of Peareang District, 2006). 
Income from the private practice at the beginning of project (2004) was only estimated by 
key informants (Table 5.7) because of a lack of formal information. It is noted that the 
estimation was made based on the entire group of health workers in each Operational District, 
not particularly on those who were the subject of the household survey. Overall, most of 
cadres conducted dual practice; the primary-level nurses and midwives in Kirivong might 
have opted out. The higher qualification they had the higher their income was. Compared 
with the quoted government regular payments (US$10 to 30, Akashi et al. 2004; Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003), all carders earned significantly higher incomes. However, it is noted that 
their income from private practice as a secondary job might have fluctuated (Shisko and 
Rostker 1976), depending on the market (Ensor et al. 2009).  
 
The incomes of cadre in Peareang and Kirivong Districts fell within common ranges. 
However, the incomes of doctors and assistant doctors in Preach Sdach Operational were in a 
lower range. These two situations imply differences from the identified levels of economic 
statuses among the three districts above (the similar level between Preah Sdach and Peareang 
Districts, but Kirivong had a higher level). However, the lower income range in Preach 
Sdach appeared ostensibly to suggest the lower economic status (the estimated income range 
may be far from correct), if the income for one day is calculated from the income range. The 
calculated income tends to be rather lower compared with the reported average charge for 
one dual practice case. Their monthly incomes were divided by 25 on the assumption that the 
health workers did dual practice at least for 25 working days in a month. The calculated one 
day income of US$12 to US$16 was intuitively thought of as low relative to the average 
charge for one case: US$2.5 to $10 (Table 5.7). There was the smaller superiority of the 
incomes of doctors over that of the secondary nurses, compared with the other two districts, 
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the doctors’ income was still ambiguous.  
 
Table 5.7: Estimations about private practice at the beginning of the project 
(prevalence, monthly income, and charge per service) 
 
Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
1) All cadres conducted. 
 
2) Estimated income  
Doctors around $1000 
Assistant Doctors $600 to 
$700 
Nurses and midwives  
(primary) $100 to $150 
 
3) Typical charge paid by a 
patient for one time 
$2.5 to $10 
 
 
1) All cadres conducted. 
 
2) Estimated income  
Doctors and Assistant Doctors: 
$300 to 400 
 
Nurses (Secondary) $200 to 
$300 
 
3) Typical charge paid by a 
patient for one time 
$2.5 to $10 
 
1) All cadres except primary nurses 
and midwives. They did almost 
only where the secondary nurses 
did not conduct dual practice. 
 
2) Estimated income  
Doctors and Assistant Doctors: 
$500 to 1000 
 
Nurses and midwives  (secondary) 
$200 to $400 
Nurses and midwives  (primary) 
$100 to $200 
 
3) Typical charge paid by a patient 
for one time 
$5 to $10 
 
Source: KI02 June 19, 2007, KI13 August 8, 2006, 2005, KI09 September 1, 2007 
2012. 
 
Different levels of prohibition of and punishments for dual practice were applied by NGO 
contractors who considered the negative effects of dual practice on the health worker’s 
performance. Therefore, some reductions of dual practice as well as reductions in income 
from it were theoretically expected. A previous report mentioned that in one of the CODs, 
decreases in the income of the subcontractors (health facilities) were attributed to dual 
practice by health workers (SRC 2006) (outline of SRC Mid-term Review, see Appendix 11).  
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The intensity of prohibition varied, from total to partial prohibition, one form of which was 
exactly the same as the MOH rule. Two contractors wrote internal punitive rules and applied 
them in their districts (Table 5.8). However, although most NGO rules were stricter than the 
MOH rule, they were considered as supplementary to the MOH rule which were to be 
primarily abided by. Therefore, the NGO contractors had difficulty in applying punishments 
(KI01 March 17 2006). Also, since the authority of enforcing punishments was held by the 
Provincial Health Office whose enforcement of punishments was lenient, punishments were 
rarely enforced (KI01, August 22 2007; KI04, May 19 2007). As a result, dual practice 
continued and NGO Contractors admitted their difficulty in prohibiting dual practice, though 
some reductions were observed (KI04 May 19 2007, KI09, Septemeber 8 2007). 
 
Table 5.8: Prohibitions of dual practice and punishments against dual practice by NGO 
Contractors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jacobs and Price. 2006. Jacobs et al. 2010, SRC 2006; KI02 May 2006, KI01 
March 17 2006, KI04 May 19 2007 
 
 
 Peareang 
(HNI) 
Preah Sdach 
(RHAC) 
Kirivong 
(SRC) 
Level of 
prohibition 
 
- complete prohibition 
by an internal rule  
 
- included prohibition 
of dual practice 
performed and 
pharmacies operated by 
family members of the 
health workers 
- adhering to the 
MOH personnel 
rule (prohibition on 
dual practice during 
working hours)  
- prohibition only during 
working hours by an 
internal rule  
 
Method of 
prohibition 
- created more severe 
rules than the MOH  
personnel rules 
- applied the MOH 
personnel rules 
without having own 
internal rules and 
penalties 
- created more severe rules 
than the MOH  personnel 
rules, including financial 
penalties 
 
Punishments 
applied 
- (a few cases ) 
including transferring  
personnel, by urging 
the Provincial Health 
Department 
- applied the MOH 
personnel rules 
without having own 
internal rules and 
penalties 
- actual application was 
almost limited to financial 
penalties 
 
- asked the Provincial 
Health Department to take 
punitive actions 
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HNI and SRC set their own internal rules. The HNI’s rules totally prohibited dual practice. If 
detected, it led to an immediate transfer of the offending personnel to another health facility 
or even to their dismissal from “secondment” to HNI. SRC prohibited dual practice during 
working hours, which was similar to the MOH rule, but SRC was stricter in prohibition and 
urged the PHD to take punitive actions in relation to the person who conducted dual practice 
and was able to apply their internal rules and cancell the employment contract between SRC 
and the person after tenatious negotiations with the PHD (KI01August 22 2007; KI04 May 
19 2007). 
 
The MOH rule lacked effective enforcement measures, resulting in the widespread dual 
practice during working hours and the negative effects as described above (Chapter 3) (van 
Damme et al. 2004; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; MOH 2002; Akashi et al.2004; Vong et al. 
2005;).  
 
Some of the health workers in CODs and MODs appeared to trade off longer working hours, 
more than eight hours, for dual practice with the least leisure time in a day. If they could 
generate income, they would conduct dual practice during weekends (KI17, April 25 2007; 
Personal observations). At the extreme, health workers could quit government jobs, seeking 
higher payment than government salaries, and move to the private sector, mostly to NGOs. 
After the ADB Pilot Project, as well as DFID/World Bank Project, some of those who had 
worked for the Operational District contracted out and benefited the extra payment 
arrangements in the projects, left their government jobs for NGOs (KI11, Augst 14 2006). 
 
Regulations of dual practice was also found at the subcontractor level. The mini-survey of 
this study revealed that some subcontractors established their punishements for health 
workers’ breaching the prohibition rules set by the NGO. The survey investigated payment 
allocation methods at the level including criteria and factors influenced the allocation.  
5.4 Other noticeable features: health workers’ household 
expenditure  
Some household expenditures were associated with the economic status of households, such 
as educational expenditure in Cambodia (McPake et al. 1996; World Bank 2006; MOEYS 
and UNICEF 2007). Some health workers in rural areas sent their children away from the 
area in order to obtain a higher and/or better education in Phnom Penh or other large towns, 
at high expenses, due to the limited opportunities for receiving higher and/or better education 
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levels in rural areas (KI16, March 28 2007; KI15, March 23 2007). Alongside these 
educational expenditure, Cambodian pupils and students in both primary and secondary 
education are often required to pay their teachers extra tuition fees for extra-curricular 
classes, which are taught by the same teachers; and also to buy educational materials from 
them, in order to achieve higher scores in their examinations, despite the fact that fees for 
primary education were abolished by the government (World Bank 2005; KI15, 24 May 
2007). 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter described finding about the payment mechanism, implementation methods of 
DFID/World Bank Contracting Project concerning the payments, and the incentive 
environment in the three CODs. The fee-for-services payment mechanism to the 
subcontractors was also similar among the CODs. The NGO contractors had guidelines for 
the allocation of performance-based payments to individual health workers. The guidelines 
appeared to be only vaguely followed because the subcontractor applied their own methods 
which reflected their strong concern to maintain equality amongst themselves. As a result, 
the meritocratic features of the payment seemed to be reduced at the individual health 
worker level.  
 
Dual practice seemed to have prevailed in the three CODs. Findings from the Key informant 
interviews concering NGO Contracotrs’ implementations and from DFID/World Bank 
Contracting Project’s contrcting agreement support this. NGO Contractors established their 
own insitutunal settings aiming to reduce it, e.g., their own prohibition rules with stricter 
levels than MOH’s rules. The subcontrctors also set up their own punishment on breaching 
the NGO rules by the health workers. DFID/World Bank Contracting Project required a 
reduction of dual practice in its agreements with the contrators. 
 
These NGO rules were backeby by enhanced moritoring and the punishments. However, the 
PHD overrode the authority of applying the enforcement measures and discretionally did not 
implement the measures, using institutional disreation (Mathauer and Carrin 2010). 
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Chapter 6 Health workers’ incomes and expenditure  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings concerning comparisons between the Operational districts 
contracted out (CODs) and the MOH managed Operational Districts (MODs) in respect of 
differences in: health workers’ and their households’ incomes and expenditures, and their 
households’ access to basic infrastructures, durable goods, possessions and materials. These 
findings respond to the first research question and less directly contribute to responses to the 
second question. The first question compares the expenditures and incomes of health 
workers. This question was derived from a hypothesis that the payments associated with the 
contracting setting (DFID/World Bank Contracting Project) might have brought in 
differences, likely increases, in the incomes and expenditures and features of the households 
between the CODs and MODs. The features consisted of the access to basic infrastructure, 
use of costly materials for their houses and possession of consumer goods. Also, a proportion 
of the income from the government sector and that of the income from dual practice were 
hypothesised to change due to the payments in the contracting.  
 
This hypothesis postulated that two types of districts held nearly similar socio-economic 
features and incomes of the health workers except those influenced by the contracting. The 
similar features as the (quasi) control group were ensured by the selection criteria of MODs 
as the comparison group (Chapter 4 and Appendix 6). The findings for the first research 
questions were expected to provide parts of factors (variables) for investigating with regard 
to the second research question, namely the exploration of factors influencing the incomes 
and expenditures of these households. 
6.2 Collected data  
Data collected by the field survey is outlined in this section. As prented in Table 6.1,the 
numbers of health workers surveyed was 250 of which 156 were from CODs and 94 from 
MODs. The 250 cases were among the 275 eligible cases, giving a coverage rate of 90.9% 
(Appendix 9), which responded well to this study’s complete enumeration approach (Chapter 
4). A total of 156 cases were from three CODs: Peareang, Preah Sdach, and Kirivong 
districts and 94 were from two MODs: Kamchay Mea and Mesang districts. The two MODs 
are located in rural areas in the same province as the two CODs, Peareang and Preah Sdach 
districts are located (Chapter 4).  
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The lower number of collected cases in MODs was partly due to a sudden cancellation of 
appointments to complete the questionnaire by some of the eligible health workers in MODs. 
The investigator was informed of the cancellations on the first day of the field data collection. 
This occurred despite the fact that these same health workers had been confirmed as being 
available to participate in the survey by the health Operational District office. The Chief of 
an MOD explained that the absent health workers were either working or studying outside 
the district or taking sick or maternal leave. 
The structure of collected data appeared to largely reflect the actual structure of the numbers 
of cadres in rural Cambodia (MOH 2002). Nearly half of the cases were those of nurses. In 
both CODs and MODs, primary nurses constituted the largest group among the cadres. 
Doctors, assistant doctors and secondary midwives were minorities. Some Operational 
District had no doctors or no assistant doctors or no secondary midwives. No females were 
included among the assistant doctors and doctor and there were no male midwives, which 
reflected the gender influence on entry to the cadres. Males were also the majority of 
secondary nurses. These suggest inevitable biases in the data structure of collected data. The 
biases largely appeared to reflect biases in the deployment of health workers in the 
Operational Districts since the data (cases) were collected by the approach of complete 
enumeration. The bias influenced the results of statistical analyses in the following chapters. 
The mean age of health workers, their household size and children enrolled were similar 
between CODs and MODs (Table 6.1).  
 
 
 169 
 
 
CODs % to the total MODs % to the total Total C/MOD %
Cadre
   Primary NS 62 39.7 55 58.5 117 46.8
   Secondary NS 47 30.1 17 18.1 64 25.6
   Secondary MW 13 8.3 5 5.3 18 7.2
   Primary MW 29 18.6 14 14.9 43 17.2
   Assist Doctors 4 2.6 1 1.1 5 2
   Doctors 1 0.6 2 2.1 3 1.2
% to the total 156 100.0 94 100.0 250 100
Gender
   Male 95 60.9 64 68.1 159 63.6
   Female 61 39.1 30 31.9 91 36.4
% to the total 156 100.0 94 100.0 250 100
Peareang Preah Sdach Krivong Kamchay
Mea
Mesang
Primary NS 25 16 21 29 26
Secondary NS 20 5 22 13 4
Primary MW 13 1 15 4 10
Secondary MW 3 1 9 3 2
Assis. Doctor 2 1 1 1 0
Doctor 1 0 0 2 0
Total 64 24 68 52 42
% to the total in
C/MODs 25.6 9.6 27.2 20.8 16.8
CODs % to the total MODs % to the total Total C/MOD
  Primary NS 48 77.4 44 80.0 92
(female) 14 22.6 11 20.0 25
% to the total 62 100.0 55 100.0 117
  Secondary NS 42 89.4 17 100.0 59
(female) 5 10.6 0 0.0 5
% to the total 47 100.0 17 100.0 64
  Primary MW 29 100.0 14 100.0 43
  Secondary MW 13 100.0 5 100.0 18
  Assist Doctor 4 100.0 1 100.0 5
  Doctor 1 100.0 2 100.0 3
Health workers' age, household size, children enrolled (mean)
41.8 S.D. = 8.2 42.1 S.D.=7.0
5 5
Children enrolled 1.9 2
Cases by cadre and district
Table 6.1: Collected cases (by district status, cadre, district, by gender, age,
household size, children enrolled)
Number of
household
Age of health
workers
CODs MODs
Cases by cadre  between CODs and MODs
Cadre by  gender between CODs and MODs
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Both CODs and MODs had closely similar variations in the number of household members 
(Figure 6.1).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Number of household members of health workers’ households by 
Operational District  
 
The selection strategy of this study chose MODs based on their underlying similarity to 
CODs in their socio-economic features and health development supports (Chapter 4). Upon 
the similarity of socio-economic features, the similarities identified in the collected data 
seemed to accommodate maximum quasi-experiment settings in the context of social science 
in which RCT-experiments are almost impossible (Chapter 4). As illustrated below, survey 
collected data also indicated the similarity in the mean government regular payments (Table 
6.2). The mean supplementary salaries and per-diems (Table 6.2) received in the government 
sector indicated that the MODs’ were ‘not heavily’ supported by NGOs or bi- or multilateral 
cooperation organisations (Chapter 4). Thus, the mean confirmed that MODs were ‘not 
heavily’ supported, implying that the monetary support received by MODs from the outside 
were nearly similar to CODs, except that the COD’s received payments associated with the 
contracting settings (Table 6.2)  . 
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6.3 Incomes of health workers in district contracted out and not 
contracted out 
6.3.1 Incomes compared  
Table 6.2 shows the means of incomes in health workers’ households with their proportions 
of the total household income and of the total income from health work including private 
practice. 
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Table 6.2: Means and proportion of health workers’ and their household income in 
CODs and in MODs (US$) 
 
 
COD (N=156) % MOD (N=94) % P-value
CODs and
MODs (N=250)
%
Government regular
payments 427.5 15.0 422.7 15 0.961 425.7 15.0
S.D. 123.3 (22.0)* 110.8 (21.3)* 118.5 (21.7)
Honorariums 2.4 0.1 6.3 0.2 3.9 0.1
S. D. 17.3 (0.1)* 33.2 (0.3)* 24.5 (0.2)
Those who received (N=9) (N=6) (N=15)
S.D. 42.4 97.9 64.6
                                              Mean 62.6 98.4 80.6
Supplementary
salary and per-diem 279.2 9.8 210.2 7.5 0.343
S.D. 318.7 (14.4)* 232.1 (10.6)* 248.7 8.9
(22.8)** 290.6  (12.9)
Those who received (N=128) (N=82) (N= 210)
Mean 340.3 241 301.5
S.D. 321 233.1 293.3
Share from user-fee
income 301.2 10.6 114 4.1 0.000 230.8 8.2
S.D. 329.4 (15.5)* 124 (5.8)* 285.6  (11.8)
(24.6)**
Those who received (N=110) (N=79) (N=189)
Mean 427.2 135.7 305.4
S.D. 316.2 124 291.8
Performance-based
payment 642.8 22.6 N/A N/A N/A
S. D. 518.5 (33.0)* N/A 401.1 14.2
S. D. 512.2 (52.5)** N/A 514.5  (20.5)
Income from private
practice 292.1 10.3 1,227.00 43.6 0.000 643.6 22.7
S. D. 971.3 (15.0)* 2,731.50 (62.0)* 1,892.00 (32.9)
Those who received (N=36)* (N=70)* (N=106)*
Mean 1,265.6 1,647.7 1,517.90 1,517.9
S. D. 1,706.1 3,058.2 2,673.80 2,673.8
Economic activities
other than health
work 900 31.6 831.8 29.6 0.726 874.3 30.9
Mean 3,179.0 3,149.1 3,161.8
Household earned (N=114) (N=84)
Mean 1,637.5 2,313.9 (N=160)**
S. D. 3,771.7 4,469.2 1,393.1
Total household
income 2,845.3 100 2,811.9 100 0.000 2,832.8 100
S. D. 3,499.8 4,434.9 3,859.2
(  )* perentage in income from health work
(  )**  perentage in payment associated with the contracting settings
HH*: household  
P-value : result of Mann-Whitnny test (two-tailed)
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(1) The total household income  
Total household incomes were nearly the same, despite the structure and amount of each 
item seeming to show differences between CODs and MODs as presented in Table 6.2. The 
payments associated with the contracting settings in CODs, which is illustrated below, and 
the income from private practice in MODs account for the structural differences. The 
payments associated with the contracting settings made the income from health work 
excluding private practice more than double that in MODs. Consequently, they made the 
COD health workers’ total household income comparable to that of MOD health workers’, 
despite higher private practice income earned in MODs, and given the minimal difference 
between CODs and MODs in income from other economic activities (Table 6.2).  
(2) Government regular payments  
Between CODs and MODs, the means of government regular payments was close (Table 
6.2) and the two data sets were not statistically different (p-value, two-tailed = 0.911 > 0.05)
5
. 
The government regular payments (Table 6.2) made a limited contribution to the total 
household income in CODs and MODs, and even to their total income from health work 
(including private practice). Nevertheless, the government payment was the second highest 
income item after the income from private practice (Table 6.2).  
(3) Payments associated with the contracting settings  
Payments associated with the contracting settings included performance-based payments, 
supplementary salaries and per-diems, and a share of user-fee income. In both CODs and 
MODs, the majority of the health workers are secondary and primary nurses and secondary 
and primary midwives. Therefore, the payments associates with the contracting settings were 
further analysed for these four cadres in CODs. Through performance-based-payments and 
supplemental salaries and per-diems, health workers in CODs earned almost half of their 
income from health work and around 30 % of the total household income. Additions of the 
share from the user-fee income raised the two values to more than 60% and 40% (Table 6.2). 
 
Across the four main cadres in CODs, the payments associated with the contracting settings 
(the total of performance-based payments, supplementary salaries and per-diems and the 
share from user-fees) reached more than 50% to their total household income and close to 
65% to their income from health work including private practice income (Table 6.2). 
 
                                                     
5
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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Some cases of performance-based payments were reported as supplemental salaries and per- 
diems as explained above, because of the lack of the vocabulary for differentiating them in 
the Khmer language. Understanding by the surveyors about distinctive definitions for 
different payment categories were promoted in training and the data collection manual and 
through guidance during fieldwork. However, conceptual confusion between the two types 
of payments remained which were not found before the data collection, and these were 
shared with the questionnaire respondents. The confusion was confirmed by the fact that 
eight health workers in CODs did not report receiving any performance-based payments. 
Instead they reported higher supplementary salaries and per-diems; the mean of their 
supplementary salaries and per-diems (US$541.8) was almost 1.7 times that of the mean of 
performance-based payments (US$321.9) of the other health workers in CODs who received 
these payments. 
1) Performance-based-payments  
Performance-based-payments might be regarded as the core financial incentive among those 
payments associated with the contracting settings. The mean of this income surpassed the 
mean income from private practice in CODs (Table 6.2). The mean amounted to almost half 
of the total of the payments associated with the contracting setting and the user-fee income 
(Table 6.3). Cadres at the primary level appeared to have benefited more from these 
payments than those at the secondary level (Table 6.3). 
2) Supplemental salaries and per-diem  
The mean of supplementary salaries and per-diems was higher in CODs than MODs. The 
difference in this income was not significant between CODs and MODs (p-value, two tailed 
=0.343 > 0.05
6)
.  
 
In MODs, the overall mean of the contribution rates from supplementary salaries and 
per-diems was around 10% in the four cadres (Table 6.3). The low contribution seemed to be 
attributed partly to this study’s selection strategy of MODs as the control group, as described 
above (Chapter 4).  
3). Share from user-fee income 
The mean of share user-fee income in COD was three times higher than in MODs (Table 6.2). 
The difference in this income between CODs and MODs was significant (p-value, two tailed 
                                                     
6
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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=0.000 < 0.05)
7
. It seemed reasonable to attribute these increases in user-fee income in 
CODs to the contracting setting which intended to increase health service delivery. 
 
Among the four majority cadres in CODs, nurses received more than double the amount of 
the shares received by nurses in MODs.  
 
Midwives in CODs benefitted lower from the share than nurses in CODs. Midwives in 
MODs benefited more than nurses in MODs. Secondary midwives in CODs benefitted 
higher than those in MODs (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3: Contributions of payments associated with the contracting settings to their 
income and total household income in four cadres in CODs (%)  
 
CODs 
Performance-based payments 
and supplementary salaries 
and per-diems  
Share from user-fee 
income  
Primary NS (N=62) 50.0(41.6) 18.0(15.2) 
Secondary NS (N=47) 
45.1(34.7) 15.9(12.6)  
 
Primary MW (N=29) 55.4(44.8)  13.9(12.3) 
Secondary MW(N=13) 45.8(39.6)  15.9(13.7) 
Four Cadres (N=151) 49.2(40.2) 15.9(13.5) 
MODs 
Supplementary salaries and 
per- diems 
Share from user-fee 
income 
Primary NS (N=55) 18.6(16.6) 8.2(7.0) 
Secondary NS (N=17) 15.4(13.8) 6.7(5.1) 
Primary MW (N=14) 8.9(7.6) 18.3(14.3) 
Secondary MW (N=5) 5.7 (5.7) 12.1(8.0) 
Four Cadres (N=91) 
12.2(10.9) 11.3(8.6) 
 
(  ) percentage to the total household income 
(4) Income from Private Practice  
Despite the enhanced prohibition of dual practice by NGO contractors in CODs (Chapter 5). 
106 of the 250 health workers obtained income from private practice; however, the 
prevalence of private practice was lower in CODs than in MODs (details in Table 7.2). 
                                                     
7
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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The difference in the private practice income between CODs and MODs was significant 
(p-value, two-tailed = 0.000 <0.05). 
 
In CODs, the ratio of mean private practice income was around 10% of their total household 
income but in MODs it was more than 40% (Table 6.2). Between CODs and MODs, there 
was not much difference in the mean private practice income among those who actually 
received it (Table 6.2). However, in MODs, disparity of this income among those who 
received it seemed to be larger in CODs (Table 6.2). 
(5) Honoraria  
Honoraria contributed to the total income of health workers and, to a limited extent, to their 
total household income. However, among the households who received honoraria, the mean 
in MODs was more than double that in CODs (Table 6.2).  
(6) Income from sources other than health work  
Income derived from sources other than health work (income from employment of other 
household members and from household enterprises excluding private practice) was 
hypothesised to be a meaningful proportion of the total household income of the health 
workers, because of the characteristics of income diversity households in LMICs (Deracon 
2002) and Cambodia (KI15, March 15 2007). It was also hypothesised to be intricately 
linked to health workers’ income, including income from private practice, based on the 
notion of a household as an economic unit. 
 
In both CODs and MODs, this category of income reached around 30% of the total 
household income. This indicates, however, that the health workers income from health work 
was significant, contributing 70% of the household income (Table 6.2). 
  
Cadre or the status of the district might have influenced this income. The importance of this 
type of income by cadre: nurses and midwives, showed similarities between CODs and 
MODs (Table 6.4). This type of income was more important to nurses than to midwives in 
both CODs and MODs. In CODs, the importance seemed to be particularly high for primary 
nurses; in MODs, the importance was high for secondary nurses (Table 6.4). 
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(7) Income from health work excluding private practice (income in the 
government sector) 
The category of income from health work excluding private practice consisted of the 
government regular salaries, supplementary salaries and per-diems, and a share from the 
user-fee income, i.e., the payments associated with the contracting settings in CODs. This 
category of income showed distinctive differences between CODs and MODs in four cadres. 
In CODs, the mean of this category of income reached at least half of the mean total 
household income; the highest was over 70%. However, in MOD, the highest income is 
almost half, but the lowest is nearly 20% of the mean total household income. Among 
primary midwives in both CODs and MODs, the ratio for the mean private practice income 
was the lowest (Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4 Three income compositions of the total household income by status of 
Operational District by cadre and their percentage to the total household income 
 
  
Health work 
excluding 
private 
practice 
Private 
practice 
Economic 
activities other 
than health 
work 
Total (household 
income) 
CODs(N=156)         
Primary NS 
(N=62) 
1666.3  238.6  1159.3  3064.2  
 (54.4) (7.8) (37.8)  (100.0) 
Secondary NS 
(N=47)  
1798.9  503.8  1038.1  3340.9  
 （53.8） (15.1) (31.1)  (100.0) 
Primary MW 
(N=29) 
1239.5  10.7  444.2  1694.4  
 (73.2) (0.6) (26.2)  (100.0) 
Secondary 
MW (N=13)  
1843.4  521.4  432.9  2797.8  
 (65.9) (18.6) (15.5)  (100.0) 
MODs (N=94)         
Primary NS 
(N=55) 
757.3  1387.4  640.5  2785.3  
  (27.2) (49.8) (23.0)   (100.0) 
Secondary NS 
(N=17)  
907.5  1345.3  2078.7  4331.5  
  (21.0) (31.1) (48.0)   (100.0) 
Primary MW 
(N=14) 
561.1  203.7  222.3  987.1  
  (56.8) (20.6) (22.5)   (100.0) 
Secondary 
MW (N=5)  
632.1  484.2  329.7  1446.0  
  (43.7) (33.5) (22.8)  (100.0) 
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6.3.2 Benefits from the contracting project : net income differences 
 
Net income increases of health workers in CODs arising from the contracting settings was 
US$899.9 (Table 6.5. For addition of supplemental salary and per-diem, see 6.3.1 (3)). 
 
 
Table 6.5: Net annual income difference of health workers in CODs arising from  
the DFID/World Bank Project (US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two of the CODs and all MODs belong to Prey Veng Province and their economic statuses 
were similar (Chapter 5). Among these four districts, the payments associated with 
contracting, including the user-fee income received by the COD workers, nearly superseded 
income from private practice received by the MOD workers (Table 6.6). Another COD, 
Kirivong in Takeo Province received a lower total from the payments associated with 
contracting settings (Table 6.6). This is despite the fact that Kirivong’s economic status was 
slightly higher than the other four provinces.  
 
However, the private practice income in Kirovong was still lower than in the two MOD 
districts in Prey Veng Province whose economic statuses were lower than Kirovong (Table 
6.6). The private practice income in Krivong seemed to indicate that health workers in 
Kirivong were more likely to conduct private practice than those in the other two CODs as 
seen in the higher rate of their conducting private practice (44.1%) than those in other CODs 
(7.7% and 8.3%). Possibly, because of Kirivong’s higher economic status, prices of private 
services might be higher. However, it is noted that those in Kirivong might still reduce dual 
practice, if their private practice income is compared with that in the two MODs. They might 
have been able to earn the same private practice income as the health workers in the two 
MODs.   
 
A: CODs  B: MODs  
Benefit in CODs 
(A – B) 
Performance-based 
payment  
642.8 0 642.8 
Supplemental salary and 
per-diem 
279.2 210.2 69.0 
Share from user-fee 
income  
301.2 114.0 187.2 
Total 
 
1,223.2 324.2 899.0 
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Table 6.6: Annual payments associated with the contracting setting and private practice 
income in the two CODs and the two MODs (Prey Veng province) and in Kirivong 
(Prey Veng province) (US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: two income items except the private practice income in MODs were not paid by 
DFID/World Bank Project.  
 
 
 
 
Prey Veng Province 
Peareag Preah SdachKamchay Mea Mesang 
1 Performance-based 
payment 845.3 646.5 0.0 0.0
2 Supplementary 
salary and per-diem 253.6 447.6 146.9 204.0
3 Share from user-fee 
income 165.8 322.1 84.4 152.1
Total (1 + 2 + 3 )
1264.7 1416.2 231.3 356.1
Private practice 155.4 69.5 1386.7 1029.3
Grand Total 1420.1 1485.7 1618.1 1385.4
Takeo Province COD 
Kirivong 
1 Performance-based 
payment 438.6
2 Supplementary 
salary and per-diem 240.2
3 Share from user-fee 
income 420.2
Total (1 + 2 + 3 ) 1090.0
Private practice 499.2
Grand Total 1598.2
COD MOD 
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6.3.3 Comparison with previous studies 
The health workers’ households seemed to be slightly better-off than the average Cambodian 
household, when their per capita household income was compared with the Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita. The per capita household income in CODs (784 household 
members) and in MOD (471 household members) were close: US$511.2; US$555.3. Both of 
these were 1.2 times higher than the GNI per capita US$480.0 in 2001 by World Bank 2008 
(World Bank 2008).  
 
Jacobs et al. (2009) presented the monthly income of health workers in Kirivong OD. In the 
current study, the mean annual incomes of health workers were converted to monthly 
incomes. The converted monthly incomes included incomes in both CODs and MODs. 
Comparisons of the findings between these monthly incomes and the monthly income 
presented by Jacobs et al. (2009) suggests a lower range of health workers' incomes found in 
the current study (Table 6.7). 
 
 
Table 6.7:  Monthly income from health work excluding private practice found in this 
study and Jacobs et al. (2009) (US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, in addition to the US$159.0, the supplementary salary of the tuberculosis and HIV 
programme was paid (Jacobs et al. 2010), consequently, a total of between US$189.0 and 
US$210.0 might have been paid to some of the workers, enlarging the gap between the two 
studies.  
 
Health workers surveyed by the MOH Incentives Study (MOH 2005) (referred to in the 
Chapter 2,) received lower government salaries than those surveyed by this study. The 
salaries were lower in even those with high qualifications, i.e, Grade A, that health workers 
This study Jacobs et al. (2009) 
CODs and 
MODs (N=250) 
CODs 
(N=156) 
MODs 
(N=94) 
Kirivong 
(N=68) 
Kirivong 
109.4 137.8 62.8 126.6 159.0 
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in rural areas seldom possess (Table 6.8). This contrasts with an expectation that the regular 
government payments to Grade A groups would have been higher than those of the health 
workers surveyed by this study because of the Grade A group’s qualifications. This study 
identified the mean of regular monthly government salaries as US$35.0 among all cadres, 
which was annualized to US$420.0. This mean was higher even than that of the Grade A, 
found in the MOH Incentive Study (Table 6.8). The unexpectedly low payment might in part 
be connected to the timing of the Study in 2004, before the government officials 15% pay 
rise in 2006. However, this rise is still insufficient to fully explain the lower payments. 
 
 
Table 6.8: Comparisons of incomes between the MOH Incentive Study and this study 
(annualized, US$) 
 
Note: Data from the MOH Incentive Study were the medians. 
Source: Government payments for the MOH Incentive Study (MOH 2005) were calculated from 
data of monthly payments in P. 2 and private practice income from P.7, P.29 Table A7. Private 
practice income and Total income were from P.5, those of Grade C was estimated from Figure 4 
on P. 5 of the study (MOH 2005). MOH 2005. p. 33, 5.5. 
 
The finding of the MOH Incentive Study presented higher private practice income than those 
earned by the health workers in this study. The private practice income of the Grade A group 
 Government 
payment: 
Private practice 
income  
Total income 
MOH Incentive Study 
(Grade A)  
doctors, dentists, pharmacists 
336.0 
(Monthly 28.0) 
Specialist: 4,800.0 
Generalist: 3,000.0- 
3,600. 
:5,400.0 
This study  
(Doctors) (N=3) 
 
N/A  N/A N/A  
MOH Incentive Study 
(Grade B) assistant level staff of 
doctors, dentists, secondary 
primary laboratory technicians, 
“some” secondary midwives and 
nurses 
240.0 
(Monthly: 20.0) 
1,200.0 1,200.0 – 
1,560.0 
This study 
(Assistant Doctors) (N=5) 
N/A  
 
N/A  N/A  
MOH Incentive Study 
(Grade C) primary and 
secondary midwives and nurses , 
primary laboratory technicians 
156.0 
(Monthly: 13.0) 
1,200.0 840.0 
This study (Nurses and 
Midwives) (N=242) 
418.8 
 
595.0 1895.5 
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(Table 6. 8) exceeded even the mean total household incomes of health workers: US$2,832.8 
in CODs and MODs (Table 6.2). Comparisons of the Grade A with the doctors and assistant 
doctors were unavailable because of the limited number of such case in this study. The 
higher income may be caused by the samples of the MOH Incentive Study which included 
higher proportions of health workers with high qualifications and those who were seldom 
working in rural Cambodia (Personal Observation). The area where samples were collected 
also seemed to influence the higher income. The areas included Battambang Province whose 
provincial town was the second largest city and Kampong Cham Province, which was 
developing as a suburban residential area for Phnom Penh.  
 
The mean private practice income of nurses and midwives (as a group) in this study was 
lower than that of Grade C group samples of the MOH Incentive Study. It is noted that Grade 
B included “some” secondary nurses and secondary midwives who were in specific 
managerial positions, but these nurses and midwives, such as Chief or sub-Chief of a MCH 
division of a Referral Hospital, seemed to be working less frequently at Health Centres from 
which this study collected the cases (Personal Observation). A factor which may account for 
the lower private practice income was the reduced labour supply in private practice by the 
health workers in CODs. The reduction of labour supply might have been caused by: the 
increases in labour supply in government health work due to their aim of increasing income; 
the higher marginal return from government work as a result of contracting incentives; the 
stricter prohibition of private practice by NGO Contractors in CODs. 
 
The total annual income of the nurses and midwives surveyed by this study was at a higher 
level than that of the Grade B and C group of the MOH but not higher than the Grade A 
group in the MOH Incentive Study as shown in Table 6.8. This fact contrasted with lower 
qualifications and lower private practice income of the nurses and midwives, and the 
possible lower economic status of CODs and MODs, than that of the area where the MOH 
Incentive Study took place.  
 
The MOH Incentive Study found that the Grade A group would be satisfied with a total 
monthly income of US$110.00 for working 40 hours a week for the government without 
giving up private practice completely (MOH 2005)
8
. The US$110.00 which was satisfactory 
to the Grade A group was compared with the monthly incomes of US$157.91 (of which the 
                                                     
8
The MOH Incentive Study also asked the sample health workers (including non-technical staff) in the 
Grade A group about their willing to receive. They were willing to receive US$400.00 of their total 
income per month from government work if this meant they had to give up their private practice.  
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annualized amount, US$1,895.5 seen in Table 6.8) of nurses and midwives in this study. 
Then, the nurses and midwives seemed to earn a reasonable range of incomes if their 
qualifications and the location of CODs and MODs were considered.  
6.4 Conclusion on Incomes  
In CODs, the payments associated with the contracting settings appeared to be a substantial 
amount of the health workers’ income as well as their household income. They earned nearly 
60% of their income for health work from these payments. The payment was around 40% of 
the total household income (Table 6.2).  
 
To each cadre group in CODs, the income brought in from the health work excluding private 
practice was significant, i.e. the income from the government sector, reaching to at least half 
of the mean total household income; the highest was over 70% of income (Table 6.4). 
However, to each cadre group in MODs, this income varied from nearly 20% at the lowest, 
to almost half of their total household income (Table 6.4). The mean of this income was 1.2 
times higher in CODs than in MODs (Table 6.2).  
 
Private practice income was 15.0% of the income from health work and 10% of the total 
household income in CODs. However, the proportions of private practice income were more 
than 60% of the income from health work and 40% of the total household income 
respectively in MODs. The private practice income in CODs was a quarter of that in MODs 
(Table 6.2).  
 
The increases in income in the government sector seemed to indicate that labour supply 
increased in the government sector because of increases in income through the payments 
associated with the contracting settings. Also, the differences in the income in the 
government sector as well as in the private practice income between CODs and MODs 
seemed to show a transfer of labour supply between the government and private sector in 
CODs.  
 
In CODs, among the four major cadres, the primary level health workers appeared to benefit 
more from payments associated with the contracting settings. Disparity in the income in the 
government sector between nurses and midwives was narrower in CODs than in MODs. The 
incomes of nurses and midwives were closer in CODs than in MODs (Table 6.4).  
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6.5 Household expenditures of health workers in CODs and MODs 
6.5.1 Household expenditures compared  
(1) Total household Expenditure 
Health workers’ total household expenditure aggregated (Table 6.9), almost $3,600.0 in all 
cases, would have been unattainable by the quoted level of government regular payments 
alone. This corresponds with the hypothesis of this study that the health workers had 
different income sources. This also further underpins this study’s argument that the impact of 
the payments associated with the contracting settings needs to be examined by their impact 
on their total household income.  
 
The mean total household expenditure was between 12 to 16 times that of the annualized 
amount of the quoted government monthly payments: $10.0 to $30.0 per month (Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003; Akashi et al. 2004). The total household expenditure was higher in CODs 
than in MODs. The difference in this expenditure was statistically significant (p-value = 
0.002, two-tailed < 0.005)
9
 .
                                                     
9
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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Table 6.9 Mean and proportion of household expenditures in CODs and MODs 
(US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HH*: household  P-value: result of Mann Whitnny U test (two-tailed)
COD (N=156) % MOD (N=94) %  P-value
CODs and MOD 
(N=250)
%
Food 1,284.00 33.8 1,335.70 41 0.436 1,303.50 36.3
S.D. 523 875.0 675.9
Non-food Daily 600.4 15.8 505.2 16.2 0.03 572.6 15.9
S.D. 398.9 392.7 399.7
Non-food Annual 592.4 15.6 486.4 14.9 0.047 552.6 15.4
S.D. 865.7 350.3 717.6
Education 602.3 15.8 347.6 11.5 0.037* 516.7 14.4
S.D. 799.7 512.2 713
HHs* which incurred (N=132) (N=91) (N=223)
Mean 711.8 387 579.2
S.D. 823.6) 516 730.6
(Education away 
from home)  
291.2 127.0 0.005 -229.5
S.D. 684.2 454.3 -612.2
HHs* which incurred (N = 42 ) ( N = 11) (N=53)
Mean 1,081.60 1,085.00 1082.4
S.D. 945.5 880.2 924
Health Service 379.8 10 156.3 4.8 0.013 295.8 8.2
S. D. 731.8 393.9 634.9
HHs* which incurred (N=61) (N=17) (N=78)
Mean 931.6 768.1 896
S. D. 904.4 592.3 845.5
Utility                                       269.5 7.1 230 7.1 254.7 7.1
S.D. 241.6 1,628.10 186.4
Rent 
Utility                                                Mean 5.4 0.1 0.4 0 3.5 0.1
S.D. 27.6 3.7 22
HHs* which incurred (N=6) (N=1) (N=7)
Mean 140 36 125.1
S. D. 31 N/A 48.4
Economic activities 
other than health 
work 67.8 79.1 96.5 2.7
S. D. 17.9 1.8 203.5 4.4 28.1
HHs* which incurred (N=37) (N=36) (N=71)
Mean 285.7 379.8 125.1
S. D. 389.4 1040.2 48.4
Total 3801.7 100 3,254.10 100 0.002 3595.8 100
S. D 1822 1,743.30 1,808.90
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Note: The ‘non-food daily’ and ‘non-food annual’ expenditures do not automatically mean daily 
or annual expenditures on all non-foods. They comprise items consumed almost daily and in 
longer term than daily. These categories and other categories were adopted from LSMS World 
Bank (Chapter 4).
 
(2)Food expenditure  
The mean food expenditure and the proportion of that expenditure to the total household 
expenditure in CODs was lower than in MODs (Table 6.9). The economic status of 
households in CODs was understood to be higher than in MODs, according the Engels' Law 
(Mankiw 2011). Between CODs and MODs, food expenditure was not statistically different 
(p-value = 0.436, two-tailed, > 0.05)
10
.  
(3) ‘Non-food daily’ and ‘non-food annual’ expenditures   
‘Non-food daily’ and ‘non-food annual’ expenditure had specific definitions as noted above.  
‘Non-food daily’ expenditure was expenditure on 13 items of goods and services consumed 
on nearly a daily basis. They include, for example, fuels for cooking, toiletries, fuels for 
motorbike and car for non-business purposes, and transportation services for individuals 
(motorbike, chicro, buses and trucks). This expenditure was higher in CODs than in MODs. 
The proportion of this expenditure to total household expenditure was almost the same 
(Table 6.9); however, the two data sets of these expenditures were significantly different 
statistically (p-value = 0.03 two-tailed < 0.05)
11
. 
 
‘Non-food annual’ expenditure was expenditure on ten items relating to goods and services 
consumed much less frequently than those in the ‘non-food daily’ group. They included, for 
example, wedding and funeral ceremonies, clothes, footwear, bags, plates, batteries; and 
materials for minor repair or maintenance of housing. The expenditure reported varied 
widely among the responding households (Table 6.9). Similarly to the ‘non-food daily’ 
expenditures, ‘non-food annual’ expenditure was higher in CODs than in MODs (Table 6.9) 
and the two data sets of these expenditures were significantly different statistically (p-value 
= 0.047, two tailed < 0.05)
12
. 
 
In CODs, on ‘non-food annual’ expenditure, households of secondary midwives showed 
distinctive features in the four cadres. The mean of this expenditure was the second highest 
                                                     
10
 Mann-Whitney U Test 
11
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
12
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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ratio to the total household expenditure, following the food-expenditure (Table 6.9). The 
reason for this was unavailable; they might perhaps be paid highly for wedding or funeral 
ceremonies (Ebihara 1969). 
(4) Educational expenditure 
Educational expenditure was found to be higher in CODs than in MODs, indicating a higher 
economic status of health workers’ households in CODs than in MODs. Educational 
expenditure is one of the important variables reflecting the economic status of Cambodian 
households (Bollen 2001; World Bank 1999, 2006; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports 
of Cambodia: MOEYS and UNICEF 2007) as explained in Chapter 4. The mean of their 
educational expenditure in their households was US$516.7 (Table 6.9), which was 15 times 
the national mean shown in the CSES 2004 study (MOP 2006), thus indicating their higher 
economic status. Higher levels of education received by their children (the net ‘upper’ 
secondary school enrolment rate: 79.8%) than the national average supported this higher 
expenditure. The national net secondary school enrolment rate was 22% female, 35% male 
(MOEYS and UNICEF 2007). Furthermore, 9.4% of the households had more than one child 
enrolled in university.  
 
The mean of educational expenditure and the ratio of this expenditure to total household 
expenditure in CODs were higher than those in MODs (Table 6.9), while the mean number 
of the children was almost the same between CODs: 1.9, and MODs:2.0 (Table 6.1).  
 
However, differences in the expenditure data sets of CODs and MODs were not statistically 
significant. After the 5% trimming on the data sets, the difference was significant (p-value 
=0.037 two-tailed < 0.05)
13
. The 5% trimming excludes the outlier-cases which compose 5% 
of the total number of samples; 2.5% from each of the highest and the lowest outliers. From 
the 250 cases in this study, 13 outliers in total, seven from the highest and six from the 
lowest, were excluded. As a result, 237 cases (N=144 in CODs, N=93 in MODs) were tested. 
The mean of the trimmed data (N=237) was US$441.9. The mean number of children was 
the same in the trimmed data between CODs (1.93) and MODs (2.09).  
Expenditure on education away from households   
The expenditure on the education away from households saw higher spending by households 
in CODs than those in MODs. The proportion of the mean to the total household expenditure 
                                                     
13
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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in CODs was almost double that of the mean in MODs (Table 6.9). The expenditure in CODs 
and MODs were statistically different (p-value = 0.005 two tailed < 0.05)
14
.  
(5) Other expenditure  
1) Health expenditure   
Total health expenditure consists of expenditure on general health services and on maternal 
and child health (MCH) services. The mean health expenditure in CODs was more than 
double that in MODs (Table 6.9). The difference in these two data sets was statistically 
significant (p-value, two-tailed: 0.013 <0.05)
15
. However, ambiguity about the health 
expenditure disturbed differentiating the economic status between CODs and MODs. Some 
households responded to additional questions concerning health services they received which 
they were not required to pay for. These unpaid health services included those provided by 
the health workers themselves or by a friend of the household. There was no information 
about what charges for health services the health workers’ households should have paid 
instead of their receiving free health services.  
 
Given the higher health expenditure in CODs than in MODs, it is noted that the number of 
households which paid for health services was 61 out of of 156 (39.1%) in CODs but only 17 
of the 94 households (18.1%) in MODs (Table 6.9). Various assumptions may be possible 
about the reasons for the higher expenditure and the higher percentage in CODs could be 
made in relation to free health services. However, almost no information about free health 
services to health workers was found in the literature about the ADB/DFID Pilot Project and 
the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project. No information was found in this study’s 
investigations: the key informant interviews and the mini-survey. This point will be further 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
Some health workers reported use of tertiary level facilities or private facilities which 
required high health expenditure. This is also further discussed Chapter 8.  
2) Utility expenditure  
Almost all the surveyed health workers’ households paid mobile telephone and electricity 
charges (90.4% and 98.0%). Paying for water or garbage collection was uncommon. The 
means of this category of expenditure represented a limited proportion of total household 
expenditure (Table 6.9). The electricity was not necessarily connected to power plants. 
Underdeveloped infrastructure and social service availability in their rural location do not 
                                                     
14
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
15
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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appear to be significant constraints to them. Their expenditure in this category might be 
related to their work demands.  
 
The mean utility expenditure in CODs was slightly higher than that in MODs (Table 6.9). 
The difference was statistically significant (p-value, two-tailed 0.023 < 0.05)
16
. Housing 
rents were paid by a small number of households and the mean (N = 250) was low. The mean 
rent was higher in CODs than in MODs (Table 6.9). The small number may be related to the 
generally high level of home ownership in rural Cambodian households (Personal 
observation).  
3) Expenditure for household economic activities other than health work 
Most of the households that conducted enterprises achieved a net income (profit), but some 
incurred a net expenditure (loss) (Table 6.9). The mean of total household expenditures (net 
loss) from economic activities other than health work was lower in CODs than in MODs 
(Table 6.9).  
4) Non-aggregated expenditures 
Expenditure items which related to savings and investments were not included to the total 
household expenditure as explicated in Chapter 4 (Deaton 1997).  
6.5.2 Comparison with previous studies  
Households of the health workers held high economic status in Cambodia. Per capita total 
household expenditure of health workers (US$708.6)
 
was slightly lower than that in Phnom 
Penh (US$879.0) in CSES 2004 (MOP 2006). The Phnom Penh data was calculated by this 
study from the data in CSES 2004 (MOP 2006). However, per capita total household 
expenditure in CODs and in MODs still belonged to a higher stratum of the higher economic 
quintile of Cambodian households (Figure 6.2). 
                                                     
16
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
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Figure 6.2: Per capita annual household expenditure of health workers’ households in 
CODs and MODs and of economic quintiles in Cambodia (US$) 
Source: The quintile data was calculated from MOP 2006.
 
A comparison with four sub-groups of the ecological-agricultural divisions
17
 confirmed the 
high economic status of their households. Their households’ per capita expenditure was only 
behind those in the urban area in Phnom Penh, the wealthiest area in many analyses of 
economic status in Cambodia (Figure 6.3).
                                                     
17
 The ecological-agricultural divisions  reflect the importance of the primary industry in the country 
influenced largely by the ecological and physical settings (World Bank 2005; MOP 2006) which were 
underlined by the ecological system of Tonle Sap Lake, the largest pure water lake in Southeast Asia 
and the that of the Mekong River (Sokhem and Sunada 2006; Nouteva et al. 2010). 
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Figure 6.3: Per capita household expenditure of health workers’ households in CODs 
and MODs and by geographical-division of Cambodia  
U**Urban, and R*Rural according to the definitions of the study (World Bank 2006). 
Source: The 4 regional data sets were calculated by this study from World Bank (2006, P.24 
Figure 2.5) which used CSES 2004 data.  
 
 
The percentage of non-food expenditure (63.7%) in the total household expenditure of health 
workers was higher than in the richest economic quintile in Cambodia as a whole. The 
richest quintile had 56% non-food expenditure, which was calculated by this study using 
data from the MOP (MOP 2006). 
6.5.3 Comparison between the total household expenditure and income   
In this study, the issues of under- reporting of health workers’ and their household income, 
(Chapter 4) (Deaton 1997), was addressed by asking the detailed questions about the income, 
measuring the total household expenditures and then comparing the total household income 
and expenditure (Deaton 1997), as explained in Chapter 4. The study measured the mean 
total household income to be around 70% of the mean total household expenditure in both 
CODs and MODs (Table 6.2, 6.9).  
 
In addition, the accuracy of the income reported by this study was confirmed by an 
investigation of the relationship between the measured household expenditure and income. 
This investigation drew on the approach which was applied by Deaton (1997) based on the 
fact that household consumption is a function of household income determined by the 
marginal propensity to consume. It was also based on the assumption that the permanent 
income and the total expenditure of a household have log normal distribution (Battistin, 
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555Blundell, and Lewbel 2009).  
 
The log of the total household expenditure and of the total household income in CODs and 
MODs were illustrated in the form of a graph (Figure 6.4). The households were ranked from 
low to high by total household expenditure. Then a graph was created according to these 
rankings, presenting two lines: that of log of total household expenditure and that of total 
household expenditure for the same households (Figure 6.4). This graph checks the 
directions of and disparity/distance between the two lines (Deaton 1997).  
 
The graph shows the income was below the expenditure. However, the similar direction of 
the lines suggests that reporting of incomes was generally consistent. The consistency was 
also suggested by the distance between two lines at different points on the diagonal line. The 
distance was maintained with a confined range, particularly in the graph of cases in CODs. It 
is important to note that accuracy levels of income surveyed could change across the cases.  
 
 
  
 
COD (N=156)                             MOD (N=94) 
 
Figure 6.4 Log total household income and log total household expenditure by district 
status  
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6.6 Access to basic infrastructure, durable goods possessions,  
and housing materials 
The households of health workers in CODs were better-off than those in MODs, judging by 
their access to basic infrastructure and housing materials used for their houses. Health 
workers’ households’ access to piped or tapped water was, on average, higher than the access 
in economic quintiles in the rural area in the Plain and it was higher in CODs than in MODs 
(Table 6.10). Their access to electricity was only slightly higher in CODs than in MODs. 
They may have been producing electricity from their own generators.  
 
Table 6.10 Access rates to basic infrastructure of health workers’ households in CODs 
and MODs and access in other divisions (%) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data of ecological and agricultural divisions was generated from CSES 2004 presented 
by World Bank report, Table 5.2, P.77 and Table 5.3, P.78 (World Bank 2007).
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Between CODs and MODs, differentiating the economic statuses of health workers’ 
households through the possession of durable goods (Table 6.11) was inconclusive, though 
most of the possession rates in CODs were higher than in MODs (Table 6.11). Of 7 items, 
the differences in possession of electric fans and bicycles were statistically significant (P < 
0.05, two-tailed)
18
 (Table 6.11). In total 17 items were asked about; ten were excluded from 
the comparison between CODs and MODs, either because the higher possession rate in 
CODs or MODs was less than 10% or because the goods were not asked about by CSES 
2004 (MOP 2006) (Appendix 16).  
 
Table 6.11: Possession rates of nine durable goods in health worker’ households in 
CODs and in MODs and the national average of CSES 2004 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * indicates the data sets of the goods were different with statistical significance
19.  
Source: The national average was from CSES 2004 presented by MOP report (MOP 2006) 
 
                                                     
18
 Mann-Whitnny U test 
19
 Mann-Whitnny U test 
 Electric fan* Bicycle*  Radio TV 
CODs 57.7 80.1 67.3 94.2 
MODs 30.9 92.6 71.3 90.4 
National 
average 
12.4 64.1 51.8 46.1 
 
Mobile 
telephone  Motorbike  
Sewing 
machine  
CODs 92.3 88.5 11.5  
MODs 87.2 86.2 11.7  
National 
average 
12.9 28.6 6.0  
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The households of health workers used more expensive materials than the average rural
20 
household in Cambodia presented in a report of CSES 2004 by MOP (MOP 2005). In CODs, 
the households used more costly materials in house construction and as fuel for cooking than 
in MODs (Table 6.12). Differences in materials and of fuels were statistically significant 
between CODs and MODs (material for frames: P = 0.033 < 0.05, 2-tailed; material for 
flooring : P=0.000 < 0.05; fuel for cooking: P=0.000 < 0.05. all two-tailed) (Table 6.12).  
  
                                                     
20
 Definitions of urban and rural were not seen in the report. 
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Table 6.12: Rates of materials used for housing in CODs and in MODs (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion on expenditures 
Expenditures in health workers’ households in CODs suggested their higher economic status 
than those in MODs, which was seen in different categories of the expenditures. The 
proportion of food expenditure to the total household expenditure and the higher mean 
Frame 
         
 
High quality 
wood 
Concrete Low quality 
wood 
Others 
 
Total  
   
CODs 69.9 20.5 6.4 3.2 100  
   
MODs 83 9.6 7.4 0 100  
   
Flooring 
         
 
Parquet 
Wood 
Bamboo, 
palm 
Tile Cement Others Wood 
board 
Total 
CODs 37.8 32.7 18.6 4.5 6.4 0.0 100 
MODs 29.8 53.2 3.2 3.2 9.6 1.1 100 
Roof 
       
 
Tile Glavanised 
iron 
Fibre 
cement 
Concrete Thatch 
leaf 
Others Total 
CODs 57.1 28.8 5.8 5.8 0.6 1.9 100 
MODs 73.4 13.8 7.4 1.1 3.2 1.1 100 
Fuel for cooking  
       
 Wood Gas Charcoal Others Total  
   
CODs 60.3 29.5 9.6 0.6 100  
   
MODs 74.5 8.5 17.0 0.0 100     
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educational expenditure in CODs than in MODs supported the higher economic status. 
Sub-categories in the food expenditure and the educational expenditure also suggested the 
status. The access levels to the basic infrastructure and the materials used for housing in 
CODs also supported the higher economic status than those in MODs. Accuracy of the 
income of the health workers and their households surveyed was supported by the result of 
the expenditure surveyed. The health workers’ households in both CODs and MODs held 
high economic status in Cambodia. 
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter presents the results of empirical investigation about the differences between 
CODs and MODs in incomes and expenditures of the health workers and their households 
and the differences in their households’ access to basic infrastructures, durable goods 
possessions and materials used for their housing. These differences suggested that the 
economic status of households in CODs was higher than in the MODs, though the difference 
in durable goods possessions showed inconclusive difference. The higher economic status of 
COD housesholds seemed to result from the payments associated with the contracting 
settings through raising health workers’ incomes, because these payments made up the 
highest proportion in the total household income in CODs. 
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Chapter 7 Result of regression analyses  
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the findings of the investigation of the second research question of this 
study which is: What is the importance of performance-based payments (the payments 
associated with the contracting settings) to the income of health workers? The descriptive 
statistical analyses in Chapter 6 illustrated the higher incomes and overall household income 
of health workers in CODs compared with those in MODs. The analysis also demonstrated 
that the payments associated with the contracting settings were responsible for pushing up 
the incomes of government sector health workers. The health workers’ household had 
different sources of income. Most notably, private practice was lower in CODs than in 
MODs.  
 
Based on the findings in Chapter 6 and additional descriptive statistical analysis below, 
multivariate regression analyses of the models described in Chapter 4 were conducted in 
order to confirm the hypothesis that the impact of the performance-based payments resulted 
in higher income for the health workers and their households in CODs. 
7.2 Additional descriptive statistical analyses  
Additional descriptive statistical analysis of the collected cases were conducted (Table 7-1-1 
to 7-1-4). The mean, median, and the standard deviation of the dependent variables in the 
form of the natural logrithms were also presented (Table 7-3-1 and 7-3-2 ). In these tables, as 
noted in the bottom of Table 7-1-4, if the number of cases were small - less than two (e.g. 
two nurses) - data of the cases were not publicized in order to avoid specification about who 
received how much, in consideration of the agreed anonymity and confidentiality of 
respondents’ to the cases.
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Table 7-1-1: Health workers subcategory income, income, total household income by district status, cadre, district, gender (Mean, standard deviation, Median, US$)
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. 
All (N=250) 1,314.8 1,160.5 763.1 643.6 643.6 1,868.4 1,958.4 1,446.5 1,995.5 874.34 150.0 3161.8
CODs(N=156) 1,653.3 1,509.8 762.4 292.1 0.0 971.3 1,945.3 1,629.8 1,293.9 900.0 236.3 3179.3
MODs (N=94) 753.2 670.5 281.9 1,227.0 450.0 2,731.5 1,980.1 1,098.6 2,805.4 831.1 96.0 3149.1
Male (N=159) 1,384.1 1,185.0 800.9 717.4 0.0 1,533.3 2,101.5 1,626.0 1,706.7 1,153.5 175.0 3899.3
Famale (N=91) 1,193.9 1,160.0 679.6 514.6 0.0 2,398.0 1,708.5 1,235.0 2,409.1 386.3 100.0 766.2
Prim. NS (N=117) 1,239.0 1,071.0 779.1 778.6 0.0 2,376.7 2,017.7 1,361.5 2,443.7 915.44 153.8 3784.5
Secnd. NS (N=64) 1,562.2 1,446.5 724.6 727.3 0.0 1,445.4 2,289.5 1,810.0 1,550.1 1,314.5 235.0 3498.1
Prim. MW  (N=43) 1,018.7 906.4 503.6 73.5 0.0 145.0 1,092.2 997.5 454.7 371.9 125.0 661.0
Secnd. MW (N=18) 1,506.9 1,540.8 772.0 511.1 292.5 806.9 2,018.0 1,612.5 1,094.4 404.2 366.3 428.1
Assi. Doc. (N=5)
Doc (N=3)
CODs
Prim. NS(N=62) 1,666.3 1,415.0 826.9 238.6 0.0 1,025.4 1,904.9 1,541.3 1,423.0 1,159.3 201.3 4653.7
Secnd. NS (N=47) 1,798.9 1,635.0 692.4 503.8 0.0 1,193.5 2,302.7 2,005.0 1,355.7 1,038.1 400.0 2140.8
Prim. MW (N=29) 1,239.5 1,185.0 453.7 10.7 0.0 35.4 1,250.2 1,185.0 455.6 444.2 60.0 752.2
Secnd. MW (N=13) 1,843.4 1,670.0 633.5 521.4 0.0 950.2 2,364.9 1,928.0 1,102.1 432.9 500.0 424.5
Assi. Doc(N=4) 
 Doc (N=1)
MOD
Prim. NS(N=55) 757.3 640.0 292.2 1,387.4 450.0 3,199.1 2,144.7 1,206.0 3,241.8 640.5 110.0 2481.4
Secnd. NS (N=17) 907.5 825.6 262.1 1,345.3 600.0 1,891.7 2,252.8 1,530.0 2,043.3 2,078.7 87.5 5844.7
Prim. MW (N=14 561.1 500.9 204.2 203.7 170.0 195.3 764.8 781.3 223.2 222.3 137.5 396.5
Secnd. MW (N=5) 632.1 627.0 67.6 484.2 450.0 450.0 1,116.3 1,077.0 197.9 329.7 0.0 0.0
Assi.Doc (N=1)
Doc (N=2)
Peareang (N=64) 1,718.6 1,557.5 946.0 155.4 0.0 908.1 1,874.0 1,572.9 1,268.3 1274.541 330.313 4681.5
Preah Sdach (N=24) 1,857.6 1,732.0 856.5 69.5 0.0 283.4 1,927.1 1,732.0 979.5 620.958 195 1426.0
Krivong (N=68) 1,519.7 1,394.9 462.8 499.2 0.0 1,140.3 2,018.9 1,504.3 1,421.5 645.967 1,394.9 462.8
Kamchay Mea (N=52) 752.5 652.3 249.8 1,386.7 415.0 3,331.1 2,139.2 1,052.5 3,382.8 908.0 67.5 3423.8
Mesang (N=42) 754.0 686.0 320.4 1,029.3 475.0 1,746.0 1,783.2 1,147.9 1,883.0 736.72 151.25 2809.8
Income from health work excluding
private practice
Private practice
Income form health work  including
private practice
Income form sources other than
health work
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Table 7-1-2: Health workers subcategory income, income, total household income by district status, cadre, district, gender (Mean, standard deviation, Median, US$)
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. *
All (N=250) 2,832.8    1,735.5    3,849.5    3,595.8    3,097.3    1,808.9    
CODs(N=156) 2,845.3    1,869.4    3,499.8    3,801.7    3,275.6    1,822.0    
MODs (N=94) 2,811.9    1,373.0    4,388.8    3,254.1    2,706.6    1,743.3    
Male (N=159) 3,255.0    1,916.5    4,377.0    3,789.9    3,263.9    1,752.4    
Famale (N=91) 2,095.0    1,515.4    2,549.4    3,256.5    2,892.9    1,865.1    
Prim. NS (N=117) 2,933.1    1,724.0    4,461.9    3,562.4    3,162.2    1,703.9    
Secnd. NS (N=64) 3,604.0    2,531.8    4,132.3    3,943.8    3,288.1    1,781.2    
Prim. MW  (N=43) 1,464.1    1,274.2    829.4       3,293.6    2,908.2    1,400.8    
Secnd. MW (N=18) 2,422.3    1,842.3    1,303.0    3,464.3    2,823.5    2,840.6    
Assi. DocDoc (N=8)
Doc (N=3)
CODs
Prim. NS(N=62) 3,064.2    1,819.6    1,819.6    3,800.0    3,479.3    1,663.8    
Secnd. NS (N=47) 3,340.9    2,536.5    2,690.1    4,056.4    3,510.8    1,814.7    
Prim. MW (N=29) 1,694.4    1,493.5    880.1       3,590.4    3,263.8    1,339.5    
Secnd. MW (N=13) 2,797.8    367.9       1,326.5    3,987.9    2,910.2    3,195.3    
Assi. Doc (N=4)
Doc (N=1)
MOD
Prim. NS(N=55) 2,785.3    1,520.7    3,974.5    3,294.6    3,033.2    1,723.9    
Secnd. NS (N=17) 4,331.5    1,670.0    6,757.5    3,632.8    2,998.7    1,698.5    
Prim. MW (N=14 987.1       916.8       436.6       2,679.1    2,304.8    1,368.2    
Secnd. MW (N=5) 1,446.0    1,411.0    535.5       2,102.8    1,662.3    674.7       
Assi.Doc.(N=1)
 Doc (N=2)
Peareang (N=64) 3,148.5    1,860.3    4,930.5    3,874.1    3,263.2    1,854.6    
Preah Sdach (N=24) 2,548.1    1,859.9    1,761.9    3,991.2    3,058.2    2,626.3    
Krivong (N=68) 2,664.9    1,889.9    2,063.9    3,655.4    3,344.4    1,412.0    
Kamchay Mea (N=52) 3,047.7    1,298.3    5,127.4    3,360.3    2,706.6    1,972.7    
Mesang (N=42) 2,519.9    1,593.0    3,290.7    3,123.0    2,685.8    1,439.1    
Total household income Total household expenditure 
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Table 7-1-3: Health workers subcategory income, income, total household income by district status, cadre, district, gender (Mean, standard deviation, Median, US$)
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. *
Peareang (64)
Prim. NS(N=25) 1,695.68   1,541.10   945.83     -           -           -           1,695.68   1,541.10   945.83     2006.56 250.00 7170.2
Secnd. NS (N=20) 1,838.77   1,545.00   924.31     495.37     -           1,599.25   2,334.14   1,726.05   1,709.66   1128.46 507.50 2447.9
Prim. MW (N=13) 1,317.35   1,185.00   595.10     3.00         3.00         N/A 1,320.35   1,185.00   592.09     634.91 600.00 596.1
Secnd. MW (N=3) 2,321.00   1,928.00   1,020.90   -           -           -           2,321.00   1,928.00   1,020.90   77.50 0.00 134.2
Assi. Doc. (N=2)
Doc (N=1)
Preah Sdach (24) Mean Median S. D. *
Prim. NS(N=16) 1,855.53   1,732.00   926.50     18.75       -           75.00       1,874.28   1,732.00   918.28     668.31 135.00 1592.6
Secnd. NS (N=5) 2,099.40   2,150.00   757.11     273.75     273.75     N/A 2,373.15   2,150.00   1,302.96   873.50 400.00 1288.3
Prim. MW (N=1)
Secnd. MW (N=1)
Assi. Doc (N=1)
Krivong (N=68) Mean Median S. D. * 64.00       663.24 100.00 1349.0
Prim. NS(N=21) 1,487.11   1,296.00   552.20     690.24     -           1,696.72   2,177.35   1,407.00   2,082.57   586.02 250.00 919.1
Secnd. NS (N=22) 1,694.44   1,649.00   365.63     563.75     225.00     847.65     2,258.19   2,015.00   1,026.69   1041.22 0.00 2038.8
Prim. MW (N=15) 1,208.24   1,193.80   283.80     18.00       -           47.84       1,226.24   1,290.00   295.98     299.47 0.00 873.9
Secnd. MW (N=9) 1,703.50   1,550.00   1,550.00   753.19     375.00     1,076.12   2,456.69   2,357.50   1,220.94   599.44 560.00 404.7
Assi. Doc.(N=1)
Doc (N=0)
Kamchay Mea (N=52) -           -           -           
Prim. NS(N=29) 695.60     620.00     218.14     1,423.86   450.00     3,966.38   2,119.47   1,080.00   3,965.55   388.46 60.00 644.8
Secnd. NS (N=13) 926.98     846.60     287.69     1,389.96   600.00     2,121.46   2,316.94   1,305.00   2,304.29   2539.77 87.50 6644.8
Prim. MW (N=4) 599.75     560.50     158.55     84.50       -           169.00     684.25     678.50     143.64     446.25 127.50 726.3
Secnd. MW (N=3) 603.17     609.00     60.46       507.00     440.00     335.55     1,110.17   1,049.00   275.39     0.00 0.00 0.0
Ass Doc (1)
Doc (N=2)
Mesang (N=42)
Prim. NS(N=26) 826.21     783.25     349.04     1,346.73   700.00     2,117.18   2,172.94   1,508.35   2,255.21   984.04 167.50 3539.6
Secnd. NS (N=4) 844.38     774.50     168.61     1,200.00   800.00     500.00a 2,044.38   1,664.25   975.34     643.75 37.50 1238.0
Prim. MW (N=10) 545.67     475.75     225.63     251.35     275.00     300.00     797.02     803.50     247.12     139.50 137.50 132.3
Secnd. MW (N=2)
Assi.Doc.(N=0)
Doc (N=0)
Income form sources other than 
health work
Income from health work excluding 
PP
Private practice
Income form health work  including 
private practice 
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Table 7-1-4: Health workers subcategory income, income, total household income by district status, cadre, district, gender (Mean, standard deviation, Median, US$)
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. *
Peareang (64)
Prim. NS(N=25) 3,702.23   1,686.00   7,266.33   4,135.63   3,689.69   2,172.33   
Secnd. NS (N=20) 3,462.60   2,578.63   3,326.39   4,076.88   4,239.85   1,860.15   
Prim. MW (N=13) 1,955.25   1,693.25   768.67     3,619.04   2,985.11   1,535.42   
Secnd. MW (N=3) 2,398.50   1,928.00   1153.10 2,910.61   2,647.88   807.05     
Assi. Doc. (N=2)
Doc (N=1)
Preah Sdach (24)
Prim. NS(N=16) 2,542.59   1,859.93   1,847.91   3,709.25   3,641.77   1,460.24   
Secnd. NS (N=5) 3,246.65   2,550.00   1,781.65   3,568.77   2,879.08   1,787.00   
Prim. MW (N=1) 847.50     847.50     2,200.47   2,200.47   N/A
Secnd. MW (N=1)
Assi. Doc (N=1)
Doc (N=0)
Krivong (N=68)
Prim. NS(N=21) 2,763.38   1,916.50   2,417.64   3,469.70   3,287.27   958.70     
Secnd. NS (N=22) 3,299.40   2,615.78   2,258.76   4,148.49   3,473.04   1,846.21   
Prim. MW (N=15) 1,525.71   1,320.00   947.17     3,658.06   3,700.13   1,193.44   
Secnd. MW (N=9) 3,056.14   3,010.00   1,418.89   3,207.42   2,910.23   938.77     
Assi. Doc.(N=1)
Doc (N=0)
Kamchay Mea (N=52)
Prim. NS(N=29) 2,507.93   1,296.50   3,990.84   3,261.60   3,033.23   1,956.52   
Secnd. NS (N=13) 4,856.71   1,617.50   7,684.24   3,862.54   3,175.82   1,858.47   
Prim. MW (N=4) 1,130.50   935.50     662.18     2,256.15   2,354.90   207.66     
Secnd. MW (N=3) 1,110.17   1,049.00   275.39     2,002.48   1,662.33   618.61     
Ass Doc (1)
Doc (N=2)
Mesang (N=42)
Prim. NS(N=26) 3,156.98   1,841.50   3,998.69   3,331.37   3,027.66   1,459.27   
Secnd. NS (N=4) 2,688.13   2,579.50   1,394.04   2,885.93   2,727.75   773.17     Note for Table 7-1-1 to 7-1-4 :if the number of cases were small,  - less than 
Prim. MW (N=10) 936.52     916.75     332.31     2,848.22   2,185.04   1,605.75   two (e.g. two nurses) - data of the cases were not publicized, in order to 
Secnd. MW (N=2) avoid specification about who received how much, in consideration to
Assi.Doc., Doc (N=0) anonimityand confidentiality for the respondents’ to the cases.
Doc (N=0)
Total HH income Total HH Expenditure 
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(1) Structure of number of health workers 
The structure of collected data employing a complete enumeration approach appeared largely 
to reflect the actual structure of numbers of cadres in rural Cambodia (MOH 2002). The 
structure, which has been discussed in Chapter 6, is outlined here because understanding the 
structure seemed to underpin the discussion and interpretation of the regression results. 
Nearly half of the cases were those of nurses; with higher numbers in the lower (primary) 
than the higher level (secondary). Doctors, assistant doctors and secondary midwives were 
minorities. The number of doctors and assistant doctors is less than 10 and that of midwives 
was less than 20. In some districts no assistant doctors or no doctors or no secondary 
midwives were included. No females were included in the assistant doctors and doctor and 
no males within the midwives, which reflected the gender influence on entry to these cadres. 
Males were also in the majority in secondary nurses (Table 6.1).  
Both in CODs and MODs, nurses were the largest group; around 70% in CODs and 80% in 
MODs. In terms of the nurses, primary nurses formed the largest number. The primary 
nurses in MODs reached around 60% of the total number. The number of secondary nurses 
has a disparity between CODs and MODs. 
(2) Dependent variables.  
The dependent variables were tabulated by district, by cadre and district, and by cadre, 
reflecting the interests of this study which centered on the differences between CODs and 
MODs (Table 7-1-1 to 7-1-4, Table 7-3-1 and 7-3-2).  
1) Income from health work excluding private practice   
Income from health work excluding private practice is one of the core interests of this study. 
At the individual Operational District level, in the three CODs the mean of this category of 
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income was at least double in the two MODs (Table 7-1-1).  
 
By Operational District 
The means of income from health work excluding private practice in Preah Sdach, Peareang 
and Kirivong Operational District, the three CODs, were higher than the means in Kamchay 
Mea and Mesang Operational District, the two MODs. The highest mean in Preah Sdach 
Operational was almost 2.5 times higher than the mean in Kamchay Mea and Mesang 
Operational District (Table 7-1-1).  
 
By cadre and district status  
The means of this income in the four major cadres (primary and secondary nurses, primary 
and secondary midwives) in COD were higher than in MODs. The means in CODs were at 
least double the means in the same cadre in MODs. The mean in secondary midwives in 
CODs was nearly triple (Table 7-1-1 to 7-1-4). 
 
2) Income from private practice 
By district 
The levels of income from dual practice differed markedly between the three CODs and two 
MODs. The mean private practice income was much lower in the three CODs than in the two 
MODs. The lowest mean in CODs, held by Preah Sdach Operational District, was almost 
one twentieth of the highest mean in MODs, held by Kamchay Mea Operational District 
(Table 7-1-1). This supports this study's hypotheses about the changes in incomes brought to 
CODs by the contracting incentives. It also suggests that proportional changes to the total 
household income occurred in the government sector income and private sector income. The 
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private practice income in CODs seemed to be reduced by the increases in the income in the 
government sector, which seemed to have accompanied transfers of labour supply between 
the two sectors.   
 
Concerning the level of prohibition of dual practice, among the three CODs, the Preah 
Sdach’s lowest mean appeared to contradict the expected outcome from the level. The level 
in Preah Sdach Operational District was the weakest of the three and was the same as the 
MOH personal rule (Chapter 5). Therefore, the highest mean in CODs might be expected in 
Preah Sdach. The level in Peareang Operational District was also inconsistent with the 
expected outcome, resulting the middle level private practice income (Table 7-1-1).  
 
By cadre and district status 
The means private practice income in three of the four cadres in CODs were lower, 
compared with the means in the same cadres in MODs. An exception was the secondary 
midwives’ mean which was higher in CODs than in MODs, by around 10%. However, 
cautious treatment to this is necessary, since even the total number of secondary midwives in 
CODs and MODs was small (N = 18). In midwives in MODs, their means of private practice 
were noticeably lower than in the nurses in MODs, being only around one sixth to one third 
(Table 7-1-1). 
 
Within each type of district (CODs and MODs), the mean private practice income by cadre 
varied largely. In MODs where no changes in prohibition rules were brought about, if the 
private practice income of nurses and midwives were compared, the difference appeared to 
be large. In cases in CODs, decisions of whether to participate in dual practice may be 
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influenced by the contracting settings. Therefore, the reported private practice income might 
have variations due to this special setting. 
 
At the Operational District level, the percentage of the number of cases which reported 
private practice income to the total number of health workers was higher in the two MODs 
than those in the three CODs. In Kirivong District, 44.1% of health workers conducted dual 
practice and this was the highest percentage among the three CODs, followed by the 
percentages in Peareang, then by Preach Sdach Operational District (Table 7.2). These 
percentages in CODs seemed to be inconsistent with the levels of prohibition of dual practice, 
similar to the inconsistency between the mean. However, cautious treatment of these findings 
is necessary, since the percentage may not necessarily agree with the mean private practice 
income by Operational District (Table 7-1-3, 7-1-4). 
3) Income from health work including private practice  
By Operational District 
Among the five Operational Districts, the rank of the mean income from health work 
including private practice appeared to be framed incompletely by their status: a COD or an 
MOD. In Kamchay Mea Operational District the mean was highest followed by Kirivong 
Operational District. Preah Sdach, Peareang and Mesang Operational District followed. The 
higher means in Kamchay Mea were realized by the private practice income, since the mean 
income from health work excluding private practice, the subcategory income, in Kamchay 
Mea was the fourth highest among the five Operational Districts. This suggests high 
magnitude to, as well as a high proportion of, the private practice income in the current 
subcategory income: income from health work including private practice (Table 7-1-1). 
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Table 7.2: Percentage of number of reported cases obtained private practice income  
Conducted % * Not Conducted %* Total 
Operational District
   Peareang (COD) 4 6.2 60 93.8 64
   Prea Sdach (COD) 2 8.3 22 91.7 24
   Kirivong (COD) 30 44.1 38 55.9 68
   Kamchay Mea (MOD) 32 61.5 20 38.5 52
   Mesang (MOD) 38 90.5 4 9.5 42
OD status
   COD 36 22.4 120 76.9 156
   MOD 70 70.2 24 25.5 94
106 144
%* to the total number
 
 
By cadre  
The mean of this subcategory income by cadre demonstrated different orders between CODs 
and MODs. The mean in primary nurses in CODs was higher than in MODs; however, the 
mean in secondary nurses was lower. The means in both primary and second midwives were 
higher in CODs than in MODs (Table 7-1-1). The means of three cadres: primary and 
secondary nurses and secondary midwives were relatively closer; however, the mean of 
primary midwives was lower, around half of the means of the three cadres (Table 7-1-1). 
 
By cadre and district status  
In CODs, the mean of this income appeared to show smaller income differences between 
nurses and midwives, compared with that in MODs (Table 7-1-1). 
 
Differences in the means between nurses and midwives in MODs were larger, compared with 
difference in the means between nurses and midwives in CODs. In MODs, the mean in 
nurses was more than double the mean in midwives. The means in primary and second 
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midwives are the lowest and second lowest among eight groups (the four majority carders in 
CODs and in MODs).  
 
In MODs, nurses’ higher means of this subcategory income (the income from health work 
including private practice) than midwives seemed to be an outcome of their higher mean 
private practice income than midwives’. The larger disparity in MODs, i.e., less disparity in 
CODs, may indicate that the payments associated with the contracting settings might have 
reduced the income disparity between nurses and midwives (Table 7-1-1).  
4) Total household income 
By Operational District 
The means total household income in Peareang Operational District was the highest followed 
by Kamchay Mea Operational District with a difference of less than 5% compared with the 
higher mean of Peareng’s. The means in Preah Sdach, Kirivong, and Mesang Operational 
District were closer (Table 7-1-2).  
 
By cadre and district status  
The mean total household income of secondary nurses in CODs was lower than in MODs 
due to higher income from sources other than health work in MODs compared with CODs 
(Table 7-1-2). However, the mean total household income of the other three of the four 
majority cadres in CODs was higher than in MODs.  
 
5) Total household expenditure 
By Operational District 
The rank of the means in total household expenditure among five districts strongly indicated 
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the higher economic status of CODs compared with MODs, which seemed to be associated 
with the contracting payments. From the highest, the rank follows as Preah Sdach, Peareang, 
and Kirivong Operational District: the three CODs, followed by Kamchay Mea and Mesang 
Operational District (Table 7-1-2). 
 
By cadre 
The means total household expenditure of nurses was higher than that of midwives. Between 
secondary and primary nurses, the secondary level workers’ mean expenditure was higher 
than that of primary level workers’. The same outcome occurred with the midwives (Table 
7-1-2). 
 
By cadre and district status 
The means in all four majority cadres were higher in CODs than in MODs. Compared with 
the mean expenditure difference in nurses between CODs and MODs, the differences in 
midwives between CODs and MODs were larger. The difference in secondary midwives was 
particularly noticeable; the mean in secondary midwives in CODs was higher, being close to 
double that of the mean in secondary midwives in MODs (Table 7-1-2).  
 
Difference in the means between nurses and midwives in MODs was larger, compared with 
difference in the means between nurses and midwives in CODs. The means in primary and 
secondary midwives are the lowest and second lowest among the eight groups (the four 
majority carders each in CODs and in MODs) in MODs and CODs.  
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(3) Conclusion of additional descriptive statistical analyses 
This additional descriptive statistical analysis showed that the incomes and the total 
household expenditure were nearly all higher in cases in CODs than in MODs. This supports 
this study's hypotheses that contracting incentives brought about higher incomes in CODs. 
They were highly likely to be attributable to the payments associated with the contracting 
settings which became a high proportion of the health workers’ income in the government 
sector as well as of their household incomes in CODs.  
 
It is noted that in the following tables, as noted in the bottom of Table 7-1-4, if the number of 
cases were small - less than two (e.g. two nurses) - data of the cases was not publicized in 
order to avoid specification about who received how much income, and in consideration for 
the anonymity and confidentiality agreed with the respondents’ to the cases.
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Table 7-3-1: Heatlth workers subcategory income, income, total household expediture  in the natural logrithms by cader. district, gender
 (mean, standard deviation, median)  
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. *
All (N=250) 7.037 7.057 0.534 7.334 7.277 0.638 7.584 7.459 0.756 8.078 8.038 0.466
CODs(N=156) 7.322 7.320 0.414 7.427 7.396 0.515 7.689 7.533 0.634 8.143 8.094 0.449
MODs (N=94) 6.565 6.508 0.340 7.179 7.002 0.782 7.409 7.225 0.902 7.969 7.904 0.476
Male (N=159) 7.095 7.078 0.517 7.430 7.394 0.633 7.707 7.558 0.786 8.137 8.091 0.460
Famale (N=91) 6.936 7.056 0.550 7.166 7.119 0.616 7.369 7.323 0.653 7.973 7.970 0.461
Prim. NS (N=117) 6.968 6.976 0.543 7.317 7.216 0.674 7.563 7.452 0.798 8.072 8.059 0.465
Secnd. NS (N=64) 7.260 7.277 0.434 7.567 7.501 0.564 7.871 7.837 0.729 8.179 8.098 0.458
Prim. MS  (N=43) 6.808 6.810 0.498 6.917 6.905 0.401 7.162 7.150 0.497 8.020 7.975 0.399
Secnd. MW (N=18) 7.186 7.340 0.545 7.493 7.385 0.482 7.667 7.518 0.511 7.990 7.945 0.505
Assi. DocDoc (N=5)
Doc (N=3)
CODs
Prim. NS(N=62) 7.323 7.255 0.428 7.398 7.340 0.514 7.673 7.506 0.688 8.155 8.154 0.420
Secnd. NS (N=47) 7.433 7.399 0.346 7.618 7.603 0.481 7.912 7.839 0.591 8.204 8.164 0.475
Prim. MS (N=29) 7.061 7.078 0.359 7.069 7.078 0.360 7.331 7.309 0.446 8.119 8.091 0.374
Secnd. MW (N=13) 7.471 7.421 0.316 7.680 7.564 0.427 7.839 7.790 0.456 8.136 7.976 0.497
Assi. Doc(N=4) 
 Doc (N=1)
MOD
Prim. NS(N=55) 6.568 6.462 0.344 7.225 7.095 0.813 7.439 7.327 0.897 7.977 8.017 0.498
Secnd. NS (N=17) 6.779 6.716 0.249 7.428 7.333 0.748 7.756 7.421 1.036 8.111 8.006 0.414
Prim. MS (N=14 6.284 6.215 0.294 6.601 6.661 0.286 6.812 6.820 0.418 7.814 7.743 0.379
Secnd. MW (N=5) 6.444 6.441 0.108 7.005 6.982 0.176 7.221 7.252 0.375 7.612 7.416 0.310
Assi.Doc (N=1)
Doc (N=2)
Peareang (64) 7.316 7.351 0.519 7.367 7.361 0.569 7.697 7.529 0.696 8.154 8.101 0.479
Preah Sdach (24) 7.445 7.457 0.404 7.468 7.457 0.430 7.670 7.527 0.573 8.158 8.026 0.484
Krivong (N=68) 7.285 7.241 0.283 7.468 7.316 0.489 7.687 7.544 0.600 8.127 8.115 0.413
Kamchay Mea (N=52) 6.575 6.480 0.309 7.169 6.959 0.853 7.399 7.169 0.967 7.982 7.904 0.513
Mesang (N=42) 6.551 6.531 0.378 7.192 7.045 0.693 7.422 7.373 0.826 7.954 7.939 0.432
Ln (Income from health work 
excluding private practice)
Ln (Total household income ) LN (Total household expenditure) 
LN (Income form health work  
including private practice)
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Table 7-3-2: Heatlth workers subcategory income, income, total household expediture  in the natural logrithms by cader. district, gender
 (mean, standard deviation, median)  
Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. * Mean Median S. D. *
Peareang (64)
Prim. NS(N=25) 7.299 7.340 0.536 7.299 7.340 0.536 7.670 7.430 0.821 8.192 8.213 0.541
Secnd. NS (N=20) 7.416 7.343 0.446 7.579 7.453 0.572 7.890 7.783 0.646 8.202 8.352 0.504
Prim. MS (N=13) 7.089 7.078 0.459 7.093 7.078 0.455 7.503 7.434 0.409 8.117 8.001 0.403
Secnd. MW (N=3) 7.689 7.564 0.417 7.689 7.564 0.417 7.711 7.564 0.453 7.952 7.882 0.267
Assi. Doc. (N=2)
Doc (N=1)
Preah Sdach (24)
Prim. NS(N=16) 7.445 7.457 0.387 7.458 7.457 0.382 7.648 7.527 0.574 8.147 8.200 0.391
Secnd. NS (N=5) 7.595 7.673 0.373 7.667 7.673 0.499 7.961 7.844 0.560 8.104 7.965 0.404
Prim. MS (N=1)
Secnd. MW (N=1)
Assi. Doc (N=1)
Krivong (N=68)
Prim. NS(N=21) 7.258 7.167 0.290 7.470 7.249 0.575 7.694 7.558 0.621 8.118 8.098 0.263
Secnd. NS (N=22) 7.412 7.408 0.221 7.641 7.608 0.400 7.922 7.869 0.570 8.228 8.153 0.480
Prim. MW (N=15) 7.071 7.085 0.241 7.084 7.162 0.249 7.221 7.185 0.434 8.149 8.216 0.357
Secnd. MW (N=9) 7.404 7.346 0.288 7.706 7.765 0.469 7.928 8.010 0.472 8.039 7.976 0.272
Assi. Doc.(N=1)
Doc (N=0)
Kamchay Mea (N=52)
Prim. NS(N=29) 6.500 6.430 0.300 7.102 6.985 0.863 7.294 7.075 0.882 7.942 8.017 0.542
Secnd. NS (N=13) 6.795 6.741 0.270 7.390 7.174 0.835 7.747 7.389 1.161 8.163 8.063 0.446
Prim. MS (N=4) 6.372 6.329 0.250 6.512 6.506 0.212 6.883 6.838 0.589 7.718 7.764 0.097
Secnd. MW (N=3) 6.399 6.412 0.101 6.992 6.956 0.244 6.988 6.956 0.249 7.573 7.416 0.290
Ass Doc (1)
Doc (N=2)
Mesang (N=42)
Prim. NS(N=26) 6.644 6.664 0.379 7.362 7.314 0.746 7.600 7.518 0.902 8.017 8.015 0.452
Secnd. NS (N=4) 6.725 6.652 0.185 7.551 7.416 0.416 7.786 7.789 0.553 7.942 7.908 0.259
Prim. MS (N=10) 6.249 6.165 0.315 6.637 6.688 0.314 6.784 6.820 0.365 7.852 7.689 0.445
Secnd. MW (N=2)
Assi.Doc. (N=0)
Doc (N=0)
Ln (Total household income )
Ln (Income from health work 
excluding private practice)
LN (Income form health work  
including private practice)
LN (Total household expenditure) 
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7.3 Regression results 
The main interest of analyses was whether the variable COD was related to higher income in 
CODs than in MOD with statistical significance. The main interest of the analysis was also 
whether the variable Peareang, Preah Sdach and Kirivong, the variable for the three CODs, 
was related to higher income than the reference variable Kamchay Mea, an MOD. The main 
interest framed descriptions of the results of regression analyses.  
 
Regressions of the incomes were performed in cases of all health workers (N=250) and cases 
by cadre. The regressions of cases by cadre were intended to confirm the magnitude of 
district status as CODs on the incomes, i.e., the impact of contracting payments. The cases 
consisted of three groups: primary nurses, secondary nurses, and midwives. Due to the small 
number of cases of primary and the secondary midwives, these two groups were combined. 
However, means of subcategory incomes (income from health work excluding private 
practice, income from health work excluding private practice, private practice income) and 
the total household income differed between the two groups of midwives (Table 7-1-1to 
7-1-4). The regressions of the total household expenditure were conducted in all cases. 
 
The dependent variables for regressions were transformed to the natural logarithm as 
described in Chapter 4 and further confirmed the normality, prior to the regression analyses. 
Plotting of dependent variable values, after the log-natural transformed into the log-natural 
form, relative to the predicted values was drawn (the normal P-P plot). The dependent 
variables are income from health work excluding private practice, income from health work 
including private practice, total household income, and total household expenditure (Figure 7. 
1 to 7.4) 
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Figure7.1 Normal P-P plot Ln (income from health work excluding private practice) 
 
 
 
Figure7.2. Normal P-P plot Ln (income from health work including private practice)   
 
 
 
 
Figure7.3: Normal P-P plot Ln (Total household income)  
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Figure7.4. Normal P-P plot Ln(Total household expenditure)  
 
 
After regressions were conducted, only those models which were of statistical significance 
(F-value) were checked and tested about their cook’s distance as well as heteroscedascity by 
plotting of the residuals
21
 and the modified White test. results from the regressions which 
were not statistically significant were shown only in tables. If noticeable points were found 
in the result, they are described.
                                                     
21
 Given limited number of the total cases collected by the survey of this study, in order to ensure 
sufficient number of cases for regressions in different groups of cases (a group of all health worker 
cases and groups of cases by cadre), outlier-cases were not excluded or trimmed. As a result, the 
plotting included these cases.  
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7.3.1 Income from health work excluding private practice  
The core hypotheses concerning the income from health work, excluding private practice, 
was that the payments associated with the contracting projects were likely to have 
contributed a high proportion of health worker income. Other hypotheses of independent 
variables for regressions of this income have been primarily written about in Chapter 4 (4.3.3 
(8) c). Hypotheses not included in Chapter 4 are as follows. The intensity of the prohibition 
of dual practice might influence the income from health work, excluding private practice. If 
the intensity of prohibition of dual practice was high, the health worker might be restrained 
in their participation, with the possible result that these health workers could make greater 
efforts within the government sector. As a result, the government sector income, i.e., the 
income from health work excluding private practice, might have increased in. 
 
The marital status of a male health worker could have an effect on income because of 
government family allowance payments paid to only married males (Chapter 3).Their 
amounts and influence on their basic payments seemed to be limited according to 
government basic payments. They were answered as a part of their regular government 
payments in this survey. 
 
Prior to multivariate regressions, univariate regressions using the logged income from health 
work excluding private practice as the dependent variable with each independent variable 
were undertaken. The regressions tested the R-squares for the variables, other statistics 
including p-value for the model (Table 7.4) and p-value of the independent variable. In Table 
7.4 each row is a model.  
 
Each set of dummy variables for the independent variables were included in a regression 
model for the test.  
 
The cut-off point for selecting the independent variables was the p-value below 0.2 as noted 
in Chapter 4 (4.3.3 (8) d) (National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania and Oxford Policy 
Management Ltd. U.K. 2001). Following the result presented in Table 7.4, the variable for 
household size (Household size) was excluded (Table 7.4). 
 
Because of the theoretical importance of the categorical or ordinal variables in the hypothesis, 
even if some variables in a set of dummy variables exceeded the cut-off point, the categorical 
or ordinal variable consisted of the dummy variables was not excluded. 
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Table 7.4: Results of univariate regression of income from health work except private 
practic 
 
 
 
 
Note: Sig = the p-value of the model. *** < 0.01, **< 0.05, * < 0.1. 
 
After the exclusion of Household size, the variable, the three models presented in Chapter 4 
were changed as follows.  
 
Group A Model 1 resulted in the following model  
Ln (Yi)  = a +b1 Secondary NS + b2 Primary MW + b3 Secondary MW + b4 Assistant 
+ Doctors  + b5 Doctor + b6 Age + b7 Age Squared + b8 Male +  
b9 Married  
+ b10 COD + b11 Economic Status + e 
 
Group A Model 2 resulted in the following the model  
Ln (Yi) = a +b1 Secondary NS + b2 Primary MW + b3 Secondary MW + b4 Assistant Doctors  
+ b5 Doctor + b6 Age + b7 Age Squared + b8 Male + b9 Married +  
b10 COD  + b11 Prohibition dual practice Mid + b12 Prohibition 
dual practice Low+ e 
 
Group B Model 3  
Ln (Yi) = a +b1 Secondary NS + b2 Primary MW + b3 Secondary MW + b4 Assistant Doctors 
 + b5 Doctor + b6 Age + b7 Age Squared + b8 Male + b9 Married  
+ b10 Measang + b11 Peareng + b12 Preah Sdach + b13 Kirivong + e 
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square S.E. Sig.(model) 
Prohibition of Private 
Practice 0.522 0.272 0.266 0.457 0.000
Cadre 0.305 0.093 0.074 0.514 0.000
Age 0.086 0.007 0.003 0.533 0.173
Age Squ 0.080 0.006 0.002 0.533 0.021
Male 0.144 0.021 0.017 0.530 0.023
COD 0.689 0.474 0.472 0.388 0.000
Household size 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.535 0.959
5ODs 0.684 0.468 0.459 0.393 0.000
Economic Status 0.284 0.081 0.077 0.513 0.000
Married 0.131 0.017 0.013 0.530 0.038
Age, Age Squ 0.108 0.012 0.004 0.533 0.233
S.E. :Standard Error of the Estimate
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Where Ln(Yi) means the log-natural transformed (Ln) the income and household expenditure 
to be investigated (HWIncmExcPP, HWIncmInclPP, Total HH Income, Total HH 
Expenditure).  
 
These models, when they applied to cases by cadre, did not include Cardre. When the cadre 
was midwives, the models included neither Cadre nor Male. 
 
(1) Group A Model 1. 
1) All health workers 
From results noted in Table 7.5, the following was interpreted. The interpretation included 
exponentiations of coefficients for independent variables applied to the regression of the 
log-transformed dependent variable (Wooldbridge 2009). The calculation formula was 
explained in Chapter 4, 4.3.3 (8).  
 
In this model, controlling for all other variables, a health work’s (Ln) income from health 
work excluding private in CODs is on average 78.0% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable 
health worker’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from 
health work excluding private practice of a health worker in CODs as was on average 
118.1% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in MODs. This result, 
the higher income was consistent with the result of descriptive statistical analyses as noted in 
Chapter 6 and Table 7-1-1.  
 
The coefficient of the variable for COD was one of only three variables which were 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice was on average 13.7% (p <0.05) higher than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income. The variable for primary nurses was the reference variable. 
After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health work excluding private practice 
of a secondary nurse was on average 14.7% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income. 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice was on average 17.6% (p <0.05) lower than a comparable primary 
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nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health work 
excluding private practice of a primary midwife was on average 14.7% (p < 0.05) above the 
income of a comparable primary nurse’s income. 
 
Controlling for all other variables a one-year advance in the age of a health worker increased 
the (Ln) income by 4.2% (p > 0.1), compared with the (Ln) income earned when the health 
worker was one year younger. After exponetiating the coefficient, a one-year advance in the 
age of a health worker increased the income by 4.2% (p > 0.1), compared with the income 
earned when the health worker was one year younger. Controlling for all other variables, the 
(Ln) income of a male health worker was 9.1% (p > 0.1) higher than the (Ln) income of a 
comparable female health worker. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a male 
health worker was on average 9.5 % (p > 0.1) above the income of a comparable female 
health worker’s income. Controlling for all other variables, the (Ln) income of a married 
health worker was 6.8% (p > 0.1) higher than the (Ln) income of a comparable unmarried 
health worker. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a married health worker was 
on average 7.0 % (p > 0.1) above the income of a comparable unmarried health worker’s 
income. 
 
Table 7.5: Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice 
[Model 1] (all health workers, N =250) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.137 0.066 2.072 0.039 ** 0.639 1.566
Primary MW -0.176 0.088 -2.009 0.046 ** 0.488 2.049
Secondary MW 0.173 0.113 1.533 0.127 0.630 1.587
Assistant Doctor 0.073 0.176 0.417 0.677 0.882 1.133
Doctor 0.197 0.216 0.913 0.362 0.967 1.034
Age 0.042 0.033 1.263 0.208 0.008 123.960
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -1.292 0.198 0.008 121.753
Male 0.091 0.082 1.118 0.265 0.347 2.881
Married 0.068 0.078 0.875 0.382 0.716 1.397
COD 0.780 0.055 14.120 0.000 *** 0.747 1.338
Economic Status* 0.043 0.061 0.705 0.482 0.717 1.394
Constant 5.529 0.699 7.913 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.552
R-square adjusted 0.531
Root MSE 0.366
AIC -491.390
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
 
Cook’s distance: 0.0340 < 0.5 
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Heterocedasticity in the model was checked by plotting the relation between the standardised 
residuals and the standardized predicted values concerning the dependent variable (Figure 
7.5). The plot shows the heterocedasticity, with two groups of error variance. However, in 
parallel with the features of hetroscedasticity, the feature of homoscedasticity appeared to be 
present within each group. In contrast, the result of modified White test indicated 
homoscedasticity as below. 
 
Considering the modified White test result, i.e., homoscedasticity and the bimodality in the 
plots, further tests of the bimodality (Appendix 8) were performed. The result of descriptive 
statistics presented that a higher mean and median of the dependent variable in CODs than in 
MODs. Patterns of distribution of cases in the CODs and in MODs in the histograms 
confirmed the findings from the descriptive statistical analyses, as expected. The patters 
appeared to indicate that each of two groups had their own peak at a different value from 
another group. These findings support the hypothesis that COD, the variable, the difference 
in the status of Operational District (CODs or MODs) was likely to be the main factor which 
caused the bimodality (Chapter 4).  
 
In addition, to test whether COD was causing bimodality consistently, regressions were 
conducted with COD and each one of the other independent variables. From these 
regressions, plots of dependent variables versus standardised predicted values were produced 
and those of dependent variables versus standardized residuals were produced. These plots 
indicated that COD was the main factor which caused the bimodality. 
 
Therefore, in Figure 7.5, if each of two groups of plot points was seen separately, each group 
appeared not to have heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.5). It is noted that outlier cases disturbed 
the constant variance in the plot (Figure 7.5); however, judging from the statistics for the 
Cook’s distance stated under Table 7.5, there were no extreme outliers.  
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Figure 7.5: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice (Model1) (All health workers, N=250) 
 
Modified white test result  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.22  0.018  0.2250  5.578  0.200   
 
The p-value, 0.200 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis (homoscedasticity) was not rejected; there is no heteroscedasticity in the model. 
 
2) Primary Nurses  
This model regressed only cases of primary nurses (N=117) with the independent variables 
used for Model 1 except dummy variables for cadres. Controlling for all other variables, the 
(Ln) income from health work excluding private practice of a primary nurse in CODs was 
77.3% (p < 0.01) higher than the (Ln) income of a comparable primary nurse in MODs. After 
exponetiating this coefficient, a COD primary nurse’s income was 116.3% (p < 0.01) above a 
comparable MOD primary nurse income. The coefficient was the only coefficient with 
statistical significance in this model. The higher income was consistent with the result of 
descriptive statistical analyses. The mean income in CODs was more than double the mean 
income in MODs (Table 6.4, 7-1-1).  
 
The plot of residuals presented bimodality (Figure 7.6). However, the test result of the 
modified White test below presented homoscedasticity. The tests to estimate which 
independent variables caused the bimodality were conducted, as it was done on the all health 
worker cases. The tests indicated that COD was the main factor which caused the bimodality. 
Consequently, the plots showed that  each of two groups in the plot did not have 
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heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 7.6:  Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 1]  (Primary Nurses, N = 117) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P >t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.118 0.096 1.229 0.222 0.003 329.235
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.221 0.225 0.003 327.949
Male 0.118 0.110 1.074 0.285 0.642 1.559
COD 0.773 0.082 9.456 0.000 *** 0.782 1.278
Married 0.079 0.161 0.489 0.626 0.641 1.561
Economic Status* 0.091 0.107 0.853 0.395 0.773 1.294
Constant 3.667 2.171 1.689 0.094
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.509
R-square adjusted 0.482
Root MSE 0.391
AIC -213.240
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
Cook’s Distance (maximum) 0.146 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice [Model 1] (Primary Nurses, N = 117) 
 
Modified white test  result  
R-square Adjusted R-square   S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.022  0.013  0.25967  2.561  0.112   
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The p-value, 0.112 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis (homoscedasticity) was not rejected; there is no heteroscedasticity in the model. 
3) Secondary Nurses  
This model regressed only cases of secondary nurses (N=64) with the independent variables 
used for Model 1 except dummy variables for cadres. Controlling for all other variables, the 
(Ln) income from health work excluding private practice of a secondary nurse in CODs was 
71.1% (p < 0.01) higher than the (Ln) income of a secondary nurse in MODs. After 
exponetiating this coefficient, a COD primary nurse’s income was 103.4% (p < 0.01) above a 
comparable MOD primary nurse income. The coefficient was the only coefficient with 
statistical significance in this model (Table 7.7). The higher income was consistent with the 
result of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 6.4, 7-1-1).  
 
The plot of residuals appeared to indicate bimodality and heteroscedasticity. In the plot, one 
of the two groups: the left one, appeared to show heteroscedasticity more clear than the other 
(Figure 7.7). These features disagreed to result of the modified White test. The result of the 
modified White result may be due to the number of cases regressed.  
 
Concerning the bimodality, the same tests for testing the contribution of COD as the one 
conducted on the two groups above (all health workers and primary nurses) were conducted. 
The tests confirmed that COD was the main factor which caused the bimodality.  
 
Table 7.7:  Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 1]  (Secondary Nurses, N = 64) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.063 0.055 1.148 0.256 0.011 90.253
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.187 0.240 0.012 84.968
Male -0.077 0.174 -0.441 0.661 0.777 1.287
COD 0.710 0.107 6.662 0.000 *** 0.760 1.316
Married 0.092 0.211 0.437 0.664 0.527 1.898
Economic Status* 0.032 0.101 0.317 0.753 0.732 1.366
Constant 5.477 1.063 5.154 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.481
R-square adjusted 0.426
Root MSE 0.329
AIC -135.881
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
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Cook’s Distance (maximum) 0.008  < 0.5 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice [Model 1] (Secondary Nurses, N = 64) 
 
Modified white test  result  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.042   0.027  0.14492 2.736  0.103 
 
The p-value, 0.103 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
 
4) Midwives  
This model regressed only cases of midwives (N=61) with the independent variables used for 
Model 1 except dummy variables for cadres and Male. Controlling for all other variables, the 
(Ln) income from health work excluding private practice of a midwife in CODs was 87.2% 
(p < 0.01) higher than the (Ln) income of a midwife in MODs. After exponetiating this 
coefficient, a COD midwife income was 139.2% (p < 0.01) above a comparable MOD 
midwife income. The coefficient was the only coefficient with statistical significance in this 
model (Table 7.8). The higher income was consistent with the result of descriptive statistical 
analyses (Table 6.4, 7-1-1).  
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodality (Figure 7.8). However, test results of the 
modified White test did not find hetroscedasticity of the model. This disagreement may be 
brought about by the small size of cases regressed. Concerning the bimodalilty, the tests for 
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checking the contribution of COD using regressions was conducted. The test results 
confirmed that COD was the main factor which caused the bimodality. If each group of plot 
points was seen separately, each group appeared not to have heteroscadasticity. Outlier cases 
in the plot were not extreme, according to the statistics for Cook’s distance (Table 7.8). 
 
Table 7.8: Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 1] (Midwives, N = 61)  
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.022 0.066 -0.333 0.741 0.009 115.699
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.174 0.863 0.009 115.676
COD 0.872 0.120 7.258 0.000 *** 0.696 1.437
Married 0.000 0.121 -0.004 0.997 0.665 1.503
Economic Status* 0.037 0.119 0.306 0.761 0.632 1.583
Constant 6.977 1.389 5.024 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.582
R-square adjusted 0.544
Root MSE 0.362
AIC -118.138
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
Cook’s distance 0.136 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 1] (Midwives N=61) 
 
The modified White test result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.040   0.024  1.8694 2.446  0.122 
 
The p-value, 0.122 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
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hypothesis was not rejected; there is homscedasticity in the model. 
 
(2) Group A Model 2 
1) All health workers  
Model 2 had, instead of Economic Status, dummy variables for levels of prohibition of dual 
practice: Prohibition dual practice Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low. All other 
independent variables were the same as those Model 1 had. Prohibition dual practice Strict 
was the reference variable for the levels of prohibition.  
 
As seen in Table 7.9, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health work’s (Ln) 
income from health work excluding private practice in CODs is on average 84.2% (p < 0.01) 
higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a health worker in 
CODs was on average 132.1% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in 
MODs. This result, the higher income was consistent with the result of descriptive statistical 
analyses (Table 7-1-1). The coefficient of the variable for COD was one of only three 
variables which were statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice was on average 14.8% (p <0.05) higher than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice (the variable for 
primary nurses was the reference variable). After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of 
a secondary nurse was on average 16.0% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income. Controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s (Ln) income 
from health work excluding private practice was on average 17.5% (p <0.05) lower than a 
comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health work excluding private practice of a 
primary midwife was on average 16.1% (p < 0.05) lower than the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income (Table 7.9).  
 
Plotting of the residuals of model presented heteroscedasticity and the bimodality (Figure 
7.9). These features agreed with the result of the modified White test of the model shown 
below. The bimodality was tested as to the COD as the main factor which caused the 
bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor.  
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Table 7.9: Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 2] (All health workers, N = 250)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.148 0.067 2.204 0.028 ** 0.621 1.610
Primary MW -0.175 0.088 -1.996 0.047 ** 0.488 2.050
Secondary MW 0.168 0.113 1.491 0.137 0.629 1.590
Assistant Doctor 0.081 0.176 0.461 0.645 0.880 1.136
Doctor 0.214 0.217 0.989 0.324 0.960 1.041
Age 0.039 0.033 1.173 0.242 0.008 124.928
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -1.188 0.236 0.008 122.998
Male 0.075 0.083 0.904 0.367 0.333 3.000
Married 0.078 0.078 0.990 0.323 0.704 1.419
COD 0.842 0.085 9.897 0.000 *** 0.315 3.178
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** -0.022 0.065 -0.334 0.739 0.634 1.577
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.088 0.091 0.967 0.335 0.257 3.884
Constant 5.535 0.705 7.846 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.554
R-square adjusted 0.531
Root MSE 0.366
AIC -490.374
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
 
 
 
Cook’s distance : 0.248 < 0.5 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Icome from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 2] (All health workers, N = 250)  
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Modified White test result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.018  0.014  0.22300  4.454  0.036 
 
The p-value, 0.036, was significant (p < 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was rejected; there is heterocedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary nurses 
This model excluded dummy variable for cadres from the previously described model applied to 
all health workers’ cases. As seen in, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a primary 
nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice in CODs is on average 
83.2% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income f in MODs. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income f a primary nurse in CODs was on average 129.8% 
(p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable primary nurse in MODs. This result, the higher 
income was consistent with the result of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-1). The 
coefficient of the variable for COD was one of three variables which were statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) in this model.  
 
Plotting of the residuals of model presented the bimodal data feature (Figure 7.10). This 
feature disagreed with the result of modified White test of the model shown below. The 
bimodality was tested as to the COD as the main factor which caused the bimodality. The 
test confirmed COD as the main factor. Considering this, if each group of the plot points are 
seen separately, heteroscedasticity was not seen in the right side group in the plot.  
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Table 7.10: Result of regression of income from health work excluding private practice 
[Model 2] (Primary nurses, N = 117)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.108 0.097 1.106 0.271 0.003 336.368
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.088 0.279 0.003 336.052
Male 0.101 0.113 0.893 0.374 0.614 1.630
Married 0.086 0.162 0.530 0.597 0.639 1.566
COD 0.832 0.114 7.306 0.000 *** 0.405 2.469
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** -0.054 0.118 -0.459 0.647 0.636 1.573
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.098 0.131 0.743 0.459 0.318 3.147
Constant 3.887 2.166 1.795 0.075
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.511
R-square adjusted 0.480
Root MSE 0.391
AIC -211.831
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
The Cook’s distance 0.126 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10:  Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income excluding 
private practice) [Model 2] ( primary nurse N = 171) 
 
 
Modified White test result 
R-square Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.019  0.010  0.25306  2.176  0.143 
 
The p-value, 0.143 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
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3) Secondary Nurses  
In this model, controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health 
work excluding private practice in CODs is on average 85.6% (p < 0.01) higher than a 
comparable secondary nurse’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
income a primary nurse in CODs was on average 135.4 % (p < 0.01) above the income of a 
comparable primary nurse in MODs. This result, the higher income was consistent with the 
result of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-1). The coefficient of the variable for 
COD was one of only three variables which were statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this 
model (Table 7.11).  
 
Plotting of the residuals showed bimodality (Figure 7.11). These features disagreed with the 
result of modified White test which did not indicate hetroscedasticity. This might be brought 
about by the small size of cases regressed. The bimodality was tested as to COD as the main 
factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. Even 
considering this test result, marginal hetroscadesticity was seen in each group. 
 
Table 7.11:  Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 2] (Secondary nurses, N = 64)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.051 0.056 0.902 0.371 0.011 94.203
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.929 0.357 0.011 89.003
Male -0.105 0.175 -0.597 0.553 0.760 1.316
Married 0.144 0.216 0.667 0.508 0.502 1.994
COD 0.856 0.171 5.020 0.000 *** 0.296 3.374
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.002 0.106 0.017 0.986 0.669 1.495
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.187 0.171 1.093 0.279 0.256 3.912
Constant 5.547 1.077 5.148 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.492
R-square adjusted 0.428
Root MSE 0.328
AIC -135.231
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance: 0.123 < 0.5 
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Figure 7. 11: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) secondary nurse N = 64 (Model 2)  
 
Modified White test result  
R-square   Adjusted R-square S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.027  0.011  0.15157  1.705  0.196 
 
The p-value, 0.196 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
4) Midwives  
In this model, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice in CODs is on average 72.6% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable 
midwife’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a 
midwife in CODs was on average 106.7% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable 
midwife in MODs (Table 7.12). This result, the higher income was consistent with the result 
of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-1). The coefficient of the variable for COD was 
only the variable which was statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.12). 
However, the variables for COD and the dual practice prohibition levels indicated much 
higher VIF (COD: 7.652, Prohibition dual practice Low: 8.213) than the cut-off point (5.0 in 
Ensor et al. 2009) (Table 7.12). 
 
Plotting of the residuals showed bimodality (Figure 7.12). These features disagreed with the 
result of modified White test which did not indicate hetroscedasticity. This might be brought 
about by the small size of cases regressed. The bimodality was tested as to COD as the main 
factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. Considering 
this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, hetroscadesticity are not seen.  
 
 233 
 
Table 7.12: Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practicepractice [Model 2]  (Midwives, N = 61)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.021 0.067 -0.317 0.753 0.009 115.762
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.160 0.873 0.009 115.727
Married -0.014 0.124 -0.116 0.908 0.641 1.561
COD 0.726 0.279 2.602 0.012 ** 0.131 7.652
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** -0.050 0.122 -0.410 0.683 0.609 1.643
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** -0.164 0.282 -0.581 0.563 0.122 8.213
Constant 7.165 1.437 4.987 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.585
R-square adjusted 0.539
Root MSE 0.365
AIC -116.519
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
 
Cook’s distance 0.402 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 12: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health 
work excluding private practicepractice) [Model 2] (midwives, N = 61)  
 
Modified White test result  
R-square   Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value  P-value 
 0.041  0.025  1.8443  2.535  0.117 
 
The p-value, 0.117 was insignificant (p > 0.05). Therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected, which implies that there is homoscedasticity in the model.  
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(3) Group B Model 3  
1) All heath workers 
From all independent variable of Model 1 and 2, this model excluded COD, Economic Status, 
dummy variable for Prohibition dual practice Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low. Instead, 
it included Mesang, Peareng, Preah Sdach and Kirivong which were dummy variables for 
four of the five study site Operational Districts (Table 7.13). They took the form of binary 
dummy variables, having Kamchay Mea, another Operational District, as the reference 
variable.  
   
As seen in Table 7.13, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s 
(Ln) income from health work excluding private practice in Peareang Operational District is 
on average 76.9% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) income in 
Kamchay Mea Operational District, the reference variable. After exponetiating the 
coefficient, the income of a health worker in Peareang Operational District was on average 
115.8% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchay Mea 
Operational District. The coefficient of the variable for Peareang was one of five variables 
which were statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.13). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, health worker’s (Ln) income from health work excluding 
private practice in Preah Sdach Operational District is on average 85.6% (p < 0.01) higher 
than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a health worker in Preah Sdach was on average 
136.1% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchay Mea 
Operational District. The coefficient of the variable for Preah Sdach was one of five 
variables which were statistically significant (p < 0.05) (Table 7.13). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, health worker’s (Ln) income from health work excluding 
private practice in Kirivong Operational District is on average 74.7% (p < 0.01) higher than a 
comparable health worker’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a health worker in Kirivong was on average 
111.1% above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchay Mea Operational 
District. The coefficient of the variable for Kirivong was one of five variables which were 
statistically significant ( p < 0.05) (Table 7.13). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
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excluding private practice was on average 15.3% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a secondary 
nurse was on average 16.5% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable primary nurse’s 
income. Controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s  from health work 
excluding private practice was on average 18.1% (p < 0.05) lower than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a secondary 
nurse was on average 16.6% (p < 0.05) below the income of a comparable primary nurse’s 
income. These coefficients for variables for secondary nurses and primary midwives were 
both statistically significant (p < 0.05) (Table 7.13). 
 
The plot of the errors shows bimodal features (Figure 7.13). These features agreed with the 
result of the modified White test below which indicated heteroscedasticity. The bimodality 
was tested as to COD as the main factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed 
COD as the main factor. Considering this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, 
hetroscadesticity may not seen (Figure 7.13).  
 
Table 7.13: Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work except private 
practice [Model 3] all health workers (N =250) 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.153 0.068 2.241 0.026 ** 0.607 1.646
Primary MW -0.181 0.089 -2.036 0.043 ** 0.478 2.093
Secondary MW 0.166 0.113 1.469 0.143 0.628 1.592
Assistant Doctor 0.088 0.177 0.495 0.621 0.874 1.144
Doctor 0.228 0.219 1.039 0.300 0.942 1.062
Age 0.038 0.033 1.137 0.257 0.008 125.549
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 -1.144 0.254 0.008 123.865
Male 0.070 0.084 0.827 0.409 0.326 3.066
Married 0.080 0.079 1.010 0.313 0.702 1.423
Mesang 0.035 0.079 0.441 0.660 0.616 1.624
Peareng 0.769 0.070 11.047 0.000 *** 0.582 1.718
Preah Sdach 0.859 0.093 9.249 0.000 *** 0.717 1.394
Kirivong 0.747 0.070 10.652 0.000 *** 0.551 1.815
Constant 5.628 0.708 7.952 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.554
R-square adjusted 0.530
Root MSE 0.366
AIC -488.580
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01   
 
Cook’s distance:  0.231 < 0.5 
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Figure 7.13: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 3] (all health workers, N=250)  
 
 
Modified White test result 
R-square   Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.018  0.014  0.22300  4.454  0.036 
 
The p-value, 0.036, was significant (p < 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was rejected; there is heteroscedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary nurses 
This model regressed cases of only primary nurses, excluding the dummy variables for 
cadres. As seen in Table 7.14, a primary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding 
private practice in Peareang was on average 89.3% (p <0.01) higher than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District, controlling for all other 
variables. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a primary nurse in Peareang 
Operational District was on average 118.8% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. This coefficients was one of 
only three statistically significant independent variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.14). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a primary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice in Preah Sdach was on average 78.3% (p <0.01) higher than a 
comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a primary nurse in Preah Sdach Operational 
District was on average 144.2% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable primary nurse’s 
income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. This coefficients was one of only three 
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statistically significant independent variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.14). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a primary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice in Krivong Operational District was on average 73.1% (p < 0.01) 
higher than a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. 
After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a primary nurse in Kirivong Operational 
District was on average 107.7% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable primary nurse’s 
income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. This coefficients was one of only three 
statistically significant independent variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.14). 
 
These higher incomes of primary nurses were consistent with the result of the descriptive 
statistical analyses (Table 7-1-2).  
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.14). These features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases regressed. The bimodality was tested as to COD as 
the main factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. 
Considering this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, hetroscadesticity is not 
seen (Figure 7.14).  
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Table 7.14:  Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 3]  (Primary nurses, N = 117)  
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.095 0.098 0.967 0.336 0.003 341.840
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.937 0.351 0.003 342.453
Male 0.078 0.115 0.679 0.499 0.591 1.692
Married 0.088 0.162 0.541 0.589 0.639 1.566
Mesang 0.114 0.111 1.032 0.304 0.619 1.616
Peareng 0.783 0.108 7.261 0.000 *** 0.670 1.492
Preah Sdach 0.893 0.128 6.970 0.000 *** 0.675 1.480
Kirivong 0.731 0.115 6.338 0.000 *** 0.668 1.497
Constant 4.209 2.190 1.922 0.057
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.516
R-square adjusted 0.480
Root MSE 0.391
AIC -210.979
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
 
Cook’s distance: 0.110 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 3] (Primary nurses, N = 117)  
 
The modified White test result 
R-square n Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.021   0.013  0.24829 2.520  0.115 
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The p-value, 0.115 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
3) Secondary Nurses  
This model regressed cases of only secondary nurses. As seen in Table 7.16, a secondary 
nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice in Peareang Operational 
District was on average 65.2% (p <0.01) higher than a comparable secondary nurse’s (Ln) 
income in Kamchay Mea Operational District, controlling for all other variables. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a secondary nurse in Peareang was on average 
91.9% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable primary nurse’s income in Kamchay 
Mea Operational District. This coefficient was one of only three statistically significant 
independent variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.15). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice in Preah Sdach Operational District was on average 83.3% (p 
<0.01) higher than a comparable secondary nurse’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea 
Operational District. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a secondary nurse in 
Preah Sdach was on average 131.2% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable secondary 
nurse’s income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. This coefficient was one of only three 
statistically significant independent variables (p< 0.05) (Table 7.15). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work 
excluding private practice in Kirivong was on average 65.4% (p < 0.01) higher than a 
comparable secondary nurse’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a secondary nurse in Kirivong was on average 
92.3% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable secondary nurse’s income in Kamchay 
Mea. This coefficient was one of only three statistically significant independent variables (p 
< 0.05) (Table 7.15). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.14). These features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases. The bimodality was tested as to COD as the main 
factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. Considering 
this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, marginal hetroscadesticity was seen 
(Figure 7.15).  
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The higher incomes were consistent with the results of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 
7-1-3). 
 
 
 
Table 7.15:  Result of regression of (Ln) income from health work excluding private 
practice [Model 3] (Secondary nurses, N = 64)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.051 0.057 0.901 0.372 0.011 94.227
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.929 0.357 0.011 89.035
Male -0.104 0.177 -0.591 0.557 0.760 1.316
Married 0.144 0.217 0.661 0.511 0.502 1.994
Mesang -0.074 0.189 -0.394 0.695 0.815 1.227
Peareng 0.652 0.122 5.354 0.000 *** 0.535 1.868
Preah Sdach 0.838 0.177 4.724 0.000 *** 0.752 1.329
Kirivong 0.654 0.125 5.240 0.000 *** 0.486 2.059
Constant 5.745 1.105 5.199 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.493
R-square adjusted 0.419
Root MSE 0.331
AIC -133.411
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance 0.108 < 0.5 
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Figure 7.15: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 3] (secondary nurse N = 64 ) 
 
The modified White test result  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.029   0.013  0.15084 1.850  0.179 
 
The p-value, 0.179 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
 
4) Midwives  
This model regressed cases of only midwife cases, excluding the dummy variables for cadres 
and Male. A secondary nurse’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice in 
Peareang Operational District was on average 82.3% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable 
midwife’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea Operational District, controlling for all other 
variables. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income a secondary nurse in Peareang 
Operational District was on average127.7% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. This coefficient was one of 
only three statistically significant independent variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.16). 
 
A midwife’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private practice in Preah Sdach 
Operational District was on average 65.9% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable midwife’s 
(Ln) in Kamchay Mea Operational District, controlling for all other variables. After 
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exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a midwife in Peareang was on average 93.3% (p 
< 0.05) above the income of a comparable midwife’sincome in Kamchay Mea Operational 
District. This coefficient was one of only three statistically significant independent variables 
(p < 0.05) (Table 7.16). 
 
A midwife’s (Ln) income from health work excluding private in Kirivong Operational 
District was on average 77.4% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable midwife’s (Ln) income in 
Kamchay Mea Operational District, controlling for all other variables. After exponetiating 
the coefficient, the income of a midwife in Peareang was on average 116.84% (p < 0.05) 
above the income of a comparable midwife’s income in Kamchay Mea Operational District. 
This coefficient was one of only three statistically significant independent variables (p < 
0.05) (Table 7.16). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.16). These features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases regressed. The bimodality was tested as to COD as 
the main factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. 
Considering this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, hetroscadesticity is not 
seen (Figure 7.16).  
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Table 7.16  Result of regression of income from health work excluding private practice 
[Model 3] ( Midwives, N = 61)  
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.015 0.068 -0.220 0.827 0.008 118.618
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.061 0.951 0.008 118.876
Married -0.017 0.125 -0.139 0.890 0.639 1.564
Mesang -0.105 0.177 -0.590 0.558 0.445 2.248
Peareng 0.823 0.168 4.887 0.000 *** 0.402 2.487
Preah Sdach 0.659 0.302 2.181 0.034 ** 0.761 1.314
Kirivong 0.774 0.161 4.808 0.000 *** 0.357 2.801
Constant 6.946 1.425 4.875 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.588
R-square adjusted 0.533
Root MSE 0.367
AIC -114.919
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
Cook’s distance 0.347 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.16: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
excluding private practice) [Model 3] (midwives N = 61) 
 
Result of modified White test  
R-square  Adjusted R-square S. E.  F-value  P-value 
0.042  0.026  1.8617  2.596  0.112 
 
The p-value, 0.112 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model.  
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7.3.2 Income from heath work including private practice 
The hypothesis of the dependent and independent variables were described in Chapter 4 
(4.3.3.(8).b., c.). However, the main point of hypotheses is repeated here. The impact of 
payments associated with the contracting settings was likely to still be revealed in 
regressions of this income, despite the inclusion of private practice income in this income 
category. 
 
Prior to multivariate regressions, univariate regressions of the income from health work 
including private practice as the dependent variable applying each independent variable 
(Table 7.17) were undertaken. The R-squares for the variables, other statistics including the 
p-value for the model and that of the independent variable were tested. According to the 
cut-off point, i.e, 0.2 (Chapter 4 (4.3.3 (8) d), Household Size was excluded (Table 7.17). 
 
 
 
Table 7.17: Result of univariate regressions of income from health work including 
private practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square S.E. Sig.(model) 
Prohibition of Private 
Practice 0.153 0.023 0.016 0.633 0.053
Cadre 0.367 0.134 0.177 0.600 0.000
Age 0.163 0.026 0.023 0.631 0.010
Age Squ 0.167 0.028 0.024 0.631 0.008
Male 0.199 0.040 0.036 0.627 0.002
COD 0.188 0.035 0.032 0.628 0.003
Household size 0.007 0.000 -0.004 0.640 0.910
5ODs 0.200 0.040 0.024 0.631 0.040
Economic Status 0.129 0.017 0.013 0.634 0.042
Married 0.143 0.020 0.016 0.633 0.024
Age, Age Squ 0.170 0.029 0.021 0.632 0.024
S.E. :Standard Error of the Estimate
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(1) Group A Model 1 
1) All health workers  
As seen in Table 7.18, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s 
(Ln) income from health work including private in CODs was on average 23.6% (p < 0.01) 
higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the 
coefficient, the income from health work including private practice of a health worker in 
CODs was on average 26.6% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in 
MODs. The coefficient of the variable for COD was one of four variables which were 
statistically significant ( p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.18). 
 
As seen in Table 7.18, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s 
(Ln) income from health work including private was on average 39.9% (p < 0.01) lower than 
a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of 
a primary midwife was on average 32.9% (p < 0.01) below the income of a comparable 
primary midwife’s income. Controlling for all other variables, a doctor’s (Ln) income from 
health work including private practice was on average 82.4% (p < 0.05) lower than a 
comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income (Table 7.18). After exponetiating the coefficient, 
the income of a doctor was on average128.0% ( p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income. These coefficients for variables for primary midwives and doctors 
were both statistically significant (p < 0.05) (Table 7.18). However, it is noted that the 
number of doctor cases is small (N=3). 
 
The plot of the residuals did not show heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.17). The features agreed 
with the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 7.18: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 1] (All health workers, N=250) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.148 0.106 1.397 0.164 0.639 1.566
Primary MW -0.399 0.141 -2.837 0.005 *** 0.488 2.049
Secondary MW 0.148 0.181 0.820 0.413 0.630 1.587
Assistant Doctor -0.186 0.282 -0.661 0.509 0.882 1.133
Doctor 0.824 0.346 2.380 0.018 ** 0.967 1.034
Age 0.091 0.053 1.718 0.087 * 0.008 123.960
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.880 0.061 0.008 121.753
Male 0.089 0.131 0.680 0.497 0.347 2.881
Married 0.001 0.125 0.011 0.991 0.716 1.397
COD 0.236 0.088 2.671 0.008 *** 0.747 1.338
Economic Status* -0.102 0.098 -1.040 0.299 0.717 1.394
Constant 5.496 1.120 4.908 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.195
R-square adjusted 0.158
Root MSE 0.586
AIC -255.612
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
 
 
Cook’s distance :0.340 < 0.5 
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Figure 7.17: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
including private practice) [Model 1]  (all health workers, N=250)  
 
Modified White test result 
R-square   Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.000  -0.004  0.73688  0.031  0.859 
 
The p-value, 0.859, was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary Nurses  
None of the three models, Model 1 to 3 applied to cases in primary nurses, gave coefficients 
with statistical significance (Table 7.19, 7.23, 7.27). Also the three models did not obtain the 
F-value with the statistical significance (p < 0.05). Inclusion of private practice income in the 
income regressed as the dependent variable seemed to bring about these results, since the 
private practice incomes have variances as seen in the result of descriptive statistical 
analyses (Table 7-1-1, 7-1-3). The means were lower in CODs than in MODs.  
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Table 7.19: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 1] (Primary nurses, N = 117) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.130 0.167 0.783 0.435 0.003 329.235
Age Squared -0.002 0.002 -0.869 0.387 0.003 327.949
Male 0.098 0.190 0.514 0.608 0.642 1.559
COD 0.160 0.141 1.127 0.262 0.782 1.278
Married -0.088 0.279 -0.316 0.752 0.641 1.561
Economic Status* -0.108 0.185 -0.583 0.561 0.773 1.294
Constant 4.750 3.756 1.265 0.209
Prob. >F 0.503
R-square 0.046
R-square adjusted -0.006
Root MSE 0.676
AIC -85.000
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
3) Secondary Nurses  
Similar to the results of regression of primary nurse cases, none of the three models gave 
coefficients with statistical significance (Table 7.20). Also, the three models did not obtain 
the F-value with statistical significance. Inclusion of private practice income in this income 
seemed to bring about these results. 
 
Table 7.20: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 1] (Secondary nurses, N = 64) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.073 0.096 0.759 0.451 0.011 90.253
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.859 0.394 0.012 84.968
Male 0.106 0.301 0.352 0.726 0.777 1.287
COD 0.246 0.185 1.334 0.187 0.760 1.316
Married 0.309 0.365 0.845 0.402 0.527 1.898
Economic Status* -0.075 0.175 -0.427 0.671 0.732 1.366
Constant 5.771 1.841 3.135 0.003
Prob. >F 0.567
R-square 0.079
R-square adjusted -0.018
Root MSE 0.569
AIC -65.568
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
4) Midwives 
In the cases in midwives, the higher income in CODs was clearly indicated. As seen in Table 
7.21, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) income from health 
work including private in CODs was on average 50.3% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable 
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midwife’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health 
work including private practice of a midwife in CODs was on average 65.4% (p < 0.01) 
above the income of a comparable midwife in MODs. The coefficient for the variable was 
only one variable which were statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.21). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.18). This feature disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases. The bimodality was tested as to COD as the main 
factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. Considering 
this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, hetroscadesticity is not seen (Figure 
7.18).  
  
 
Table 7.21. : Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 1] ( Midwives, N = 61) 
Coefficient Standad Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.050 0.079 -0.633 0.529 0.009 115.699
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.443 0.659 0.009 115.676
COD 0.503 0.142 3.546 0.001 *** 0.696 1.437
Married -0.027 0.143 -0.190 0.850 0.665 1.503
Economic Status* -0.062 0.141 -0.439 0.662 0.632 1.583
Constant 8.140 1.641 4.960 0.000
Prob. >F 0.001
R-square 0.324
R-square adjusted 0.262
Root MSE 0.428
AIC -97.763
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
Cook’s distance: 0.293 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.18: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
including private practice) [Model 1]  (midwives, N = 61)  
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The modified White result 
R-square   Adjusted R-square S. E.  F-value  P-value  
0.034  0.018  0.2556  2.070  0.156 
 
The p-value, 0.156 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model.  
(2) Group A Model 2 
1) All health workers 
This Group A Model 2 did not include Economic Status but include Prohibition dual practice 
Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low (Table 7.22). As seen in Table 7.22, in this model, 
controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) income from health work including 
private practice in CODs was on average 24.5% (p < 0.1) higher than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health 
work including private practice of a health worker in CODs was on average 27.8% (p < 
0.1%) above the income of a comparable health worker in MODs. However, the coefficient 
of the variable for COD was not statistically significant (p > 0.05) (Table 7.22). 
 
As seen in Table 7.22, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s 
(Ln) income from health work including private was on average 39.9% (p <0.01) lower than 
a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of 
a primary midwife was on average 49.0% (p < 0.01) below the income of a comparable 
primary nurse’s income. Controlling for all other variables, a doctor’s (Ln) income from 
health work including private was on average 82.6% (p <0.05) lower than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income (Table 7.22). After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of 
a doctor was on average 128.4% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable primary 
nurse’s income. These coefficients for variables for primary midwives and doctors were only 
two statistically significant variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.18). However, it is noted that the 
number of doctor cases is small (N=3). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.19). The features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases (Figure 7.19).  
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Table 7.22: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 2] (All health workers N = 250) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.150 0.108 1.389 0.166 0.621 1.610
Primary MW -0.399 0.141 -2.829 0.005 ** 0.488 2.050
Secondary MW 0.147 0.181 0.814 0.416 0.629 1.590
Assistant Doctor -0.185 0.283 -0.655 0.513 0.880 1.136
Doctor 0.826 0.348 2.374 0.018 ** 0.960 1.041
Age 0.091 0.053 1.700 0.090 * 0.008 124.928
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.859 0.064 * 0.008 122.998
Male 0.087 0.134 0.649 0.517 0.333 3.000
Married 0.003 0.126 0.021 0.983 0.704 1.419
COD 0.245 0.137 1.792 0.074 * 0.315 3.178
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.105 0.105 1.004 0.316 0.634 1.577
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.012 0.147 0.082 0.935 0.257 3.884
Constant 5.388 1.133 4.757 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.195
R-square adjusted 0.154
Root MSE 0.587
AIC -253.619
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
Cook’s distance 0.216 
 
The plot of the residual appeared to have homoscedasticity (Figure 7. 19).  
 
 
Figure 7.19: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
including private practice) [Model 2] (All health workers N = 250) 
 
The modified White result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.000   -0.004  0.73676 0.025  0.874 
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The p-value, 0.874, was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary Nurses 
3) Secondary Nurses  
4) Midwives  
 
Model 2 applied to cases in primary and secondary nurses and midwives failed to obtain the 
statistical significance for F-value for the model equation and for all coefficients of variables in 
the regressions failed to obtain. Results of the regressions are shown only in tables below.  
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Table 7.23 : Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 2] ( Primary nurses, N = 117) 
 
Coefficient Stdandar Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.123 0.169 0.727 0.469 0.003 336.368
Age Squared -0.002 0.002 -0.807 0.421 0.003 336.052
Male 0.085 0.195 0.436 0.663 0.614 1.630
Married -0.083 0.281 -0.297 0.767 0.639 1.566
COD 0.202 0.197 1.021 0.310 0.405 2.469
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.134 0.205 0.656 0.513 0.636 1.573
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.070 0.228 0.307 0.760 0.318 3.147
Constant 4.735 3.754 1.261 0.210
Prob. >F 0.612
R-square 0.047
R-square adjusted -0.014
Root MSE 0.678
AIC -83.101
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Table 7.24 : Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 2] (Secondary nurses, N = 64) 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.067 0.098 0.681 0.498 0.011 94.203
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.774 0.442 0.011 89.003
Male 0.093 0.307 0.305 0.762 0.760 1.316
Married 0.331 0.377 0.878 0.384 0.502 1.994
COD 0.310 0.298 1.040 0.303 0.296 3.374
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.089 0.185 0.485 0.630 0.669 1.495
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.082 0.299 0.273 0.786 0.256 3.912
Constant 5.712 1.885 3.031 0.004
Prob. >F 0.677
R-square 0.080
R-square adjusted -0.035
Root MSE 0.574
AIC -63.653
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
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Table 7.25: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 2] ( Midwives, N = 61) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.049 0.079 -0.618 0.539 0.009 115.762
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.430 0.669 0.009 115.727
Married -0.041 0.147 -0.276 0.783 0.641 1.561
COD 0.364 0.330 1.102 0.275 0.131 7.652
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.049 0.145 0.338 0.737 0.609 1.643
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** -0.157 0.333 -0.470 0.640 0.122 8.213
Constant 8.223 1.700 4.838 0.000
Prob. >F 0.001
R-square 0.327
R-square adjusted 0.252
Root MSE 0.431
AIC -96.012
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
 (3) Group B Model 3 
1) All health workers 
This Group A Model 2 did not include Economic Status but include Prohibition dual practice 
Mid and prohibition dual practice Low (Table 7.26). As seen in Table 7.26, in this model, 
controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) income from health work including 
private in Peareang was on average 28.3% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from 
health work including private practice of a health worker in Peareang was on average 32.7% 
(p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchaly Mea. However, the 
coefficient of the variable for COD was not statistically significant (p > 0.05) (Table 7.26). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) income from health work including 
private in Preah Sdach was on average 30.1% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from 
health work including private practice of a health worker in Peareang was on average 35.1% 
(p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchaly Mea. However, the 
coefficient of the variable for COD was not statistically significant (p > 0.05) (Table 7.26). 
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Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) income from health work including 
private in Kirivong 38.9% (p < 0.01) was higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) 
income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from health work 
including private practice of a health worker in Peareang was on average 47.6% (p < 0.01) 
above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchaly Mea. However, the coefficient 
of the variable for COD was not statistically significant (p > 0.05) (Table 7.22). 
 
Coefficients for these three variables were three of 5 variables with statistical significance. 
However, the higher incomes in these three individual CODs were inconsistent with the 
result of descriptive statistics, if the mean incomes were compared between the three CODs 
and Kamchay Mea (the reference variable). This inconsistency might be attributable to the 
data structure of the income in Kamchay Mea. The Kamchay Mea income had high value of 
the standard deviance compared to the mean. In contrast, the median in the three CODs were 
higher than Kamchay Mea (Table 7-1-1), and this was consistent with the regression result, 
i.e., higher incomes in CODs than MODs.  
  
 
As seen in Table 7.26, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a primary midwife’s 
(Ln) income from health work including private was on average 41.8% (p < 0.01) lower than 
a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of 
a primary midwife was on average 34.6% (p < 0.01) below the income of a comparable 
primary midwife’s income. Controlling for all other variables, a doctor’s (Ln) income from 
health work including private was on average 87.3% (p < 0.05) lower than a comparable 
primary nurse’s (Ln) income. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a doctor was 
on average139.4% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable primary nurse’s income. 
These coefficients for variables for primary midwives and doctors were statistically 
significant variables (p < 0.05) (Table 7.26). However, it is noted that the number of doctor 
cases is small (N=3). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.20). The features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases or outliers (Figure 7.20) which were still not 
extreme according to the statistics for Cook’ s distance (Table 7.26)  
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Table 7.26 : Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 3] (All health workers, N = 250) 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.165 0.109 1.513 0.132 0.607 1.646
Primary MW -0.418 0.142 -2.936 0.004 *** 0.478 2.093
Secondary MW 0.140 0.181 0.775 0.439 0.628 1.592
Assistant Doctor -0.163 0.284 -0.573 0.567 0.874 1.144
Doctor 0.873 0.351 2.483 0.014 ** 0.942 1.062
Age 0.087 0.053 1.629 0.105 0.008 125.549
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.773 0.078 * 0.008 123.865
Male 0.068 0.135 0.502 0.616 0.326 3.066
Married 0.009 0.126 0.071 0.943 0.702 1.423
Mesang 0.120 0.127 0.948 0.344 0.616 1.624
Peareng 0.283 0.112 2.534 0.012 ** 0.582 1.718
Preah Sdach 0.301 0.149 2.020 0.044 ** 0.717 1.394
Kirivong 0.389 0.112 3.457 0.001 *** 0.551 1.815
Constant 5.414 1.135 4.772 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.198
R-square adjusted 0.154
Root MSE 0.587
AIC -252.569
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
Cook’s distance : 0.208 < 0.5  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.20: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
including private practice) [Model 3] (All health workers N = 250) 
 
The modified White test result 
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R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.000   -0.004  0.74257 0.03  0.955 
 
The p-value, 0.955, was significant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
 
2) Primary nurses  
3) Secondary nurses 
Model 3 applied to cases of primary and secondary nurses failed to obtain statistical 
significance to its F-value as well as coefficients of all variables entered, as seen below 
(Table 7.27, 7.28 ).  
 
Table 7.27 : Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 3] ( Primary nurses, N = 117) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.099 0.170 0.584 0.561 0.003 341.840
Age Squared -0.001 0.002 -0.651 0.516 0.003 342.453
Male 0.044 0.199 0.219 0.827 0.591 1.692
Married -0.080 0.280 -0.285 0.776 0.639 1.566
Mesang 0.209 0.192 1.091 0.278 0.619 1.616
Peareng 0.220 0.187 1.177 0.242 0.670 1.492
Preah Sdach 0.312 0.222 1.408 0.162 0.675 1.480
Kirivong 0.359 0.200 1.796 0.075 * 0.668 1.497
Constant 5.215 3.795 1.374 0.172
Prob. >F 0.582
R-square 0.058
R-square adjusted -0.012
Root MSE 0.678
AIC -82.383
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
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Table 7.28: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 3] (Secondary nurses, N = 64) 
 
4) Midwives  
As seen in Table 7.29, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) 
income from health work including private in Peareang was on average 50.5% (p < 0.05) 
higher than a comparable midwife’s (Ln) income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the 
coefficient, the income from health work including private practice of a midwife in Peareang 
was on average 65.7% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable midwife in Kamchay 
Mea. The coefficient for the variable was one of the two variables which were statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.29). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) income from health work including 
private in Kirivong was on average 55.5% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable midwife’s 
(Ln) income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating, the coefficient, the income from health 
work including private practice of a midwife in Kirivong was on average 74.2% (p < 0.01) 
above the income of a comparable midwife in MODs. The coefficient for the variable was 
statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
 
The plot of the residuals shows bimodal features (Figure 7.21). These features disagreed with 
the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate heteroscedasticity. This is 
possibly due to the small number of cases. The bimodality was tested as to COD as the main 
factor which caused the bimodality. The test confirmed COD as the main factor. Considering 
this test result, if the plot points are seen in each group, hetroscadesticity is not seen (Figure 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.066 0.099 0.669 0.506 0.011 94.227
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -0.760 0.450 0.011 89.035
Male 0.093 0.309 0.301 0.765 0.760 1.316
Married 0.332 0.380 0.872 0.387 0.502 1.994
Mesang 0.150 0.331 0.454 0.651 0.815 1.227
Peareng 0.263 0.213 1.235 0.222 0.535 1.868
Preah Sdach 0.345 0.310 1.113 0.270 0.752 1.329
Kirivong 0.353 0.218 1.617 0.112 0.486 2.059
Constant 5.771 1.932 2.987 0.004
Prob. >F 0.754
R-square 0.083
R-square adjusted -0.050
Root MSE 0.578
AIC -61.893
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
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7.21).  
 
 
Table 7.29: Result of regressions of (Ln) income from health work including private 
practice [Model 3] (Midwives, N = 61) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.047 0.081 -0.587 0.560 0.008 118.618
Age Squared 0.000 0.001 0.402 0.689 0.008 118.876
Married -0.041 0.148 -0.278 0.782 0.639 1.564
Mesang -0.023 0.210 -0.112 0.912 0.445 2.248
Peareng 0.505 0.200 2.529 0.014 ** 0.402 2.487
Preah Sdach 0.349 0.359 0.972 0.336 0.761 1.314
Kirivong 0.555 0.191 2.904 0.005 *** 0.357 2.801
Constant 8.054 1.691 4.763 0.000
Prob. >F 0.003
R-square 0.327
R-square adjusted 0.238
Root MSE 0.435
AIC -94.027
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance: 0.246 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln income from health work 
including private practice) [Model 2] (Midwives, N = 61)   
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The modified White test result  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.036   0.019  0.25302  2.192  0.144 
 
The p-value, 0.144 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homocedasticity in the model.  
 
 
7.3.3. Total household income  
The total household income in CODs was hypothesised to be increased by the payments 
associate with the contracting settings, thus, it was likely to be higher than in MODs. In 
relation to the total income the proportion of these payments was hypothesised to be high. 
Hypotheses of independent variables were described in Chapter 4.  
 
Prior to multivariate regressions, using the logged total household income, univariate 
regressions applying each independent variable were undertaken in order to test the 
R-squares for the variables, other statistics including p-value for the model (Table 7.30). The 
variables for household size (HHSize) was excluded from the equation. 
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Table 7.30: Results of univariate regression of (Ln) total income of households of health 
(All health workers, N = 250) 
 
 
 (1) Group A Model 1 
1) All health workers  
As seen in Table 7.31 in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) 
total household income in CODs was on average 29.2% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable 
health worker’s (Ln) total household income. After exponetiating, the coefficient, the income 
of a health worker in CODs was on average 33.9% (p < 0.05) above the income of a 
comparable health worker in MODs. The coefficient of the variable for COD was the only 
variable with statistical significance (p > 0.05) (Table 7.31). The higher income in CODs was 
consistent with the result of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-2). 
 
Plotting of residuals did not indicate heterocedasticity (Figure 7. 22). This feature was 
consistent with the result of the modified White test. In the plot, the outliers were checked by 
the statistics of Cook’s distance and found not to be extreme (Table 7.31). 
  
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square S.E. Sig.(model) 
Cadre 0.323 0.104 0.086 0.723 0.000
Male 0.216 0.046 0.043 0.740 0.001
Married 0.197 0.039 0.035 0.743 0.002
COD 0.179 0.032 0.028 0.746 0.004
5ODs 0.178 0.032 0.016 0.750 0.094
Prohibition of Private 
Practice 0.152 0.023 0.015 0.751 0.056
Age 0.119 0.014 0.010 0.753 0.060
Age, Age Squ 0.137 0.019 0.011 0.752 0.097
Economic Status 0.084 0.007 0.003 0.755 0.185
Household size 0.042 0.002 -0.002 0.757 0.510
S.E. :Standard Error of the Estimate
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Table 7.31 : Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 1] (All health 
worker, N = 250) 
Coefficients Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.227 0.128 1.766 0.079 * 0.639 1.566
Primary MW -0.308 0.170 -1.814 0.071 * 0.488 2.049
Secondary MW 0.171 0.218 0.784 0.434 0.630 1.587
Assistant Doctor -0.323 0.340 -0.950 0.343 0.882 1.133
Doctor 0.648 0.418 1.551 0.122 0.967 1.034
Age 0.109 0.064 1.711 0.088 * 0.008 123.960
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.801 0.073 * 0.008 121.753
Male 0.138 0.158 0.875 0.383 0.347 2.881
Married 0.156 0.151 1.037 0.301 0.716 1.397
COD 0.292 0.107 2.731 0.007 *** 0.747 1.338
Economic Status* -0.037 0.119 -0.315 0.753 0.717 1.394
Constant 5.023 1.352 3.715 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.164
R-square adjusted 0.126
Root MSE 0.707
AIC 12.000
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance: 0.340 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.22: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household income) 
[Model 1]  (All health workers, N=250) 
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The modified White test result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.001   -0.003  1.00124 0.303  0.583 
 
The p-value, 0.583, was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary Nurses  
3) Secondary Nurses  
 
Similarly to the regressions of the health work income including private practice income, all 
three models: Model 1 to 3 in cases in primary and secondary nurses failed to obtain the 
statistical significance for F-value of the equation and the coefficients of variable entered 
(Table 7.32 to 7.33). Because the results were without statistical significance, the results of 
regressions were shown only in tables. However, a noticeable point was that a result of 
regression and that of descriptive statistical analysis of the total household income of 
secondary nurses disagreed. As note in Table 7.33, a health worker’s (Ln) total household 
income was 31.0% (p> 0.1) higher than a comparable health worker’s (LN) income in MODs, 
controlling for all other variables. However, the mean income was lower in CODs than in 
MODs (Table 7-1-1).  
 
Table 7.32: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 1] (Primary 
nurses, N = 117) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.225 0.196 1.147 0.254 0.003 329.235
Age Squared -0.003 0.002 -1.219 0.226 0.003 327.949
Male 0.120 0.224 0.537 0.592 0.642 1.559
COD 0.233 0.167 1.397 0.165 0.782 1.278
Married 0.105 0.329 0.318 0.751 0.641 1.561
Economic Status* -0.037 0.218 -0.169 0.866 0.773 1.294
Constant 2.588 4.431 0.584 0.560
Prob. >F 0.395
R-square 0.054
R-square adjusted 0.003
Root MSE 0.797
AIC -46.338
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
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Table 7.33:  Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 1] (Secondary 
nurses, N = 64) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.150 0.124 1.212 0.231 0.011 90.253
Age Squared -0.002 0.001 -1.164 0.249 0.012 84.968
Male 0.367 0.390 0.942 0.350 0.777 1.287
COD 0.225 0.240 0.941 0.351 0.760 1.316
Married 0.032 0.474 0.067 0.947 0.527 1.898
Economic Status* -0.132 0.227 -0.579 0.565 0.732 1.366
Constant 4.328 2.387 1.813 0.075
Prob. >F 0.626
R-square 0.071
R-square adjusted -0.026
Root MSE 0.738
AIC -32.277
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
4) Midwives  
This model excluded the dummy variables for cadre and for females. As seen in Table 7.34 
in this model, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) total household income in 
CODs was on average 61.4% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable midwife’s (Ln) total 
household income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the total household income 
of a midwife in CODs was on average 84.8% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable 
midwife in MODs. The coefficient for the variable was only one variable which was 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) in this model (Table 7.34). 
 
Plotting of residuals presented approximate homoscedasticity (Figure 7.23). This feature was 
consistent with the result of the modified White test below which did not indicate 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 7.34: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 1] (Midwives, N 
= 61) 
Coefficient Std. Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.118 0.085 -1.387 0.171 0.009 115.699
Age Squared 0.001 0.001 1.223 0.227 0.009 115.676
COD 0.614 0.154 3.985 0.000 *** 0.696 1.437
Married 0.190 0.156 1.222 0.227 0.665 1.503
Economic Status* 0.153 0.153 0.996 0.324 0.632 1.583
Constant 9.417 1.783 5.283 0.000
Prob. > F 0.000
R-square 0.340
R-square adjusted 0.280
Root MSE 0.465
AIC -87.666
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
 
 
 
Cook’s distance: 0.150 < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.23: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household income ) 
[Model 1] (midwives, N = 61) 
 
The modified White test result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.002   -0.015  0.27574 0.128  0.712 
 
The p-value, 0.712 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
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(2) Group A Model 2 
1) All health workers 
In this model as shown in Table 7.35, no coefficients were statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) total household income in CODs 
was on average 20.5% (p > 0.1) higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) total 
household income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the total household income 
of a heath worker in CODs was on average 22.8% (p < 0.01) above the income of a 
comparable a heath worker in MODs (Table 7.35).  
 
Table 7. 35: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 2] (All health 
workers, N = 250) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.212 0.130 1.625 0.105 0.621 1.610
Primary MW -0.309 0.170 -1.820 0.070 * 0.488 2.050
Secondary MW 0.177 0.218 0.811 0.418 0.629 1.590
Assistant Doctor -0.334 0.341 -0.979 0.328 0.880 1.136
Doctor 0.624 0.420 1.487 0.138 0.960 1.041
Age 0.113 0.064 1.763 0.079 * 0.008 124.928
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.860 0.064 * 0.008 122.998
Male 0.160 0.161 0.994 0.321 0.333 3.000
Married 0.143 0.152 0.941 0.348 0.704 1.419
COD 0.205 0.165 1.245 0.214 0.315 3.178
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.008 0.126 0.061 0.951 0.634 1.577
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** -0.122 0.177 -0.690 0.491 0.257 3.884
Constant 5.037 1.366 3.686 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.166
R-square adjusted 0.124
Root MSE 0.708
AIC -159.875
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
2) Primary nurses  
3) Secondary Nurses  
 
All three models: Model 1 to 3 in cases in primary and secondary nurses, failed to obtain 
statistical significance for F-value of the equation and the coefficients of the variable entered 
(Table 7.36, 7.37). Because of the results without the statistical significance, the results of 
regressions were only shown in tables. If noticeable points were found, they are described.  
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A noticeable point was that a result of regression and that of descriptive statistical analysis of 
the total household income of secondary nurses disagreed. As note in Table 7.37, a secondary 
worker’s (Ln) total household income in CODs was higher than a comparable secondary 
nurse’s (LN) income in MODs, controlling for all other variables. However, the mean 
income was lower in CODs than in MODs (Table 7-1-2).  
 
Table 7.36: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 2] (Primary 
nurses, N = 117) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.244 0.199 1.225 0.223 0.003 336.368
Age Squared -0.003 0.002 -1.299 0.197 0.003 336.052
Male 0.151 0.230 0.657 0.513 0.614 1.630
Married 0.093 0.331 0.280 0.780 0.639 1.566
COD 0.130 0.233 0.560 0.576 0.405 2.469
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** -0.028 0.241 -0.115 0.908 0.636 1.573
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** -0.171 0.268 -0.637 0.526 0.318 3.147
Constant 2.325 4.423 0.526 0.600
Prob. >F 0.467
R-square 0.058
R-square adjusted -0.003
Root MSE 0.799
AIC -44.773
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Table 7.37: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 2] (Secondary 
nurses, N = 64) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.147 0.128 1.154 0.253 0.011 94.203
Age Squared -0.002 0.002 -1.104 0.274 0.011 89.003
Male 0.361 0.398 0.908 0.368 0.760 1.316
Married 0.043 0.490 0.088 0.930 0.502 1.994
COD 0.258 0.387 0.666 0.508 0.296 3.374
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** 0.139 0.240 0.580 0.564 0.669 1.495
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** 0.041 0.388 0.107 0.915 0.256 3.912
Constant 4.204 2.446 1.719 0.091
Prob. >F 0.739
R-square 0.072
R-square adjusted -0.044
Root MSE 0.745
AIC -30.290
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
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4) Midwives  
No coefficients were statistically significant in this model. However, As seen in Table 7.38, 
in this model, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) income total household 
income in CODs was on average 37.2% (p > 0.1) higher than a comparable midwife’ (Ln) 
total household income in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a 
midwife in CODs was on average 45.1 % (p> 0.1) above the income of a comparable 
midwife in MODs (Table 7.38). 
 
Table 7.38 : Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 2] (Midwives, N 
= 61) 
Coefficient Std. Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.117 0.086 -1.364 0.178 0.009 115.762
Age Squared 0.001 0.001 1.202 0.235 0.009 115.727
Married 0.167 0.159 1.048 0.299 0.641 1.561
COD 0.372 0.357 1.042 0.302 0.131 7.652
Prohibition dual
practice Mid** -0.175 0.157 -1.118 0.269 0.609 1.643
Prohibition dual
practice Low*** -0.272 0.361 -0.753 0.455 0.122 8.213
Constant 9.821 1.840 5.336 0.000
Prob. > F 0.001
R-square 0.347
R-square adjusted 0.274
Root MSE 0.467
AIC -86.303
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
 
(3) Group B Model 3 
1) All health workers 
As seen in Table 7.39 in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) 
total household income in Peareang was on average 37.1% (p < 0.01) higher than a 
comparable health worker’s (Ln) total household income in Kamchay Mea. After 
exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a health worker in Peareang was on average 
44.9% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchaly Mea. The 
coefficient was one of the two variable with statistical significance (p > 0.05) (Table 7.39). 
This higher income in Peareang was consistent with the result of descriptive statistical 
analyses (Table 7-1-3). 
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Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) total household income in Kirivong 
was on average 37.9% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) total 
household income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income from 
health work including private practice of a health worker in Kirivong was on average 46.1% 
(p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable health worker in Kamchaly Mea. 
 
The higher income in Kirivong was not consistent with the result of descriptive statistical 
analyses (Table 7-1-3). 
 
The plot of the residual appeared not to show heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.24). This feature 
was consistent with the result of modified White test below which did indicated 
hetroscedasticity. Outlier cases in the plot were not extreme according to the statistics of 
Cook’s distance (Table 7.39). 
 
Table 7.39: Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 3] (All health 
workers, N = 250) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Secondary NS 0.225 0.132 1.707 0.089 * 0.607 1.646
Primary MW -0.326 0.172 -1.898 0.059 * 0.478 2.093
Secondary MW 0.171 0.219 0.782 0.435 0.628 1.592
Assistant Doctor -0.314 0.343 -0.918 0.360 0.874 1.144
Doctor 0.665 0.424 1.567 0.118 0.942 1.062
Age 0.110 0.065 1.709 0.089 * 0.008 125.549
Age Squared -0.001 0.001 -1.794 0.074 * 0.008 123.865
Male 0.144 0.163 0.881 0.379 0.326 3.066
Married 0.149 0.152 0.975 0.331 0.702 1.423
Mesang 0.105 0.153 0.684 0.495 0.616 1.624
Peareng 0.371 0.135 2.753 0.006 *** 0.582 1.718
Preah Sdach 0.254 0.180 1.413 0.159 0.717 1.394
Kirivong 0.379 0.136 2.793 0.006 *** 0.551 1.815
Constant 4.926 1.370 3.597 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square 0.167
R-square adjusted 0.122
Root MSE 0.709
AIC -158.370
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance: 0.193 < 0.5 
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Figure 7.24: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household income ) 
[Model 3]  (All health workers, N=250) 
 
Modified White test result   
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value  
0.001   -0.003  1.00112 0.358  0.550 
 
The p-value, 0.550 was insignificant (p> 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is no heteroscedasticity in the model. 
2) Primary nurses 
3) Secondary Nurses  
This regression model in cases in both primary nurses and secondary nurses failed to obtain 
statistical significance (p < 0.05) for their F-values and coefficients.  
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Table 7.40 : Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 3] (Primary 
nurses, N = 117) 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.221 0.201 1.100 0.274 0.003 341.840
Age Squared -0.003 0.002 -1.164 0.247 0.003 342.453
Male 0.111 0.235 0.472 0.638 0.591 1.692
Married 0.096 0.331 0.290 0.772 0.639 1.566
Mesang 0.202 0.226 0.895 0.373 0.619 1.616
Peareng 0.386 0.220 1.754 0.082 * 0.670 1.492
Preah Sdach 0.238 0.262 0.907 0.366 0.675 1.480
Kirivong 0.363 0.236 1.540 0.127 0.668 1.497
Constant 2.552 4.478 0.570 0.570
Prob. >F 0.491
R-square 0.065
R-square adjusted -0.004
Root MSE 0.800
AIC -43.637
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Table 7.41 : Result of regressions of total household income [Model 3] (Secondary nurses, 
N = 64) 
 
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age 0.147 0.129 1.142 0.258 0.011 94.227
Age Squared -0.002 0.002 -1.093 0.279 0.011 89.035
Male 0.361 0.401 0.900 0.372 0.760 1.316
Married 0.043 0.494 0.088 0.930 0.502 1.994
Mesang 0.035 0.430 0.082 0.935 0.815 1.227
Peareng 0.224 0.277 0.810 0.421 0.535 1.868
Preah Sdach 0.266 0.403 0.659 0.512 0.752 1.329
Kirivong 0.363 0.284 1.281 0.206 0.486 2.059
Constant 4.241 2.512 1.688 0.097
Prob. >F 0.827
R-square 0.072
R-square adjusted -0.063
Root MSE 0.751
AIC -28.298
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
4) Midwives 
As seen in Table 7.42, controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) total household 
income in Peareang was on average 64.8% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable midwife’s 
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(Ln) total household income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
income from health work including private practice of a midwife’s in Peareang was on 
average 91.8% (p < 0.01) above the income of a comparable midwife’s in Kamchaly Mea.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a midwife’s (Ln) total household income in Kirivong was 
on average 47.3% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable midwife’s (Ln) total household 
income in Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the income of a midwife’s in 
Kirivong was on average 60.48% (p < 0.05) above the income of a comparable midwife’s in 
Kamchaly Mea (Table 7.42). This higher income in Peareang was consistent with the result 
of descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-3). 
 
This higher income in Peareang and Kirivong were consistent with the result of descriptive 
statistical analyses (Table 7-1-3).These two coefficients were only two coefficients which 
obtained with statistical significance (p > 0.05) (Table 7.42). 
 
The plot of the residual appeared not to show heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.25). This feature 
was consistent with the result of modified White test below which did not indicated 
hetroscedasticity. Outlier cases in the plot were not extreme according to the statistics of 
Cook’s distance (Table 7.42). 
 
Table 7.42 : Result of regressions of (Ln) total household income [Model 3] ( Midwives, 
N = 61) 
 
 
The Cook’s distance: 0.484 < 0.5 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t P > t Tolerance VIF
Age -0.117 0.088 -1.340 0.186 0.008 118.618
Age Squared 0.001 0.001 1.180 0.243 0.008 118.876
Married 0.167 0.161 1.039 0.304 0.639 1.564
Mesang 0.007 0.228 0.033 0.974 0.445 2.248
Peareng 0.648 0.216 2.996 0.004 *** 0.402 2.487
Preah Sdach 0.377 0.389 0.970 0.337 0.761 1.314
Kirivong 0.473 0.207 2.287 0.026 ** 0.357 2.801
Constant 9.553 1.831 5.217 0.000
Prob. > F 0.001
R-square 0.347
R-square adjusted 0.261
Root MSE 0.471
AIC -84.304
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
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Figure 7.25: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household income ) 
[Model 3]  (midwives, N = 61 (Model 3)  
 
The modified White test result 
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E. F-value  P-value 
 0.002   -0.015  0.27366 0.115  0.736 
 
The p-value, 0.736 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected ; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
 
(4) Conclusion for results of income regressions 
The regressions of the incomes of health workers and their households showed that these 
incomes were higher in CODs than in MODs with statistical significance in most of the 
models. The higher incomes were supported by sufficient percentage differences from the 
incomes in MODs. This confirms the high impact of payment associated with the contracting 
settings, implying that the higher income in the government sector in CODs raised the 
income from health work including private practice and the total household income. 
 
The variable, COD, obtained positive coefficients with statistical significance in most 
regression models of these different types of income. The variables for three individual 
Operational Districts: Peareang, Preah Sdach and Kirivong, compared with Kamchay Mea, 
an MOD, again obtained higher positive coefficients, with statistical significance, in most of 
the regression models of different types of income. Regressions of the cases for all health 
workers presented reasonably strong evidence for the higher income. Regressions of the 
cases by cadre also presented reasonably convincing evidence, with regressions of midwife 
cases resulting in strong evidence. These findings were consistent with results from 
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descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-1 to 7-1-4). 
7.3.4 Total household expenditure  
(1) Group A Model 1  
Prior to multivariate regressions, using the logged total household expenditure, univariate 
regressions applying each independent variable were undertaken in order to test the 
R-squares for the variables, other statistics including p-value for the model (Table 7.43) and 
p-value of the independent variable. Each row of the table shows the regression result. 
Checking by the criteria noted in Chapter 4 (4.3.3 (8) d), it was found that a regression with 
Economic Status obtained p-value of 0.308. However, it was kept as an independent variable, 
due to the importance to the theoretical hypothesis concerning the contribution to the total 
household expenditure (Table 7.43). 
 
Table 7.43 Result of univariate regressions of (Ln) total household expenditure with 
variables in order from the highest R-square 
 
 
 
 
 
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square S.E. Sig.(model) 
Household size 0.320 0.103 0.099 0.434 0.000
COD 0.181 0.033 0.029 0.459 0.004
Male 0.170 0.029 0.025 0.460 0.070
Cadre 0.210 0.044 0.025 0.490 0.049
Age 0.113 0.013 0.009 0.464 0.075
5ODs 0.183 0.033 0.018 0.463 0.079
Married 0.179 0.032 0.028 0.460 0.005
Prohibition of Private 
Practice 0.143 0.021 0.006 0.463 0.077
Economic Status 0.065 0.040 0.0002 0.124
Age, Age Squ 0.190 0.036 0.003 0.460 0.308
S.E. :Standard Error of the Estimate
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As seen in Table 7.44, controlling for all other variables, a health work’s (Ln) total household 
expenditure in CODs was on average 18.6% (p < 0.01) higher than a comparable health 
work’s (Ln) total household expenditure in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
expenditure of a health work in CODs was on average 20.4% (p < 0.01) above the 
expenditure of a comparable health work in MODs.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s one-year increase in age resulted in a 
9.8% (p <0.05) increase in (Ln) total household expenditure than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) total household expenditure. After exponetiating the coefficient, one-year 
increase in age raised the household expenditure on average by 10.3% (p <0.05) above the 
expenditure total household expenditure in the health worker’s previous age.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a one person increase in the membership of a household 
of a health worker brought about 8.0% (p < 0.01) higher (Ln) total household expenditure. 
After exponetiating the coefficient, a one person increase in the membership of a household 
of a health worker brought about 8.3.% (p < 0.01) higher total household expenditure. 
 
The plot of the residual appeared not to show heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.25). This feature 
was consistent with the result of modified White test below which did not indicated 
hetroscedasticity. Outlier cases in the plot were not extreme according to the statistics of 
Cook’s (Cook’s distance: 0.204 < 0.5). 
(2) Group A Model 2  
As seen in Table 7.45, controlling for all other variables, a health work’s (Ln) total household 
expenditure in CODs was on average 16.6% (p < 0.1) higher than a comparable health 
work’s (Ln) total household expenditure in MODs. After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
expenditure of a health work in CODs was on average 18.1% (p < 0.1) above the expenditure 
of a comparable health work in MODs.  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s one-year increase in age resulted in a 
9.9% (p < 0.05) increase in (Ln) total household expenditure than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) total household expenditure. After exponetiating the coefficient, one-year 
increase in age raised the household expenditure on average by 10.4% (p < 0.05). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a one person increase in the membership of a household 
of a health worker brought about 8.0% (p < 0.01) higher (Ln) total household expenditure. 
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After exponetiating the coefficient, a one person increase in the membership health worker 
brought about 8.3.% (p < 0.01) higher total household expenditure. 
 
The plot of the residual appeared not to show heteroscedasticity (Figure 7.26). This feature 
was consistent with the result of modified White test below which did not indicated 
hetroscedasticity. Outlier cases in the plot were not extreme according to the statistics of 
Cook’s (Cook’s distance: 0.191 < 0.5).
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Table 7.44: Result of regression analyses of     Table 7.45: Result of regression analyses of 
(Ln) total household expenditure (Group A Model 1)     (Ln) total household expenditure (Group A Model 2) 
 
Model 1: Cook’s distance 0.204 < 0.5.     Model 2 Cook’s distance 0.191 < 0.5 
VIF :Variation-inflaton factors, an indicator of multicollinearity used commonly (Ensor et al. 2009)
Group A Model 1 Group A Model 2
B S. E. Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF B S. E. Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF
HHSize 0.080 0.020 0.254 4.068 0.000 0.843 1.187 0.080 0.020 0.254 4.061 0.000 0.843 1.187
Secondary NS 0.168 0.077 0.157 2.189 0.030 0.637 1.569 0.164 0.078 0.154 2.111 0.036 0.620 1.613
Primary MWs 0.097 0.102 0.078 0.951 0.343 0.485 2.063 0.096 0.102 0.078 0.945 0.345 0.485 2.064
Secondary MW 0.167 0.130 0.093 1.286 0.200 0.630 1.588 0.169 0.130 0.094 1.293 0.197 0.629 1.591
Assit. Doctro -0.328 0.203 -0.099 -1.612 0.108 0.878 1.139 -0.330 0.204 -.099 -1.619 0.107 0.876 1.141
Doctor 0.347 0.250 0.081 1.389 0.166 0.961 1.040 0.342 0.251 0.080 1.360 0.175 0.955 1.047
Age 0.098 0.039 1.635 2.525 0.012 0.008 127.623 0.099 0.039 1.650 2.534 0.012 0.008 128.578
AgeSqu -0.001 0.000 -1.528 -2.389 0.018 0.008 124.512 -0.001 0.000 -1.545 -2.399 0.017 0.008 125.744
Male 0.157 0.095 0.163 1.656 0.099 0.340 2.938 0.162 0.097 0.168 1.673 0.096 0.327 3.056
Married .074 .090 .056 .818 .414 0.708 1.413 0.071 0.091 0.053 0.777 0.438 0.697 1.435
COD 0.186 0.064 0.194 2.924 0.004 0.747 1.338 0.166 0.098 0.173 1.692 0.092 0.315 3.178
Economic status 
< Kirivong  -0.015 0.071 -0.014 -0.208 0.836 0.713 1.403 - - - - - - -
ProhibitionDPMid - - - - - - - 0.008 0.076 0.008 0.105 0.916 0.631 1.585
ProhibitionDPMO
H - - - - - - - -0.028 0.105 -0.030 -0.266 0.791 0.257
3.884
(Constant) 5.176 0.809 6.401 0.000 5.173 0.818 6.322 0.000
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.221 0.222
Adjusted R-
squared 0.182
0.179
Root MSE 0.422 0.422
AIC -419.143 -417.218
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Heterocedasticity in the model 1 was checked by the plotting (Figure 7.26 ). This plot also 
appeared to indicate homoscedasticity.  
 
 
Figure 7.26: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household 
expenditure ) [Model 1](All health workers, N=250) 
 
Result of modified White test  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value P-value  
0.030  -0.001   0.25968  0.870 0.352 
 
The p-value, 0.352 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
 
Heterocedasticity in the model 2 was checked by the plotting (Figure 7.27). The plot 
appeared to show homoscedasticity.  
 
 
Figure 7.27: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household 
expenditure ) [Model 2](All health workers, N=250) 
 
Result of modified White test  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E.   F-value  P-value  
0.003  -0.001   0.26133   0.852   0.357 
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The p-value, 0.357 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was not rejected; there is homoscedasticity in the model. 
(3) Group B Model 3  
As seen in Table 7.46, in this model, controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s 
(Ln) total household expenditure in Kirivong was on average 19.7% (p < 0.05) higher than a 
comparable health worker’s (Ln) the expenditure in Kamchay Mea (the variable for 
Kamchay Mea was the reference variable). After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
expenditure of a health worker in Kirivong was on average 21.8% (p < 0.05) above the 
expenditure of a comparable health worker in Kamchay Mea  
 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s (Ln) expenditure in Peareang was on 
average 18.9% (p < 0.05) higher than a comparable health worker’s (Ln) expenditure in 
Kamchay Mea. After exponetiating the coefficient, the expenditure of a health worker in 
Peareang was on average 20.8% (p < 0.05) above expenditure comparable health worker in 
Kamchay Mea. 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a secondary nurse’s (Ln) expenditure was 16.3% (p < 
0.01) was higher than a comparable primary nurse’s (Ln) expenditure (the variable for 
primary nurse was the reference variable). After exponetiating the coefficient, the 
expenditure of a secondary nurse was on average 17.7% (p < 0.01) above the expendiuturee 
of a comparable primary nurse. 
 
The higher expenditures were consistent with the result of the descriptive statistical analysis 
about the means of expenditures in these Operational Districts, despite that the orders from 
the highest about the percentage differences and about the means. However, the order of 
these percentage differences was different from the order of the mean which was from the 
highest to lowest (Table 7-1-4). 
 
Controlling for all other variables, a health worker’s one-year increase in age resulted in a 
9.8% (p <0.05) increase in (Ln) total household expenditure than a comparable health 
worker’s (Ln) total household expenditure. After exponetiating the coefficient, one-year 
increase in age raised the household expenditure on average by 10.3% (p <0.05) above the 
expenditure total household expenditure in the health worker’s previous age.  
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Controlling for all other variables, a one person increase in the membership of a household 
of a health worker brought about 8.0% (p < 0.01) higher (Ln) total household expenditure. 
After exponetiating the coefficient, a one person increase in the membership of a household 
of a health worker brought about 8.3.% (p < 0.01) higher total household expenditure. 
 
Table 7.46: Result of regression analysis of (Ln)total household expenditure Result of 
regressions of total household income [Model 3] (All health workers, N = 250) 
 
Coefficient S. E.
S. 
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
HHSize 0.080 0.020 0.254 4.036 0.000 *** 0.839 1.191
Secondary NS 0.163 0.079 0.152 2.062 0.040 ** 0.606 1.650
Primary MW 0.098 0.103 0.080 0.953 0.342 0.474 2.110
Secondary MW 0.169 0.131 0.094 1.295 0.197 0.628 1.593
Ass.Doctor -0.332 0.205 -0.100 -1.621 0.106 0.870 1.150
Doctor 0.337 0.254 0.079 1.324 0.187 0.935 1.069
Mesang -0.012 0.091 -0.010 -0.134 0.894 0.613 1.630
Peareang 0.189 0.080 0.178 2.353 0.019 ** 0.581 1.720
Preah Sdach 0.161 0.107 0.102 1.497 0.136 0.717 1.395
Kirivong 0.197 0.081 0.189 2.432 0.016 ** 0.550 1.817
Age 0.099 0.039 1.657 2.531 0.012 ** 0.008 129.401
AgeSqu -0.001 0.000 -1.553 -2.396 0.017 ** 0.008 126.816
Male 0.164 0.098 0.170 1.670 0.096 * 0.319 3.130
Married 0.070 0.091 0.053 0.768 0.443 0.695 1.438
(Constant) 5.143 0.821 6.263 0.000
Prob. >F 0.000
R-square .222
R-square adjusted .175
Root MSE .222
AIC -415.237
*p <0.1
**p<0.05
***p < 0.01  
 
Cook’s distance 0.177 
 
The higher total household expenditures in the thress CODs were highly likely to have been 
associated with the contracting settings; the magnitude of the payments associated with the 
contractings seemed to contribute to the higher expenditure. The result of descriptive 
statistical analysis strongly supports the high magnitude.  
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Heterocedasticity in the model was checked by the plotting (Figure 7.28 ). The plot appeared 
to show homoscedasticity.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.28: Scatter plot of residuals (dependent variable: Ln Total household 
expenditure ) [Model 3](All health workers, N=250) 
 
Result of modified White test  
R-square  Adjusted R-square  S. E.  F-value   P-value  
0.003  -0.001   0.26114  0.868   0.352 
 
The p-value, 0.352 was insignificant (p > 0.05), therefore, the H0, the null assumption 
hypothesis was accepted; there is no heterocedasticity in the model. 
 
(4) Conclusion for results of expenditure regressions 
The regressions of the total household expenditures additionally confirm the higher 
expenditure of health workers’ households in CODs. The higher expenditure was likely to 
have been brought about by the payments associated with the contracting settings. The 
higher expenditures were consistent with the higher means of expenditure in CODs than in 
MODs in the results of descriptive statistical analyses.  
7.4 Conclusion  
The result of regression analyses above confirms higher incomes and total household 
expenditures in CODs as a group (Modle 1 and 2) or the three individual CODs (Model 3), 
compared with MODs as a group or Kamchay mea, an MOD, used as the reference variable 
(the summary is shown in Table7.47-1, -2). The higher incomes were highly likely to have 
been brought about by the contracting payments associated with the contracting settings. The 
magnitude of the payments associated with the contracting settings, which was reflected in 
the coefficients of variables, seems to be reasonably high.  
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The result of descriptive statistical analysis (Chpater 6 and Table 7-1-1 to 7-1-4) strongly 
supports the high magnitude. Therefore, it is concluded that payments associated with the 
contracting settings were highly likely to have contributed to increasing the incomes. Also, 
the higher incomes in CODs suggested increases in labour supply in the government sector 
and brought about labour transfer from the private sector to the government sector. 
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Table 7.47-1  Summary of regression analyses for variables expressing CODs and individual CODs
1
Cases
Variable for CODs COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
Group A Model 1
 (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.01) ***
Group A Model 2
 (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.01) ***  (P < 0.05) ***
Variable for individual CODs
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Group B Model 3
All (P < 0.01) *** All (P < 0.01) *** All (P < 0.01) ***
PG (P < 0.01),  PS (P < 
0.05), KV (P < 0.01),
***
2
Cases
Variable for CODs COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
Group A Model 1
 (P < 0.01) ***  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.01) ***
Group A Model 2
 (P < 0.1) ***  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1) ***
Variable for individual CODs
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Group B Model 3 PG (P < 0.05), PS (P < 
0.05) ,KV (P < 0.01), 
***
PG (P > 0.1), PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P < 0.1)
 (P > 0.1) All (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)
PG (P < 0.05), PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P < 0.01)
***
Income from health work excluding private 
practicce
Income from health work including private practice 
All workers Primary nurses Secondary  nurses Midwives 
All workers Primary nurses Secondary  nurses Midwives 
Cases: All N=250, Primary nurses N=117, Secondary nurses  N=64, Midwives =61. Group B Model 3: All = Peareng, Prea Sdach, and Krivong Operational 
Districts PG: Peareng, PS: Prea Sdach,  KV: Krivong
***P < 0.01, ** P <0.05, * P<0.1
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Table 7.47-2  Summary of regression analyses 
3
Cases
Variable for individual CODs COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
COD 
Equation's 
F-value 
Group A Model 1
 (P < 0.01) ***  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P < 0.01) ***
Group A Model 2
 (P > 0.1) ***  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1) ***
Variable for individual CODs
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation's 
F-value 
Group B Model 3 PG (P < 0.01), PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P < 0.01)
***
PG (P < 0.1),  PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P > 0.1)
 (P > 0.1) All (P > 0.1)  (P > 0.1)
PG(P < 0.01), PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P < 0.05)
***
4
Cases
Variable for individual CODs COD 
Equation'
s F-value 
Group A Model 1
 (P < 0.01) ***
Group A Model 2
 (P < 0.1) ***
Variable for individual CODs
Peareng, Preah Sdach, 
Krivong
Equation'
s F-value 
Group B Model 3 PG (P < 0.05), PS (P > 
0.1), KV (P < 0.05)
***
Total household income 
Total household Expenditure 
Cases: All N=250, Primary nurses N=117, Secondary nurses  N=64, Midwives =61. Group B Model 3: All = Peareng, Prea Sdach, and Krivong Operational 
Districts PG: Peareng, PS: Prea Sdach,  KV: Krivong
***P < 0.01, ** P <0.05, * P<0.1
All workers Primary nurses Secondary  nurses Midwives 
All workers
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Chapter 8 Discussion   
8.1 Introduction  
First this chapter discusses the qualitative evidence concerning dual practice before 
implementation of the payments associated with the contracting setting. This qualitative 
evidence supports the prevalence of dual practice before the implementation of payments, 
compensating for the lack of base-line data of income from the private practice in this study. 
Second,  
the evidence for a potential reduction in dual practice income in the intervention areas is 
assessed. In the third section, the intervention areas and varying effects are discussed.  
The section focuses more exclusively on the effect on secondary nurses in different CODs, 
and illuminates more generally the implementation at the subcontractor level. The final 
section focuses on the methodological contribution of the mixed methods approach and 
finishes with a brief review of the Theory of Change.  
 
The discussion draws on the findings arising from the mixed-methods of this study which 
applied a sequential design (Creswell et.al 2011b; Bryman 2006), beginning with a 
qualitative investigation of key informants with experience of the contracting project, such as 
the NGO Contract managers. The qualitative interviews highlighted the extent of the private 
practice engaged by government health workers and the different institutional rules and 
mechanisms developed by contractors to prohibit the practice, and the allocation of 
performance-related payments in each of the three districts. This was followed by a 
quantitative household survey of 250 government health worker households, which 
described and compared government health workers’ and their household incomes and 
expenditures between CODs and MODs and among the five Operational Districts. A 
mini-survey was also undertaken to investigate the payment allocation methods at the 
subcontractor level that contributed to the varying incentive environments at the micro-level. 
Then, the regression analyses which followed descriptive statistical analyses of household 
survey data contributed to exploring the impact of payments associated with the contracting 
settings. 
8.2 Dual practice before implementation of payments 
It was earlier noted that, increasingly, performance-based payments have been included as 
part of the contracting out of government health services in LMICs and post-conflict fragile 
states (Carlson et al. 2005) The main argument for their promotion by donor agencies and 
International Finance Institutions, such as the World Bank, was their perceived potential to 
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increase service delivery by changing the incentive environment in local health systems.  
The main difficulties which affected health service delivery in this environment were 
identified as: 
1) The public sector characteristics of incentive and institutional arrangements (Belsey and 
Ghatak 2003; Soch and Beek 2011), including low government salaries (Soeters and 
Griffiths 2003), appeared to influence the effect of payments. 
2) Pervasive dual practice private practice income had significant implications for the 
effectiveness of service delivery (Soeter and Griffiths 2003; Akashi et al. 2002), but  
3) Regulating dual practice was facing persistent difficulties (González 2004).  
 
Low government regular payments in both CODs and MODs found by this study were in 
accord with the findings of the MOH incentive study (1995), and it was widely recognised 
by the NGO contractors that reducing the private practice of health workers would be 
difficult in this environment. However, what remained unclear was whether the 
performance-based payments would offer a sufficient impact on the health workers’ 
individual and household incomes that would reduce their participation in dual practice 
while increasing their labour supply to public service delivery; this is discussed in the next 
section (8.3). One of the difficulties in determining this in the current study was the extent 
and degree of private practice pursued by the health workers surveyed. With an absence of 
base-line data, the study relied on the evidence from the qualitative interviews for  the 
prevalence of private practice.  
 
Key informant interviews indicated that private practice was routinely practiced by the 
government health workers, who themselves did not perceive any wrongdoing, with 
workshops provided at the start of the project explaining why:  
   
“… dual practice is still conducted. They (health workers) do not understand what sorts of 
practices are regarded as private practice. …They do not understand private practice 
conducted by their family is wrong.” (KI01, 17 March 2006) 
 
“…we had workshops for making them understand, and that it included prohibition of 
private practice” (KI02, Jul.9, 2007)  
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Key informants’ perceptions about dual practice also suggested the high prevalence and even 
the necessity for dual practice: “They (health workers working for Operational Districts 
contracted out) need time to go to outside (their health facility for private practice), get 
outside for feeding their family.” (KI 11, August 4, 2006).  
One NGO Contractor acknowledged the importance of private practice income to the health 
workers and their dependence on alternative sources income, given the fact that the level of 
performance-based payments might fluctuate:  
 
“(We do not prohibit private practice completely), because payments to them are 
performance-related payments, the amount of salaries are not assured all time, so that 
alternative income resources to sustain a certain level of income is necessary (KI04, 22 Apr. 
2005). 
 
At the beginning of the DFID/World Bank contracting project in 2004, it would also be 
reasonable to assume that dual practice was widely recognised as prevalent and negatively 
affecting health service delivery interventions in CODs and MODs. This was because in 
Cambodia, at that time, the negative consequences from dual practice by health workers 
were widely acknowledged and highly prevalent (MOH 2005; SRC 2006). The contract 
agreements for the DFID/World Bank contracting project included a requirement that the 
health workers’ abstain from private practice (MOH 2001). The need to prohibit, or at least 
regulate, dual practice was therefore acknowledged at the beginning of the contracts in the 
three COD districts. 
 
Prohibition rules with enhanced monitoring (De Tella and Savedoff 2001) were introduced 
by the NGO Contractors (Chapter 5, 5.3) and might have been effective in the reduction of 
dual practice. The probability of detection may have influenced a health worker’s decision 
not to conduct dual practice (De Tella and Savedoff 2001). NGO Contractors in two CODs 
(HNI in Peareang and SRC in Kirivong Operational Districts) strengthened the existing 
MOH prohibition rules and all three contractors enhanced their monitoring of dual practice 
(Chapter 5). RHAC in Prea Sdach Operational District, did not introduce their own rule but 
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applied the MOH’s, which were the most lenient prohibition rules among the three NGO 
Contractors: “if it (the MOH rule) is followed strictly, it is sufficient.”(KI02, 22 Aug 2007).  
 
Differences in the strengths of prohibition among the three NGO Contractors may reflect 
their perspectives of health workers’ dual practice, income from private practice, and income 
from the government. Consequently, it could be inferred that health workers’ incidence of or 
income from private practice might, to some extent, have been framed by the NGO 
Contractors’ reflections on these factors and inclusion in their incentive design. Their 
incidents of or income from private practice did not appear to respond directly and 
exclusively to the differences in the level of the contractors’ prohibition rules. However, it is 
noted that evidence from descriptive statistical analyses (Table 7-1-3) showed health workers 
in all CODs had reduced dual practice. The evidence for this was shown in their lower 
incomes from private practice than in MODs.  
 
In Preah Sdach Operational District, which was under RHAC’s management and where the 
prohibition rule was the most lenientt, the mean income from private practice was the lowest 
among the three CODs, with a participation rate among the health workers of less than 10%, 
the middle range among the three CODs. However, In Kirivong Operational District, while 
the prohibition rule was the middle strength, the mean income was the highest,  with a 
participation rate above 40%. In Peareang Operational District, also, the level of prohibition 
did not correspond with the outcome (Table 7.2, Table 7-1-1). However, it is noted that other 
factors may also have affected the level of income.  
 
RHAC also appeared to make more explicit efforts to ensure a certain level of government 
sector income to the health workers including the performance-based payments associated 
with contracting, acknowledging that government regular payments were below their living 
cost, as seen in some other LMICs (Ensor and Witter 2001). RHAC’s approach seemed, in 
part, to affect health workers’ labour supply. RHAC, at the beginning of implementation, 
engaged in negotiations with the health workers regarding a liveable wage:   
“(s)ince government salaries were low. …negotiations (with health workers were held) 
…(about) what constitute(d) a liveable wage …(and payment) that was agreeable (with 
them)s” (KI02, 22 August 2007). 
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In Preah Sdach Operational District, the health workers income from the government sector 
was the highest among the three CODs (Table 7-1-1). 
Interestingly, the mini-survey, which investigated payment allocation methods at the 
subcontractor level, found that some subcontractors imposed a penalty on health workers’ 
conducting dual practice, in addition to those already imposed by the NGO Contractors 
(Chapter 5. 5.3). This action again suggests the prevailence of dual practice at some early 
stage of the implementation and that health workers’ were being regulated in order to reduce 
dual practice. 
8.3 The importance of the perforamence based payment  
8.3.1 Changes in labour supply in CODs after the contracting project  
Based on a synthesis of the findings, this study argues that the health workers’ higher income 
in CODs than MODs has been achieved by the payments associated with contracting settings, 
raising the income from government sources to almost equivalent level of private practice 
income earned in MODs. The main supporting quantitative evidence for the above 
arguments follows: 
 
1) The payments associated with the contracting settings reached around 60% of the income 
from health work excluding private practice and 40% of their household income among 
health workers in CODs. This raised the income to a comparable level with the private 
practice income of health worker in MODs. These proportions were achieved despite that 
fact the health workers had different income sources (Table 6.2).   
 
2) The results from the regression analyses indicated a reasonably high magnitude of the 
Operational District status as CODs with statistical significance on increase in incomes 
compared with MODs. The results also showed that the particular effect seemed to be more 
important than the effects of other factors concerning the districts and the health workers. 
The factors were also hypothesized to be potentially influential before the test, and included 
the economic status of districts and the levels of prohibition of dual practice in them and the 
health workers’ cadres, taking demographic attributes into account (Tables in Chapter 7 after 
7.5 and summary tables: Table 7-47-1. -2). 
 
Further, based on the synthesis of the quantitative (Chapter 6, 7) and qualitative evidence 
(Chapter 5 and above), a reduction in dual practice by the COD health workers can be 
tentatively argued. The quantitative evidence showed that income from private practice was 
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much lower in CODs than in MODs, and sometimes none in some cadres in CODs, while in 
others the incidence was also much lower and, again, none in some cadres in some CODs 
(Table 7.2). Proportional declines in private practice income were also found. Income from 
private practice was noticeably more substantial in the two MOD districts, and contributed 
significantly to total household income (Tables 7-1-1, 7-1-2, 7-2). 
 
The following evidence further strengthens this tentative argument. During the household 
survey of this study in July 2007, dual practice was observed less in CODs than in MODs by 
the surveyors
22
, suggesting the possible reduction of dual practice in CODs. A decrease in 
dual practice was also established in a study by Jacobs et al. (2010) in Kirivong Operational 
District. In this Operational District, from 2005 to 2006, the percentage of deliveries at 
government health facilities increased from 39% to 59% of the total number of deliveries in 
the catchment area of the health facilities. Jacobs et.al (2010) argued that this showed that 
the midwives’ private practice had decreased: they supported more than half of the deliveries 
at the government facilities. 
 
In the qualitative study, health workers in CODs were found to complain about the economic 
difficulty caused by the prohibition of dual practice .In this example, the complainant 
focused on the complete prohibition of dual practice - including the pharmacy business of a 
family member - in Peareang Operational District, the COD with the strictest prohibition rule 
(Chapter 5, 5.3). “Health workers here are complaining.  Not only their private practice, but 
also their family’s business was prohibited… wives (of health workers) can not run 
pharmacy, can not earn income… (we have) economic difficulties.” (KI09, June 20 2007). 
 
Health workers’ complaints about the stringent prohibition were also found in the 
mini-survey about subcontractors’ payment allocation methods.  
 
What these complaints may indicate is that health workers’ were reluctantly reducing or 
stopping dual practice. However, despite some evidence of such reductions, the NGO 
Contractors appeared to perceive persistence in health workers’ dual practice in Peareang and 
                                                     
22
 The surveyors claimed, at debriefing meetings during the fieldwork, and it was recorded in a report 
(Abe 2007): “(I)nterviewing in the OD not contracted out (MODs) was not easy because some of them 
(health workers) did not come to work when the survey team visited HCs (Health Centres) even when 
they were on duty. Private practice by GHWs (government health workers) was more active in the 
afternoon…”. 
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Kirivong Operational Districts.  
“We intensified monitoring on their private practice. …, but it was difficult to stop it.” (KI05, 
June 19, 2007 ) 
 
The prohibition rules seem to reflect the perspectives and judgements about dual practice 
being conducted in their Operational Districts of the NGO Contractors, whose own values or 
missions or work ethics  represent a difference between the NGO and the government 
sectors (Lewis 2001). The NGO Contractors’ perspective may be associated with the notion 
that NGOs are more effective at health service delivery than the government organisation 
(Gilson et al 1997; Strong et al. 2005; Eichler et al. 2009). They, as the principal, may be 
stricter on the agent’s cheating than the public sector. However, NGO contractors were still 
surrounded by the complex public sector incentive environment (Balsey and Ghatak 2003), 
with the result that their prohibiting dual practice often seemed to be frustrated by the 
discretionary decisions (Mathauer and Carrin 2010) taken by the Provincial Health 
Department (PHD) found in the key informant interviews (Chapter 5): 
 
“It is difficult to stop their private practice, because PHD does not punish the health workers, 
though we requested punishment,” (KI04 March 17th 2006). 
 
The labour supply transfer in the three CODs, which are tentatively argued, were found to 
differ by Operational District, by cadres, and cadres by Operational District, given that 
income from private practice in all CODs was much lower than MODs (Table 7-1-1) and as 
noted in relation to the level of prohibition rules above (8.2). The income from the 
government sector also differed by the same tabulation, but with a less degree.  
8.3.2 Secondary nurses’ benefit influenced by different policy implementation 
by NGO Contractors 
An interesting finding from the mixed methods approach was that differences in the 
contracting policy implementation by the three NGO Contractors appeared to benefit the 
incomes of various cadre groups in CODs in different ways. However, as noted in Chapter 5, 
the principles of the implementation of each NGO contractor were similar, e.g., making the 
performance-based payments connected to quantitative indicators and primarily based on 
health workers’ cadre and positions in the MOH health system (Chapter 5)   
 
Secondary nurses in CODs, however, seemed to benefit less than primary nurses from the 
intervention, in terms of the coefficient for COD, the variable, in regressions of (Ln) income 
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from health work (excluding private practice) on the same set of independent variables 
(Model 1). The coefficient for COD was 0.710 for a secondary nurses in CODs but 0.773 for 
a primary nurses ( Table 7.7, 7.6).  
 
Effectiveness of financial incentives depends on the principal’s capability of designing the 
incentive with regard to fluctuations of the incentive payments. The agent wants to avert 
fluctuations of the incentive payment but accept to be paid the incentive payments. Therefore, 
the agent’s cost in accepting fluctuations needs to be responded to by the principal in the 
incentive design. (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Milgrom and Holmstrom 1991; Eichler et al. 
2009). NGO Contractors appeared to have variously incorporated the significance of costs 
into their incentive design, where the health workers needed to reduce income from private 
practice. It seemed that the NGO Contractors reflected, in the incentive design, their own 
perspective about the contracting-related payments, income from private practice and the 
balance between the contracted-related payments and private practice income.  
 
The three NGO Contractors’ bottom line appeared to be common. That was to pay “livable 
wages” (KI01, 23 April 2005) to all health workers in their Operational Districts. This 
seemed that they intended to reflect their idea about ensuring the level of total payments, 
regularly paid, at a level which enabled the health workers to live decently (Chapter 5) 
 
Qualitative evidence of this study (Chapter 5) showed that the lower benefit for secondary 
nurses might have been attributable to the NGO Contractors’ different incentive designs and 
implementation practices, including their prohibition of dual practice, in relation to the cost 
to the secondary nurses. 
 
The lower benefit of secondary nurses than of primary nurses might be explained by 
inferences about the mean income from the government sector including the 
contracting-related payments in secondary nurses in Kirivong Operational District. This was 
because the number of secondary nurses in Kirivong was nearly half the total number of 
secondary nurses, which were the largest group of this cardre in CODs (46.8%), and 34.4% 
of all secondary nurses, which may have contributed to the lower benefit. The Kirivong 
secondary nurses obtained the lowest mean among the three CODs: nearly 81% of Prea 
Sdach’s and 92% of Peareang’s mean (Table 7-1-3). The Kirivong cases were distributed 
mostly in lower income ranges among all COD secondary nurse cases (Table 7-1-3).  
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In contrast with the secondary nurses’ lower benefit, the payment guideline set by the NGO 
Contractors, including SRC in Kirivong Operational District, were highly likely to 
accommodate higher payments to secondary level health workers than the primary level 
(Chapter 5, 5.2.(3)), reflecting their perspectives about incentives within the incentive design 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  
 
The income differentiation by qualification level was distinct from the MOH payment 
schedule in which the two levels of health workers receive basically the same government 
regular payments (Chapter 6, Table 6.8). In the project implementation, actual payments to 
health workers were made by the subcontractor at the subcontractor facility. However, it is 
likely that the higher payment allocations to secondary nurses have been maintained at the 
subcontractor level payment allocations, since the evidence from the mini-survey of this 
study showed that cadre was a key criteria in allocating payments (Chapter 5, 5.2.(6)).  
 
Then, why was the mean income of Kirivong secondary nurses low? This might have been 
due to the incentive design by SRC. Differently from the other NGO Contractors, SRC 
formulated a payment schedule to individual health workers which was coordinated with the 
total payment to the subcontractors and SRC’s criteria for payment allocation for health 
workers (Chapter 5, 5.2.(3)). The low income may, in part, have been the outcome of the 
payment schedule and also, in part, have been associated with SRC’s concern about possible 
reductions of the income after the end of the contracting project. SRC restrained the payment 
to individual health workers in order to narrow income gaps between the payments to health 
workers during and after implementation of the contracting project, based on an assumption 
about problematic reductions in the payments after the end of project (SRC 2006). It would 
be difficult to hypothesise that the low income might have been largely attributable to low 
performance of the secondary nurses, given that the achievements of the performance 
objectives of implementation were evaluated highly (SRC 2006), and an investigation about 
the relationship between the incentive payments and health workers’ performance was out of 
the scope of this study. 
 
However, having an effective incentive design is often disturbed by the information 
asymmetry (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) in their designing process (Chapter 5). Interviews 
with RHAC’s manager indicated that the NGO seemed to carefully reflect, within the 
incentive design, the health workers’ preferences about their incentives (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). This seemed, in part, to be due to RHAC’s reduction of the information 
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asymmetry through significant negotiations with health workers about their preference, as 
noted in the previous section. In Preah Sdach, the secondary nurses’ mean was the highest 
among those in three CODs (Table 7-1-2).  
 
RHAC might have advantages in capturing the health workers’ preference about their 
payments. RHAC was one of the most established Cambodian NGOs in the health sector, 
having long-working experiences of large scale projects in cooperation with major bilateral 
donors. Therefore, they might have been particularly able to capture the health workers’ 
preferences. Their managers also included ex-managers of the MOH health system (Personal 
Observations) who had experience of the incentive environment in the government sector, 
which might have been a further advantage. 
 
The income from the government sector and from private practice were intricately correlated 
(Shishko and Rostker 1976). The lowest income from the government sector was received by 
the Kirivong secondary nurses (Table 7-1-3) among the three COD’s secondary nurses. We 
can infer from this level of income that the secondary nurses may still have been inclined to 
conduct dual practice (Shishko and Rostker 1976; Chernichovsky and Bayulken 1995), due 
to their interest in ensuring that the total income from health work was close to their 
preferred level.  
 
This inference was consistent with evidence of this study’s quantitative investigation. The 
Kirivong secondary nurses obtained the highest mean income from private practice among 
the secondary nurses in all three CODs (Table 7-1-3). In addition, the number of health 
workers in Kirivong Operational District who reported conducting dual practice was the 
highest rate among the three CODs (Table 7.2).  
 
However, it is important to bear in mind that it is possible that other factors in the incentive 
environment might have influenced the Kirivong secondary nurses’ income. For example, 
the weak enforcement measures for the prohibition by PHD discussed above might have 
invited their conducting dual practice. 
8.3.3 Midwives’ benefits brought by the payments associated with the 
contracting  
In contrast with the situation of secondary nurses, both primary and secondary midwives in 
the CODs, compared with midwives in MODs seemed to obtain a significant benefit from 
the payments associated with the contracting setting and other components of the 
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intervention. This can be seen in the high coefficients for the following variables: all CODs 
together, then each separately (Peareang, Prea Sdach and Kirivong), and in the regressions of 
the income from health work excluding private practice in midwife cases. The difference 
between COD and MOD in terms of the income of midwives was sufficiently high, assuming 
all other conditions were equal. The difference in income of midwives between each of the 
three CODs and Kamchay Mea, a MOD, was also sufficiently high (Table 7.8, 7.12, 7.16). 
These higher incomes were supported by results from the descriptive statistical analyses. In 
CODs, the mean of income from the health work (excluding private practice) was more than 
65% of the mean total household income. However, in MODs the mean income was only 
slightly higher than 50% (Chapter 6, Table 6.4) 
 
Another distinctive point concerning midwives’ benefit between CODs and MODs was a 
narrower income gap in government sector income between midwives and nurses in CODs 
than in MODs. Midwives’ incomes in the MODs were distinctively lower than that of 
nurses’, even though nurses still obtained higher income than midwives in CODs (Chapter 6, 
Table 6.4). In MODs, the secondary midwives’ mean income was lower even than primary 
nurses. Interestingly, the income gap in MODs (Table 6.4) appeared to disagree with the 
MOH payment scale (Chapter 3, Table 3.2) in which nearly all of the midwives and nurses 
surveyed seemed to belong to the same grade. Therefore, theoretically, income gap which 
occurred between midwives and nurses in MODs should be limited. 
 
Evidence from the Key informant interviews and the mini-survey support the narrower 
income gap. The sub-contractors and NGO Contractors appeared to put emphasis on a) 
health workers’ performance and b) differences in cadre including qualification level, as 
found by this study (Chapter 5). A subcontractors’ payment allocation method appeared to 
capture and encourage midwives’ high performance in order to achieve the subcontracting 
objectives. The specific method applied by a subcontractor appeared to increase midwives’ 
income, as they utilized an indicator independently from the NGO Contractor. The indicator 
evaluated the midwife’s performance more sensitively and thoroughly. It was concerned with 
whether more than 10 deliveries were supported at the health center. If more than 10 
deliveries were supported, the midwives at the health center received a bonus for it at the 
subcontractor-level payment allocation. This arrangement seemed to be an additional 
financial incentive to the midwives. This arrangement could be associated with institutional 
and organisational discretion (Mathauer and Carrin 2010). This type of special arrangement 
might have been implemented by other subcontractors; however, such a generalization would 
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require more supporting evidence.  
 
The secondary midwives’ high benefit (Table 6.4) may be explained straightforwardly by the 
NGO Contractors’ payment guidelines (Chapter 5). The guidelines differentiated payment by 
qualification level: primary or secondary (Chapter 5, Chapter 3, Table 3.2). This is confirmed 
by the evidence that in MODs, secondary midwives obtained a mean income with a limited 
difference from that of primary midwives (Table 6.4). However, as noted in Chapter 5, the 
payment allocation in the CODs was ultimately delivered by subcontractors at Health Centre 
level, making it difficult to identify the extent to which the payment guidelines of NGO 
contractors contributed to the narrower gap in CODs.  
 
While acknowledging these differences concerning the midwives’ income from health work 
in government sector between the CODs and MODs, it is difficult to explain the mechanism 
for the difference, particularly in relation to differences in implementation of the contracting 
by the three NGO Contractors. 
 
It was apparent, from the complete enumeration approach used in this study, that there was a 
shortage of midwives, particularly secondary midwives in both the CODs and MODs and the 
five individual Operational Districts surveyed (Table 7-1-1, 7-1-2). The shortage issue was 
supported by the evidence from the key informant interviews; for example, the interview 
about staffing in Preah Sdach Operational District highlighted the shortage issues in that 
district, “we have almost no midwives in our staff….Most of our staff is at the primary level” 
(KI02 July 24, 2006).  
 
The narrower midwife-nurse income gap in CODs might have been able to mitigate the 
secondary midwife shortage issues, if the outcome was able to be maintained without being 
affected by other factors. However, as noted in Chapter 2, retention of health workers is 
influenced not only by financial incentives but also by non-financial incentives 
(Willis-Shattuk et al. 2008).  
 
Compared with primary midwives, the income of secondary midwives and nurses might 
have been judged as disproportionally low, as noted in Chapter 3. This perception was heard 
frequently in the context of the pre-service education of midwives and was attributed to the 
shortage of secondary midwives (Personal Observation). The perception seemed to be 
generated by the fact that, in spite of longer term pre-service education for secondary 
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midwives than for primary midwives and even secondary nurses (Fujita 2009), the secondary 
midwives’ government salaries were very similar to primary midwives’ and nurses’ (Table 
3.2). The issue of lower income was recognised by the MOH as a contributing factor to the 
shortage of secondary midwives (Sherratt 2006) and was reflected in their policy during this 
study’s fieldwork. The increases in their incomes in CODs might have contributed to 
mitigating the serious shortage of midwives, particularly secondary midwives, in 
Cambodia’s rural areas (Chapter 3.3, Sherratt 2006). However, this argument still need 
further evidence. 
8.3.4 Emphasis on non-merit based payment allocation methods at the 
Subcontractor level 
The narrower difference between midwives and nurses in CODs discussed above was 
consistent with one of the common approaches to payment allocation which the mini-survey 
found at the subcontractor level. The approach appeared to ensure a certain explicit level of 
‘equality’ that was desired among the health workers (Chapter 5, 5.2.(6)). This is despite the 
observation that this approach seemed to be contradictory to the aim of the 
performance-based payments in the intervention (DFID/World Bank Contracting Project) 
area. Their approach appeared to show their preference for less or non-merit base payment to 
the performance-based payments which they felt would damage the teamwork among them 
(Chapter 5, 5.2.(6)), particularly with a limited number of health workers. A key informant 
commented: 
 
“Primary nurses, secondary nurses and primary midwives can be treated as one group, 
actual implementers of the contracting project one group. They… are working together at 
most of Health Centres, so that they understand their work, their feelings, and what they are 
doing other than their work at Heath Centres, including their private practice” (KI18, 
August 20, 2006). 
 
Taking the approach, which differed from the intention of the project, could be understood as 
institutional and organisational discretion (Matheaue and Carrin 2010). The finding of this 
approach, as well as some subcontractors’ taking different or even deviated payment 
allocation methods, was meaningful, offering yet another insight into the black box of the 
incentive environment (Chapter 8, 8.5). In the box, i.e., at the subcontractor level, the 
intended outcomes of the performance-based payment might have been altered or disturbed.  
 
However, the finding of this approach appeared to be significant within the context of this 
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study, because it suggested that the health workers’ might not accept merit-based incentives. 
Based on this, one can infer that, rather than performance-based payments, other types of 
financial incentives may be more acceptable. Whether or not alternatives would need to 
achieve a similar level of income increases is difficult to decide and is outside the scope of 
this study.  
8.4 Methodological contribution to the literature  
The key informant interviews contributed to a fuller understanding of the payment 
mechanisms associated with the contracting settings and the incentive environment. The 
NGO Contractor Managers elaborated the payment mechanism, institutional and 
organisational arrangements, including the discretionary decisions and related 
implementation rules by the NGO Contractors and the background information of the project 
implementation. Most of these findings were unstudied and/or largely undocumented. It was 
found that, while the NGO Contractors in the studied districts share common implementation 
policies and approaches in principle, there were differences in implementation. In particular, 
the discretionary institutional and organisational arrangements were found to be exercised 
implicitly but affected the implementation significantly. NGO Contractor managers’ 
perceptions about incentive designs and the prohibition rules of dual practice enabled an 
in-depth understanding of outcomes of the incentive payments.  
 
The household survey collected 250 cases from three CODs and two MODs and obtained 
health workers’ and their household incomes and expenditures with a high degree of 
accuracy by asking questions which reflected characteristics of their incomes from different 
sources and rural Cambodian life and livelihood in general. Therefore, comparisons of the 
incomes and expenditures between CODs and MODs and among other groups of cases gave 
convincing results. The comparisons presented strong evidence for the high impact of the 
payments associated with the contracting settings with statistical significance. The evidence 
from household survey also provided concrete and detailed variables and hypothesis for the 
regressions analyses. The complete enumeration approach of the survey successfully 
collected sufficient number of cases for the regression analyses.  
 
The regression analyses presented strong evidence that the payments associated with the 
contracting settings made the largest contribution to differences in income and expenditure, 
with statistical significance among the factors, i.e. the independent variables. The 
theoretically selected independent variables made it possible to demonstrate that the 
payments were much more influential than the economic status of Operational Districts and 
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the levels of prohibition of dual practice which were also hypothesised to influence the 
incomes and expenditures. The regressions conducted on cases grouped roughly into two: 
with both all health workers and health workers by cadre it was possible to confirm the large 
influence of payments. 
 
The mini-survey provided notable evidence which contributed to an in-depth understanding 
concerning the impact of payments associated with the contracting settings. The evidence 
enhanced the findings about the institutional arrangements for the payments and extended 
explanations about the income differences between CODs and MODs, as well as among 
cadres in each and between the two types of Operational Districts. The survey presented 
evidence that subcontractors applied discretionary payment methods which emphasised the 
concern to maintain an equal distribution of payments among health workers at the facility in 
their allocation, differently from the NGO Contractors’ payment approaches and in contrast 
to the purpose of performance-based payments (Chapter 5, 5.2. (6)). Thus the subcontractor 
payment methods might have influenced the actual payments, i.e., the outcome of the 
payments associated with the contracting settings, while other factors also might have 
influenced outcomes. 
 
As noted in several points above, mixed methods research contributed significantly to this 
study. The following describes the particularly important contributions, which were in 
accordance with Bryman’s rationale for the mixed method research (Chapter 4) (Bryman 
2012). First, the approach of this study presented new and important evidence which 
facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of performance based 
payments. The quantitative investigation: household survey and regression analyses provided 
strong evidence for the significant impact of the payments which resulted in higher incomes 
in health workers’ and their households in CODs than in MODs. The qualitative evidence 
compensated for the constraints of quantitative investigation, the non-experimental settings, 
i.e., absence of the baseline data. It also accommodated valuable insights into the impact of 
payments, payment mechanisms, and the complex incentive environment. The mixed 
methods research accommodated the triangulation of findings from both methods of 
investigation and raised the credibility of the findings within the context of a general 
shortage of literature.  
 
As noted in the section above, findings from the key informant interviews contributed to 
consecutive quantitative investigations: selecting variables and formulating questions in the 
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household survey; selecting variables for regression analyses. The insights obtained from the 
key informant interviews enabled a more comprehensive understanding of the evidence 
derived from the household survey and the regression analyses. It also extended and 
deepened the explanations about how and why the quantitative outcomes of payments were 
brought in. The mini-survey presented evidence which enhanced the understanding of 
payment mechanism by the key informant interview and contributed to the explanations of 
the quantitative outcomes of payments. Consequently, findings from the two methods were 
synthesized. 
 
The outcomes were the income differences, the labour supply changes, and the differences in 
benefits among the cadres. The qualitative evidence presented plausible explanations, not 
only about the contracting- payments’ strongest influence to but also significant influence by 
the payment mechanism at NGO and subcontractor levels and by the incentive designs 
formulated by the NGO Contractor. The assessment drew on the institutional processes and 
rules that were revealed through the key informant interviews. These plausible explanations 
were supported neither simply by figures nor abstract narratives, but by concrete quantitative 
evidence of the income differences. They were supported also by comprehensive and 
qualitative evidence of actual implementations and institutional settings. These findings are, 
therefore, particularly useful. 
8.5 Theory of change 
The theory of change (Chapter 2 Figure 2.1) developed for this study was effective and 
guided most of the factors, as well as changes brought by the factors and flows of 
consecutive changes toward the policy objectives of DFID/World Bank Project. However, 
retrospectively, the theory of change can be categorized as one that is framed by the 
top-down approach to policy implementation (Walker and Gilson 2004). It understands that 
policy implementation consists of rational plans, processes and control at the center level. 
Effective implementation is considered to be possible, upon the requirements of 
implementation being fulfilled. Failure of implementation is considered to be attributable to 
inadequate planning (Walker and Gilson 2004). The top-down approach seemed to be 
inconsistent with the evidence presented by this study. The evidence showed that factors, 
processes or changes, which may be seen as unexpected or irrational from the perspective of 
the top-down approach and this study’s theory of change, actually influenced the 
implementation and outcome of the contracting-related payments.  
 
Another approach to policy implementation, the bottom-up approach (Hjern & Porter 1981), 
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perceives that an understanding of systems and actors is necessary for the implementation 
and is important to the understanding of reasons for the failure of implementation. This 
approach might have been more suitable for framing the theory of change of this study, since 
an understanding of payment mechanisms and NGO contractors and subcontractors as 
implementers accommodated important insights into the impact of the incentive payments.  
 
Also, this approach regards discretionary practices by actors (Hjern & Porter 1981), such as 
those Lipsky calls Street-level Bureaucrats, significant to the policy outcome (Lipsky 1980; 
Walker and Gilson 2004). The factors, processes or changes in this study were influenced 
largely by the organisational and institutional discretion (Matheau and Carrins 2010) which 
seemed to include ‘Street-level Bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980). Noticeable discretions were 
applied to payment allocations at the subcontractor level and the implementation of 
enforcement measures of PHDs, and the different payment guidelines and payment schedules 
by NGO contractors.  
 
Importantly, this study illuminated a comprehensive depth of understanding of health 
workers’ preferences as a key factor in effective incentive design (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992). Discussion about the incomes of Kirivong secondary nurses was indicative of the 
significance of this factor. Their preference for the form of incentives was also found to be a 
significant factor in implementing the incentive payments. The outcome of their preference 
for non-merit based payment were discussed above. Therefore, health workers’ preference 
should be included in order to improve the current theory of change.  
8.6 Conclusion 
The payments associated with the contracting settings of the DFID/World Bank Contracting 
Project brought in sufficiently higher income to the health workers and their households in 
CODs than in MODs, raising their income received from the government sector. It was 
tentatively argued that health workers spent labour supply more in the government and less 
in the private sector in CODs compared with MODs, thus transferring their labour supply, 
i.e., decreases in dual practice in CODs. These tentative arguments were underpinned by the 
proportional changes in private practice income in relation to the total household income 
between CODs and MODs. 
 
From the qualitative evidence, it was found that, at the beginning of the implementation of 
DFID/World Bank Contracting Project, the health workers in CODs actively conducted dual 
practice. This evidence compensated, to some extent, for the lack of baseline sources of 
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income. Consequently, this evidence strengthened the above tentative argument for a 
reduction of private practice. It is noted that the reduction appeared to respond much more to 
the payments associated to the contracting than the differences in the strength of the 
prohibition rules. 
 
Mixed methods research provided interesting findings. Different levels of benefit from the 
contracting payment scheme among cadres seemed to be attributable to differences in the 
implementation by NGO Contractors. The differences, then, seemed to reflect their 
perceptions/perspectives about the importance of payments to the health workers and about 
health workers’ preference for the payments. The Kirivong secondary nurses, who seemed to 
benefit less, may fall within the spectrum of this explanation. It is noted however, that the 
payments to the health workers were highly likely to be exposed to sub-contractors 
discretions.  
 
The narrower income gap in the government sector income was found between midwives 
and nurses in CODs than in MODs. This might be attributed to institutional arrangements by 
the NGO Contractors and by subcontractors who exercised discretion. Subcontractors’ 
payment allocation methods were found to be more ‘egalitarian’, in that there was an 
emphasis on maintaining equal payments among health workers, in contrast to concept of the 
performance-based payments. This approach might have narrowed the income gap. Finally, 
but importantly, there were other factors in the incentive environment which might have 
influenced the health workers’ income. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion  
This chapter first presents both empirical and theoretical contributions to this study, followed 
by its limitations due to inherent causes and the study design. Next, policy recommendations 
based on the findings are presented. Finally, a proposal for possible future study based upon 
the current study is presented. 
9.1 Contribution of this study 
This study has explored the impact of performance-based payments on the government 
health workers’ incomes and their household incomes in contracting out government health 
services in rural Cambodia. Through findings from the exploration, this study contributes 
substantially to our comprehensive understanding of the impact of these payments, by 
articulating concretely the significance of the impact on the government health workers’ 
incomes and their household incomes and an understanding of the implementations of the 
payments by NGO contractors.  
 
A remarkable finding of this study was that the payments resulting from the DFID/World 
Bank Contracting Project had a significant impact on realising higher income in health 
workers’ in CODs than in MODs. Their higher incomes were achieved largely through these 
payments. The government sector income almost reached an equivalent level with that of 
private practice income earned in MODs. This study presented these findings with concrete 
quantitative evidence, as powerful evidence for the argument that the payments make a 
meaningful contribution.  
 
Theoretically also, this study contributed significantly, by revealing and elaborating the 
complex incentive environment and deepening the understanding of it. This environment was 
influenced by various factors such as the public sector characteristics, health workers’ dual 
practice, dual practice regulations, health workers’ having multiple income sources, and 
institutional and organisational discretions. Concerning these factors, theoretically significant 
findings were obtained about the influence of NGO contractors’ payment mechanisms 
including incentive design and other implementations. These factors had a large influence on 
the environment as well as the outcomes of financial incentives, sometimes unexpectedly. 
Different implementation practices among the contractors accommodated different levels of 
benefits to health workers by cadre; their incentive designs reflect their different views of the 
importance of the incentive payments and income from private practice. 
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However, the identified subcontractors’ discretionary payment allocation methods, i.e., the 
institutional and organisational discretions, also largely influence the actual payments to the 
health workers. They would sometimes override what NGO contractors intended and what 
the performance-based payments meant to achieve; the health workers’ preference for an 
equality of payments among them diluted the merit-based rationale for the payments. It is 
noted that the significance of the discretions concerning the incentive payment has received 
little attention in the literature about financial incentives to health workers in LMICs.  
9.2 Limitations of this study 
This section discusses limitations of this study, which are categorised as those which are 
inherent in the research environment or those which arose from the design of this study. 
 
A lack of relevant literature posed (Chapter 5) a huge barrier to obtaining sufficient 
background information as well as specific information relating to the DFID/World Bank 
contracting project and the selection of a study site. This required the investigator to collect 
background information and primary data and consume larger resources than planned. This 
problem also affected the formulation of key informant interview questions which could 
produce efficiently relevant replies. Consequently, the investigator needed to have multiple 
interviews with the same key informant. 
 
The lack of statistical data about economic development in each of the five Operational 
Districts was an issue, since the level of economic development was one of the selection 
criteria for matching them as study sites. Consequently, selection of the five Operational 
Districts used comprehensive socio-economic criteria which drew on the criteria widely used 
in studies and practice in rural development (Chambers 1997). After the selection, the 
commune-level poverty rates found in a poverty map (MOP and WFP, 2003) were applied to 
further investigate the levels. 
 
All of the key informants were those who spoke English and the interviews were conducted 
in English. Having only English speakers might have reduced ranges of experiences and 
perceptions heard in the interview. Inclusion of non-English speaker-informants would have 
solved this issue. However, hiring a fluent interpreter between English and Khmer who has 
sufficient working experiences in the health sector proved excessively expensive to this as a 
PhD study.  
 
This study applied SPSS, which was available in Queen Margaret University. The SPSS 
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default setting did not have some types of statistical tests such as Chow Test and the White 
Test which were not originally intended to be included in this study. These tests are available 
in the default setting of Stata and SAS. Conducting these tests by SPSS required the 
investigator to undertake additional work: extensively investigating the data and the test 
algorithms often on the internet or through personal consultations; finding and adjusting 
syntaxes to be used on SPSS. This extra work consumed a significant amount of time. 
Instead of SPSS, in future quantitative studies the investigator will use Stata, which 
accommodates more varieties of statistical tests in the default setting than SPSS. 
 
The design of this study - quasi-experimental cross sectional study with mixed methods - 
was affected by the lack of baseline data of different types of incomes, particularly the 
income from private practice. This was due to the timing of this study which was after the 
beginning of the DFID/World Bank Contracting Project. It was impossible to compare the 
incomes in CODs and MODs between ex-ante and ex-post of the project.  
 
Consequently, concretely identifying the degree of the impact of payments on changes in 
health workers’ labour supply between the government and private sector, before and after 
the implementation of the contracting project, was difficult. A reduction of dual practice 
could not be conclusively argued. The lack of available publicised and written information 
relating to the incomes in CODs and MODs was also unhelpful in reducing the weakness of 
the design. However, a merit of the mixed method study, the synthesization of results from 
quantitative and qualitative research in this study, compensated for these limitations by 
providing evidence for the prevalence of dual practice at the beginning of project 
implementation.  
 
A response to the limitation of a lack of baseline data could be the conducting of another 
qualitative investigation after the regression analyses, in support of the advantages of the 
mixed method approach and the sequential implementation (Bryman 2012; Creswell 2011a). 
This investigation would be expected to compensate for the lack of ex-ante data of income 
from private practice and deepen understanding of the impact of payments on changes in the 
labour supply as well as factors influencing the incentive environment.  
 
This investigation would employ key informant interviews which would be expected to 
confirm, through the informant's perceptions, the evidence for changes in labour supply 
presented in the current study. The interviews would also explore income differences brought 
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about by the implementation and the institutional and the organisational rules and 
discretionary practices of NGO Contractors and sub-contractors. These institutional and 
organisational elements were found by the current study to have had a significant influence 
on incentive payments, such as the payment allocation methods, at the subcontractor level. 
The income differences were found to be associated with health workers’ responses to the 
incentives, i.e., labour supply change, such as the case seen among Kirivong secondary 
nurses.  Informants should be mainly staff-level health workers in CODs but include the 
same NGO Contractor managers and managerial-level health workers in CODs who were 
key informants in the current study, since they have a good knowledge of institutional 
arrangements. The staff health workers are not likely to speak English. If so, the current 
study’s bias for the key informant selection based on their speaking English will be reduced.  
 
The current study’s complete enumeration approach collected a sufficient number of cases 
for the various regression models. It had the advantage of collecting data in developing 
countries where data for formulating a sampling framework are problematic and physical 
and resource constraints disturb data collection following the framework (Milligan and Njie 
2004). However, the cases collected by this approach had a bias in their number or became 
too small in number when they were divided by their attributes. Therefore, some regression 
models and matching of cases by health workers’ attributes were impossible (Chapter 6).  
 
This data bias and small number, may have been avoided by selecting other Operational 
Districts with a higher number of eligible health workers instead of the current CODs and 
MODs; however, it was impossible for the current study. The selection of CODs in this study, 
which largely influenced the selection of MODs, was greatly constrained by geographical, 
physical and other conditions.   
 
Before selecting the individual CODs, the two provinces (Prey Veng and Takeo Provinces) 
were selected as the provinces from which CODs, and subsequently MODs were selected 
from Prey Veng Province. The two provinces had advantages over the other five provinces 
where Operational Districts were contacted out. Most of these five provinces were scattered 
in the remote peripheral or border areas. The areas were suffering physical access problems 
from the capital, national border conflicts, other security problems, under-developed basic 
physical infrastructure, and problems concerning ethnic minorities (World Bank 2006, 2007; 
MOH2007b). Coping with these problems seemed to  be beyond the resources of a PhD 
 307 
 
study. These problems seemed also to present too great a challenge in recruiting surveyors 
for the household survey.  
 
Even Prey Veng and Takeo Provinces shared some of these problems, but to a lesser degree. 
Also, these two provinces were located side by side in the areas within about 250 Km of the 
capital, which accommodated the selection of three CODs with similar characteristics.  
 
Adding another Operational District as a MOD from either Prey Veng or Takeo Province 
may be thought to have been appropriate, since it would have been expected to reduce the 
problems in the collected data. However, it is important to bear in mind this addition would 
be possible only if the following conditions were fulfilled. This is because the current 
non-selected Operational Districts in these two provinces were once screened by the 
investigator with the criteria on the possibility of their becoming MODs, the controls 
(Chapter 4 and Appendix 5). This fact requires these Operational Districts to be much 
scrutinised, importantly in relation to on-going health projects there which are being 
supported by outside organisations such as NGOs. If there are on-going health projects, their 
financial and non-financial incentives to health workers and routine managerial support are 
to be quantified, clarified, and checked (Chapter 4 and Appendix 5), in order to concretely 
include their influence in the analyses. Distinguishing this influence is necessary to increase 
the suitability of the Operational Districts as a control, in the qusai-experimental 
cross-sectional study with mixed methods.  
 
Upon adding a new MOD, excluding some cadres from the data collection in all CODs and 
MODs is expected to reduce data bias in collected cases. The cadres to be excluded are those 
whose original membership was estimated as quite small within a rural health centre 
(Chapter 3). They are doctors and assistant doctors. 
 
In the mini-survey, the small number of surveyed subcontractors reduced the ability to 
generalie about the findings. The size of the survey was due to the late inclusion of a 
mini-survey in this study; only very limited remaining resources were available to the 
survey.  
 
The household survey asked a large number of detailed questions covering varieties of 
expenditures. They were able to collect accurate expenditures; however, retrospectively not 
all questions were necessary, considering the time span of the DFID/World Bank Project and 
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generally known tendency of Cambodian health workers’ way of living and non-health 
economic activities. Reducing the number of unnecessary questions would have been 
expected to increase resources availability for improving research design as stated here. 
9.3 Policy recommendations 
Applying effective financial incentives to health workers in LMICs, particularly in the 
post-conflict and/or fragile state, is crucial for changing health workers’ behaviour and 
consequently increasing service delivery. The findings presented by this study demonstrated 
that performance-based payments are effective for this purpose. The evidence has significant 
implications for policies adopting such payments under the resource constraints including 
institutional capacity commonly seen in LMICs. The evidence presents responses to previous 
policy failures to pay effective incentives.   
 
The evidence showed that incentive payments have an effective impact if the payments 
increase the health workers’ total income from the government sector sufficiently, being at a 
comparable. Thus, such incentives contribute to restraining dual practice in the countries 
where enhancement of regulatory institutional settings is difficult (Di Tella and Savedoff. 
2001; Ensor and Thompson 2006). Ascertaining the optimum level of payments helps to 
avoid either an excessive number of incentives or a shortage of incentives and reduces the 
loss of government resources for implementation of incentives. The level of incentives 
should reflect concrete robust data on health workers’ and their households’ incomes in the 
government and private sectors. 
 
However, careful decisions regarding the institutional and organisational arrangements for 
the incentive payments are necessary in order to ensure its effectiveness, reflecting in the 
decisions the characteristics of the incentive environment, which are framed by public sector 
characteristics (Belsey and Ghatak 2003; Soch and Beek 2011) and institutional and 
organisational discretions (Mathauer and Carrin 2010). The impact of payments is affected 
by influential institutional and organisational discretions exercised, explicitly and implicitly, 
at different levels of the health system. Also, to ensure the impact, preferences of health 
workers about the form and payment mechanism methods of incentives need to be 
incorporated in the incentives design.   
9.4 Areas for further research 
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of the impact of financial incentives on health 
workers, changes in labour supply through financial incentives needs to be further 
 309 
 
investigated by an empirical study with mixed methods in the form of the before-and after 
study. The current study argued that changes in health workers’ labour supply in the 
government and private sector was brought about by the contracting payments settings. It 
tentatively concluded, based on the qualitative evidence, that transfer of their labour supply 
between the two sectors, i.e., a reduction of dual practice, was also brought about by the 
payments. Therefore, quantitative evidence for the labour supply transfer needed to be 
ascertained in order to better understand the impact of financial incentive on the labour 
supply transfer. Qualitative methods are essential for gaining experiences and perceptions of 
policy implementers and health workers about incentives and the incentive environment, 
given that the labour supply transfer may be influenced by other factors, notably institutional 
and organisational factors or non-financial incentives.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1 Additional data of ADB Evaluation  
 
 
Table A1.1: Mean change in health service coverage indicators by ADB Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Contract-Out’, ‘Contract-In’ and ‘Control’: definitions were the project’s definitions and 
described in Chapter 2 in this theses.  
Source: ADB 2002a. P.36 Table A6.1.Modified. 
 
 
  
 
‘Contract-Out’ 
(%) 
‘Contract-In’ 
(%) ‘Control’ (%) 
Antenatal care 401.5 233.3 160.1 
Delivery with trained personnel 0.0 0.0 26.0 
Facility delivery 142.0 225.1 0.0 
Antenatal tetanus immunization 400.0 148.6 149.1 
Family planning knowledge (all) 599.5 317.4 307.4 
Family planning knowledge (lower 50% 
Socio-economic group) 559.5 301.4 271.0 
Contraceptive prevalence rate 122.6 104.5 93.4 
Child immunization 158.1 81.8 55.7 
Vitamin A capsule receipt (all) 20.9 18.1 -25.1 
Vitamin A capsule receipt (lower 50% 
Socio-economic group) 23.9 29.9 -24.1 
Illnesses treated in district health facility 
(lower 50% Socio-economic group) 1096.0 490.5 81.7 
Average 320.4 177.3 99.6 
 
‘    
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Table A2.2: Quality of care at Health Centres and Referral Hospitals (means among health 
facilities) 
 
 
COs = ‘Contract-Out’, ‘CIs = ‘Contract-In’, Control = ‘Control’: definitions were the 
project’s definitions and described in Chapter 2 in this theses.  
Health Centre* = the cited source of data was the National Institute of Public Health (2001), 
no further details available. Total point** = the maximum possible points vary among the 
Operational Districts; they depended upon the number of Health Centres located in the 
operational district. OD*** = Operational Districts. 
Source: ADB 2004. P. 30 Table A3.1modified. 
 
 
 
  Health Centres* Referral Hospitals 
  
Total point** 
 
% 
achieved 
 
Total point** 
 
% 
achieved 
 
Baselin
e  
Evaluatio
n 
 
Baseline 
Evaluatio
n 
 COs   (436) (73) (50) (380) (80) 
Ang Rokar 6 427 71 75 399 84 
Memut 0 445 76 25 362 76 
CIs   (454) (61) (98) (411) (86) 
Cheung Prey 0 428 63 160 362 76 
Krivong 0 518 63 60 434 91 
Pereng 6 417 58 75 438 92 
Control 
ODs(mean) 
  (332) (52) (80) (261) (55) 
Bati 0 346 51 60 160 34 
Kamchay 
Mear 
17 362 56 50 316 66 
Kroch Chhmar 0 302 50 160 276 58 
Preah Sdach 0 317 52 50 293 61 
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Appendix 2: Interview guidelines to the key informants (examples) 
March 2007 
Interview guideline 
Questions about rural livelihood and rural life for formulation of the questionnaire sheet 
(household survey)   Example 1  
(Sections for food and household enterprises) 
 
1. Rural household  
What are commonly seen household structure (household head, members constitute, 
comparison with the previous studies)? 
 
2. Food expenditure  
- What are sources of information for deciding food items to be asked? 
- What are your comments about Comments of each food items/number of items asked by 
CSES 2003 (relevance to the study site, locality seasons, etc.)? 
- What are your comments about structure of questions suitable Cambodian rural 
households? 
- What is importance in home production and consumption to the household? 
 
- What are important in purchasing methods (frequency, amount) by rural households, their 
recording the expenditure? 
 
- What are your comments about possibility of checking of accuracy of reported prices using 
prices of goods at local markets? 
 
- What are your comments about possible household members who could tell accurate food 
expenditure? 
 
3. Household enterprises  
What are common kinds of household enterprises in the area where the study site was 
included? 
What are your comments about level of income and expenditure by household enterprise? 
What are household enterprises as dual job by health workers (other than private practice 
types commonly seen) ? 
 Types  Scale way of covering the loss from the enterprise 
Who frequently conducts?  
 340 
 
Profitability and sustainability as additional income source to health workers. 
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Interview guideline 
Questions about rural livelihood and rural life for formulation of the questionnaire sheet 
(household survey)    Example 2 
(Sections for education, household enterprises – sub-section for primary industry) 
 
1. Education  
- What is common expenditure for education at different level written and unwritten in 
publications? 
(school fees, fees for educational materials, extra charges for preparatory study and materials 
for examination provided and prepared by formal school teachers) 
- What is means for transportation and fee? 
- What is other expenditure (uniforms and meals)? 
 
- What are trends for educations: double schooling, charges? 
- What are your comments about education received by children away from the household 
(education in Phnom Penh or big towns)? 
- What is the importance of education received by children away from the household 
(education in Phnom Penh or big towns)? 
 
2. Sub-section for primary industry  
 
- What are common types of activities in the primary industry operated by households in the 
area where the study site was included? 
 
- What are your comments about applicability about written information about the activities 
in the primary industry? 
(purpose of activities: commercial or home consumption, types of activities and products, 
seasonality,  
main input and output, input to be purchased, common prices, frequency of purchases,  
uses of agricultural machinery, labour sharing, profitability, etc.) 
 
- What are your observations about health workers’ household enterprises in the primary 
industry? 
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Interview guideline 
Questions about implementation of contracting project by NGO Contractors  No. 1 (NGO 
managers)  
 
1. Reason for entering the contract relations with MOH  
(1) What are reasons for entering the contract relations with MOH, objectives of NGO 
contractors in the contracting? 
 
 
(2) Formation/organisational arrangement of the implementation   
What are formation/organisational arrangement of the implementation?  
(staff of NGO in the district, national or international, skill types of staff, etc.) 
 
 
2. Districts responsible for  
Please describe: 
1) Area and locations  
(distance and hours from Phnom Penh, main means and issues for transportation) 
 
 
2) Socio-economic features 
(the economic level, markets, road conditions and other basic infrastructure, main economic 
activities, educational level, ethnic compositions, etc.) 
 
 
3) Health services  
1 General conditions (diseases, health awareness, staff deployment, health facilities)  
 
 
3. Staff situation (government health workers working for the contracting implementation). 
- What is their status? 
- How much do they receive from government salary? 
- What are dual practice (frequency, income earned), working hours, motivation, changes in 
performance in the course of implementation)? 
 
4. Dual practice 
1) What are common dual practices? 
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What are the types ? What is importance of their dual practice? 
 
2) What are rules of prohibition applied by the NGO? 
3) What are your comments about compliance? 
4) What are enforcement measures? 
5) What are comments of Cambodian health staff about the prohibition you have heard? 
6) What are Issues? 
 
5. Types of payments to health workers  
1) What are their basic salaries? 
2) What are performance-based-payments?, What are your comments about the 
performance-based-payments? 
3) What are methods of allocations of user-fees? 
4) What are other payments do heath workers have? 
 
6. Relation between the project implementation and the Provincial Health Department  
What are your comments about? 
 
7. Institutional issues for the contracting project concerning MOH and supporting donors  
What are your comments about? 
 
8. Possible MOH Depts.or organisations which may provide useful information for this study   
What are your comments about? 
 
9. Other information:  
Differences from implementation of contracting out by other NGO Contractors (main 
emphases or characteristics of the NGO Contractors and other NGO Contrators) What 
are your comments about? 
 
10 Other information (about the district not contracted out) 
What are your comments about possible districts which seem to be suitable for this study 
(having quasi-experimental design)?  
 
(similarities in socio-economic aspects, physical accessibility, accessibility to health workers 
in the districts through the Provincial Health Department and the (health) District Office) 
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Interview guideline ( to NGO managers)  
Questions about implementation of contracting project by NGO Contractors  
1. Process of sub-contracting  
1.2 Contracting with individual health workers  
- What are performance targets for each staff? 
 
 
1.3 Introduction of contracting out/performance-based payments (concept) to health workers 
Please describe how did you introduce the concept of contracting out to individual staff? 
 
 
2 Performance-based payments  
- What is achievement by HCs monthly? 
 
- What is lowest performance, highest performance and the average? 
 
- What are your comments about cases of failure of HCs to achieve the target (reduction of 
payment, response of health workers)?  
 
 
3. Details of the internal rules and monitoring relating to performance-based payments 
Please describe . 
 
4 Issues of low performance and measures for improving them 
(1) What are Issues? 
(2) What are enhancing management capacity by the NGO contractors? 
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Interview guideline  
Questions to MOH about the contracting project (Example 1) 
 
1 Bidding by NGOs  
1 What are formation and number of NGO staff in the proposal by the NGO bidders? 
 
2. What are processes of bidding and characteristics and main components of TOR? 
 
3. What are laws governing relations between government health workers and NGO? 
 
4 What are types and mechanism for staff payments (pilot project and the project)? 
 
5. What is status of government health staff?  
 
6. What are rules, punishment, solution mechanism for problems of performance of 
government health staff? 
 
7. What are advantages of being government staff (not moving to the private sector)? 
 
8. Other information (about the district not contracted out) 
What are your comments about possible districts suitable for the quasi-experimental design 
of this study? 
(similarities in socio-economic aspects, physical accessibility, accessibility to health workers 
in the districts through the Provincial Health Department and the (health) District Office) 
 
 346 
 
2005 
Interview guideline  
Questions to MOH about the contracting project (Example 2) 
 
1 Monitoring structure  
Please describe the monitoring structure and the following specific aspects of the monitoring 
concerning the contracting project. 
 
1. 2. MOH Routine Monitoring  
Please describe 
(1) Methods:     (2) Duration:  
(3) Team: structure 
(4) The base-line indicator 
(5) Report  
(6) Who design the monitoring approach? 
(7) Learning from monitoring, issues  
 
1.3 Advantage of the monitoring 
What are your comments about advantage of the monitoring concerning the performance and 
compliance? 
 
2. Views toward monitoring by NGO  
What are your comments about monitoring by NGO? 
 
 
3 Staff performance management.   
(1) What are number of staff deployed?    What percentage of required number was 
fulfilled? 
(2) What are methods/elements of staff management which seem to raise their performance 
including performance-based payment? 
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2005 
Interview guideline 
Questions about implementation of contracting project by NGO Contractors  No. 1 (NGO 
managers)  
 
1. Reason for entering the contract relations with MOH  
(1) Please describe reasons for entering the contract relations with MOH, objectives of NGO 
contractors in the contracting. 
 
 
(2) Formation/organisational arrangement of the implementation   
Please describe Formation/organisational arrangement of the implementation   
(staff of NGO in the district, national or international, skill types of staff, etc.) 
 
 
2. Districts responsible for  
Please describe: 
1) Area and locations  
(distance and hours from Phnom Penh, main means and issues for transportation) 
 
 
2) Socio-economic features 
(the economic level, markets, road conditions and other basic infrastructure, main economic 
activities, educational level, ethnic compositions, etc.) 
 
 
3) Health services  
General conditions (diseases, health awareness, staff deployment, health facilities)  
 
 
3. Staff situation  
Please describe the following points about government health workers working for the 
contracting implementation. 
- Status, government salary, dual practice (frequency, income earned), working hours, 
motivation, changes in performance in the course of implementation) 
 
4. Dual practice 
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Please describe the following and what are your comments about: 
 
1) Practices, types  
2) Rules of prohibition applied by the NGO 
3) Compliance 
4) Enforcement measures 
5) Disciplining Cambodian health staff 
6) Issues?  
 
5. Types of payments to health workers  
What types of payments do the workers receive? 
 
What are your comments about: 
1) Basic salaries 
2) Performance-based-payment 
3) User-fees 
4) Other payments 
 
6. Relation between the project implementation and the Provincial Health Department  
What are your comments about: 
 
 
7. Institutional issues for the contracting project concerning MOH and supporting donors  
What are your comments about? 
 
 
8. Possible MOH Depts.or Organisation which may provide useful information for this study   
 
 
9. Other information:  
What are your comments about differences in implementation of contracting out between 
your NGO and other NGO Contractors (main emphases or characteristics of the NGO 
Contractors and other NGO Contrators)?  
 
10. Other information (about the district not contracted out) 
What are your comments about possible districts suitable for the quasi-experimental design 
of this study?  
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(similarities in socio-economic aspects, physical accessibility, accessibility to health workers 
in the districts through the Provincial Health Department and the (health) District Office) 
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Interview guideline  
Questions to managers of NGOs working in the Cambodian health sector about the 
contracting project and government health workers’ income (Example 2) 
 
1. The contracting out project in relation to its high evaluation of raising performance of 
health workers.  
 
What are your comments about the contracting out project in relation to its high evaluation 
of raising performance of health workers. What made you have the view? 
 
 
 
2. Performance-based payments (effectiveness, amount, etc.) 
What are your comments about performance-based payments (effectiveness, amount, etc.)? 
 
 
 
3 Health workers’ income obtained in the government sector and implication to them 
- What are your comments about government regular payments? 
 
- What are your comments about supplementary salaries and per-diems?  
 
- What are your comments about relative importance of these incomes to the health workers? 
  
4. Dual practice  
 
- What are your comments about level of private practice among them? 
 
- What are your comments about income from dual practice? 
 
- What are your comments about prohibition of dual practice by the government regulation 
and effectiveness? 
 
5. Income from other than dual practice  
- What are common economic activities by household of health workers? 
 
6. Reasons for government health workers’ retaining in the government sector 
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What are your comments about reasons for government health workers’ retaining in the 
government sector? 
 
 
 
7. Districts selected as the subject of this study  
(The treatment : Peareng, Preah , Kirivong, the control: Kamchay Mea, Mesang). 
 
What are your comments about: 
 
- Socio-economic feature 
 
- Health issues-  
 
- Health system issues. 
 
- Previous experiences of health development project 
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Appendix 3: Sections and sub-sections of CSES 2004 (Source: MOP 2004) 
Foot Note : Basic household information 
List of household members 
Summary of presence in the household 
Information on migration 
Food consumption during the last 7 days (recall method) 
Education and literacy 
Housing 
Household economic activities 
Land ownership 
Production of crops 
Cost of cultivation 
Hypothetical questions on rental and sales market 
Input and output from livestock raising activities 
Input and output from fish cultivation 
Input and output from forestry and hunting 
Inventory of household non-agricultural economic activities during the past 12 months 
Household liabilities 
Household income from other sources 
Durable goods and other expenditures (partial non-food recall) 
Construction activities in the past 12 months 
Nutrition 
Fertility and child care 
Fertility history 
Child feeding and vaccinations 
Mortality 
Health check of children 
Current economic activity 
Activity status during the past 7 days 
Main occupation during the past 7 days 
Employment and earnings during the last 12 months 
Health 
Illnesses during the past 4 weeks 
Smoking 
HIV/AIDS 
Victimisation 
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Appendix 4: Flow of processes of field work 
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Appendix 5: Recruitment and training of surveyors 
(1) The locations of the announcement of the recruitment of surveyors  
CEDAC, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia ( an umbrella and membership organisation 
of the NGO sector in Cambodia), Royal University of Phnom Penh, University of Health 
Science, Royal University of Agriculture, Royal University of Law and Economic, National 
University of Management, Prekleap National School of Agriculture, Build Bright 
University.  
 
(2) Content, trainer, and training of surveyors 
Table 8A.1: Content, trainer, and training of surveyors  
 
Can I talk with you for 10min, today? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of the field practice: a health centre of Muk Compuil Operational District in Kandal 
Province 
 
(3) Training materials (presentation sheets for training)   
Content Trainer 
Introduction of this study, the concepts of the 
household survey of this study, the concepts of 
sections of the questionnaire 
The investigator  
Rural livelihood, the agricultural sector, 
household enterprises (especially focusing on the 
household money flows  
Project manager 
Tips and rules of taking the survey The investigator 
Sharing field experiences (rural livelihood, 
socio-economic household survey)  
The field supervisor, the Field 
Editor 
Practice (taking the survey of food expenditure, 
money flows of enterprises)  
The investigator 
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Appendix 6 
Identified cases by the matching cases between CODs and MODs for regression 
analyses (Chapter 4)  
 
The processes and result of the matching by controlling for major characteristics were 
described in Chapter 4. Here, additional descriptions about the number of cases caught by 
the criteria are presented.  
 
The attributes applied for matching were: 
- Gender,  
- Age generations (their 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s)  
- Number of their household members (one to ten) (Table x)  
-  Marital status  
 
The number of primary nurses who fulfilled these criteria was 28 (17 of 48 male primary 
nurses in CODs, 11 of 44 male primary nurses in MODs). If the number was balanced 
between CODs and MOD, the total became 22 (11 from each status of district).  
 
Secondary nurses who fulfilled these criteria numbered 29 (19 of 42 male secondary nurse in 
CODs, 10 of 17 male secondary nurses in MODs). If the number was balanced between 
CODs and MOD, the total became 20 (10 from each status of district). 
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Appendix 7 
Modified version of the White test for heetroscedasticity in regression models  
 
SPSS does not have the White test which tests the hetroscedasticity in the default setting. 
Therefore, this study employed the modified version of White test, considering the fact that 
the independent variables which represented by binary dummy variables in my model(s) in 
this study causes perfect multicollinearity in the conventional White test. The White test 
which hypothesised;  
 
e²=c+d1ŷ+d2ŷ²+ error term, 
 
here, e means residuals, c constant, d variance, ŷ all predicted values of dependent variables. 
d1 and d2 equal to 0 (zero).  
(Economic History, History Department, Oxford University accessed April 8, 2013) 
 
(QM1 –Session 8 Multiple Regression IIIOLS Assumptions& Effects of Violation, 
http://ecohist.history.ox.ac.uk/03Lecture_slides_2010/QM1_2010_11/QM1_2010week8.pdf 
( accessed April 8, 2013) 
 
It was tested if there is no significant correlation of squared residual with the unstandardized 
predicted value. The null hypothesis states that there is significant correlation between the 
squared residual and the unstandardized predicted value. The alternative hypothesis states 
that there is no significant correlation between the squared residual with the unstandardized 
predicted value. 
H0: Constant variance (homoscedasticity) 
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H1: Heteroscedasticity. 
 
Regressing the dependent variable on all independent variables gave the unstandardized 
residuals and the unstandardized predicted values. Then, the unstandardized residuals were 
squared and regressed on unstandardized predicted values. The test gave the following 
statistics including the f-value of this regression. 
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Appendix 8: Methods for exploring the variables which brought about the bimodality 
the most largely in the residual plot and analyses  
residual plot (Chapter7) and analyses  
 
The following methods were employed to confirm that COD was the main factor which 
caused the bimodality presented in the residual plots in regression diagnostics (Chapter7). 
After explanation of the method, two examples of analyses employing the method were 
presented. 
 
1. Checking the dependent variable concerning the difference between CODs and MODs 
For the dependent variables, the mean, the median, and the standard deviation were 
compared between CODs and MODs. Differences in these statistics were described in 
Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
Next, patterns of the distribution of dependent variables of cases in CODs and in MODs 
were compared in the form of two separate histograms; one of CODs and of MODs.  
 
2. Checking the independent variables for their influence to the bimodality 
Following the checking of the dependent variable, a univariate regression of the logged 
dependent variable in each of the models was conducted, applying each of the independent 
variables of the model. From this regression, plots of dependent variables (Y axis) versus 
standardized predicted values (X axis) (Type A plot) as well as plots of dependent variables 
(Y axis) versus standardized residuals (X axis) (Type B plot) were produced. 
 
First, only the COD variable was examined (in case of Model 3, instead of COD, the dummy 
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variables expressing individual Operational Districts. They were Peareang, Preah Sdach, 
Kirivong and Mesang Operational Districts, with Kamchay Mea as the reference variable). 
Then, COD and another independent variable (Group A Model 1 and 2) were applied (in 
case of Model 3, instead of COD, the dummy variables expressing individual Operational 
Districts and another independent variable). 
 
All plots in each type were visually compared with the plots produced from the regression 
which had only COD, and compared each other among themselves, The comparison checked 
whether COD was the main factor which caused the bimodality and whether the paired 
independent variable enhanced or reduced the bimodality in relative to the other independent 
variables paired with COD. Next, among the independent variables except COD, the order of 
their influence to the bimodality was decided. 
 
Next, according to the order, the independent variables, starting from the lowest influence 
were added one by one to regressions of the dependent variable. At each addition, the two 
types of plots which explained above were produced. These plots were checked as to 
whether the addition presented or enhanced bimodality. If presented, checking was 
conducted to know which independent variable also caused the bimodality. Then, degree of 
influence of the specified variables was compared with that of COD. 
 
3 Example of the analyses of variable’s influence on bimodality in the residual plots.  
Regression models, definitions and expressions of independent variables were presented in 
Chapter 4. Note: Plots and descriptions of test results on other dependent variables and other 
groups of cases can be provided by the investigator upon request. 
 
 363 
 
Example 1
23
 
1. Checking the dependent variable concerning differences between CODs and MODs 
Dependent variable: income from health work excluding private practice  
Cases: All health workers (N=250), Model 1 to 3 
 
Results from descriptive statistical analyses of the dependent variable were investigated 
between CODs and MODs. The mean and median of the income in CODs were higher than 
in MODs. The standard deviation in CODs were higher than in MODs.  
 
As seen in 1.1, histograms of the income shown below appeared to indicate a difference in 
the distribution of the cases between COD and MOD. In most cases the incomes in CODs 
had higher values than cases in MODs. The two histograms had own peak at different 
amount of the incomes; cases COD cases at higher amount than MOD cases. 
 
 
1.1 Distribution of dependent variable 
 
                                                     
23
 As noted in previous text above, plots and descriptions of test results on other dependent variables 
and other groups of cases are provided by the investigator upon request to the investigator.  
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2. Checking the independent variables for their influence to the bimodality (Model 1 to 3)  
[Model 1] 
2.1 Regression on all independent variables  
Independent variables: Age, Age Squared, Cadre, Married, Male, Economic Status, COD  
Plots from this regression were shown below. 
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2.2 Regressions only on COD (binary dummy variable)  
Plots from this regression were shown below. 
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2.3 Regression on pairs which consisted of COD and another independent variable  
1) COD and Cadre (plots from this regression were shown below) 
The plots appeared to maintain the bimodality which were to be attributable to COD. 
However, with each group, Cadre, the variables, appeared to divide the cases.  
 
 
 
 
2) COD, Age and Age Squared (plots from this regression were shown below)  
Age and Age Squared were put in together with COD. The plots below appeared to maintain 
the bimodality presented in the plots of the regression only on COD. However, Age and Age 
Squared appeared to spread plot points in a semi-circular. 
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3) COD and Married (plots from this regression were shown below) 
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4) COD and Economic Status (plots from this regression were shown below)  
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5) COD + Male (plots from this regression were shown below ) 
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The order of approximate influence of each independent variable to the bimodality was 
estimated from the plots. The order was, from the weakest, Age, AgeSquared, Cadre, Male, 
Married and Prohibition dual practice Mid, Prohibition dual practice low, and COD. 
 
2.4 Adding independent variables, one by one, according to their approximate influence to 
the bimodality (plots from this regression were shown below) 
 
Additions of the independent variables confirm that COD was the main factor that caused the 
bimodality. The pairs of plots from five regressions below before adding COD appeared not 
to present bimodality but presented marginal heteroscedasticity. 
 
1) Age + Age Squared  
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2) Age + Age Squared + Cadre  
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3) Age+ Age Squared + Cadre + Married  
 
 
4) Age + Age Squared + Cadre + Married + Male 
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5) Age + Age Squared + Cadre + Married + Male + Economic Status 
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6) Age+ Age Squared + Cadre + Married + Male + Economic Status + COD 
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[Model 2]  
2. Checking the independent variables for their influences the bimodality 
2.1 Applying all independent variables (plots from this regression were shown below)  
Independent variables: COD, Age, AgeSquared, Cadre, Male, Married, Prohibition dual 
practice Mid, and Prohibition dual practice Low  
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. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Combination of COD and another independent variable 
One pair was newly created; it was the combination of COD with Prohibition dual practice 
Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low. All other possible combinations between CODs and 
the remaining independent variables in Model 2 were already examined in the test for Model 
1 above. 
 
Plots from the newly created pair indicated bimodality (plots from this regression were 
shown below). In the plot below, one of the two groups of cases had three groups within it, 
suggesting three difference feature of prohibition of dual practice among CODs. 
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1) COD and Prohibition dual practice Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low 
 
 
 
 
From the newly produced plots and the plots from the previous section, the order of 
approximate influence of each independent variable was estimated. It was, from the weakest, 
Age, AgeSquared, Cadre, Male, Married and Prohibition dual practice Mid, Prohibition dual 
practice low, and COD. 
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2.3 Adding independent variables one by one (plots from this regression were shown below) 
Next, based on the order, one new regression was performed. The regression had all other 
independent variables except COD (Age, AgeSquared, Cadre, Male, Married, Prohibition 
dual practice Mid, and Prohibition dual practice Low). From this regression, plots were 
produced  
 
 
 
 
Model 3 
2. Checking the independent variables for their influences to forming the bimodality 
2.1 Applying all independent variables (plots from this regression were shown below) 
 
Independent variables: Age, AgeSquare, Cader, Male, Married, Individual Operational 
Districts (Peareang, Preah Sdach, Kirivong and Mesang) Plots from this regression appeared 
to indicate bimodality as below. 
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2.2 A new regression with only independent variable for individual Operational Districts 
(Peareang, Preah Sdach, Kirivong and Mesang) was performed. Plots from the regression 
were produced. This is because in Model 3 the variable for individual Operational Districts 
instead of COD was assumed to be the main cause of the bimodality since the model did not 
have COD. 
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2.3 Combination of Individual Operational Districts and another independent variable. 
Regressions with each of the following combination of Individual Operational Districts and 
another independent variable used in Model 3 were performed. Plots from the regressions 
were produced.   
 
1) Individual Operational Districts, Age and AgeSquared 
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2) Individual Operational Districts and Cadre  
 
 
 
 
3) Individual Operational Districts and Male  
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4) Individual Operational Districts and Married  
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An approximate order of the influence of independent variables which might have caused the 
bimodality seemed to be Cadre, Age and AgeSquared (treated together), Male, Married, and 
Individual Operational Districts, from the lowest and the highest. Male and Married 
appeared to have a similar level of influence. 
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2.4 Adding independent variables, one by one, according to their approximate strength of 
influence to the bimodality 
Regressions were conducted adding the independent variable one by one, according to the 
order estimated above. 
 
1) Cadre  
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1) Age + AgeSquared  
 
 
 
2) Cadre + Age + AgeSquare  
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3) Cadre + Age + AgeSquare + Male  
 
 
 
 
4) Cadre +Age + AgeSquare + Male + Married 
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Example 2  
Dependent variable: Income from health work excluding private practice 
Cases: midwives (N=61), Model 1 to 3 
 
Difference between this example and the previous two examples of the test operation for 
COD’s influence to bimodality were, first, that the variable Gender was not included in the 
regression for the test on midwife cases.  
 
1. Checking the dependent variable concerning difference between CODs and MODs 
 
Results from descriptive statistical analyses were investigated between 3 CODs and 2 MODs. 
The influence of COD, i.e., difference in district status as CODs or MODs appeared to be the 
main factor which caused bimodality. 
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1.1 Distribution of dependent variable 
Histograms of the income, below, appeared to indicate differences in the distribution of the 
midwife cases between COD and MOD. Most of cases of income in CODs were spread over 
higher values than those in MODs, making approximately two peaks: cases in MODs at low 
values cases in CODs at higher values than MODs.  
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable was investigated by Operational District with consideration to the 
status difference (CODs or MODs). Results of the descriptive statistical analyses indicated 
that the means and the medians in midwives were higher in the three individual CODs than 
in the two individual MODs. The standard deviation in CODs was higher than in MODs. 
 
2. Checking the independent variables for their influences to forming the bimodality (plots 
from regression were shown below) 
 
2.1 Applying all independent variables  
Group A Model 1  
Independent variables: Age + AgeSquared + Married + COD + Economic Status  
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2.2. Applying only COD  
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2.3 Regression on pairs which consisted of COD and another independent variable  
1) COD + Age + Age Squared  
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2) COD + Married  
 
 
 
 
3) COD + Economic Status  
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From the plots produced above, order influence of approximate independent variables which 
might have brought about the bimodality in the original plot was estimated. The order was, 
from the lowest, Age and AgeSquared, Marred, EconoStatus and COD. The influence of 
EconoStatus and COD appeared to be close. However, EconoStatus appeared to further 
divide one of the two groups into two. This might be due to the fact that there were two 
levels of economic status among three CODs as described above.  
 
 
2.4 Adding independent variable one by one according to its approximate influence to the 
bimodality 
 
1) Age and AgeSquared  
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2) Age, Age Squared and Married  
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3) Age, Age Squared, Married, Economic Status  
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4) Age, AgeSquared, Married, Economic Status and COD  
 
 
 
 
Model 2  
1 Investigation of the dependent variable 
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Results were the same as result for Model 1. 
 
2.1 Applying all independent variables  
Age + AgeSquared + Married + Prohibition dual practice Mid + Prohibition dual practice 
Low＋COD  
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Applying only Prohibition dual practice Mid + Prohibition dual practice Low  
In order to explore the influence of Prohibition dual practice Mid and Prohibition dual 
practice Low, plots from the regression which had only the two dummy variables for 
prohibition rules were produced below. 
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2.3 Applying pairs consisting of COD and another independent variable 
1) COD and Prohibition dual practice Mid, and Prohibition dual practice Low  
COD was paired with only Prohibition dual practice Mid, and Prohibition dual practice Low 
because COD was paired with all of other independent variables (Age, AgeSquared, Married, 
Economic Status) applied to this Model, Model 2 when Model 1 was investigated in above.  
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2.4 Adding independent variables one by one according to their strength of influence to the 
bimodality 
 
Investigation of Model 2 in this section was began by adding Prohibition dual practice Mid 
and Prohibition dual practice Low to the regression with Age, AgeSquared, and Married. 
The regression with these three independent variables was performed in the investigation 
process of Model 1 above. The plots did not show bimodality. 
 
Adding Prohibition dual practice Mid and Prohibition dual practice Low produced plots 
presented bimodality. The plots appeared to be rather similar to the plots from the regression 
which had all of the independent variables. Careful comparisons of the plots from two types 
of regressions identified slight difference. 
 
Similarly might have been brought about in part by factors concerning the following. These 
variables for the prohibition rules might also have contributed independently to dividing the 
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plot points into two in a similar way to the way COD influenced the original bimodality. The 
prohibition rules had three levels of strength (low, middle, strict), but were also able to be 
divided into two groups (non-enforced =low level, enforced = middle and strict models). The 
non-enforced group consisted of two MODs and Prea Sdach Operational District and the 
enforced group two CODs. Therefore, this underlying dichotomus division could be 
associated with the contracting project since it brought about the two different groups for the 
strength of dual practice prohibition rules. These test results and the inference suggested that 
COD made the largest influence to the original bimodality. 
 
1) Age + AgeSquared + Married + Prohibition dual practice Mid + Prohibition dual practice 
Low  
 
 
 
 
2) Age + AgeSquared + Married + Prohibition dual practice Mid + Prohibition dual practice 
Low + COD  
The addition of COD to the regression above still appeared to maintain bimodality, 
increasing  the number of the group of plot points on the right side of the plot, compared 
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with the plots from the previous regression which did not have the variable for CODs. Also, 
the same group appeared to have a larger number of plot points randomly distributed, 
marginal heteroscadesticity, compared with the previous plot. 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 3 
1 Investigation of the dependent variable 
Results were the same as the result for Model 1. 
 
2.1 Applying all independent variables  
The individual Operational Districts (3 CODs :Peareang, Prea Sdach, Kiriviong and 1 MOD 
Mesang), Age, AgeSquared, Married  
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2.2 Only the individual Operational Districts: Peareang, Prea Sdach, Kiriviong (3 CODs) and 
Mesang (MOD)  
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2.3 Regression on pairs which consisted of the individual Operational Districts  
1) The individual Operational Districts, Age and AgeSquared  
 
 
 
2) Individual Operational Districts and Married  
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2.4 Adding independent variables one by one according to their strength of influence to 
the bimodality 
This section began from adding the individual operational districts, i.e., Mesang, Peareang, 
Preah Sdach, and Kiriviong to the regression which had Age, AgeSquared, and Married as 
the independent variables. The regression with three independent variables was produced in 
the investigation process of Model 1 but presented below. The plots did not show 
bimodality. 
 
 404 
 
 
 
 
The addition of Mesang, Peareang, Preah Sdach, and Kiriviong appeared to present the 
bimodality. Consequently, it might be possible to conclude that COD made the largest 
influence to the original bimodality. 
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Appendix 9: Questionnaire for asking allocation of payments associated with the 
contracting at subcontractor level  
Questionnaire on Sub-contracting of Contracting Project 
 
Date:______________  Name (Sub-contractor) : _______________________ 
Name of HC Chief (If HC Chief is not the Sub-contractor, indicate it after the name by a 
click) :____________________,  _________________ 
Position in the HC (HC Chief, MCH Chief, etc) :______________   
Status as a Government Official (please circle): Official   Not yet official   Hired by 
Subcontractor 
Province (Code) :______________  OD (Code):_______________ 
Health Center Name (Code) :_________ 
 
This survey is an academic survey independent from any organisations in Cambodia. This 
study would like to ask you about things relating to payments to health staff in 
subcontracting. 
 
1. Indicators 
1.1 What kind of activities of your HC are the indicators you, the sub-contractor, need to 
achieve? Please select from the following (multiple answers are possible).  
1.2 What was the value of the indicators for the second quarter of 2007? 
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Table 1: Answer to Question 1 
 Click(
√) 
Cove
rage 
rates  
Num
ber  
 
a. OPD    
b. Short-term admission    
c. Specific immunization 
(specify:______________________________________
______) 
   
d. Full immunization (specify excluded one, if 
any:______________________________) 
   
e. TT2 (specify the 
client:________________________________________
__________) 
   
f. ANC (specify the definition : e.g. 2 times of visit 
per/woman,  provision of TT2, provision of 
_____________________________________________
_____________) 
   
g. Delivery at HC     
h. Delivery at home but attended by HC staff    
i. Birth spacing (specify the methods and 
unit :_________________________________) 
   
j. TB 
(specify:______________________________________
_____________) 
   
k. Referring to Referral Hospital    
l. Other qualitative indicators 
(specify:______________________________________
___) 
   
m. Qualitative indicator 
(specify:____________________________ ) 
   
n. Others 
(specify:______________________________________
__ 
   
 
1.3 What percentage was the average achievement of these indicators in the second quarter 
of 2007? 
 
 
Answer:______________________________ 
 
2. Assigning indicators 
2.1 Did you assign a specific staff to achieve a specific indicator of the subcontracting? 
 
Yes   No 
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2.1 Did you assign more than one staff to achieve an indicator? 
 
Yes (specify the indicators by cadre: 
_____________________________, _________________________________ 
______________, __________________) 
No  
 
3. The Performance-Based Payments (PBP) are paid according to the result of activities of 
the month. After the contractor-NGO has reviewed the achievement of your health facility 
and decided the subsidy to your health facilities, you allocate the PBP among the health staff. 
 
Which factors do you use in deciding the contribution made by each health staff in your 
Health Center to the achievement? (Please click the column after the factors in Table 3. 
Multiple answers are possible  
 
4. What is the relative importance of each of the factors to the total of them? (If the total of 
factors is 100%, what percentage do you put on each of the factors?, Please write the 
percentage in the column in the Table 2. If the importance differs among the staff, please 
write the average ) 
 
Table 2: Answer to Question 3 and 4  
Answers  Click
(√) 
Percent
age (%) 
   Aver
age 
a. Achievement of the indicator assigned to the staff (%)    
b. The number of patients each of the health staff took to HC    
c. Attributes of the staff (e.g., cadre, responsibilities such as 
HC Chief, length of employment) 
   
d. Performances which are expected based on the attributes 
(e.g. giving correct treatments as health staff responsible for 
MCH, providing appropriate injections of immunization to a 
baby as scheduled.) 
   
e. Behaviours which might have been contribute to the 
achievement (keep punctuality, abiding the roster, following 
rules such as about private practice) 
   
f. Factors or ways of deciding were defined by the Contractor 
NGO (specify the content) 
_________________________________________________
_______________ 
   
g. Others (specify)    
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5. Do you apply all the factors to all the cadres of your HC at the same percentage as you 
answered above?  
 
Yes (go to Q7)   No (go to Q6) 
 
6. Factor subject for different determinants 
6.1 If the answer to Question 5 is “No”, to whom you apply the factors? Please indicate in 
Table 3 the person’s cadre and other attributes you consider when you use the factors. Please 
use the code below when you reply. 
 
6.2 what percentage did you put on each of them (total 100%)? Please indicate in Table 3. 
Cadre 
Doctor...101 Assistant Doctor...102 Secondary Midwife...103 
Primary Midwife...104 Secondary Nurse...105 Primary Nurse...106 
 Others...107 
 
Responsibility 
Chief of HC....201 Deputy Chief of HC...202 Chief of EPI...203 Staff of EPI...204 Chief 
of MCH...205 Staff of MOH...206 Chief of Internal Medicine...207 Staff 
of Internal Medicine...204  Chief of Medical (Medicine) Supply ...203 Staff of Medical 
(Medicine) Supply...204 General Staff (no specific area   205 Others   205 
 
Position in the subcontracting 
Manager (subcontractor) ...301  Deputy Manager (Deputy 
subcontractor)...302 Normal staff in the subcontracting...303 
 
Others (e.g. the status as a government official, Specify)...401 
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Table 3: Answer to 6.1 and 6.2  
 
 Click(
√) 
Q.6.1 
person’s 
attributes  
Q 
6.2
  
% 
a. Achievement of the indicator assigned to the 
health staff (%) 
   
    
    
b. The number of patients each of the health staff 
took to HC 
   
    
    
c. Attributes of the HEALTH STAFF     
    
    
d. Performances which are expected based on the 
attributes  
   
    
    
e. Behaviors which might have been contribute to 
the achievement  
   
    
    
f. Others    
    
 
 
 
7 The following questions ask about details of the factors answered in Question 4.  
7.1 If you selected ‘Answer c’ (Attributes of the staff) (If you did not select Answer C, 
please go to Question 7.3),  
what aspects of the attributes do you consider in deciding the contribution of the health staff 
to a monthly achievement? Please fill the table 4. If the aspects you consider differs 
according to the status (a government official or casual staff, or hired by the subcontractor), 
please describe the differences. 
 
7.2 What is the relative importance of each of the aspects to the total attributes of the health 
staff to be considered? If the total importance is 100%, what percentage do you put on each 
of the aspect?  
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Table 4: Answers to 7.1 and 7.2  
Answers  Considered 
(√)  
Percentage (%) Differences 
by the status 
a. Cadre    
b. Responsibility    
c. Length of employment    
d. Position    
e. Others    
    
 
 
7.3 If you selected ‘Answer d’ (Performances which are expected based on the attributes), 
what aspects of the performance do you consider in deciding the contribution of the staff?  
 
 
Table5: Answer to 7.3 
Performance Differences 
by the 
status 
a.   
b.   
c  
 
7.4 If you selected ‘Answer e’ (Behaviors which might have contributed to the achievement), 
what aspects of the behaviors do you consider in deciding the contribution of the staff? If 
there are differences in the percentage by cadre, or by responsibility, or by position, or by 
other attributes, please describe them. 
 
Table 6: Answer to 7.4  
Answers  Considered 
(√) 
Percentage 
(100%) 
differences by the 
status 
a. Keeping punctuality    
b. Abiding the roster    
c. Abiding the prohibition of 
private practice 
   
d. Abiding other rules    
e. Others    
 
8. A basic or guideline PBB to each of the health staff of you HC was said to be decided. For 
example, providing every month at least Health staff A (an Assistant Doctor) with 
US$100.00 and Health staff B (a Secondary Midwife) with US$90.00.  
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8.1 When you had decided these amounts, which factors did you reflect in the decision?  
Please click factors in Table 7. Multiple answers are possible. Please click the column in 
Table 7). If there are other factors within each category of the factors (c to e) that influenced 
the decision, please specify.  
 
8.2 What is the relative importance of each of the factors to the total, if the total of factors is 
100%? Please fill Table 7. 
 
8.3 If there are differences in the application of factors by cadre, or by responsibility, or 
position, or by others, please specify in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Answers to 8.1 and 8.2  
Factors  8.1. 
Clic
k (√) 
8.1 
Specifi
c 
factors 
8.2 
Percentag
e (%) 
8.3 
Differences 
(by cadre, 
responsibility
, position, 
others) 
a. Achievement of the indicator assigned to 
the staff  
 N/A   
b. The number of patients each of the health 
staff took to HC 
 N/A   
c. Attributes of the health staff (e.g., cadre, 
responsibilities such as HC Chief, length of 
employment) 
    
d. Performances which are expected based on 
the attributes (e.g. giving correct treatment as 
defined, preparing necessary equipment)  
    
e. Behaviours which might have been 
contribute to the achievement (keep 
punctuality, abiding the roster, following 
rules such as about private practice) 
    
f. Factors or ways of deciding were defined 
by the Contractor NGO (specify the content) 
Content:_____________________________
__ 
____________________________________
__ 
 N/A   
g. Others (specify)     
 
 
9 User-fee income 
9.1 One percent of the user-fee of government health facilities must be sent to the national 
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treasury, one percent to the provincial health department, and some portion should be used 
for the operational cost. Some of remaining proportion of the user-fee income can be used 
for staff payments. In the subcontracting, do you have a separate scheme for allocating the 
user-fee income among the staff different from the PBP? 
  
Yes    No (end of this questionnaire) 
 
9.2 Which points are the main difference of allocation methods between user-fee income and 
PBP? (Please click the column after the factors in Table below. Multiple answers are 
possible)  
 
Table 18: Answer to 8.2  
 
 Click(√) 
1) factors used in deciding the allocation  
 
 
2) relative importance of the factors  
 
 
3) cadre of health workers determines the factors and the 
relative importance of the factors 
 
 
9.3 When you decide the allocation, which factors do you reflect in the decision? (multiple 
answers are possible. Please click the column in Table 7). If there are other factors within 
each category of the factors (c to e) that influenced the decision, please specify.  
 
9.4 What is the relative importance of each of the factors to the total, if the total of factors is 
100%? 
 
9.5 If there are differences in the application of factors by cadre, or by responsibility, or 
position, or by others, please mention. 
 
Factor % Differences (by 
cadre, 
responsibility, 
position, others) 
1)    
2)    
3)    
4)   
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Appendix 10: Selection processes of the control Operational Districts (MODs)  
The three criteria for the selection were: 
Criterion a.  socio-economic development levels, which were not obviously different from 
the CODs. 
Criterion b.  access to the national roads, which is similar to that in CODs. 
Criterion c.  the Operational Districts, which have not been “heavily” supported by NGOs 
or donors. 
For the definition of “heavily” please see 4.3.2, 3..  
 
(1) Prey Veng Province 
First, screening results by the first two criteria are described, since the results were relatively 
easy to obtain due to the nature of the criteria. After this, the screening result by the third 
criterion is described. 
 
The two criteria are:  
Criterion a. apparent development level; 
Criterion b. access to the national roads.  
 
An Operational District which includes the provincial town in its catchment area was 
excluded due to its apparent developed level (Criterion a). 
Another Operational District was excluded because of its apparently more highly developed 
level; this was due to its including one of the major ferry ports along the Mekong River in 
south east Cambodia (Criterion a).  
The third was excluded because it has a significant advantage over the Peareang and Preah 
Sdach Operational Districts. It has a national road penetrating its catchment area, whereas 
Peareag and Prea Sdach Operational Districts have no access at all to a national road from 
the Operational District (Criterion b). 
The remaining criterion is: 
Criteria c. the Operational Districts, which have not been “heavily” supported by donors or 
NGOs. 
 
In order to exclude Operational Districts which had been "heavily" supported by NGOs 
and/or donors (Criterion c), the level of support by NGOs and donors in Kamchey Mea and 
Mesang Operational Districts was investigated. As a result of the investigation, the two 
Operational Districts were not considered to be “heavily supported. Therefore, these two 
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Operational Districts were selected as the control Operational Districts (MODs). Table A6.1 
shows the support in the two Operational Districts (Kamchey Mea and Mesang Operational 
Districts).  
 
Table A6.1 Support of donors and/or NGOs in the two Operational Districts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Kamchey Mea and Mesang Operational Districts were being supported by UNICEF and 
relatively small scale NGOs. Although the information collected is not exhaustive, the level 
of support from UNICEF and that of the other NGOs were not found to be “heavy." Since 
the support from UNICEF was almost the same in the two Operational Districts, the 
description of it is written before that of the NGO activities in each Operational District. 
 
UNICEF  
UNICEF’s support in Kamchey Mea and Mesang Operational Districts was part of a 
program in the area of child survival in different locales in Cambodia. UNICEF stationed no 
staff at the Operational District offices or at the Health Centres (personal communication, Mr. 
Rasoka Thor, Child Survival Project Officer, May 10, 2006). 
 
NGO: Ponleu Ney Kdey in Kamchay Mea Operational District 
A Cambodian NGO, Ponleu Ney Kdey was mainly conducting training of a limited number 
of HRHs and facilitating community participation in health promotion activities performed 
by the Health Centres(personal communication. Dara Sokhoeun, Manager, Poneleu Ney 
Kdey, May 21, 2007.) 
 
NGOs: Child Love Association; Christian Care for Cambodia in Mesang Operational District 
A Cambodian NGO, Child Love Association, which was funded by Save the Children U.K., 
was conducting a project, which was targeted mainly at HIV/AIDs and nutrition in a part of 
 Kamchey Mea Meseng 
Donor  UNICEF  UNICEF 
NGO  Ponleu Ney Kdey 
(Cambodian NGO) 
Child Love Association 
(Cambodian NGO) 
Christian Care for Cambodia 
(non-Cambodian NGO) 
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Mesang Operational District (personal communication. Wat Somuen, Child Love 
Association, Director, personal communication, April 9, 2006). Also, Christian Care for 
Cambodia was providing health services for TB, including treatment and education in a 
northern part of the Operational District (personal communication John Coats, Christian 
Care for Cambodia, Project Manager, April 25, 2006).  
 
(2) Takeo Province 
The screenings were made on the three non-contracted out Operational Districts, first, by the 
first two criteria above (Criterion a. development level, Criterion b. access to national roads). 
These screenings excluded all three Operational Districts.  
 
Two Operational Districts in the northern part of the province were excluded by the first 
criterion. The northern part of the province, which is adjacent to the capital city, is relatively 
developed. The northern part is also more developed, compared with Peareng and Preah 
Sdach Operational District in Prey Veng Province. Another Operational District in Takeo 
Province, which is not at the northern part; but which includes Takeo’s provincial town, was 
also excluded due to its developed socio-economic situation.  
 
The second criterion, b. access to national roads, gave the following assessment regarding all 
three non-contracted out Operational Districts: they are adjacent to national roads, similar to 
the access to Kirivong Operational District. It also reinforced the first criteria’s exclusion of 
the two Operational Districts.  
 
One remaining non-contracted out Operational District was screened according to the third 
criterion (Criterion c. the Operational Districts, which have not been “heavily” supported by 
NGOs or donors), and was excluded. This non-contracted out Operational District was found 
to be supported by a NGO and the level was found to be “heavily” supported (personal 
communication Chan Rada ,RHAC Project Manager, May 1, 2006).  
 
As a result of these screenings, no Control-Operational Districts were selected from Takeo 
Province. Another Operational District contracted out to SRC was Ang Roker, which 
included in a relatively developed administrative district town as an important point for 
transportation in the area.  
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Appendix 11: Results of SRC Mid-term Review  
This section contrasted selected results of the SRC mid-term review and the ADB’s 
evaluation of “ADB Pilot Project”; the selected aspects were common to the two: health 
service coverage (quantity and quality); cost efficiency; equity. The purpose of this is to 
contrast the results of the two projects. 
 
(1) Service coverage  
All the targets stipulated in the contract agreement between SRC and the MOH had been 
achieved by SRC by 2006, prior to the end of the project (Jacobs et al.2010). Thus, it could 
be argued that SRC’s implementation in Kirivong Operational District was successful. 
However, it is noted that the SRC implementation, which began in May 2004, exceeded the 
final targets in 2004(Jacobs, B. et al. 2010). This implies that the set targets might have been 
lower than possible achievement, although the health coverage data before the Contracting 
Project in Takeo was not available at the time. The SRC Mid-term Review evaluated the 
quality of care (from technical aspects) as “acceptable” and “above average” among 
government health services then current in Cambodia (SRC 2006 p.17) . 
 
(2) Equity 
The SRC Mid-term Review states that thanks to the equity funds, people of a lower 
socio-economic stratus in the Kirivong and Ang Roker Operational Districts had benefitted 
more than those of a higher stratum (SRC 2006). However, it cautions that the availability of 
equity funds exceeded the appropriate level and included those who actually had the ability 
to pay the service fees (SRC 2006). 
 
(3) Cost efficiency  
The SRC Report found that the annual per-capita expenditure on health services in Kirivong 
Operational District was US$3.06(SRC 2006 p.4).  
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Appendix 12 Number of eligible government health workers and the response rate  
 
Table: Number of eligible government health workers, the number who responded, and the 
response rate  
 
 Eligible health 
workers 
No. of health 
workers who 
responded 
Response 
rate 
Operational Districts 
contracted out (CODs) 
   
Peareang (Prey Veng 
Province) 
70 65 92.9% 
Preah Sdach (Prey Veng 
Province) 
27 25 92.6% 
Kirivong (Takeo Province) 68 67 98.6% 
Operational Districts managed 
within MOH system (MODs) 
   
Mesang (Prey Veng Province) 46 43 93.5% 
Kamchey Mear (Prey Veng 
Province) 
64 52 81.3% 
 275 252 91.6% 
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Appendix 13: Ethics approval from Cambodian Ministry of Health Ethical Committee  
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Appendix 14  
Table: Possession rates of durable goods of health workers’ households in CODs 
and MODs, and the national average  
 
 
 
Source: National data from CSES 2004, modified from Table 1, P.1., Table 2 and 3, 
P. 2, Table 5, P. 3, MOP 2005 (MOP 2005)
 
Personal 
Computer Air-conditioner Printer 
PC 
Games 
This study 0.8 0.0 0.4 1.6 
National 
average  
1.4 0.9 0.4 N/A 
 Car Boat 
High-quality 
wood furniture 
Gas 
cooker 
This study 8.4 4.0 48.4 50.8 
National 
average  
3.0 9.7 N/A N/A 
 Water sink Camera   
This study 4.8 4.8   
National 
average  
N/A N/A 
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Appendix Part II 
Expenditure Survey of households of Government Health Workers 
 
Control number(GHW Code) : _________________  Male interviewer (name, and signature):______________________  Interview 
Dates:___________________ 
     Female interviewer  (name, and signature):___________________  Interview Dates:____________________
  
Supervisor/Editor (name and signature):________________________ Date checked by Supervisor/Editor:__________________  
Date of re-interview if necessary: __________________   Re-interviewer:_____________________  
 Remarks:__________________________ 
Date entry 
Operator:_______________________ Date:____________________________ Remarks:_______________________ 
 
Government Health Worker (GHW) 
Name:_______________ Age:_______ Sex (code): _________   HH member ID code: 99 
Cadre (code number): __________(Primary Nurse...01, Secondary Nurse...02, Primary Midwife...03, Secondary Midwife...04, Assistant Doctor...05, Doctor...06, others...07, 
specify) 
 
Health Center(HC)  
Province (code):_______________(______)  OD (code):_________________________  Contracted out/MOH (code): _________________________ 
HC Name (HC Code) :________________(____________) Commune:______________  Village:__________________ 
Household location : 
Commune:______________ Village:__________________ House number:_________________ Remarks:_______________________________________ 
*GHW Code:_____________________________ 
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Household head (please fill this section after completion of Section 0A): *If the GHW and the HH head is the same person, change the ID code to “9901” 
 Name  HH member 
ID code 
Age on 
the 
interview 
date 
Sex 
Male 1, 
Female 2 
Relation to GHW  
GHW...99, spouse...01, 
son/daughter-in-law..02, child...03, 
parent...04, parent-in-law...05 brother/sister 
06, brother/sister-in-law...07 grand 
children...08, grand parent...09, 
nice/nephew...10, uncle/aunt...11, others...12 
Date of interview 
(DD/MM/YY) 
Section 
responded 
HH Head  01      
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Other respondents (please fill this section after completion of all questions): 
Sectio
n  
 Respondent 
Name  
HH 
member ID 
Code 
 
HH member 
Code (GHW 
Code + HH 
member ID) 
use the codes 
in Section 0A  
Relation to 
GHW 
(indicate 
by code of 
0A Q6) 
Date of 
interview
(DD/MM/
YY) 
0  Information  HH head =      
1 Education The same person who answer 
Section 7. 
    
2 Health The same person who answer 
Section 7. 
    
 Last maternal care      
3 Employment All employed persons     
4A Housing: Type HH head =     
4B Housing:  Material The same person who answer 
Section 7. 
    
4C Housing:  Utilities and facilities The same person who answer 
Section 7. 
    
4D Construction and prices of 
housing 
HH head =     
5 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, 
Livestock and other animal 
products 
     
6 Self-Employment (the three most 
important enterprises) 
     
 4 
 
7 Food Expenditure and home 
production 
     
8 Non-food and durable goods The same person who answer 
Section 7. 
    
9 Income and remittance HH head=     
10 Borrowing, lending, and saving HH head =     
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Section 0 Information of household members *All questions should be asked the household head.  
0A Basic information We would like to know the persons who usually live and eat together in this household. Please make a list of your household (HH) members who live 
here or has been absent for less than 12 months. *Each of the HH members will be provided with a HH member ID code, starting from GHW followed by household head. 
*If the GHW and the HH head is the same person, the use only the column for GHW. If the number of row is not enough, please add as appropriate. 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 c
o
d
e
 
1 Name  2 Age 
on 
intervi
ew 
date 
(less 
than 
one 
years 
old..99) 
3 
Sex 
Mal
e..1, 
Fe
mal
e 2 
4 
Birth 
date 
(DD/
MM/Y
Y) 
unkn
own 
date 
and 
mont
h...99
/99/y
y 
5 Birth 
place  
Pearen
g...1,  
Kamch
ay 
Mea..2, 
Mesan
g...3 
Prea 
Sdach.
..4, 
Kirivon
g..5 
Phnom 
Penh...
6 
Other..
7 
6 Relation to 
GHW  
GHW...99, 
spouse...01, 
son/daughter in 
law..02, 
child...03, 
parent...04, 
parent-in-law...05 
brother/sister 06, 
borther/sister 
in-law...07 grand 
children...08, 
grand 
parent...09, 
nice/nephew...10, 
uncle/aunt...11, 
others...12 
7 HH 
Member 
Code  
(GHW’ 
Code + HH 
member ID  
+) written 
by 
Surveyor 
8 Marital 
status 
Married..
.1 
Divorced
...2 
Separate
d...3 
Widowe
d (the 
spouse 
died) ...4 
Never 
married..
.5 
9 Spouse  
Is the spouse of [Name] 
living in this 
household? 
Yes...1 
No...2 
99 GHW          
01 HH Head         
02          
03          
 6 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 c
o
d
e
 
10 food and other daily 
expenditure, durable goods, 
education, and health 
a. Who is the 
best-informed person on  
the following topics: food 
expenditure, non-food 
daily expenditures such as 
clothes, consumer durable 
goods, and expenditures 
and statuses of education 
and health of the 
household members? b. 
Write the code (HH ID + 
Relation to GHW). 
11 Women who underwent 
services relating to maternal care  
 
a. Do you have female household 
member who gave a birth in the 
past 24 months? (Section 2B will 
use this answer) 
Yes...1  
No...2 
b. If the answer to a. is yes, 
specify name and c. write the 
code (HH ID + Relation to GHW). 
12  Inhabitant 
How many months in 
past 12 months did 
[Name] live in this 
household? 
----months 
99  a. Code (yes or No): 99  
01 a. Name b. Code 
(HH ID + 
Relation to 
GHW) 
b. Name c. Code (HH ID + 
Relation to GHW) 
01  
02   1  02  
03   2  03  
   3  04  
     05  
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0B Occupation        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 Which work did [Name] conduct for most of the time in the past 12 months? If the person 
had two such jobs at the different points in the past 12 months, write the two. If the person 
was a pupil/student, and if the person went more than two school (e.g. moved from a 
high-school to a university), indicate all schools the person went in the past 12 months. 
Employed 
Government health worker…1 
Private Health worker…2 Other government worker.....3 Private business...4 NGO...5 
Self-employed  
Agriculture...6.1, forestry...6.2, fishery...6.3, livestock…6.4, Animal production (egg, 
duckling)...6.5 
Labouror (agriculture, construction, etc. paid daily, monthly salary)...7  
Non agriculture health-related (clinic, pharmacy, etc) …8 Non agriculture non 
health-related...9 
Unemployed (including looking for a job)...10 
Schooling (still studying) 
Kindergartener…11  Pupil Primary School…12  Lower secondary…13  Higher 
secondary…14  Vocational/Training School pre-secondary certificate/diploma…15  
Vocational/Training School post-secondary certificate/diploma…16 Student College (2 
years)…17  University…18 Post graduate school…19  
Others... Specify by A Code (English or PC or other skill training courses without working 
and going to schools written above...20, others...21)  
2 How many months did [Name] engage 
with the main job  in the past 12 
months? 
(months of schooling/studying are 
asked about, also) 
 
___months 
99     
01     
02     
03     
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 3 How many 
days did [Name] 
engage with the 
main job in the 
past 7 days? 
 
___days 
4 What did [Name] 
engaged in as the 
secondary work for the 
other time used for the 
main work (Q1) in the 
past 12 months? Use the 
codes for Q1. 
None 99. 
 
5 How many months did 
[Name] engage in the 
secondary work in the 
past 12 months? 
(months of 
schooling/studying are 
asked about, also) 
 
___months 
6 How many days did [Name] 
do the secondary work in the 
past 7 days? 
 
___days 
99       
01       
02       
03       
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0C Migration (the HH members aged 5 years and over will be asked about) 
  
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r ID
 c
o
d
e
 
7 <The three most important self-employed 
non-agricultural enterprises of HH and the most 
informed-person> a. What were the three most important 
non-agriculture enterprises of the household in the past 
12 months? Specify them by Industry Codes on the next 
page b. who among your household members engaged 
in each of them in the past 12 months and d. who is the 
best-informed person about each of them? For b and c,  
specify the name and HH Member Code* 
 
No self-employed persons in this household -->0C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 Inhabit out the 
household (not 
including commuting) 
 
Did [Name] live out 
the household in past 
12 months? 
Yes…1 
No…2end 
 
2 Where did [Name] 
live? 
Within Prey Veng 
Province...1 
Within Takoe 
Province...2 
Phnom Penh...3 
Other 
provinces...99 
 
 
3 How many months did 
[Name] live out the 
household? 
 
Number of month(if it is 
Less than 1 month, wirte 
it as 0.X month) 
 
99 a. Code b. the HH member 
(Name and HH 
Member Code) 
c. Best informed 
person (Name and 
HH Member Code) 
    
01    99    
02    01    
03    02    
    03    
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Industry Codes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agro-industry (business)  
Growing rice and other cereals 01 
Growing vegetables, horticultural product, nursery products 02 
Growing fruit, nuts 03 
Manufacturing (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, apparel, wood 
products, furniture, rubber, plastic products, machinery, electric apparatus, 
vehicles, publishing and printing, recycling, etc.) 
04 
Electricity, gas and water supply 05 
Construction 06 
Wholesale and retail trade (operating a shop), repair of vehicles and 
household and personal goods, except pharmacy  
07 
Pharmacy 08 
Hotels and restaurants 09 
Transport, post and communications 10 
Financial activities (lending money, etc.) 11 
Real estate activities 12 
Education (teaching English, computer, and other subjects, developing 
and selling educational materials, etc.) 
13 
Health (operating private hospitals, clinic, private practices at home or 
patients’ homes) 
14 
Social Activities (NGOs, associations) 15 
Others 16 
 11 
 
1 Education 1A Information Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 Literacy 
Can 
[Name] 
read and 
write 
Khmer 
language? 
 
Yes…1 
No…2 
 
 
2 < Completed education> 
a. To which level of education and b. grade did [Name] 
completed? If it was a Vocational/Training school, add 
the code of the education completed before the school. 
c. when and d. how many years ago did [Name] 
completed? Multiple answers are acceptable. 
Kindergarten…1 
Primary school…2 Lower secondary…3  Upper 
secondary…4 
Vocational/Training school pre-secondary 
diploma/certificate…5 
Vocational/Training school post-secondary 
diploma/certificate…6 
College (2 years)…7  University…8  Post graduate 
school…9  
Distance education…10 Non-formal education (literacy 
program, agricultural extension, etc. NOT in-service 
training)...11, 
Other...12,  No education…13 
Foreign language course…14  Computer course…15 
Other intensive off-school intensive course (math, 
classical music, etc.)...16 
 
 
 
 
3 <Current 
enrollment> 
a. Which level of 
education and b. 
which grade is 
[Name] 
attending? Ask 
about the person 
who is a pupil 
/student only. 
 
Code numbers 
are the same as 
those for 
Question 2 left. 
 
 
4 Is the 
school a 
public or 
private 
school? 
Ask about  
members 
Public 
school...01, 
Private 
school... 02 
 
5 How many 
years ago 
[Name] began 
to attend?  
If it was less 
than one 
years ago, 
indicate the 
months. 
e.g. 6 
months=06, 
10 
months=10. 
 
6 <current enrollment>place of school  
a. Did or Does [Name] need to live 
away the household? b. If the answer 
to a is yes, specify place, c. years and 
duration [name] was (is being) away, if 
it is less than 1 year, write 
“__months”. 
Yes…1 
No…2 
 
Place: 
Within Prey Veng Province...1 
Within Takoe Province...2 
Phnom Penh...3 
Other provinces...99 
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a. School 
A Code 
b. 
Grade/Yea
r 
c. Year 
completed 
d. __years 
ago 
a. 
School 
A Code 
b. 
Grade 
/Year  
A Code __years ago a. A Code b. A Code c.__ 
years 
(__mont
hs)  
99             
01             
02             
03             
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Section 1 Education (End) 1B Expenditure (cont’d) 
 
How much did your household spend for following items for [Name ] (write his or her HH member ID code in the first column)? 
Part 1 Ask about the person who is a pupil/student now 
Part 2. Ask about those who completed the education in the past 36 months (e.g. if it is June 2007 now, include the time by June 2004) and about expenditures for 
the final 12 months. 
Amount of spending (Riels) If the person is attending or attended two levels of education, ask about the two. 
No spending...0, Unkown...99, If the answer is no spending, write the reason in the columns below the double line. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1. Tuition for 
the all 
education in 
the past 12 
months (if more 
than one 
school/course 
are attended at 
the same time, 
specify the 
tuition for each 
school/course) 
2 Cost or 
charges 
for 
special 
activities 
or events 
(examinat
ions, 
festivals, 
etc.) in 
the past 
12 
months 
 
3 
Uniform 
and 
statione
ries in 
the past 
12 
months 
 
 
 
4 Textbooks, 
learning 
materials, 
private 
intensive 
courses for 
school 
subjects in 
the past 12 
months 
5 Transportation services in past one months, not 
including motorbikes and bicycles own by the 
household a. How much is the transportation cost? 
(if past one month was in a school holiday season, or 
the month with national holidays, please answer 
about monthly cost in two months ago). If [Name] did 
not attend the last month, ask about the cost of final 
month [Name] attended. b. If [Name] only attended 
some months, indicate the number of months 
attended. 
6 Snacks or meals, or other foods bought at 
schools from students’ pocket money  in 
past one month a. How much is the cost for 
them? (if past one month was in a school 
holiday season, or the month with national 
holidays, please answer about monthly cost 
in two months ago) If [Name] did not attend 
the last month, ask about the cost of final 
month [Name] attended. b. If [Name] only 
attended some months, not 12 months, 
indicate the number of months attended. 
If attended 12 months, put 12.. 
Part 
1 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 a1 Amt b1 Mnth a2  Amt b2 Mnth a1 
Amt 
b1 Mnth A2  
Amt 
b2 Mnth 
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Part 
2 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 a1 Amt b1 Mnth a2 Amt b2 Mnth a1 
Amt 
b1 Mnth a2 Amt b2 Mnth 
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Section 1 Education (End) 1B Expenditure (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
7 Support for the 
schooling that 
requires [Name] to live 
out of the household 
in the past 12 months, 
except the tuition 
 
8 Scholarship receiving 
a. How much has [Name] received scholarship 
in the past 12 months? b. Specify the school 
level by code of Q2. C. Specify the term 
supported. 
 
Amount (Riels) 
Not received...0 
9 Total 
expenditure for 
education in the 
past 12 month. 
Calculated by the 
survey team 
Part 1 1 2 a. Amount  b. School 
Level 
c.Term 
supporte
d (years) 
 
       
       
       
Part 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 
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Section 2 Health 2A Last consultation (end) Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 Present 
health 
status  
How do 
you think 
[Name]’s 
current 
health 
status is? 
 
Good.. 1 
Satisfacto
ry..2 
Bad...3 
 
2 a. Did [Name] 
have an illness or 
an injury in the 
past 4 weeks? 
b. if the answer is 
yes, specify by 
code. 
 
 
Yes...1,      
No...2 
Road 
accident...01 
Fall from tree or 
building...02 
Snake/animal 
bite..03, Other 
accident...04, 
Diarrhea...05, 
Fever...06, 
Respiratory 
diseases...07, 
Cough...08, Other 
illness..09 
 
3 How 
serious 
was it? 
 
Very … 1 
Serious…
2 
Not 
serious 
(not 
chronic)
…3  
Chronic 
…4  
Others…5 
4 Where did [Name] have 
consultations for it (the 
three most-used 
facilities by codes (Q6))? 
 
This house, by the 
household- member 
GHW (free of charge)…1   
Health Center…2   
Referral Hospital…3 
Provincial Hospital…4 N 
ational 
Hospital/Cente)…5 
Home visit by GHW…6  
Private…7     Home 
visit by GHW (private)…8  
Pharmacy…9  
Other shop selling 
drugs...10  Khmer 
doctor…11   Traditional 
or religious healer…12 
Other…13 
5 a. How much was 
paid for the 
consultation in total?  
Amount (Riels)    
None...0 
 
b. If the money 
included the drug, 
indicate drug amount.  
Amount  (Riels) 
Not included drug 
charges....99 
 
C. if no money was 
paid, specify the 
reason by code (the 
consultation was 
free...01, the person 
who provided services 
was either a member 
or a friend of the 
household...02, 
somebody outside the 
household paid the 
cost...03) 
 
6 <If the cost for drug 
was included in the 
payment answered 
to Q5, skip this and 
go to Q7> a.  
 
How much was paid 
for the drugs? 
Amnt (Riels)    
None...0,  
 
b. if no money was 
paid, specify the 
reason by code 
(drugs were not 
prescribed...01, the 
prescribed drugs 
were given free of 
charge...02,  
the prescribed drugs 
were possessed by 
[Name] or the 
household...03, 
Others...04) 
7 a. How much 
was paid for 
other costs such 
as 
transportation, 
lodging, so 
forth? 
Amnt (Riels) 
None...0 
 
b. if no money 
was paid, specify 
the reason by 
code (other costs 
were not 
necessary 
because the 
health facility 
was close...01, 
somebody 
outside the 
household paid 
the costs...02, 
Others...03) 
8 How 
much was 
the total 
costs of 
other 
househol
d 
members 
for the 
[Name]’s 
consolati
ons (e.g. 
transportat
ion for 
accompan
ying)? 
 
Amnt.(Rie
ls) 
None...0  
9. How 
much was 
the total 
cost paid 
for the 
illness of 
[Name] 
which has 
been 
discusse 
d (Q5 to 
Q8) 
including 
other HH 
members’ 
costs for 
it? 
 
Amnt.(Rie
ls) 
None...0 
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 A Code a. A 
Code 
b. A 
Code 
A Code a b c a  b.  c   a.  b. a.  b. Amnt. Amnt. 
9
9 
                
0
1 
                
0
2 
                
0
3 
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2B Last maternal care (end) If HH members were not found in Section 0AQ10-->Section 3. Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 How many 
times did 
[Name] 
undergo 
maternal care 
in past 12 
months (only 
those who 
were found in 
the answer to 
Section 
0AQ11)  
IHH member ID 
of the person 
__Times 
 
2 a. What 
kind of 
care did 
you 
undergo? 
 
Antenatal 
care...1 
Delivery…
2 
Postnatal 
care…3 
Others…4 
b. when 
did you 
undergo  
(MM/YY) 
3 Where did [Name] 
have the care  
including delivery (the 
three most-used 
facilities)?  
 
This house, by the 
household- member 
GHW...1  Health 
Center...2  Referral 
Hospital...3  Provincial 
Hospital...4   
National Hospital 
(National Center)...5  
Home visit by GHW...6  
Private clinic...7  Home 
visit by GHW (private)...8    
Pharmacy...9 
Other shop selling 
drugs...10 
Khmer doctor...11 
Traditional or religious 
healer...12 
4 a. How much was paid 
for the last maternal care 
in total?  
 
Amount (Riels) 
None...0 
b. If the money included 
the drug, indicate drug 
amount.  
Amount  (Riels) 
Not included drug 
charges....99 
C. if no money was paid, 
specify the reason by 
code (the consultation 
was free...01, the person 
who provided services 
was either a member or a 
friend of the 
household...02, 
somebody outside the 
household paid the 
cost...03) 
5 <If the cost for drug 
was included in the 
payment answered to 
Q4, skip this and go to 
Q6>a. How much was 
paid for the drug for 
the last maternal care? 
Use the codes of Q3 
 
Amount 
None...0 
b. if no money was 
paid, specify the 
reason by code (drugs 
were not 
prescribed...01, the 
prescribed drugs were 
given free of 
charge...02,  
the prescribed drugs 
were possessed by 
[Name] or the 
household...03, 
Others...04) 
6 a. How much 
was paid for 
other costs such 
as transportation, 
lodging, so forth 
for the last 
maternal care,  
 
Amnt.(Riels) 
None...0 
b. if no money 
was paid, specify 
the reason by 
code (other costs 
were not 
necessary 
because the 
health facility 
was close...01, 
somebody 
outside the 
household paid 
the costs...02, 
Others...03) 
7 How much 
was the total 
cost paid of the 
other 
household 
members for 
the [Name]’s 
last maternal 
care(e.g. 
transportation 
for 
accompanying)
? 
 
Amnt (Riels) 
None...0 
 
8. How much 
was the total 
cost paid for 
the last 
maternal care 
of [Name] 
which has 
been 
discussed by 
Q1 to Q7, 
including 
other HH 
members’ 
costs for it? 
 
Amnt.(Riels) 
None...0 
___Times a  b.  a  b.  c   a  b.  c   a.  b. a.  b. Amnt. Amnt. 
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3. Employment 3A Payment of the main job (end)  Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 a. Where did you work 
this job in the past 12 
months? 
 
Within this District…1, 
Within this OD (only GHWs 
or other health workers can 
use this code)...2, Phnom 
Penh…3,  
Other place…4 
b. Who is your employer? 
Government…01 
NGO…02 
Private…3 
2 In the past 12 month, a. in what frequency did you 
receive your regular main payment? b. how much was 
the average amount of your regular main payment? c. 
How much did you receive the regular payment in 
total? (If you receive in-kind, please answer the 
monetary value of the payment). Amount (Riels) 
 
Daily...1, Weekly...2 
Monthly...3, Other...4 
3 In the past 12 month, a. in what frequency did you receive 
bonuses? b. how much was the average amount of the 
bonuses? c. How much did you receive the bonuses in 
total? (If you receive in-kind, please answer the monetary 
value of the payment). Amount (Riels) 
 
None...0 
Monthly...1, One time in a year...2, Two times in a year...3,  
Other...4 
a. b. a. A code b. Average c. Total  a. A code b. Average c. Total  
99         
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3. Employment 3A Payment of the main job (cont’d))  Respondent Name:            HH Member Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
4 a. Did you receive each of following payments relating to your work in the past 12 months? b. If so, 
how much did you receive the payment in total in the past 12 months? 
Amount (Riels) 
 
Yes...1, No...2 
Supplemental salaries from donors...01, Performance-based payment...02, Share from user-fee 
income (the health sector)...03 
Per-diem received activities relating to the work (attending training, outreach activities, transport 
materials, etc.) ...04, Honorarium for giving training or lecture...05 
Others (e.g. income from private practice, teaching private educational courses)...06 
(Note: if the household head has answered, private practice and teaching private educational courses 
such as English or PC as ones of “the three most important enterprise of the household” as the 
answer to Section 0BQ8, do not include payments of these here and include in Section 6) 
5 How much did this 
respondent receive 01 to 
06 of Q4 in total in the 
past 12 months? 
Amount (Riels) 
Calculation by Survey 
Team 
6 How much your 
income did you put 
in your household 
budget in the past 12 
months? 
Amount (Riels) 
 
c. 
Tot
al  
a. 
A. 
Co
de  
b. 
Amt
. 
c. A. 
Cod
e  
d. 
Amt
. 
e. A. 
Code  
f. 
Am
t. 
g. A. 
Code  
h. 
Amt. 
I. A. 
Code  
j. 
Amt. 
k. A. 
Code  
l. 
Amt. 
  
99  01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 (  )  04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 (  )    
  01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 (  )  04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 (  )    
  01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 (  )  04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 (  )    
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3. Employment 3B Payment of the secondary job (cont’d)  Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
1 a. Where did you work 
this job in the past 12 
months? 
 
Within this District…1, 
Within this OD (only GHWs 
or other health workers 
can use this code)...2, 
Phnom Penh…3,  
Other place…4 
b. Who is your employer? 
Government…01 
NGO…02 
Private…3 
2 In the past 12 month, a. in what frequency did 
you receive your regular main payment? 
 b. how much was the average amount of your 
regular main payment? c. How much did you 
receive the regular payment in total? (If you 
receive in-kind, please answer the monetary 
value of the payment). Amount (Riels) 
Daily...1, Weeky...2 
Monthly...3, Other...4 
3 In the past 12 month, a. in what frequency did you receive 
bonuses? b. how much was the average amount of the bonuses? c. 
How much did you receive the bonuses in total? (If you receive 
in-kind, please answer the monetary value of the payment). Amount 
(Riels) 
 
None...0 
Monthly...1, One time in a year...2, Two times in a year...3,  Other...4 
a. b. a. A code b. Average c. Total  a. A code b. Average c. Total  
99         
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3. Employment 3B Payment of the secondary job (cont’d)  Respondent Name:            :  
 
H
H
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
ID
 c
o
d
e
 
4 a. Did you receive each of following payments relating to your work in the past 12 
months? b. If so, how much did you receive the payment in total in the past 12 months? 
Amount (Riels) 
 
Yes...1, No...2 
Supplemental salaries from donors...01, Performance-based payment...02, Share from 
user-fee income (the health sector)...03 
Per-diem for attending training relating to the work ...04, Honorarium for giving training or 
lecture...05 
Others (e.g., private practice, teaching private courses)...06 
(Note: if the household head has answered, private practice and teaching private 
educational courses such as English or PC as ones of “the three most important enterprise 
of the household” as the answer to Section 0BQ7, do not include payments of these here 
and include in Section 6) 
5 How much did this 
respondent receive 
01 to 06 in total in 
the past 12 months? 
Amount (Riels) 
Calculation by 
Survey Team 
6 How much your income 
did you put in your 
household budget in the 
past 12 months? 
Amount (Riels) 
 
a. A. 
Code  
b. 
Am
t. 
c. A. 
Cod
e  
d. 
Amt. 
e. A. 
Cod
e  
f. 
Amt. 
g. A. 
Cod
e  
h. 
Amt. 
I. A. 
Cod
e  
j. 
Amt. 
k. A. 
Code 
l. 
Amt. 
 
99 01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 
(  ) 
 04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 
(  ) 
   
 01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 
(  ) 
 04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 
(  ) 
   
 01 
(  ) 
 02 
(  ) 
 03 
(  ) 
 04 
(  ) 
 05 
(  ) 
 06 
(  ) 
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4 Housing 4A Type (HH head should be the respondent)  
1 How many year have your household been living in the current house? 
 
    Years  
2 Is this house your own house with a legal document? 
 
Yes…1Q4 
Yes, but partly…2Q3 
No….3Q3 
 
3 To whom this house belongs partially or totally (multiple answers are acceptable)?
   Name and relationship with the household head 
(use HH ID code) 
 
4 Are you sharing this house with another household which has separate budget for 
living? 
Yes…1 
No….2 
5 How many rooms is your household occupying for what functions, for example, 
for sleeping and/or multiple purposes)? Please make a list below. 
This question does not ask about kitchen, toilet, and those for business use 
(shops, workshops, etc.)  
 
Function Code (sleeping...01, living 
room..02., others...03) 
Number 
a. Sleeping 01  
b. Room    
c. Room    
 
6 Are you borrowing this house (not paying money) or renting? 
Yes, borrowing...1->4B2 
No, renting...2 
No...3 4B2 
 
4B Characteristics Respondent Name...............HH Member Code: 
 
1 How much did your household pay the rent in the past one month? (if not paid, 
write 0) 
   Amount (Riels) 
2 How big is the plot (land) for the house? 
   Square meter 
 
3 How big is the house itself? 
   Square meter 
 
4 What is the main material for the frame of your house? (through Surveyor’s 
observation) 
Concrete...1 
High quality wood...2 
Low quality wood...3 
Other...4 
 
 5 What is the main material for the roof? 
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Concrete...1 
Tin...2 
Fiber Cement...3 
Slate-4 
Tiles...5 
Thatch leaf...6   
Others...7 
6 What kind of material did you use for the wall? 
Concrete ...1 
Bricks...2 
Wood or log...3 
Plywood...4 
Zinc sheet...5  
Thatch leaf...6 
Other...7 
 
7 What is the main material for flooring? (through observation) 
Tiles...1 
Cement ...2 
Parquet Wood...3   
Wood board...4 
Bamboo, palm ...5 
Other...6 
 
 
 
4C Utilities and facilities    Respondent Name...............HH Member Code: 
1 What kind of a system of electricity is your household mainly using? 
Supplied by suppliers (government/private)...1 
Generator...2 
Battery...3 
Others...4 
 
2 How much did your household pay for the electricity or the system of electricity in 
the last one month (Riels)? 
   Not pay...0 
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3 How much did you pay for the garbage collection in the last on month (e.g. written 
in the same invoice for electricity) (Riels)? 
   Not pay...0 
 
 
4 What kind of water facility or water is the most important for your household for 
drinking in dry season and rainy season? 
Piped water…1 
Public tub…2 
Tube/piped well or borehole…3  
Protected dug well…4 
Unprotected dug well...5 
Rain Water…6    
Water from river or pond, or stream…7 
Sold water (tank truck vendor)…8 
Others...9 
 
 
 
 
 
5 How much did your household pay for the water in the last one month (Riels)? 
 
   Not pay...0 
 
 
 
6  Which type of toilet do you have in your house? 
Toilet connected to sewerage...1 
Septic tank...2 
Pit latrine...3 
Open land...4   
None...5 
Others...6 
 
7 What kind of fuel did your household used mainly for cooking in the past 12 
months? 
Gas…1 
Charcoal…2   
Wood…3  
Others (e.g. chafe) 
 
8 Does anyone in your household own a mobile telephone? 
a. Yes...1-->b.   No….218 
 
b. Specify all the person by HH member ID. 
   
 
9 a. How much did your household pay for the total charge of mobile telephones in 
the last one month? b. If individual household members are paying from their 
pocket money, please specify who are paying by HH member ID. c. How much did 
the members pay in the last one month? 
a. Total charge (Riels) 
  
1 Dry Season  
2 Rainy Season  
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4D Construction and prices of housing    
Respondent Name...............HH Member Code: 
1 When was the main part of this house constructed? 
 
 
 
2 If you added any part after the main construction, when was it? 
 
 
3 a. How much did your household pay for constructing this house (the main and 
added part) in total? Amount (Riels) 
Not pay...0      
b. If no money was paid specify reason by code (inheritance.. 001, others..002) 
      
4 a. How much did your household pay for purchasing the plot of this house (the 
main and added part ? Amount (Riels) 
Not pay...0      
b. If no money was paid specify reason by code 
(inheritance.. 001,  
given by the government due to being government workers...002 occupying the 
state land and having a right to use...003, 
borrowing seasonal/annual...004, others...005) 
 
 
5 (Hypothetical questions only to house owners) If your household did not own this 
house (including land), how much monthly rent would your household need to pay 
to live a house like this in this village (Riels)? 
 
 
6 How much would your household pay for buying your house building today 
(Riels)?  
 
 
7 How much will your household sell this land (Riels)? 
Unknown...99
 b.  HH member ID c. Charge paid (Riels) 
1  1 
2  2 
3  3 
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Section 5 Agriculture (fishery, forestry) and Livestock  (cont’d)        Respondent Name...............HH Member Code: 
 
1 What was the main 
purpose of the agricultural 
activities of your 
household in the past 12 
months? 
Household consumption 
only...1-->end 5A   Mainly 
house consumption plus 
sales of the surplus....2,  
Mainly sales plus home 
consumption...3, Sales 
only...4     Others...5 
2 a. How large is each of the 
plots? b. What it the unit? 
 
Square meter (m2)...1  
Are...2 
Hectares...3 Rai...4  Kong...5 
Other...6 
3 (Rainy season) a. What product did you household grow in the plot in the last rainy 
season? (Product Codes, see next page) 
b. How much amount (quantity, Kg) did you harvest from the cropping?  
c. How much gross income (Reals) for d. what amount (quantity) did your household 
obtain from the last rainy season?  
If the quantity is unknown, write the code 99, for the price 999 
 a.  b. a. Product  
A code 
b. Quantity (Kg) c. Gross 
Income 
Amnt. 
d. Quantity (Kg) 
 1  1
st
  harvest    
   2
st
  harvest    
 2  1
nd
 Harvest    
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   2
st
  harvest 
 
   
 29 
 
Section 5 Agriculture (fishery, forestry) and Livestock   
 4 a. For which input of the following, did you spend for regarding each of 
the products answered to Q2 in the last rainy season? b. How much?  c. 
For what quantity did you spend? Write it with the unit. 
Amnt. (Riels) 
 
None..0, Seeds and seedlings…01   Fertilizer and insecticide…02 
Labor…03   (Quantity=Write number of laborers hired in total 
and the  total cost for the number)  Storage…04   Transportation…05   
Pumping for irrigation…06   Any items above given for free …07, specify 
the item code after the “07” as 07__.  Improvement land and 
buildings…08  Any items above obtained by credit …09, specify the item 
number after the “09”,  Others…10 
5 How much net 
income (Reals) from 
the each of the 
products answered to 
Q3 did your household 
obtain in the past 12 
month? (Calculated by 
Survey Team) 
6 How much did you put from the 
income, including the one answered to 
Q5, from last dry season in the budget 
for your household in the past 12 
months? 
(Rainy season cropping end) 
 
Amnt.(Riels) 
 a. A code b. Amnt. c. Quantity (Kg. or the total 
number of person hired) 
Amnt. Amnt. 
  
1
st
  harvest      
    
    
2
st
  harvest      
    
    
1
nd
 Harvest      
    
    
2
st
  harvest      
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Product Code 
 For 
first 
harvest 
For 
second 
harvest 
Rice 1 6 
Sticky Rice 2 7 
Vegetable 3 8 
Fruits 4 9 
Others 5 10 
If the household made more 
than third harvest, use the code 
1 to 5 again. 
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5A Agriculture (end)             
P
lo
t c
o
d
e
 
7 (Dry season) a. What product did you 
household grow in the plot in the last dry 
season? If answer is none, end 5A. (Product 
Codes, see the previous page) 
b. How much amount (quantity, Kg) did you 
harvest from the cropping?  
c. How much gross income (Reals) d. for what 
amount (quantity) did your household obtain 
from the last dry season? If you sold one 
product several times, specify the farm-gate 
price of each of sales in the last dry season. 
If the quantity is unknown, write the code 99, 
for the price 999 
8 a. For which input of the following, did you 
spend for regarding each of the products 
answered to Q7 in the last rainy season? b. How 
much?  c. For what quantity did you spend? 
Write it with the unit.     Amnt. (Riels) 
 
None...0, Seeds and seedlings…01   Fertilizer 
and insecticide…02  Labor…03  (Quantity=Write 
number of laborers hired in total and the  total 
cost for the number)  Storage…04   
Transportation…05   Pumping for irrigation…06   
Any items above given for free …07, specify the 
item code after the “07” as 07__.  Improvement 
land and buildings…08  Any items above 
obtained by credit …09, specify the item number 
after the “09”,  Others…10 
9 How much net 
income (Reals) from 
the each of the 
products answered to 
Q3 did your household 
obtain in the past 12 
month? (Calculated by 
Survey Team) 
10 How much did you put from 
the income, including the one 
answered to Q9, from last dry 
season in the budget for your 
household in the past 12 
months? 
(Dry season cropping end) 
Amnt.(Riels) 
 
 a. Product  
A code 
b. 
Quantit
y (Kg) 
c. Gross 
Income 
Amnt. 
d. 
Quantit
y (Kg) 
a. Q code b. Amnt. c. Quantity (Kg. or 
the total number of 
person hired) 
Amnt. Amnt. 
1 1
st
  
harvest 
 
        
 2
nd
 
Harvest 
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2 1
st
  
harvest 
 
        
 2
nd
 
Harvest 
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5B Forestry and/or fishery             
Respondent Name:            HH Member Code:  
 
 
1 Please make list of all 
fishery and/or non-forest 
products of your household 
produced in the past 12 
months. 
 
Codes for forestry 
Fish caught...1 
Fish raised...2 
Fish trapped ...3  Others...4  
Codes for fishery 
Mushrooms...5 
Nuts...6 
Others...7 
2 How much gross 
income did you obtain 
from selling it? 
(farm-gate price in 
Riels) 
Amnt..(Riels) 
3 a. For which input of the following, did you spend for forestry 
and/or fishery in the past 12 months? b. How much?  c. For 
what quantity did you spend? Write it with the unit. 
None...0 
Codes for forestry 
Equipment…1 
Transportation…2 
Labor…03   (Quantity=Write number of laborers hired 
in total and the  total cost for the number) Labor…03   
(Quantity=Write number of laborers hired in total and the  total 
cost for the number) 
Permission fee for harvesting 4   
Others…5 
Codes for fishery  
Equipment (fishing gear and others)…6 
boat…7 
Labor…8   (Quantity=Write number of laborers hired in total 
and the  total cost for the number),   Feeding...9, Others…10 
4 How much net 
income did your 
household obtain 
from forestry and/or 
fishery in the past 12 
months? 
Amount (Riels) 
 
Forestry...1 
Fishery...2 
(Calculated by 
Survey Team) 
5 How much 
net income did 
you put in your 
household 
budget in the 
past 12 
months? 
 
Amount (Riels) 
 
Q code  a. Code  b. Amnt. c. Quantity a. Q 
code 
b. Amt. a. Q 
code 
b. Amt 
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5B Forestry and/or fishery (end)      
 
1 Please make list 
of all fishery 
and/or non-forest 
products of your 
household 
produced in the 
past 12 months. 
 
Codes for forestry 
Fish caught...1 
Fish raised...2 
Fish trapped ...3  
Others...4  
Codes for fishery 
Mushrooms...5 
Nuts...6 
Others...7 
2 a. How much 
gross income did 
your household 
obtain from sales 
of the  each of the 
animals in the past 
12 months?  
b. From what 
number of animals 
did you obtain? 
Amnt(Riels) 
3 a. For which input of the following, did you 
spend for your live stock raising in the past 
12 months? 
 b. How much?  c. For what quantity did 
you spend? Write it with the unit. 
 
d. If your household purchased animals 
specify the kind by codes for Q1. 
Amnt(Riels) 
Purchasing animals...501,  Feed...502 
Veterinary services...503 
Breeding services...504 
Repair and maintenance of livestock 
facility...505 
Transportation...506 
Electricity...507 
Other...508 
4 How much net 
income did your 
household obtain from 
livestock raising in the 
past 12 months? 
Amnt. (Riels) 
(Calculated by Survey 
Team) 
5 How much net income did you put in your 
household budget in the past 12 months? 
 
Amnt .(Riels) 
 
Q code a. A 
code 
b. 
Number 
a. 
Amnt. 
b. 
Numbe
r 
a. A 
code 
b. Amnt. c. 
Qua
ntity 
d.  Am
nt. 
Amnt. 
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5C Livestock and other animal products  Respondent : name         HH Member Code 
 
 
 
1 Please make list of 
all livestock your 
household and 
indicate their present 
number. Cows...1 
Buffalo...2 
Horse...3 
Pig...4 
Poultries...5 
 
 
2 a. lHow much 
gross income did 
your household 
obtain from sales of 
the each of the 
animals in the past 
12 months? b. From 
what number of 
animals did you 
obtain? 
Amnt(Riels) 
3 a. For which input of the following, did you spend for your live 
stock raising in the past 12 months? b. How much?  c. For what 
quantity did you spend? Write it with the unit. 
d. If your houshold purchased animals specify the kind by codes 
for Q1. 
Amnt(Riels) 
Purchasing animals...501,  Feed...502 
Veterinary services...503 
Breeding services...504 
Repair and maintenance of livestock facility...505 
Transportation...506 
Electricity...507 
Other...508 
4 How much net 
income did your 
household obtain from 
livestock raising in the 
past 12 months? 
Amnt. (Riels) 
(Calculated by Survey 
Team) 
5 How much net 
income did you put in 
your household 
budget in the past 12 
months? 
 
Amnt .(Riels) 
 
a. A code b. 
Number 
a. Amnt. b. 
Numer 
a. A code b. Amnt. c. 
Quauntity 
d.  Amnt. Amnt. 
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5C: Livestock and other animal products (end)       
: 
6 Please make 
list of all animal 
products by your 
household in the 
past 12 months 
and indicate 
their present 
number.  
Egg...1 
Duckling...2 
Others...3 
7 How much 
gross income 
did your 
household 
obtain from 
sales of the 
each of the 
animal 
products in the 
past 12 
months? 
Amnt(Riels 
8 a. For which input of the following, did 
you spend for producing animal 
products in the past 12 months? b. How 
much? c. For what quantity did you 
spend? Write it with the unit. d. If your 
household purchased animals specify 
the kind by codes for Q1. 
Amnt(Riels) 
 
Purchasing animals...501,  Feed...502, 
Veterinary services...503 
Breeding services...504 
Repair and maintenance of livestock 
facility...505, Transportation...506 
Electricity...507, Other...508 
9 How much net income 
did your household obtain 
from animal products in 
the past 12 months?  
Amnt (Riels) 
(Calculated by Survey 
Team) 
10 How much net income did you put in your household 
budget in the past 12 months? 
Amnt (Riels) 
a. Q 
code 
b. 
Numb
er 
a. Amnt.  a. Q 
code  
b. Amnt. c. 
Quantit
y 
d  Amnt.  
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5D: Machinery and equipments Information and expenditure (end)  
Respondent Name (the best-informed person for the agriculture) :        
HH Member Code: 
 
  1.a. In the past 12 months, how many of 
following items did you household  
owned?  
b. If so, what was ownership of each of 
the items 
Not have...0 
Owned...1 
Lent...2 
Borrowed...3Q4 
Not buy, shared...4Q4 
Others...5 
2. a How much did this household pay for the purchasing?  
If it was borrowed from, or lent to the other household in the past 12 months, b. how 
much did you pay for the borrowing? c. Or how much did you obtain from the lending? 
Amnt(Riels) 
 
  a. number b. ownership a. Amnt. b. Amnt. c. Amt. b. Amnt. 
Harrow 
/rake 
551       
Plough 552       
Hand 
tractor 
553       
Cart 554       
Motor 
pump 
555       
Others 556       
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6 Self-employment, three most important enterprises of the household 
Respondent: the best-informed person Name:                HH Member Code: 
T
h
e
 t
h
re
e
 m
o
s
t 
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
e
n
te
rp
ri
s
e
s
 C
o
d
e
 0
B
Q
7
 
1 a. what kind of 
enterprises were they ? 
(confirm and write the 
code from the answer 
to 0BQ7). 
b. Who were the main 
customers? 
 
General public...1 
Persons who conduct 
particular works...2 
Patients...3 
Others...4 
2 How 
much 
was the 
gross 
income 
of the 
enterpris
e in the 
past 12 
month? 
Amnt. 
(Riels) 
3 a. For which input of the 
following, did this enterprise pay in 
the past 12 months? b. how much?  
(If something was paid in kind, 
please convert it into monetary 
value.) 
 
Amount (Riels) 
Not pay...0 
electricity...1, water...2, fuels 
(gasoline, kerosene)...3, Raw 
material...4, Labor...5, Permission 
charge for operation...6 
Other operational expenditure ...7 
4 How much 
was the net 
income of 
the 
enterprise 
in the past 
12 month? 
 
Amnt(Riels) 
(Calculated 
by Survey 
Team) 
5 How much of 
the net income 
did you put in 
your 
household 
budget in the 
past 12 
months? 
Amnt (Riels) 
 
6 If you need to sell of this the entire enterprise 
with the set equipment, how much is the price? 
 
(Riels) 
 
 a. A Code b. A Code Amnt. a. A Code b. Amnt. Amnt. Amnt. Amnt. 
1 
 
        
2 
 
 
        
3 
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7. Food-expenditure and home production(cont’d) (the most knowledgeable person about food-expenditure will be asked 
Respondent: Name:          HH Member Code: 
1 How much does your household usually pay for foods for a typical week? If the food 
includes the food which was produced by your household, or bartered or given from other 
households, estimate the market price of the food and include in the total payment. 
  Riels 
 
 
 
2.. In what quantity and how much (Riels) does your household usually pay for following 
food items for a week? If your household consumed the item which was produced by your 
household, or bartered or given from other households, estimate the market price of the 
quantity consumed and include it in the total payment. 
 
   a. Quantity     b. Unit          b. Riels 
Rice 7001     
 
Noodle (Khmer, Chinese )7002     
 
Bread 7003    
 
Fruit vegetable 7005    
 
Flower vegetable 7006  
 
Tuber vegetable 7007    
 
Stem vegetable 7008  
 
Meat 7009     
 
Fish 7010     
 
Egg 7011     
 
Fruit 7012     
 
Nut 7013     
 
  Other ingredients (salt, sugar, ,   
  oil, source, etc.) 7014 
   Non-alcoholic beverage (tea,  
   , coffee, juice, etc. ) 7015 
   Alcoholic drink (rice wine, beer, etc.)    
   7016 
   Tobacco 7017 
      
   Others 7018 
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
Code for unit for Q4,5,6. 
 
 
 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the past 12 
months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did your 
household 
purchase or barter 
in the past one 
week?  
b. Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it (if it 
was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do your 
household 
consume the item 
in a typical week?  
b. Please Indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much do 
you pay for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity did 
your household 
consume the home 
production in a 
typical week? 
 b. Please indicate 
the unit. c. How much 
was it, if it was 
purchased in retail 
market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did your household usually 
purchase the item in the past 12 months? 
 Q 
Code 
A 
Cod
e 
a. 
 
b. c. a.  b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Rice (normal) 701FB            
Sticky rice 702            
Rice Broken  703FB            
Corn on the 
cob 
704FB            
 
Kg 1 Piece (e.g. 3 pieces of bread) 2 Bottle, can, package 3 
Other 4     
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the 
past 12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
4 a. What 
quantity of the 
food did your 
household 
purchase or 
barter in the 
past one 
week?  
b. Please 
indicate the 
unit. c How 
much was it (if 
it was 
purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do 
your 
household 
consume the 
item in a 
typical week? 
b. Please 
indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much 
do you pay 
for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity 
did your 
household 
consume the 
home production 
in a typical week?  
b. Please indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much was 
it, if it was 
purchased in retail 
market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did 
your household usually 
purchase the item in the 
past 12 months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Co
de 
a. b. c. a. b. c. a. b. c.  
Rice 
cakes 
705F
B 
           
Khmer 
noodles 
706F
B 
           
White 
rice 
noodles 
707F
B 
           
Bread 708F
B 
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the past 
12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
4 a. What quantity of 
the food did your 
household purchase 
or barter in the past 
one week?  
b. Please indicate the 
unit. c. How much 
was it (if it was 
purchased in retail 
market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do your 
household 
consume the item 
in a typical week?  
b. Please Indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much do 
you pay for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity 
did your household 
consume the home 
production in a 
typical week?  
b. Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it, if it 
was purchased in 
retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did 
your household usually 
purchase the item in the 
past 12 months? 
 Q 
Code 
A 
Cod
e 
a. 
 
b. c. a
.  
b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Morning 
glory 
709            
Cabbage 710            
Spinach 711            
Other 
Leaf 
vegetable
s  
712            
Tomatoes 713            
Eggplants 714            
Cucumber  715FB            
Mung 
bean 
716FB            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the 
past 12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did your 
household 
purchase or barter 
in the past one 
week? b. Please 
indicate the unit. c 
How much was it (if 
it was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do your 
household 
consume the item 
in a typical week? 
b. Please indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much do 
you pay for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity did 
your household 
consume the home 
production in a typical 
week? b. Please 
indicate the unit. 
c. How much was it, if it 
was purchased in retail 
market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did your household usually purchase 
the item in the past 12 months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Code 
a. b. c. a. b. c. a
. 
b. c.  
Mung 
bean 
sprouts 
717            
Ridge 
gourd 
718            
Green 
gourd 
719            
Other 
Fruit 
vegetabl
e 
720            
Cauliflo
wer 
721            
Broccoli 722            
Other 
Flower 
vegetabl
e specify 
723            
Potatoes 724            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the 
past 12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did 
your household 
purchase or 
barter in the past 
one week? b. 
Please indicate 
the unit. c How 
much was it (if it 
was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do 
your 
household 
consume the 
item in a 
typical week? 
b. Please 
indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much 
do you pay 
for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity 
did your 
household 
consume the 
home production 
in a typical week? 
b. Please indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much was 
it, if it was 
purchased in 
retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months 
did your household 
usually purchase the 
item in the past 12 
months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Code 
a. b. c. a
. 
b. c. a. b. c.  
Sweet 
potatoe
s 
725            
Onions 726            
Carrot 727            
Taro 728            
Garlic 729            
Other 
Tuber 
vegetabl
e  
730            
Bamboo 
shoot 
731            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the 
past 12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
. 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did 
your household 
purchase or 
barter in the past 
one week? b. 
Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it (if it 
was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do 
your 
household 
consume the 
item in a 
typical week? 
b. Please 
Indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much 
do you pay 
for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity 
did your 
household 
consume the 
home production 
in a typical week? 
b. Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it, if it 
was purchased in 
retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months 
did your household 
usually purchase the 
item in the past 12 
months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Cod
e 
a. 
 
b. c. a.  b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Other 
stem 
vegetable 
732            
Chicken  733            
Duck 734            
Pork with 
fat 
735            
Pork 
without 
fat 
736            
Beef 737            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the 
past 12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did 
your household 
purchase or 
barter in the past 
one week? b. 
Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it (if it 
was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do 
your 
household 
consume the 
item in a 
typical week? 
b. Please 
Indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much 
do you pay 
for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity 
did your 
household 
consume the 
home production 
in a typical week? 
b. Please indicate 
the unit. c. How 
much was it, if it 
was purchased in 
retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months 
did your household 
usually purchase the 
item in the past 12 
months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Cod
e 
a. 
 
b. c. a.  b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Freshwat
er Mud 
fish large 
738            
Cat fish 
(Andeng) 
739            
Shrimp 740            
Dried fish 741            
Cheese 
fish 
Prahook 
742            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the past 
12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
4 a. What quantity of 
the food did your 
household purchase 
or barter in the past 
one week? b. Please 
indicate the unit. c. 
How much was it (if 
it was purchased in 
retail market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What 
quantity do 
your household 
consume the 
item in a typical 
week? b. Please 
Indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much do 
you pay for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity did 
your household 
consume the home 
production in a typical 
week? b. Please 
indicate the unit. c. 
How much was it, if it 
was purchased in retail 
market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did your household 
usually purchase the item in the past 12 
months? 
 Q 
Code 
A 
Co
de 
a. 
 
b. c. a
.
  
b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Other 
seafood  
743            
Chicken 
egg 
744            
Duck egg 745            
Banana 
(dessert) 
746            
Papaya 
(dessert) 
747            
Lime 
(dessert) 
748            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (end) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the past 
12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
4 a. What 
quantity of 
the food did 
your 
household 
purchase or 
barter in the 
past one 
week? b. 
Please 
indicate the 
unit. c. How 
much was it 
(if it was 
purchased in 
retail 
market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５a. What quantity do 
your household 
consume the item in 
a typical week? b. 
Please Indicate the 
unit. 
c. How much do you 
pay for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity did your 
household consume the home 
production in a typical week? b. 
Please indicate the unit. c. How 
much was it, if it was purchased 
in retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did your household 
usually purchase the item in the past 12 
months? 
 Q 
Cod
e 
A 
Co
de 
a. 
 
b. c. a.  b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Jackfruit 
(dessert) 
749            
Other fruit  750            
Peanuts 751            
Vegetable oil 752            
 49 
 
Salt 753            
Fish source 754            
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7. Food-expenditure and home production (cont’d) 
3 Have your household 
members  
consumed any of the 
following items in the past 
12 months? 
 
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
4 a. What quantity 
of the food did 
your household 
purchase or barter 
in the past one 
week? b. Please 
indicate the unit. 
c. How much was 
it (if it was 
purchased in retail 
market)? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
５ a. What quantity do 
your household consume 
the item in a typical 
week? b. Please Indicate 
the unit. 
c. How much do you pay 
for it? 
Amnt.(Riels) 
6 a. What quantity did your 
household consume the home 
production in a typical week? b. 
Please indicate the unit. c. How 
much was it, if it was purchased 
in retail market? 
Amnt.(Riel) 
7 How many months did your 
household usually purchase the 
item in the past 12 months? 
 Q  A d a. 
 
b. c. a.  b. c. a. b. 
 
c 
 
 
Soy sauce 755            
Palm 
vinegar 
756            
Glutamate/
MSG 
757            
Rice wine 763            
Beer 764            
Tobacco 
and tobacco 
products 
765            
Other foods 766            
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8. Non-food expenditure 
8A ‘Non-food daily’ expenditure       
 
1 Did your household purchase or barter any of following 
item in the past one month?  
Yes...1 
No...2 
 
2 How much did your 
household spend for the item 
a. in the past one month and b. 
in the past 12 months? (Riels) 
If it was bartered, write the 
monetary value. 
3 How much was the monetary 
value of use of home 
production of the item by your 
household in the past a. one 
month and b. in the past 12 
month? (Riels) 
 Cod
e 
A Code a. one  b. 12 a. One b. 12 
Wood for cooking 801      
Gas or kerosene for cooking 802      
Soap, Shampoo, toothpaste, and other 
toiletries 
803      
Insecticide spry, mosquito coils 804      
Haircut, hairdressing 805      
Dish-wash and laundry detergent 806      
Gasoline for motorbike and car for 
individual use 
807      
Transportation services (e.g., motorbike, 
chicro, buses, trucks) 
808      
Newspaper, stationary for home use 809      
Pocket money for children including 
special occasion such as ceremonies 
(except the foods bought at school 
810      
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which were answered Section 1B) 
Entertainment (e.g, borrowing CD) 811      
Wages to home servants 812      
Others, specify here. 
a:____________________ 
813      
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8. Non-food expenditure 
8B ‘Non-food annual’ expenditure 
 
1 Did your household purchase or bartered  
any of following item in the past 12 month?  
Yes...1 
No...2 
2 How much did your 
household spend for the item 
a. in the past one month and b. 
in the12 .months?(Riels) If it 
was bartered, write the 
monetary value. 
3 How much was the 
monetary value of use of 
home production of the item 
by your household in the 
past a. one month and b. in 
the past 12 month? (Riels) 
 Code A Code a.One b.12 a.One b.12 
Clothes, underwear, and fabric  821      
Footwear 822      
Hat, umbrella 823      
Towels and Cromer 824      
Bags 825      
Plates, cups, pans, etc. 826      
Lighting bulbs, batteries   827      
Materials for minor repair or 
maintenance of housing 
828      
Wedding and Funeral (household 
member) 
829      
Others specify (e.g., toys) here 
a:___________________ 
830 1     
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8C Durable goods (cont’d)   Respondent name:           HH Member Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Does your household have     a. any of 
following item (not for business use)?    Yes...1     
No....2 
b. If your household owned the item, how many?  
2 Since when has 
your household 
owned the item  
Year 
3 How much did you pay 
for it (if it was a gift, or 
barter, indicate the 
monetary value) (Riels) 
4 How much will be the 
current sales price, 
suppose you will sell it?     
(Riels) 
 Code a. A 
Code 
b. 
Number 
a. b. a Amnt. b. Amnt. a. Amnt. b. Amnt. 
Radio and/or 
cassette player with 
radio 
881         
TV 882         
Mobile phone 883         
Camera 884         
Personal computer 885         
Sewing machine 886         
Printer 887         
PC game player 888         
Electric fun 889         
Air-conditioner, 890         
Bicycle  891         
Motorbike 892         
Car  893         
Boat 894         
Battery 895         
Generator 896         
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8C Durable goods (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 Does your household have     a. any of 
following item  
(not for business use)?    Yes...1     No....2 
b. If your household owned the item, how many?  
2 Since when has 
your household 
owned the item  
Year 
3 How much did you pay 
for it (if it was a gift, or 
barter, indicate the 
monetary value)   Amount 
(Riels) 
4 How much will be the 
current sales price, 
suppose you will  sell it?     
Amount (Riels) 
 Code a. A 
Code 
b. 
Numbe
r 
a. b. a Amnt. b. Amnt. a. Amnt. b. Amnt. 
Quality wood 
furniture 
897         
Gas-cooker 898         
Water sink 899         
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9. Income and remittance (receiving) 
Respondent name:           HH Member Code: 
1 Did you household receive any of following items in cash or in kind in the past 12 
months?  
Yes...1      No...2 
2 a. For what item, b. how much in 
monetary value did your household 
receive?  
Amount(Riels) 
 code A Code a. item (Number) b. Amnt. 
Fund from the government in cash or in-kind 
Items: pensions for retired government 
officials...1, gift for living...2, others...3 
901    
Income from leasing  
Items: land including land for agricultural 
use...1, building...2, equipment including 
durable goods listed in 8C...3, others...4 
902    
Income from sales of assets 
Items: land...1, building...2, equipment except 
those answered in 5D...3, Others...4 
903    
Interest  
Items: Interest on savings ...1, interest on 
lending (not as business)...2, Others...3 
905    
Other income  
Items: remittance...1, withdrawal from saving...2, 
sales of stocks or gold and jewelry...3, Others...4 
906    
Total calculated by Survey Team     
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10 borrowing, lending, and savings 
Respondent=HH Head           HH member ID :  
 
1 a. In the past 12 months, did your household have outstanding loans borrowed from outside your household? 
 (e.g., , for illness or injury, for ceremonies such as wedding or funeral, for purchasing land or house.) 
 
Yes…1 No…2    a. 
 
     b 
 
 
b. if the answer is yes, please specify the amount (Riels)  b. 
 
 
2.a  In the past 12 months did anyone of your household owe loans to your household? 
Yes…1 No…2    a 
b. if the answer is yes, please specify the amount (Riels) b. 
  
 
3. In the past 12 months, did your household put in money in Tong tin in every month? 
Yes…1 No…2    a.  
b. if the answer is yes, please specify the monthly amount (Riels)  
     b 
 
4. in the past 12 months, did your household put money in funeral club in every month? 
Yes…1 No…2      
b. if the answer is yes, please specify the amount (Riels)  b 
 
 
5. How much do you have in the other form of saving today (on the interview date)? 
Amount (Riels) 
None...0      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
